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 Abstract 
 
 
 
This dissertation focuses on the interconnectedness of informality and so-
cial protection in Ecuador, by means of answering the overarching ques-
tion as to whether recent social protection policy initiatives have rein-
forced processes of labour informality, adapted to them or attenuated 
them. 
The influence of cash transfer programmes on labour market outcomes 
has raised concerns among scholars and practitioners. The core idea be-
hind this critique is that non-contributory social protection has distortive 
features. The cash delivered to individuals is believed to provide them with 
perverse incentives, including the incentive to exit the formal sector and 
opt for informality or not seize opportunities to take on formal sector 
employment, so as to stay eligible for social benefit. According to this ar-
gument, social protection schemes, such as cash transfer programmes, can 
lead to lower labour participation and/or more informal employment. But 
there is little evidence to support this thesis. The perversity argument, as 
held up in public debate, is largely misplaced. In fact, poor workers tend 
to have little choice in the labour market and mostly have few options 
other than engaging in informal activity, which is often characterised by 
high rates of underemployment. 
This dissertation draws on localised research to further explore the in-
teractions between social protection and labour market structures, focus-
ing on the gendered and generational aspects of welfare provisioning. Two 
cities in the south of Ecuador, Loja and Machala, form the context of new 
empirical evidence gathered in this research. The new data were used to 
examine the challenges of providing targeted income support in a context 
marked by deep-rooted social inequalities. Informal employment has been 
predominant in these cities both before and after the introduction of the 
 Abstract xix 
 
nation-wide cash transfer programme. Thus this research contributes to 
public and labour economics by critically revisiting some of its key as-
sumptions regarding the behaviour of providers and recipients of social 
benefit schemes. Likewise, it provides a political economy perspective on 
social protection and how it influences labour market behaviour in an in-
terconnected and contextualised manner. 
Ecuador’s most important social protection programme, the Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano, introduced in the early 2000s, is found to have had 
very little effect on the structure of the labour market. This finding casts 
doubt on the transformative potential that the cash transfer programme 
was expected to possess. At the same time, however, the lack of significant 
labour market impact also discredits the frequently made argument that 
the receipt of cash transfers will make recipients more ‘dependent’ (that 
is, reduce labour efforts) or will encourage informal employment. The re-
search also shows that the cash transfer programme has changed state–
society relationships by introducing new rationalities and redefining the 
role of social policy in economic development. Findings also indicate that 
different population groups have been able to reposition themselves vis-
à-vis the state. Despite the centrality of women as beneficiaries in the non-
contributory social protection scheme, relatively little has been written 
about how their participation affects their job status. This thesis shows 
that because women have been the main recipients of the social benefit, it 
has reinforced their traditional roles in the household as well as in the la-
bour market, rather than empowering them economically as the designers 
of the cash transfer programme originally intended. Through its findings, 
this research aims to contribute to a better-informed dialogue between 
different strands of development studies, social policy and labour eco-
nomics. Analytically, the thesis provides new insights into how social wel-
fare provisioning interacts with labour market choices and opportunities 
as mutually influencing forces. 
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 EEN KEUZE?  
VERSTREKKING VAN GELD EN 
AFHANKELIJKHEIDSNARRATIEVEN IN HET LEVEN VAN 
VROUWEN IN ZUID-ECUADOR  
 
 Samenvatting 
 
 
Dit proefschrift gaat over de verwevenheid van informaliteit en sociale 
bescherming in Ecuador. Het biedt een antwoord op de centrale vraag 
naar het effect van recente beleidsinitiatieven op het gebied van sociale 
bescherming op processen van arbeidsinformaliteit. Hebben deze beleidsi-
nitiatieven die processen versterkt, verminderd, of zijn ze eraan 
aangepast?  
De invloed van sociale verstrekking van geld (cash transfer programmes) 
op de arbeidsmarkt is een punt van zorg onder wetenschappers en prak-
tijkmensen. De gedachte hierachter is dat premievrije sociale bescherming 
verstorende effecten heeft omdat het verstrekte geld perverse prikkels 
biedt. Het zou mensen aanmoedigen om de formele sector te verlaten en 
te opteren voor informaliteit of om kansen op werk in de formele sector 
te laten lopen om in aanmerking te blijven komen voor een sociale uitker-
ing. Vanuit deze gedachte kunnen regelingen voor sociale bescherming 
zoals de sociale verstrekking van geld leiden tot een lagere arbeidspartici-
patie en/of meer informele werkgelegenheid. Er is echter weinig bewijs 
voor deze stelling. Het perversiteitsargument dat in het publieke debat 
wordt verdedigd is niet erg steekhoudend. Arme werknemers hebben in 
de praktijk vaak weinig keus op de arbeidsmarkt en zien zich meestal ge-
noodzaakt werk te zoeken in de informele sector, waarin doorgaans een 
groot gebrek aan werkgelegenheid is.  
 Samenvatting xxi 
 
Dit proefschrift beschrijft lokaal onderzoek waarin de interactie tussen 
sociale bescherming en arbeidsmarktstructuren verder wordt verkend, en 
is gericht op de gender- en generatieaspecten van welzijnszorg. Voor dit 
onderzoek zijn nieuwe empirische gegevens verzameld in twee steden in 
het zuiden van Ecuador: Loja en Machala. Het doel was om na te gaan wat 
de knelpunten zijn bij het verlenen van gerichte inkomenssteun in een 
context die wordt gekenmerkt door diepgewortelde sociale ongelijkheid. 
Zowel voor als na de landelijke invoering van de sociale verstrekking van 
geld had informele werkgelegenheid de overhand in deze steden. Dit 
onderzoek draagt dus bij aan de overheids- en arbeidseconomie door een 
kritische herbeschouwing van enkele belangrijke aannamen over het ge-
drag van aanbieders en ontvangers van sociale uitkeringen. Ook laat dit 
onderzoek vanuit het perspectief van de politieke economie zien hoe so-
ciale bescherming gedrag op de arbeidsmarkt op een samenhangende en 
gecontextualiseerde manier beïnvloedt.  
Het belangrijkste sociale beschermingsprogramma van Ecuador, het 
Bono de Desarrollo Humano, dat in het eerste decennium van deze eeuw werd 
geïntroduceerd, blijkt zeer weinig effect te hebben gehad op de structuur 
van de arbeidsmarkt. Dit gegeven is in tegenspraak met het trans-
formatieve potentieel dat de sociale verstrekking van geld naar verwacht-
ing zou hebben. Tegelijkertijd ontkracht het ontbreken van een significant 
effect op de arbeidsmarkt ook het vaak aangevoerde argument dat het  
ontvangen van geld mensen ‘afhankelijker’ maakt (d.w.z. dat de inspan-
ningen om werk te vinden zullen afnemen) of informele werkgelegenheid 
bevordert. Uit het onderzoek blijkt ook dat de sociale verstrekking van 
geld de relatie tussen de staat en de samenleving heeft veranderd door 
nieuwe rationaliteiten te introduceren en de rol van sociaal beleid in de 
economische ontwikkeling opnieuw te definiëren. De resultaten wijzen er 
ook op dat verschillende bevolkingsgroepen zich ten opzichte van de staat 
hebben kunnen herpositioneren. Ondanks het feit dat vrouwen de centrale 
begunstigden van de premievrije sociale bescherming zijn, is er tot op 
heden relatief weinig geschreven over de invloed van hun participatie op 
hun beroepsstatus. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat de traditionele rol van 
vrouwen in het huishouden en op de arbeidsmarkt is versterkt omdat zij 
de belangrijkste ontvangers van sociale uitkeringen zijn; hun economische 
positie is echter niet versterkt, zoals de bedenkers van de sociale verstrek-
king van geld oorspronkelijk hadden bedoeld.  
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Het doel van dit onderzoek is om een bijdrage te leveren aan een beter 
onderbouwde dialoog tussen verschillende onderdelen van ontwikkel-
ingsstudies, sociaal beleid en de arbeidseconomie. Puur analytisch biedt 
het proefschrift nieuwe inzichten in hoe sociale voorzieningen en ar-
beidsmarktkeuzes en -kansen functioneren als elkaar wederzijds 
beïnvloedende krachten.  
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Cash transfers as perverse incentives: narratives of 
dependence 
Cash transfers (CTs), the flagship modality of targeted social protection in 
Latin America, have become the tool of choice in poverty reduction 
throughout the region, promoted as effective in enhancing human capital 
while smoothing consumption levels among the poor. Mainstream eco-
nomic thinking has favoured targeted welfare provisioning, further pro-
moting CTs as effective crisis response mechanisms and means of social 
protection in contexts with low levels of formal employment. More re-
cently, however, the influence of CTs in the region on labour market out-
comes among recipients has raised concerns among scholars and practi-
tioners. The core idea behind this critique is that social protection has 
distortive features: the cash delivered to individuals is believed to provide 
them with (perverse) incentives to exit the formal sector and opt for in-
formality or not to formalise when they have the chance. Along these lines, 
it is argued that cash transfer programmes create moral hazard among 
working-age adults who receive these benefits. An extensive body of liter-
ature has sought to verify this hypothesis. This contention has not only 
gained increased attention in international debates about social protection 
(such as among donors and development finance institutions, including 
the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank), but it has 
also influenced policy making within countries.   
CTs are often designed as temporary interventions, designed to protect 
the poor—by managing uninsured risk—while affecting production deci-
sions and helping to provide a permanent way out of poverty. CTs aim to 
provide means to vulnerable households to better manage risks against 
income shocks‚ preventing them from selling off assets or from taking 
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children out of school in moments of adversity. Though designed to be 
temporary, most programmes in the region are still in place after nearly 
two decades. While generally considered successful in achieving their ob-
jectives (Barrientos & Villa, 2016), political support seems to be waning. 
In the Ecuadorian case, although the cash transfer programme Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano (BDH or Human Development Grant) has been as-
sociated with improvements in children’s cognitive achievement (Paxson 
& Schady, 2007; Ponce & Bedi, 2010; Schady et al., 2008), food expendi-
ture and nutrition (Buser et al., 2013; León & Younger, 2008; Schady & 
Rosero, 2007), and with a reduction in child labour (Cecchini & Madariaga, 
2011; Gonzalez-Rozada & Llerena Pinto, 2011; León et al., 2001; Martínez 
Dobronzky & Rosero Moncayo, 2007), an anticipated outcome, the over-
all effect on labour supply of adult recipients is the subject of some con-
troversy. The BDH has come under attack by critics claiming that the pro-
gramme is merely creating welfare benefit dependency and loss of 
economic self-sufficiency among its recipients. Recipient women of work-
ing age are being stigmatised for not making sufficient efforts to work and 
find better employment, allegedly motivated by securing continued eligi-
bility for the BDH programme. In the political discourse, voices opposing 
any income support for the poor working-age population have become 
stronger. 
Since its inception, the BDH has been strongly criticised for allegedly 
supporting ‘poor people’s laziness’ at the cost of the middle classes’ con-
tributions. Following contested increases in payroll taxes, inheritance taxes 
and changes in contributory social insurance implemented in the country 
after 2008, the reproach to non-work-based welfare provision has intensi-
fied and further divided public opinion. After a decision in 2012 to finance 
an increase of the monthly transfer to US$50 by imposing a corporate 
income tax for the private banking sector, opinion leaders have argued for 
a dismantling of the cash transfer programme, trying to convince readers 
that it is the reason behind the increased informalisation—portrayed as 
evasive practices—in the country. The central government responded to 
these criticisms in part by emphasising its contribution to developmental 
outcomes, such as increases in school attendance, by tightening the pro-
gramme’s targeting, accelerating the process of graduation and promoting 
affiliation to contributory social insurance—resulting in a significant drop 
in the number of recipients by 2014. Hence, the response to dependency 
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concerns and normative debates has been to emphasise the design of so-
cial protection in such a way as to minimise this perverse incentive and its 
distorting effect on labour markets. 
A number of studies seem to support this view. These studies suggest 
that the BDH has led to: (1) a drop in paid labour—as visible in either 
longer duration of unemployment and/or higher rates of inactivity among 
recipients; or (2) an increased probability of remaining in or even transi-
tioning towards informal sector employment (Gonzalez-Rozada & 
Llerena Pinto, 2011; Mideros & O’Donoghue, 2015). Although the BDH 
is associated with higher inactivity and higher rates of informality among 
recipients, this could be caused by the structural impediments women face 
in the labour market—as noted by Mideros and O’Donoghue (2015). 
Women’s employment options are limited in Ecuador, in particular among 
the poorest.  
The targeting mechanism of the BDH fits within broader processes of 
gender segregation: recipients are mothers with underage children or el-
derly persons excluded from contributory pension benefits. Labour mar-
ket participation by these recipients is therefore limited by gendered roles 
as caretakers, accentuated by their age. The programme deliberately chose 
women as recipients for the conditional component, expecting that they 
would spend the money on the needs of the family and hence best serve 
the developmental objectives of the programme. However, the pro-
gramme might have also reinforced traditional gender roles. Without suf-
ficient support to reconcile care and paid work in an equitable way, many 
recipient women seem to ‘choose’ part-time informal work, the most 
mother-friendly option available to them. Note that informality is charac-
terised by flexible hours‚ albeit irregular income, which due to a lack of 
affordable childcare and observance of statutory maternity leave seems 
more compatible with childrearing.1 For reasons spelled out above, BDH 
recipients are less likely to participate in (formal sector) employment. 
 Thus, isolating the effect of BDH on informal employment becomes 
problematic, as informality rates are highest among the poorest popula-
tion—and even more so among female workers amongst them—regard-
less of their participation in the BDH programme. The identification of 
the specific mechanisms through which targeted social protection affects 
labour market outcomes is also contingent on broader institutional factors 
pushing poor women into flexible informal work, namely unequal access 
to childcare, low compliance with labour regulation and occupational sex 
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segregation. Unequal access to care reinforces the gender bias, as paid care 
is not an option for the poorest women, contributing to self-selection into 
part-time flexible employment. Weak enforcement of labour legislation 
aimed at reducing gender discrimination has led to a continuation of in-
formality, mostly affecting women—conditional on their education, back-
ground and age. As recipient mothers tend to have lower levels of educa-
tion, they are more likely to be absorbed into the lower tier of the informal 
sector, poorly rewarded and operating beyond the state’s reach. Moreover, 
BDH recipients tend to have children at a younger age, compounding the 
aforementioned constraints to entering formal employment. As a result, 
female BDH recipients, needing to balance paid work and care, are more 
likely to remain in traditionally ‘female’ occupations, mostly in the infor-
mal sector, while childcare is often left to mothers and grandmothers lack-
ing support from fathers. The underlying reasons for this differ from those 
held up by the perversity argument.  
In the light of the issues described above, this research has focused on 
the question: to what extent do cash transfers encourage informalisation 
via perverse incentives? This research finds that the perversity argument, 
influenced by the dominant debates discussed above, is largely misplaced. 
What could be seen as labour market outcomes resulting from perverse 
incentives, for example higher inactivity rates or prevalence of informal 
employment, might in fact originate rather from structural impediments 
for many workers to access formal employment. Studies which associate 
informality with non-contributory social protection thus seem to be mis-
taken about the direction of causality. In effect, the role of non-contribu-
tory social protection in originating informalisation is minimal.2 For the 
bulk of the labour force, the possibility of choosing between a formal or 
informal occupation is irrelevant given crucial circumstances constraining 
their actual choice. Rather than focusing on individual choice, the persis-
tence of informality can be better explained through more structural ac-
counts that consider the gap between informal and formal employment 
arrangements as a by-product of segregated labour markets and bifurcated 
protection systems. 
This argument stands in contrast to the rationale behind the association 
of cash transfers with increased informality. Most economists’ accounts of 
the causes of informality argue this is a voluntary and individual choice. 
Only a few economists perceive informality as a structural outcome or as 
a result of marginalisation. Consequently, most of the debate is focused 
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on individual behaviour, according to which choices are allegedly made 
without considering the broader social and economic context which sets 
constraints on such choices. In view of these broader structural con-
straints, the influence of cash transfers seems minimal; perverse incentives 
can be identified, but these can be considered to be of no more than mar-
ginal influence within the broader structural and institutional constraints 
that condition people’s choices.  
CTs may still impact informal employment in different ways—that is, 
not through perverse effects on occupational choice, but rather through 
the institutional channel used for implementing targeted modes of social 
protection. Targeted social protection schemes typically fail to address the 
causes of economic inequality, such as the loss of economic security for 
informal workers. As a consequence, they entrench institutional stratifica-
tion and segmentation of populations on the basis of the targeting criteria 
(such as gender and age) that are typically associated with such schemes. 
These identity qualifiers, or, following Harriss-White, ‘institutions of iden-
tity’ (2010, p. 172), constitute, on their own, forms of social regulation. 
Cash transfers, as part of the social protection system, can thus play a role 
in the maintenance (or alternatively in the transformation) of social regu-
lation and social difference. It could be argued that the increasing number 
of quantitative studies of CTs that account for individual qualifiers, for 
example disaggregating results by sex and age, are recognising social dif-
ferences. These studies tend to produce static accounts of the social pro-
tection system without paying sufficient attention to dimensions of social 
differentiation, instead diluting these concerns. Thus, it is necessary to ap-
proach these qualifiers as relational, capturing specific processes that result 
in the intersections of sex, age and ethnic background. The overarching 
concern is the question of stratification, which, if left unattended in the 
design of social protection systems, might replicate (instead of correct) 
processes of marginalisation existing in the labour market that are related 
to the unequal distribution of employment and social rights.  
1.2 Policy context: a revolution in social protection? 
This dissertation elaborates on the ongoing international policy debate re-
garding social protection and informality, drawing on an extensive review 
of recent literature promoting cash transfers and social protection as ‘a 
revolution from the South’. The celebration of this modality of welfare 
provision has been accompanied by strong criticism related to its inability 
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to tackle the persistence of informality, the erosion of formal and secure 
employment and other underlying causes of economic inequality and so-
cial stratification. This work explores the parallel to these debates in the 
Ecuadorian (and related regional) policy and political debates and evalu-
ates such claims by means of presenting alternative accounts, drawing on 
quantitative analysis and qualitative and documentary research.3  
Ecuador’s current development agenda aspires to attain a reformulated 
model of economic growth and social inclusion through intensified public 
investment, under a project self-proclaimed as Revolución Ciudadana (or 
Citizens’ Revolution), also presented as Good Living, Socialism of Good 
Living or 21st Century Socialism4. To this end, ‘among the foremost duties 
of the State are the guarantee, without discrimination, of the effective en-
joyment of rights, the eradication of poverty and the equitable redistribu-
tion of resources and wealth’ (Ecuadorian Constitution 2008 – Article 3) 
(Translated by Senplades as found in National Secretariat of Planning and 
Development, 2013, p. 55). New mechanisms for an increased presence 
of the state have given the Citizens’ Revolution a distinctive character. 
Some assess this shift as positive (Ray & Kozameh, 2012; Weisbrot et al., 
2017), highlighting amongst many economic reforms the absorption of 
the Central Bank into the executive branch,5 the creation of a tax on capital 
exiting the country, the re-regulation of the financial sector,6 and the sig-
nificant increase in public investment and government expenditure.7 The 
dissolution of the Fondo Ecuatoriano de Inversión en los Sectores Ener-
gético e Hidrocarburífero (FEISEH or Ecuadorian Fund for Investment 
in the Energy and Hydrocarbons Sectors),8 increased oil revenues9—partly 
due to a renegotiation of oil contracts, extensive mineral extraction (mainly 
gold and copper), an increase in related royalties10 and taxes paid to the 
state, have facilitated the expansion of government spending since 2007 
when President Correa took office. Social spending, especially in the areas 
of education, health and social welfare, increased from 4.3 per cent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2006 to 9.4 per cent of GDP in 2013, 
the highest levels of social spending in Correa’s administration, and re-
turning to 8.6 per cent of GDP as of 2016 (Weisbrot et al., 2017). Spending 
on social welfare (or Bienestar Social), a category that includes funding of 
the BDH and other social welfare programmes (Ray & Kozameh, 2012), 
increased between 2000 and 2006 from 0.3 per cent to 0.6 per cent of 
GDP, after a peak level of 1.2 per cent in 2001 (SIISE-BCE-eSIGEF, 
2017). After Correa took office, social welfare spending increased to 1.0 
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per cent of GDP (as of 2007), up to 1.5 per cent of GDP during 2010–
1111 (SIISE-BCE-eSIGEF, 2017; Weisbrot et al., 2017), and returning to 
1.0 per cent as of 2016 (Weisbrot et al., 2017). The budget for BDH nearly 
doubled from 2006 to 2007, increasing from US$192 million to US$381 
million (CEPAL, 2016), rose significantly during subsequent years (Inter-
national Labour Organization, 2014) and reached its highest level in 2013: 
US$1.1 billion (CEPAL, 2016). As of 2016, the budget for BDH was re-
duced to US$651 million (ibid.).    
This shift in economic policies has been accompanied by elements of 
change and continuity in the provision of social protection, maintaining—
until very recently—a bifurcated system, with an upper tier of contributory 
social insurance covering the formally employed and supplementary pro-
visions directed to rural farmers; and a lower tier of non-contributory so-
cial assistance providing income support with cash transfer programmes, 
such as the BDH or the Joaquín Gallegos Lara grant. Recent reforms were 
introduced to address problems of stratification of employment-derived 
benefits. First, the abolition of various forms of precarious employment, 
namely labour subcontracting and hiring by the hour, introduced in 2008 
by the National Constituent Assembly, aimed at ‘eliminating sources of 
non-compliance with labour rights’ (International Labour Organization, 
2014, p. 6). Second, a minimum wage policy was introduced under the 
framework of Salario Digno (or decent wage), levelling up wages to the cost 
of a basic family basket.12 This framework included obligatory affiliation 
of workers to social security—failure to fulfil this obligation now results 
in a penalty as indicated in Article 327 of the National Constitution (2008) 
(ibid.). Third, and following a constitutional mandate to recognise and 
value unpaid family work, amas de casa (or homeworkers) were incorpo-
rated to the social security system—or contributory social insurance—un-
der a scheme partly subsidised by the state. The level of subsidy and indi-
vidual contributions of homeworkers is determined after an assessment of 
the socio-economic situation of the household (Maldonado-Cabrera & 
Vallejo-Luzuriaga, 2015).  
Yet debates on the effectiveness of these reforms are ongoing, given 
the still growing importance of informal employment. ‘[Between 2007 and 
2012] informal employment increased in the informal sector and among 
own-account workers at the same time it declined among employers and 
domestic workers’ (International Labour Organization, 2014, p. 10). As of 
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2009, more than two-thirds of urban employment (about 2.7 million work-
ers) in Ecuador was informal. These estimates do not include employment 
in the agricultural sector or rural areas.13 In contrast, data on employment 
in the informal sector—measured as the number of workers employed in 
informal enterprises—suggests informality was much lower: about 1.6 mil-
lion urban workers were employed by informal enterprises in 2009. 
Whereas this enterprise-based definition shows that only one-third of ur-
ban workers were employed in the informal sector, it reveals that 1.1 mil-
lion workers were informally employed in ‘formal’ enterprises (ILO, 
2014). Thus, it can be seen that the boundaries set for informality deter-
mine the—lack of—visibility of insecurity and instability of workers. The 
former definition, that is ‘informal employment’, emphasises the regula-
tion and protection dimensions not captured by the sectorial division of 
formal and informal enterprise registration. The fact that so much of the 
informal urban employment takes place in formally registered enterprises 
or households—24 per cent in Ecuador, the second largest share in the 
region14—and that informal employment in the informal sector persists, 
opens up new dimensions on the debate for the provision of social pro-
tection and its applicability to societies with more people joining the in-
formal and casual work segments of the labour market. 
In this context, the prominent role of targeted forms of social assis-
tance, as per the BDH programme, challenges the ‘revolutionary’ charac-
ter of the administration. The expansion of social programmes is associ-
ated with that of extractive activities, whereby arguments for national 
ownership are justified in terms of ‘oil dividend’15—with citizens eventu-
ally receiving their share. Current reforms in social protection have been 
presented as a shift towards a more inclusive approach to social protec-
tion, away from the promotion of privatisation, liberalisation and deregu-
lation that came about with neoliberal reforms applied at the end of the 
last century—in what the administration has coined the ‘long neoliberal 
night’. Yet the preference for targeted modalities of social protection is 
problematic. Current social assistance programmes, despite their clear fo-
cus on poverty reduction, interact with historical structures driven by de-
pendency on primary exports, limited expansion of the productive capac-
ity and high degrees of labour informality. As noted by Ponce and Vos 
(2012), the primary export-led growth strategy pursued in the country has 
not been conducive to dynamic growth of formal industrial activity and 
services, leaving a large and still expanding informal sector, which in turn 
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has contributed to the need to set up and continue with non-contributory 
schemes such as the BDH. Although poverty and income inequality have 
fallen significantly over the past 15 years, the question remains how to 
address the contradictions and social tensions accompanying the delivery 
of a Citizens’ Revolution by means of maintaining targeted policy instru-
ments, such as cash transfers, next to renewed strategies of economic and 
social development, aimed at tackling the exclusion of significant segments 
of the population from decent employment opportunities. Little infor-
mation is available about how this shapes recipients’ job status and work-
ing conditions, although for workers in the informal economy, failure in 
accessing social protection entails greater precariousness and vulnerability. 
Furthermore, for people in informal employment, vulnerability is closely 
linked to economic insecurity (Beneria & Floro, 2006) and social exclusion 
(World Bank, 2012).  
In the context of social policy, national planning has been comple-
mented by an agenda intended to reduce economic inequality and social 
exclusion (MCDS, 2017). Non-contributory social protection and support 
to income-generating activities have been prioritised along these lines. Yet 
it should be noted that the cash transfer programme BDH has a long tra-
jectory. By 2007, with a larger base of recipients, debates on inclusion 
came to the fore, as the BDH programme had been only slightly reformed 
after 2003 when it was reformulated as a (conditional) cash transfer. De-
spite a discursive shift towards a more transformative role of social pro-
tection, the BDH programme still occupies a central position in poverty 
reduction strategies. This focus on poverty reduction does not necessarily 
suggest that the administration has not prioritised reducing inequality. In 
fact, inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, decreased from 0.55 to 
0.47 between 2006 and 2016 (Weisbrot et al., 2017), in line with the general 
trends observed in the region (Gachet et al., 2016). Yet, even if income 
inequality levels have reduced—although with some signs of reversal after 
2015—some have argued this is not sustainable (ibid.), joining other schol-
ars who have already highlighted the need to transform the economic 
structure, reduce the dependency on commodities and increase the tax 
base in order to ensure a steady reduction in inequality (Ponce & Vos, 
2012a). In the particular connection of inequality with labour income and 
cash transfers, Gachet et al. (2016) estimate that, for the period 2005–16, 
the marginal contribution of cash transfers to the observed reduction in 
income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) during this period 
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was between 2.5 and 4.5 per cent for each 1 per cent increase in cash re-
ceived; whilst the contribution of labour income is actually negative: an 
increase of 1 per cent in labour income is associated with an increase in 
inequality of 1 to 2 per cent.  
In its basic set-up, the BDH programme builds largely on already ex-
isting CT models popular throughout Latin America. Conditional cash 
transfers (CCTs) were positioned as a technical tool for poverty allevia-
tion, and thus claimed to be insulated from the hazard of political misuse 
(for an extended discussion of the ‘model power’ of Oportunidades-Mex-
ico, see Peck & Theodore, 2015). In the midst of an economic crisis, Ec-
uador adopted the cash transfer model in 1999 with the creation of Bono 
Solidario (BS), originally modelled after the Mexican programme Opor-
tunidades (previously Progresa, and currently Prospera) (Schady & Araujo, 
2008). During its initial years, the programme was an unconditional cash 
transfer: no conditions were imposed and it was introduced to compensate 
the poor for loss of income caused by the elimination of a subsidy on 
cooking gas. By 2003, the programme was reformed as a conditional cash 
transfer, with requirements pertaining to health (regular medical check-
ups) and education (school attendance) for children in recipient house-
holds. Yet proof of meeting these conditionalities was ‘only needed for 
initial registration and not for continued participation’ (Ray & Kozameh, 
2012, p. 15), making of the BDH an unconditional cash transfer scheme 
after enrolment. Yet others argue that the BDH is a ‘cash transfer with 
soft conditions’ (Mideros & O’Donoghue, 2015, p. 227), as ‘BDH trans-
fers were not explicitly conditional on pre-specified behaviours like school 
enrolment, although households were encouraged to spend transfer in-
come on children’ (Araujo et al., 2016, p. 5). Advertising campaigns ac-
companied the expansion of the BDH, as documented in Schady and Ro-
sero (2007), whilst some administrators and front-line workers were 
instructed to remind participants of the enrolment conditionalities (Schady 
& Araujo, 2008).  
Actually, various rounds of experimental-design evaluations exploited 
these ambiguities in the demarcation and monitoring of conditionalities, 
testing whether a nudge was required or not. For instance, Schady and 
Araujo defined ‘a group of people who “believed” the transfer was condi-
tioned [although the] conditionality was not really enforced, though the 
implementation created the perception among certain households that it 
would be’ (ibid., p. 73), amongst which the impact of the BDH was much 
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higher. The BS programme was reformed in 2003 and renamed Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano. By 2012, the BDH reached approximately 1.8 million 
households (for an estimate16 of 9.5 million people or 44 per cent of the 
total population). The BDH includes a conditional component, providing 
a monthly stipend of US$50 to mothers (1.2 million as of 2012) with 
school-age children, and a non-contributory and unconditional pension 
component of US$50 per household (later denoted pensión asistencial or as-
sistance pension), targeted to household with members above the age of 
65 or with disabilities. By 2012, the pension component reached about 
580,000 households.  
In 2015, the Ecuadorian state led a process of subsidised affiliation of 
more than 450,000 BDH recipient women to the contributory branch of 
social insurance (IESS or Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social), un-
der the Ley de Seguridad Social para las trabajadoras no remuneradas del 
hogar (Law for Social Security for Unpaid Family Workers). This reform 
has resulted in higher affiliation rates amongst women, as a contribution 
is now deducted from BDH recipients’ monthly stipend aimed at accumu-
lating funds for a retirement pension as part of the general social insurance 
regime, IESS. Under this scheme, affiliated BDH women are entitled to 
old age, disability and death pensions, though only after a continued pe-
riod of contributions,17 and are not covered against health-related risks. 
Although this is a step toward a more inclusive approach to social protec-
tion provisioning, as it stands now the system remains stratified: the home-
workers’ affiliation scheme offers lesser benefits to BDH recipients as 
compared with those offered to formally employed workers regardless of 
their status within the household.  
Lastly, although women have gained significant access to social protec-
tion, mostly via the BDH, their inclusion has not resulted in more equal 
gender outcomes, that is, access to formal paid work. The question re-
mains: to what extent has social protection supported women in overcom-
ing differences and creating a more level playing field in the labour market? 
This is not to suggest that no gains have been made over the last two 
decades, but rather to question the nature of the institutional responses to 
women in the design of social protection systems. 
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1.3 Framing a research question 
From an understanding that social relations produce and reinforce pro-
cesses of vulnerability and exclusion, as manifested in the prevalence of 
unprotected employment, i.e. informal employment, and considering the 
(re)entry of historically excluded groups (e.g. ‘dependent’ women, the el-
derly), this dissertation begins by questioning the transformative capacity 
of the current social protection system in Ecuador. Specifically, this re-
search aims to answer the overarching question whether the current con-
figuration of the social protection system has attenuated processes of in-
formal employment, adapted to or, rather, reinforced them.  
If that is indeed an option, that social protection has adapted to or even 
reinforced processes of informalisation, the next step is to understand the 
source of informality. This dissertation explores the specific conditions 
under which social protection influences workers’ employment choices, 
such as whether to seek a job in formal or informal activity. This is both a 
theoretical and an empirical question. From a theoretical perspective, the 
dissertation aims at answering: what are the (documented) distortive fea-
tures of welfare provisioning? How can non-contributory social protec-
tion introduce dependency and create work disincentives? As an empirical 
question, the project explores the contingencies that may result in in-
creased informality among recipients in Ecuador. That is to say, do recip-
ients of social protection benefits actually have the ability to choose be-
tween formal and informal occupations? What are the specific conditions 
that reinforce informalisation among the recipient population? Are these 
conditions associated with notions of welfare dependency and/or intro-
duced by non-contributory social protection?  
Social protection could also be seen as more than reactive or adaptive, 
but rather serving a transformative role. Its transformative character could 
be identified in the potential to tackle the sources of exclusion and vulner-
ability, as per the exclusion from formal employment and vulnerability 
manifested in income volatility that accompanies informal work arrange-
ments among recipients. This motivated a third line of inquiry that guided 
this dissertation: to what extent has the current social protection system 
affected historical trajectories and social relations that produce and per-
petuate exclusion from formal employment among recipient populations? 
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1.4  Studying informality and social protection: towards an 
analytical framework 
Aiming for the right balance of focus in making an argument whilst ac-
knowledging complexity, this work does not aim to fit all of these theories 
into one single framework. To understand the interactions between social 
protection and informality, both public economics (as informed by welfare 
economics) and labour economics can provide important insights. The 
neoclassical literature on public and labour economics has tended to ad-
dress the issues of social protection and employment through the analysis 
of choice, work effort and (dis)incentives. Many empirical applications 
have assessed the impact of government interventions on efficiency and 
equity in outcomes. Drawing on critiques of the underlying approaches, 
this study puts forward an alternative analytical framework for the analysis 
of social protection and informality and extended it to an analysis of the 
specific dynamics of southern Ecuador. In doing so, it provides a supple-
mentary account of how targeted social protection was implemented in 
Ecuador and its effects on labour market outcomes.  
From a critical angle, the literature on feminist economics and sociol-
ogy of gender questions the validity of the choice models, in particular that 
of some of the assumptions regarding labour supply and household anal-
ysis. Instead, it looks at the specific conditions that determine the posi-
tioning of women in the labour market, including those associated with 
care needs. Moreover, the literature on social policy and welfare regimes 
helps to situate welfare provisioning as historically and politically emer-
gent, introducing topics such as social stratification, which is particularly 
useful to relocate the analysis of current social protection systems within 
broader social structures and evolving academic debates. The approach 
taken in this dissertation, however, does not focus on welfare regime ty-
pologies, but instead favours a more localised analysis of the political econ-
omy of social protection, attentive to the nuances and variations of the 
institutional apparatus within the nation-state. These critical perspectives 
flag the normative implications of social protection devised at a national 
level, as they raise questions about the appropriate role of the state in the 
governing of (peripheral) populations. 
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1.4.1 Informal employment: theoretical considerations 
Employment is the most visible component of work, often defined in 
terms of labour as a factor of production that contributes to the produc-
tion of goods and services that are valued and included as part of an econ-
omy’s GDP (UNRISD-WIEGO, 2012). Yet many informal activities are 
poorly recorded in GDP, as they are less visible in terms of registration 
and accounting though they play a key role in employment creation. As 
noted by Razavi et al., ‘market-based’ exchanges can take many different 
forms and are not confined to situations where individuals exchange their 
labour directly for a salary or a wage. Those who are self-employed—
whether farming their own land, working in a family-run enterprise or 
working as street vendors—engage in other forms of market transaction 
to realise the value of their labour. However, ‘not all of these exchanges 
are consistently captured and counted in labour force surveys and calcula-
tions of GDP’ (2012, p. xx). In this dissertation, such activities are ap-
proached as part of informality, in terms of both informal sector employ-
ment and informal employment.  
Informality, as a separate theoretical term, emerged in the 1970s under 
the employment missions conducted by the International Labour Organ-
ization (ILO) and in the seminal work of Hart (1973). At a macro level, 
economic growth was expected to result in a reduction of firm-level and 
employment informality. As GDP increased, the informal sector was ex-
pected to decrease, even more so in a context of demographic transition, 
with the younger population benefiting from the expansion of formal pro-
ductive employment. In many developing economies, however, even as 
GDP increased, formal employment stagnated, resulting in the growth of 
informal employment and lower contributions (tax and pensions). Not-
withstanding the macro process described above, the majority of contem-
porary economists adhere to microeconomic foundations to argue that in-
formality is a voluntary and individual choice (Fields, 1990; Maloney, 2004; 
Levy, 2008; Jütting & de Laiglesia, 2009). Implicit in this notion is the idea 
that workers and/or firms opt for the informal sector because of the ben-
efits that it delivers to them, e.g. evasion of taxes and contributions.  
From a different angle, theories of segmented labour markets approach 
job selection not as a choice made by workers from among a wide range 
of options but rather as involuntary. Such an approach acknowledges that 
the labour market is not a single space, a single market, but an amalgam of 
many non-competing segments bound by different institutional rules 
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and/or barriers. Workers’ access to some sectors of the labour market are 
restricted regardless of individual preferences and attributes (an aspect that 
is often emphasised in human capital models). Uthoff (1986), for instance, 
relates labour segmentation in terms of the allocation into formal and the 
informal sectors, and earnings inequalities. Other authors perceive infor-
mality as a structural outcome (Breman, 1976; 1996; Harriss-White, 2003; 
Heintz, 2004; Phillips, 2011), delivering advantages to large firms and even 
the state—which turns into an extractive instead of protective entity, free 
of regulatory obligations and protections. Also from a structuralist per-
spective, informality is regarded as a result of the marginalisation of a seg-
ment of the labour force, following a more dual explanation, as per Lewis 
(1954) or Furtado (1965). 
The concept has evolved away from the demarcation of an informal 
sector (enterprise-based concept) and towards informal employment (job-
based concept). Informal employment, in the context of this dissertation, 
is understood as employment in unprotected (such as social security) or 
unregulated jobs, whether carried out in formal or informal sector enter-
prises or households (Hussmanns, 2004; UNRISD-WIEGO, 2012; Razavi 
et al., 2012). The informal label, when applied to employment, encom-
passes a variety of unstable and unprotected jobs in which people receive 
insufficient, if any, access to welfare and work-related benefits. In analyti-
cal terms, these concepts, informal employment and employment in the 
informal sector, refer to different aspects of the informalisation of employ-
ment. The first concept, informal employment, refers to the total number 
of workers who are not fully registered and lack employment-derived ben-
efits. These are usually workers engaged in employment on a casual basis 
and lacking (contributory) social protection. This typology of informal em-
ployment can also be found in the formal sector, for example in well-es-
tablished companies that hire workers per hour against labour regulations; 
in the informal sector, for example in unregulated activities such as street 
vending; and in households, for example home-based female garment 
workers. The second concept, employment in the informal sector,18 refers 
only to those workers employed by informal enterprises—and thus refers 
to a smaller fraction of employment.  
The study of the causes of informal employment within formal firms 
has received less attention in the literature. Most of the current debate on 
informal employment has been driven by the perversity argument, for ex-
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ample evasion of income taxes and social security contributions, compli-
ance costs, queuing for formal jobs (Perry, 2007). For the Latin American 
region, for instance, Perry notes that (new) entrants into self-employment 
are often formal workers, who have already accumulated physical capital 
while working for a wage and have the option of switching occupations. 
This ‘exit’ or voluntary view is also favoured by Fields (1990), who pro-
poses that ‘given the constrained choices available to them, a great many 
of informal sector workers are in that sector voluntarily’ (ibid., p. 65). In 
line with Fields’ argument, Maloney (2004), drawing on household survey 
data from Latin America, also suggests that employment in the informal 
sector is a ‘rational option’ taken by workers after analysing the entire 
package of benefits (and costs) offered by various employment arrange-
ments,19 hence the subsequent prescription for reducing incentives to drop 
formal employment, namely, handing out cash without the need to per-
form any (regulated) work. 
Acknowledging these diverging perspectives on informality, two main 
causal processes can be identified as better explaining informality as ex-
plored in this dissertation. The first process recognises informalisation as 
the movement into petty production activities, most often as a result of 
the upgrading of rural activities. This upgrade is more likely to occur in 
the lower-tier segment of the labour force, among rural workers transi-
tioning to small-scale activities in urban areas. Such informal activities are 
often depicted as having low productivity, therefore providing low-in-
come livelihoods. It could be said that more than entrepreneurial activities, 
these informal activities are best interpreted as people’s survival efforts 
(Berner et al., 2012). In this context, the role of non-contributory social 
protection seems marginal in the decision about ‘going informal’, although 
it can aid workers in the rural–urban transition or in safeguarding liveli-
hoods. The second process, related to the proliferation of informal firms 
and maintenance of informal employment—regardless of the scale—
speaks of an exit notion, i.e. opting out for informality. This is more plau-
sible amongst those in the upper-tier segment, as remaining informal in-
volves some costs and learning, for example bunching behaviour. Within 
this logic, non-contributory social protection could be seen as a distorting 
element, increasing the perceived benefits of informality.  
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Women and informality: labour markets as gendered institutions 
Women’s experience of informal employment differs from that of men. 
Informal employment comprises a larger proportion of women’s non-ag-
ricultural employment than of men’s employment (WIEGO, 2017). 
Women continue to be overrepresented in the lower tier of informal em-
ployment (e.g. domestic work, home-based work, street vending) (ibid.) 
and perform most of the unpaid care work (Razavi, 2011; Razavi et al., 
2012). Thus the analysis of labour markets, and more specifically of infor-
mality, needs to touch upon the constraints faced by women, as the eco-
nomic and social conditions in which they engage in employment often 
reflect gender norms. As noted by Razavi et al.: 
Labour markets do not operate in a vacuum. As social institutions they are 
shaped by social norms and power inequalities. Women and men do not 
come to the market with the same resources, be it working capital, labour 
(of others), social contacts and different types of skills and experiences. 
These differences are themselves often the outcomes of gender-based bar-
riers and inequalities. (2012, p. 9) 
Social institutions underpin employment outcomes and can structure 
other inequalities such as those related to access to state-provided social 
protection. Norms dictating the amount, type and valuation of women’s 
work are translated into employment outcomes, be it occupational sex seg-
regation or differences in income, the latter also known as the gender pay 
gap. In the absence of meaningful countervailing policies, gendered labour 
market outcomes can also result in a gendered structuring of social pro-
tection systems, as noted by women’s limited and weak access to social 
security provisions or their overrepresentation in non-contributory 
schemes, for example CCTs. Thus it is necessary to move gender back to 
the centre of the study of social protection, in order to better capture how 
the ‘social institutions through which social policy is filtered are all indeli-
bly bearers of gender––be it families and communities, markets, informal 
arrangements for care, or health and education systems, and the public 
sector’ (Razavi & Hassim, 2006, p. XV). When studying the relationships 
between social protection and employment, a gender perspective is partic-
ularly important, as sex-based inequalities in access to social protection 
may perpetuate informality and segregation and erode opportunities for a 
level playing field for women in the labour market. As noted by the au-
thors, ‘[w]omen’s unpaid care work continues to form the bedrock on 
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which social protection is subsidized, with erosions in state provisioning 
impacting most strongly on women’ (ibid.). 
Intersectionality and informality 
Although the connections between social protection and informality are 
discussed in the field of gender, or more specifically the positioning of 
women in the labour market, it is worth mentioning that other individual 
qualifiers—or institutions of identity (Harriss-White, 2010)—such as age 
and ethnicity further structure employment and derived entitlements. The 
dissertation thus approaches the intersectionality of gender with age and 
ethnicity, levering the analysis of social protection and labour market out-
comes. Different interpretations of age are integrated into the analysis: 
when conducting quantitative analysis, age is treated as a chronological 
fact, that is, ‘the figure identifying the number of (Gregorian) calendar 
years that have passed since birth’ (Huijsmans, 2016, p. 8), whilst in related 
discussions and complementary quantitative analysis, a more sociological 
understanding of age, by which ‘age is made important in particular social 
and historical contexts and in interaction’ (Laz, 1998, p. 92, emphasis in 
original), is allowed. This is particularly suited to the analysis of social pro-
tection policies and interventions, including social security provisions and 
cash transfers whose eligibility criteria focus on age and gender. Ethnicity, 
also discussed as race as per the sociology literature, is regarded as a ‘social 
construction rather than a biological fact’ (Laz, 1998, p. 86), or, alterna-
tively, a system of ‘social differentiation’ (Radcliffe, 2015c, p. 16). Alt-
hough most of the quantitative analysis presented here follows categories 
of self-reported ethnicity, the analysis is aware of how race is ‘defined by 
and constituted within social groups […] it is accomplished by individuals’ 
(ibid.). Problems associated with the identification of ethnicity in official 
statistics, especially in the intersection with gender, confirm this view.  
With regard to specific gendered employment outcomes, this disserta-
tion discusses patterns of participation in the labour force, differentiated 
by sex and age, and occupational sex segregation. With regard to partici-
pation in the labour force, age and sex determine, to a great extent, the 
constraints faced by women due to ‘socially ascribed responsibilities for 
reproductive work’ (Razavi et al., 2012, p. 26). Occupational sex segrega-
tion is approached as the ‘separation of women and men into different 
occupations’ (Razavi et al., 2012, p. 23). This is also noted in earlier welfare 
regime analysis literature, which indicates that when ‘sexual equality seems 
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to exist in terms of formal job definitions […] behind similar occupational 
labels hides a powerful internal career-segmentation (Esping-Andersen, 
1990, p. 208). Intermittent employment and occupational sex segregation 
affect not only women’s labour income, but their access to work-related 
benefits: ‘[t]he way in which pension systems distribute rights, resources 
and risks can affect men and women differently and serve to mitigate, re-
produce or amplify the gender inequalities emerging from the labour mar-
ket’ (Arza, 2012, p. 9). Although there are many ways of approaching oc-
cupational sex segregation, this dissertation focuses on the over- or 
underrepresentation of women (and minorities) in different occupations 
associated with traditional gender roles and/or lower pay. 
Sex occupational segregation: rational response or socialisation? 
In orthodox economic theory, segregation is seen as a rational response 
by employers and employees. Supply-side explanations consider that 
women choose mother-friendly jobs in their attempt to maximise earn-
ings, conditional on intermittent and flexible employment, a by-product 
of their role as care providers. While many women opt for these jobs based 
on family demands, others, due to their education level and experience, do 
not qualify for dependent employment—their preferred option—which 
would guarantee them maternity leave and fixed schedules. Demand-side 
explanations account for discrimination during the hiring process. Women 
are not considered for employment by many employers who are in the 
grip of arbitrary notions about who is appropriate for a job, in particular 
if they offer on-the-job training, as women’s career breaks, for example 
for childbearing, are perceived as increased costs for the employer (Eng-
land, 2005; 2010). 
Segregation is also discussed as a product of socialisation: individual 
preferences and aspirations are transmitted culturally, driving men and 
women to apply for different job positions (England 2005; 2010; 2015). 
Recently, England (2015) has criticised the overemphasis that sociologists 
of gender place on ‘the social’, inattentive to individuals’ agency. This is, 
however, different from the argument made in orthodox economics, 
which tends to divert the attention from structural forces and considers 
gendered work the result of women’s choices—for an extended review, 
see Folbre and Nelson (2000), Folbre (2012) and England (2015). These 
are better explained as mutually reinforcing processes leading to the de-
valuation of female work. Work traditionally done by women, for example 
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nursery, domestic work, and so on, is deprecated by cultural ideas that 
underestimate their contribution and feed the bias against hiring and/or 
placing women and rewarding their work. At the institutional level, these 
beliefs are often reproduced in the workplace, perpetuating segregation. 
1.4.2 Non-contributory social protection: situating cash transfers 
Social protection is defined in varied ways by scholars and development 
agencies. Most relate social protection to employment, aiming at improv-
ing workers’ ‘living standards and economic security’ (Razavi et al., 2012, 
p. 30). Mkandawire’s definition of social welfare comes very close to cur-
rent conceptualisations of social protection, encompassing ‘access to ade-
quate and secure livelihoods and income’ (2004, p. 6). Yet Mkandawire 
shuns a direct focus on workers, hence suggesting a much broader scope. 
Social protection is increasingly used to denote a mix of social insurance, 
social assistance and labour market regulation (Barrientos, 2010, p. 3). 
These include a variety of policies and programmes that provide protec-
tion regardless of employment status. According to Barrientos and Hulme, 
social insurance ‘consists of programmes providing protection against 
contingencies arising from life-course contingencies such as maternity and 
old age, or from work-related contingencies such as unemployment or ill-
ness’. Although this definition suggests extended coverage, this is usually 
financed with contributions from workers and their employers. This is one 
of the main differences between it and social assistance, which, as Barrien-
tos notes, is usually tax-financed and specifically directed toward ‘support 
for those in poverty’. Razavi et al. relate it not to poverty but to (the ina-
bility to) work, vulnerability or citizenship-derived entitlements, indicating 
that social assistance ‘provides transfers to people who are unable to work 
and who are deemed eligible, whether on the basis of their income, their 
vulnerability status or their rights as citizens’ (2012, p. 30).  
     In the study of informality and social protection as it is approached 
in this dissertation, a focus on (economic) risk and volatility helps explain 
the need for income support directed at those who are in ‘atypical’ em-
ployment arrangements. However, processes of informalisation are not 
only informed by and manifested in various economic dimensions, for ex-
ample income insecurity, but more generally in the broader social struc-
ture. Structural ‘social risks’ contribute to poverty and vulnerability, 
whereby ‘groups or individuals are marginalised or discriminated against’ 
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(Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004, p. 7). In what is presented as a ‘trans-
formative’ view on social protection, the authors continue to describe it 
as: 
[a]ll public and private initiatives that provide income or consumption 
transfers to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and 
enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall 
objective of reducing the economic and social vulnerability of poor, vulner-
able and marginalised groups. (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004, p. 9) 
This view informs the understanding of the state’s efforts to address 
the ‘social, political and economic structures and relationships, and pro-
cesses of exclusion and adverse incorporation’ (Barrientos & Shepherd, 
2003, p. 3) that perpetuate poverty and vulnerability. In this connection, it 
is important to note that ‘[s]ocial policy is supposed to address problems 
of stratification, but it also produces it’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 3). The 
question of whether policies exacerbate or diminish existing social differ-
ences makes the social protection system a stratification system20 in its 
own right (1990, p. 4). Molyneux argues, along the same lines:  
The extent to which any re-entry into society by previously excluded groups 
is transformative or merely palliative depends on the degree to which indi-
viduals gain some capacity to tackle the social relations that produce or re-
inforce their vulnerability and exclusion. (2016, p. 6) 
Ongoing debates on how to integrate other social groups, those who 
do not perform paid work or do so on the margins of the state’s regulation, 
continue to inform the conceptualisation of social protection. Razavi et al. 
integrate various vulnerable populations—women, the chronically ill and 
the elderly—in their definition of social protection, as ‘concerned with 
preventing, managing, and overcoming situations that adversely affect 
people’s well-being or living standards. It encompasses policies that pro-
tect people from the adverse consequences of illness, disability, maternity 
and old age; market-risks such as unemployment and price volatilities; and 
economic crises and natural disasters’ (2012, p. 30). Many of these conse-
quences derive from the way in which certain groups, women in particular, 
attach to the labour market. Social protection is directly linked to the social 
structures dictating the functioning of labour markets, sometimes resulting 
in bias against women. As noted by Razavi et al., ‘[t]his is especially the 
case with social insurance type of programmes that are closely tied to for-
mal employment: by assuming full-time, formal, life-long employment as 
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the norm, such programmes implicitly discriminate against women’ (2012, 
p. 11). Inequalities emerging from the labour market, for example the in-
ability to secure a formal job, can be easily translated into social protection 
systems, for example the inability to accumulate sufficient funds for a pen-
sion. 
Transfers, labour supply and perverse incentives 
Traditional models of labour supply, used in both public economics and 
labour economics, approach decisions regarding work effort and con-
sumption as a result of rational choice. According to neoclassical con-
sumer theory, an individual maximises utility21 by choosing among con-
sumption and leisure options—given a budget constraint.22 Since transfers 
provide a source of income without requiring additional work, the budget 
constraint is shifted in position (i.e. substitution effect) and slope (i.e. in-
come effect). This argument can be repeatedly found in the unemploy-
ment insurance literature, where it is theorised that individuals receiving a 
lump sum transfer are induced to consume more physical goods and more 
leisure. Thereby, the labour supply falls. 
As documented by Moffitt (2002), contemporary discussions of wel-
fare and work disincentives can be traced back to the USA in the 1960s, 
in relation to the programme Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC)—note that a parallel situation would take place later in Europe 
in response to the ‘New Deal’ in the United Kingdom, a workfare pro-
gramme introduced in 1998. By that time, Tobin and Friedman had iden-
tified the negative effects of welfare programmes on labour markets 
(ibid.). In determining the optimal marginal tax rate to be imposed by wel-
fare programmes, they found that tax rates of 100 per cent discouraged 
work. Following this seminal work, [public] economists shifted their inter-
est to the quantification of such an effect, developing new econometric 
techniques for the analysis of negative income tax and work incentives, 
including the quite popular randomised experimental trials (ibid.). Along 
these lines, most contemporary welfare programmes are seen to negatively 
affect labour supply: ‘[a]lmost no program reforms have unambiguously 
desirable labour supply effects on their own’ (Moffitt, 2002, p. 2403). Note 
also that in the work disincentives literature pertaining to the analysis of 
welfare programmes, the participation in welfare itself is theorised as a 
choice variable, as some eligible individuals, due to stigma or costs (e.g. 
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hassle costs), might decide not to participate despite leisure and consump-
tions gains (Moffitt, 2002). Altogether, this body of literature is concerned 
with the more normative aspects, for example choices regarding work al-
location and programme participation, that inform the optimal design of 
welfare programmes. 
Many authors have taken this discussion on disincentives, as advanced 
in the global North, and applied it to the schemes in the South, where 
arguments of dependence assume a level of transfers sufficient to substi-
tute for (paid) work. As noted by Ferguson, traditional welfare pro-
grammes in the North were indeed ‘meant to replace the normal pay check 
for the injured or temporarily unemployed worker’ (2015), whereas the 
cash transfer programmes set up by the end of the 1990s in the South are 
‘less about replacing [labour] income lost through inactivity’ (ibid.) but in-
stead are intended as a catalyst, enabling recipients to claim informal live-
lihoods, finance job seeking, create new employment opportunities and 
overall capacities for income generation, although evidence is uneven 
(DFID, 2011; Ferguson, 2015).  
Nevertheless, the argument of perversity is still rooted in a particular 
understanding of social protection that confines it to the ambit of employ-
ment and derived entitlements (or lack thereof). For instance, Levy, one 
of the architects of Mexico’s CT programme Progresa (now called Pros-
pera), when discussing the ‘unintended’ effects of CTs on employment 
outcomes in Mexico in his book Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes, defines social 
protection as programmes for non-salaried workers that ‘provide benefits 
to all workers who are not covered by social security, regardless of their 
income level’ (Levy, 2008, p. 3). He distinguishes social protection from 
social security, or what is usually discussed in the literature as social insur-
ance. According to the author, social security is directed at formal workers, 
‘in which case they also include firing and severance pay regulations’ 
(ibid.). His conceptualisation indeed suggests a contradiction between 
these two typologies, social protection and social security. Note that alt-
hough CTs are often treated as a single policy instrument, they fit within 
overall strategies of social protection as defined above. 
Transfers, women and dependency 
The situation of women in social protection systems has distinctive fea-
tures, as women have been integrated later and differently in welfare 
schemes, with entitlements often related to their condition as mothers 
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and/or dependents. As noted by Molyneux, in most Latin American coun-
tries: ‘[w]here women’s needs were specifically acknowledged, entitle-
ments were gained principally by virtue of their place within the family as 
wives and mothers whose main legally enforceable responsibility was the 
care of husbands and children’ (Molyneux, 2007). It was not in their con-
dition as workers but due to their positioning within the family that inte-
gration took place. This is a key observation because, as she notes, ‘women 
were grouped, along with children, as those who required protection rather than 
the full rights of citizenship’ (ibid., emphasis added). 
This need for protection continues to inform social provisioning, with 
the moral economy that guides the integration of women having changed 
ever so slightly. In the definition of productive activities, the positioning 
of women in the labour market is caught between the economic and moral 
spheres. The economic sphere seeks labour market integration of the 
working-age population in general, as wage labour takes place in the mar-
ket and thus belongs to ‘the public’. The moral sphere aims at safeguarding 
women’s reproductive capacities, which are arguably at risk if women fa-
vour paid work outside the home. In this confinement of women to re-
productive work, there is a ‘moral elevation’ (Folbre, 1991) of home duties 
next to a devaluation of care work. As noted by Folbre, this tension can 
be traced back to early discussions amongst political economists during 
the nineteenth century regarding women’s role in productive work. Alt-
hough women’s care work was considered productive (ibid.) during the 
nineteenth century, by the 1900s it was relegated to the private sphere.  
Early conceptualisations of productive work assigned women to the 
family, and thus to the private, whilst men’s role was ascribed to the mar-
ket. Even neoclassical economic thinking, often preoccupied with com-
petitive markets, did not allow for ‘economic self-interest to disrupt the 
home’ (Folbre, 1991). As discussed in the next section, assuming altruistic 
behaviour within the household has important implications for the design 
of employment and social protection policies. To this day and when it 
comes to categorising and valuating women’s work, the tension between 
the private (i.e. family) and public (i.e. market) spheres remains. This is 
even more so when studying labour markets in the light of social protec-
tion policies, as this private vs public division is rooted in a specific cate-
gorisation of women as dependent. It is not surprising, then, that the per-
versity argument discussed above would seem stronger if applied to a 
population that is already likely to be associated with dependency.  
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Exploring alternative accounts, it is also possible to find literature that 
explores the reversed causality, that is, women’s participation in produc-
tive work leading to a decrease in reproductive work. Even before the 
perversity debates as discussed above, when defining productive work 
within the discipline of economics, there was already some concern about 
how women’s labour participation might affect social reproduction. In the 
first demarcations of productive work that emerged in the 1930s, Marshall, 
for instance (as discussed in Folbre 1991), treated the participation of 
women in paid work as a possible threat to the private sphere, as an in-
crease in women’s wages would result in the abandonment of household 
duties. 
Women and the limits of household analysis in the study of work effort 
and dependency 
Early theorisations of the participation of women in the labour market, as 
per the work of Mincer (1962), also assumed that women had a choice 
between leisure and work, differentiating paid work and unpaid ‘house-
work’ (using the author’s terminology). The actual outcome (in terms of 
women’s paid work) was seen as dependent on the income of the husband. 
A key assumption for this is that the income is pooled within the house-
hold (or that income is shared among household members). Thus, an in-
crease in one household member’s income may result in a decrease not in 
his/her hours of work, but in those of other family members (1962). Later 
models account for intra-household allocation behaviour and theorise the 
household as a redistributive unit, that is, some members are providers 
whilst others are recipients (of income). They often distinguish between 
household heads and other members, and more recently account for dif-
ferent bargaining constraints—the actual share of household income re-
ceived by different members—thus questioning the unitary allocation 
model (Cuesta, 2006). 
The standard assumptions about households’ unity listed above are 
problematic as they tend to simplify familial structures and fail to expose 
the intrinsic motives behind job search and integration into the labour 
market among women. As noted by Deaton (1997), conducting research 
at the household level is complex. Households, and their members, are 
continuously shifting, a fluidity that is essential to their subsistence. These 
movements are poorly captured in household records used for allocation 
of cash transfers, causing many households to be missing from official 
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listings. Household-level analysis is difficult not only due to the challenges 
of registering transient household members. Even if all households and 
their members were tracked down, premises around the uniformity and 
fixity of the household as a unit of analysis, as assumed in most quantita-
tive research on cash transfers, have tended to obscure intra-household 
dynamics that often work against recipient mothers. Feminist scholars 
have warned about the reduced visibility of women’s positions within 
household analysis (Mies, 1982; Folbre, 1986; Orloff, 2009; Folbre, 2012). 
Nevertheless, most quantitative studies pertaining to CCTs depart from a 
joint household utility function. BDH evaluations are no exception: 
Schady and Rosero (2007), Schady et al. (2008) and Mideros and O’Do-
noghue (2015) use Becker’s (1974; 1981) family collective model, built on 
altruism, with all household members pooling their resources regardless 
of their participation in the production and the distribution of family in-
come.  
Following Folbre (1986), a household collective utility function poses 
several problems. First, it requires the aggregation of household members’ 
tastes and preferences—note that Arrow (1950; 1963) proved such aggre-
gations unrealistic. The idea of unity (and cooperation) within the house-
hold obscures market and non-market channels through which women 
contribute to the household as well as the economic and societal benefits 
and/or restrictions derived from their position as care providers. Second, 
a joint utility function assumes that altruism prevails within the household, 
contradicting the core idea behind utilitarianism, that of self-interest. Un-
der this logic, care providers (mostly women) must derive their utility from 
another household member’s wellbeing, which in strict terms can lead to 
coordination problems, overlapping individual efforts (Folbre & Goodin, 
2007). Moreover, such logic does not allow for motivational complexity; 
instead, it contributes to an essentialist view of gender and care provision-
ing within the household. 
Yet the definition of the household has been central to the structuring 
of social protection systems. From its beginning in the Latin American 
region, as elsewhere in the world, contributory social insurance used a 
fixed definition of household, perpetuating gender bias in access to enti-
tlements (Molyneux, 2007). Based on a male ‘breadwinner’ and his regis-
tered dependents—wife and children—access to social protection was 
deeply rooted in notions of gender difference. In most traditional schemes 
of social protection and as permeated into those that are more recent, for 
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example cash transfers, these notions resulted in the positioning of women 
as mother-dependents visible to the state with regard to their normative 
social roles (ibid.). In addition to this gendered conceptions of the house-
hold, state-provided social protection in lower income-countries of the 
region, including Ecuador, remained segregated along the axes of regis-
tered employment, for example access to formal jobs (Amsden, 2010), 
condition of poverty, regional bias (e.g. urban vs rural) and ethnic inequal-
ities (Molyneux, 2007). The wider population, the informally employed, 
were by design excluded from contributory social protection schemes.  
The problem of registration has always been present in the design of 
social protection, in as much as the functioning of the system depends on 
demographic documentation, such as the registration of marriages and 
documentation of births. Social protection was provided to wives (and 
their children) as long as they were legally married to a formal worker. To 
complicate things further, ‘atypical’ household arrangements are often at-
tributed to poorer households. Analysis of household surveys reveals that 
patterns of marriage and fertility are distinctly different across income 
groups: it is among the poor that the rate of female-headed households 
and cohabitation is higher. Thus, it is at the lower end of the income dis-
tribution that the male breadwinner model is not only inapt, but has its 
most detrimental effect.23 In view of this, this work suggests abandoning 
the household as unit of analysis, using instead gender, ethnic-based (when 
available) and age-specific dimensions. A gendered approach to social pro-
tection provisioning is becoming critical to expose the increased vulnera-
bility of women. This approach is best suited to understand the structure 
in which recipients operate, acknowledging that not all women benefit 
equally or at all from conditional cash transfer programmes targeted at 
specific kinds of women, especially in the light of diverse life trajectories.            
1.5 Research contribution  
The research contribution of this dissertation is threefold: theoretical, 
methodological and procedural. This research fits into the renewed inter-
est in the connections between social policy and employment (Heintz & 
Lund, 2012; World Bank, 2012; UNRISD-WIEGO, 2012). In this debate, 
the great majority of (mainstream) authors adhere to the argument that 
social protection should be limited, avoiding the issue of labour market 
distortions. The research presented here gathers alternative perspectives 
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informed by various disciplines, such as sociology and social anthropol-
ogy, and integrates social protection and employment in a more compre-
hensive manner. The purpose of this research is not to condemn the em-
ployment outcomes of social protection nor to defend it against criticisms. 
Rather, it seeks to understand the rationale of cash transfers: what they 
seek to change. By studying cash transfer effects on employment in a 
highly informalised context, the work is attentive to other processes shap-
ing particular conjunctures and helping to explain the gap between what 
is intended and what is accomplished. As such, this study aims to expand 
the possibilities of thinking critically about what cash transfer programmes 
are intended to be, what they actually are and what they might be. 
Although there is an important body of research on CTs in Ecuador 
assessing their impact on developmental outcomes related to human cap-
ital, for example nutrition and schooling, their specific connection to em-
ployment, and more specifically informality, has received less attention. 
Available literature dealing with employment outcomes associated with 
the BDH approaches them from an individual choice perspective. Thus, 
the main contribution of this research is the exploration of the relation-
ships, not simply the interactions, between employment structures and 
non-contributory social protection in the light of the evolving nature of 
both. The research is original in the sense that little research has combined 
issues of informality with the political economy of welfare provisioning in 
the South by means of in-depth local research. In addition, the research 
explores the gendered aspects of social protection in Ecuador, contesting 
the transformative character attributed to recent social protection initia-
tives and evaluating the positioning of women in such a segregated con-
text. The positioning of women in the social protection system and the 
labour market is seen as relational, in the intersections of sex, age and eth-
nicity. 
The research advances a mixed-method strategy that also includes a 
survey conducted in two southern cities in Ecuador; the qualitative sample 
included various generations of recipients and former recipients of the 
BDH, purposively drawn from official registries and key nodes of informal 
employment. The combination of data collection methods provided rich 
and textured elements for social analysis, acknowledging the complexity 
of households and the multi-layered nature of policy making and imple-
mentation under specific contingencies. The efforts were explicitly di-
rected to embedding and justifying the methods to the research question, 
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context and theoretical grounding, instead of testing and/or replicating 
methodologies. This is a specific feature in the study of cash transfers, 
which have become one of the most popular subjects for impact evalua-
tion, in particular along the lines of randomised trials. Whilst the empirical 
assessment of these programmes informs policy making, it has also tended 
to confine the analysis to the most visible and measurable features, ne-
glecting other critical development concerns such as broader public policy 
reforms. Without being dismissive of this approach, which has certainly 
informed the design of cash transfers with empirically grounded insights 
(in particular regarding nutrition, health and education related outcomes), 
my research aims at problematising the production of social statistics, sit-
uating them in specific social and institutional settings and, as such, em-
bodying politics and norms that prevail in such settings. 
Indeed, the analysis of non-contributory social protection in Ecuador 
relies predominantly on impact evaluation, making use of household sur-
veys or individual employment survey data. Employment surveys cover 
mostly main cities and urban areas, providing scarce information on rural 
and distant areas. A focus on subnational units, that is, cities, helped to 
pinpoint how variations in institutions and structural factors shape eco-
nomic performance and policy implementation. From a more procedural 
perspective, the research provides useful insights that can inform policy 
making based on a more detailed and contextualised depiction of infor-
mality which goes beyond the standard statistical and survey methods that 
collect and abstract employment data.  
Finally, this research adds to the growing body of literature on social 
protection and employment in the region, with aspects that could be rele-
vant for other Andean countries which share similar employment struc-
tures and social protection schemes. Accounts of the alternative institu-
tional arrangements set up for employment creation and welfare 
provisioning could be identified, some of them only available in Spanish. 
Hence this research could serve as a bridge between these emerging de-
bates and those produced in the global North, adding to the continuous 
conversation regarding what works in social protection, across borders 
and disciplines.  
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1.6 Research focus and case selection 
Map 1.1 Research locations: Loja and El Oro in southern Ecuador 
 
Drawing on field economics (Harriss-White, 2003), this research coupled 
the analysis of national social protection systems with local research in 
order to trace the various paths leading towards informality. By selecting 
smaller areas for in-depth analysis, the project design set out to gain de-
tailed knowledge of the interaction between social protection and infor-
mality as it operates in the field. The fieldwork took place on the southern 
provinces of El Oro and Loja (see Map 1.1). Access to formal social secu-
rity and BDH targeted benefits determined the choice of these cases, as 
they offered a rich space to study the interconnectedness of labour struc-
tures and social protection. As most of the economic activity is clustered 
in the provincial capitals, the fieldwork was conducted in the urban centres 
Machala (El Oro’s capital) and Loja (Loja’s capital) and, when possible, in 
their rural surroundings. Table 1.1 shows the proportion of urban and ru-
ral populations, as well as the sex ratio, in both cities. It can be noted that 
Machala is predominantly urban, whilst Loja presents a slightly higher 
share of population living in areas categorised as rural (peripheral areas 
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with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants). In terms of sex ratio, that is, the num-
ber of males for each female, Loja presents a slightly higher ratio. Also, 
the dependency ratio, that is, the pressure on the ‘productive’ age groups 
(those aged above 15 and below 65) with respect to the ‘dependent’ 
groups, is higher in Loja but still lower than the national average. 
Table 1.1 Population figures for Loja (city) and Machala, 2010* 
Area Indicator Total Share/ratio 
Loja  Urban  170,280  79.3  
 Rural  44,575  20.7  
 Total  214,855  100  
 Sex ratio**  107.6 
 Dependency ratio***  58.1 
Machala  Urban  231,260  94  
 Rural  147,120  6  
 Total  245,972  100  
 Sex ratio**  99.9 
 Dependency ratio***  53.4 
National  Urban  9,090,786  62.8  
 Rural  5,392,713  37.2  
 Total  14,483,499  100  
 Sex ratio**  101.8 
 Dependency ra-
tio*** 
 60.7 
* Year of last national census. 
** Males for each female multiplied by 100. 
*** Age–population ratio of those ages 0 to 14 and 65+ (dependent) to those assumed 
productive: ages 15 to 64 multiplied by 100. 
Source: INEC and SiCES 2017, adapted by the author. 
 
Employment figures are not available for the city of Loja (that is, can-
ton level), because the official labour market survey ENEMDU is repre-
sentative only at the provincial level and for main cities (including 
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Machala). For comparison purposes and since the lowest level of disaggre-
gation available for ENEMDU data is provincial, Table 1.2 compares em-
ployment indicators for El Oro and Loja. Note that the provincial capitals, 
Machala and Loja, absorb 39 and 48 per cent of the provincial population 
respectively. El Oro province, where Machala is located, presents a lower 
share of employment in the informal sector (much lower than Loja prov-
ince and below the national estimate), although it has increased over time 
from 33.7 to 36.1. This variation in informality rates makes the compari-
son across cases interesting. As per social security affiliation rates, there is 
a sustained increase in both provinces, partly due to the changes in labour 
regulation introduced in recent years. Yet Loja province exhibits higher 
rates of affiliation and a substantial increase, from 42.5 to 49.1 per cent in 
the reference period, whereas in El Oro, the increase is much more mod-
est (from 33.7 to 36.1). Note that the mean nominal individual labour in-
come accounts for all paid work activities including own-account work, 
salaried work, as reported by informants in the ENEMDU survey (SiCES, 
2017) has steadily increased in both provinces, although there is a substan-
tive gap with respect to national averages. 
Table 1.2 Employment figures for Loja (province) and El Oro, various years 
Province Indicator Years 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Loja  
% employment informal sector 57.4 52.6 47.5 47.8 46.5 
% workforce affiliated to social se-
curity (IESS) 42.5 49.1 47.5 48.3 49.1 
Inactivity rate 32.5 29.6 37.2 35.6 32.4 
Domestic service (% employment) 2.2 1.7 2.1 1.3 2.1 
Mean individual labour income 384.5 407.9 491.4 510.7 456.7 
El Oro 
% employment informal sector 33.7 34.9 32.3 34.7 36.1 
% workforce affiliated to social se-
curity (IESS) 33 35.7 36 37.4 35.3 
Inactivity rate 38 38.6 35.2 36.1 35.9 
Domestic service (% employment) 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.6 2.3 
Mean individual labour income 438.5 462.7 478 467.4 438.9 
National % employment informal sector 40.8 40.1 39.7 40.4 43.7 
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Province Indicator Years 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
% workforce affiliated to social se-
curity (IESS) 41.4  43  44.3  44.2  42.1  
Inactivity rate 38.3  37.9  35.5  34.2  32.7  
Domestic service (% employment) 2.5 3.1 3.2 2.7 2.8 
Mean individual labour income 422.1 469.4 486.7 512.8 489.7 
Source: Compiled and calculated by author from SiCES (2017). 
 
As is the case for most provinces, commerce and public administration 
are clustered in their capitals (main cantons). Government agencies are 
well established in the region, delivering public services in close coordina-
tion with regional and national offices. In addition, economic activities 
such as commodity production (bananas, sugar, corn and coffee), mining, 
livestock (in Loja) and financial services have brought some prosperity to 
the region. Highly incorporated into the national economy by means of 
commerce, the southern region is an important node for national produc-
tion. El Oro concentrates most of the domestic banana production24 and 
has an advanced export zone. Therefore, it is closely integrated with na-
tional centres—Guayaquil in particular—and international markets—the 
United States and Europe—by means of commerce (RIMISP, 2011). In 
Loja’s province, associative crops of coffee and corn have proven to be 
successful income sources in rural areas, linking small farmers with inter-
national markets for organic production. Yet intensified commodity pro-
duction has been associated with adverse incorporation, which has been 
detrimental for agrarian workers who have lost their land holdings and are 
usually employed in the urban informal sector.25  
Rural assessments have revealed high levels of internal migration by the 
working-age population, who opt to move to bigger urban centres, partic-
ularly from rural Loja towards Machala. In terms of international migra-
tion, note that in the aftermath of the 1999 financial crisis, a significant 
share of the working population left the country looking for better income 
opportunities. After nearly two decades, migration flows have slowed. Be-
cause of migration, both internal (domestic) and international, there is a 
marked ageing of the population in rural areas in Loja: 12.3 per cent of the 
population is above 65 years old, the highest share in rural areas in Ecua-
dor. It is worth noting that the cities of Machala and Loja, at the time of 
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design of this research project (2012), had relatively low income poverty 
rates, at 56.9 per cent and 43.6 per cent respectively.  
The heterogeneity in the socio-economic conditions, as described 
above, is deemed essential in order to ensure enough variance in the study 
of social protection and employment structures across these cities. These 
are neither the most typical cases of precarious work and extreme poverty, 
nor outliers with fully formalised and regulated employment. Instead, El 
Oro and Loja exhibit a quite assorted scenario for studying the practices 
of social protection. The selection of contiguous provinces provides some 
control over cultural, historical and ecological conditions. Due to com-
merce linkages and migration processes operating within the southern re-
gion, differences in levels of economic development and education are 
minimised. However, this strategy represents a trade-off between the abil-
ity to control variables due to contiguity and the ability to generalise—
which is not the aim of my field research. Nevertheless, constant compar-
isons with national-level (and main cities) estimates helped to balance the 
potential effects of contiguity.    
All things considered, the cities of Loja and Machala in southern Ecua-
dor are treated as a diverse case study design (Gerring, 2006). The decision 
was made to focus on a small number of cases that could provide insights 
into the documented causal relationship: non-contributory social protec-
tion increases informality. For the choice of cases, the design relied on 
purposive non-random selection, looking for variation in dimensions of 
theoretical interest, for example informality rates, affiliation to contribu-
tory social security and inactivity rates. It opted for cases that were distant 
from the national mean without being extreme cases in order to illuminate 
the variations in social protection and informality. The choice of contigu-
ous provinces allowed for the control of some factors, such as peripheral 
location, yet enough variation in variables of interest (e.g. informal em-
ployment and social security), whilst having roughly the same level of par-
ticipation in the BDH programme. As noted by Gerring (2006), the logic 
of diverse-case study rests upon the logic of typological theorising, devised 
to provide not only hypotheses on how variables operate ‘but contin-
gent generalisations on how and under what conditions they behave in 
specified conjunctions or configurations to produce effects on specified 
dependent variables’ (George & Bennett, 2005).  
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1.7 Procedure and methods 
The compilation of the research work over the course of four years dis-
closed a tension between the initial stages of the research—undertaken in 
The Hague whilst conducting desk research and prior to the various visits 
to Ecuador—and the final stages, informed by a more critical orientation 
towards social policy, looking at it not only as a practical (and measurable) 
tool but as an object of critique. At first, the research was mostly con-
cerned with understanding and assessing the microeconomic foundations 
of labour economics and welfare economics, trying to answer the umbrella 
question: do people always have a choice? After conducting the survey in 
Ecuador, the analysis became more cautious in the use of data, in particu-
lar survey data aiming at covering vast territories occupied by highly di-
verse populations. This critical analysis helped in recasting (national) sta-
tistics as an instrument for inclusion and exclusion of populations in social 
protection systems. The research then shifted towards understanding not 
the population but rather the state as the subject, one that studies and 
manages the population. As such, this work articulates alternative accounts 
to reinterpret the research problem as one of critical social policy, related 
to the structural and institutional aspects of social provisioning. 
The study relies on mixed methods, drawing on both quantitative and 
qualitative data. It is worth differentiating between the various data collec-
tion methods employed, for example structured interviews, unstructured 
narrative interviews and survey research; and data analysis methods, for 
example qualitative content analysis of policy documents, genealogy (as 
per Foucauldian analysis), quantitative analysis of repeated samples and 
survey data analysis. Whereas the rationale for data collection followed a 
more inductive reasoning, data analysis was informed by a deductive ap-
proach. Data collection methods first aimed at immersion in the field and 
the exploration of the various causal connections (related to social protec-
tion) and conditions that seemed to influence the occurrence of informal-
ity in the selected locations, as informed by structured and unstructured 
interviews. Once key factors were identified, the design plan continued 
with the fielding of a survey (as discussed in detail in Chapter 5). Data 
analysis, however, had as a starting point an extensive literature review of 
the theoretical debates on informality and social protection. This was then 
complemented with data and insights from the multiple realities encoun-
tered in the field. These inductive and deductive aspects were iterated in 
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the research process, complementing each other according to the data re-
quirements and need for theoretical grounding. 
Following a nested research design (see Figure 1.1), the first step of the 
analysis dealt with the main definitions of informality and its documented 
causes. A second body of literature was integrated in the analysis, explor-
ing the specific connections between informality and social protection 
provision. Literature pertaining to cash transfers, as they emerged in the 
region by the turn of the century, received particular attention. Social pro-
tection and informality were reconnected and revisited in the light of the 
argument of ‘perverse incentives’. A third set of literature touched upon 
the historical contingencies accompanying social protection provisioning 
in Ecuador, both before and after the adoption of CTs. Such historical 
grounding emphasises the processes of socio-demographic change, delin-
eating the political trajectories and economic structures that seemed to af-
fect labour market institutions and welfare institutions. In terms of socio-
demographic changes, the analysis discusses the changes in household 
composition and size, age structure and gender composition of the popu-
lation, and how these affect employment structures. This approach led to 
the questioning of some assumptions that are usually taken for granted 
(e.g. when and in which modalities were women incorporated to protec-
tion systems? do transfers introduce dependency in a highly informalised 
context? was formal employment always the norm?), highlighting their 
limitations and/or inapplicability. 
A second step involved documentary research of policy documents, 
official records, reports and speeches pertaining to social protection pro-
visioning in Ecuador. This research strategy brought together the analysis 
of the cash transfer programme BDH: its genealogy, its diagnoses and pre-
scriptions, as well as its exclusions; and the analysis of the process they 
aim to regulate and improve. To this end, documents were treated as in-
struments of critique rather than merely practical tools, teasing out social 
and economic influences in the formulation of policies pertaining to wel-
fare and employment. These were contrasted with various narratives and 
interpretations, as informed by qualitative research with front-line workers 
and BDH recipients. This included narratives on the role and significance 
of public sector institutions, mainly central government, involved in the 
provision of social protection for different populations such as formal 
workers, rural workers, the elderly, mothers and young children. In the 
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connection with care, although there are many state-led policies and pro-
grammes that may be intended to provide social protection and care ser-
vices, such as childcare centres, this dissertation focuses on those that aim 
at explicitly assisting and/or financing unpaid carers (mothers in the case 
of the BDH conditional component) or financing old age when the person 
has not accumulated sufficient funds for a pension (as per the BDH pen-
sion component). Although pensions are not directed towards financing 
care, there are key components of social protection. And depending on 
the source of funding of the pensions e.g. contributory schemes or na-
tional budget, they could also be labelled as either social insurance or social 
assistance. Regardless of the source of funding, pensions can also benefit 
other members of the household. As noted in the case of the pension 
component of the BDH, grandmothers who participate in the programme 
often times assisted and financed their daughers and their children, in par-
ticular when the father was absent.   
A third step involved quantitative analysis, namely, a comparative static 
analysis based on repeated representative samples: ENEMDU data col-
lected by the National Department of Statistics of Ecuador (Instituto Ec-
uatoriano de Estadística y Censos, or INEC) pertaining to the analysis of 
main trends in employment and social protection in Ecuador for the past 
two decades (when available). The research was complemented with offi-
cial registries, as restricted access to official household records (SELBEN 
and RS) used for the selection of recipients and overall targeting of the 
BDH programme was granted, as well as access to BDH payrolls (or Bases 
de Pagos) administered by the Ministry of Social and Economic Inclusion 
(Ministerio de Inclusión Económica y Social, or MIES). While official la-
bour force surveys were used for the construction and analysis of quanti-
tative indicators pertaining to various informal employment categories and 
their evolution over time, increasingly, close work with informal workers 
made clear the need for a more textured analysis of some occupations un-
derrepresented in these surveys. The different occupations include domes-
tic workers, street vendors, waste pickers and other categories of informal 
workers who were purposively selected in the field survey. Next to these 
groups, interviews were undertaken with household family carers, for ex-
ample mothers, grandmothers, daughters and daughters-in-law, who were 
giving, receiving and organising care. Using qualitative research tech-
niques, the dissertation offers an in-depth view of selected forms of infor-
mal employment. 
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The procedure for data collection is best captured in the fourth and 
fifth steps detailed in Figure 1.1. Data collection, following a more induc-
tive approach, first focused on the clusters of Loja and Machala, repeatedly 
returning to official national figures to contextualise the interpretation of 
more localised research. The fieldwork took place in Ecuador and in-
volved conducting surveys, in-depth interviews (both structured and nar-
rative) with recipients and more general field observations in the selected 
locations. Interviewees also included key informants such as public offic-
ers, academics, politicians and consultants who could enrich the under-
standing of the design and practices of social protection in Ecuador. For 
the quantitative aspect of the mixed-methods design for data collection, a 
survey was fielded. The survey was not aimed at producing statistically 
(regional or national) representative data; rather, it was tailored towards 
providing a textured data set for social analysis of employment and social 
protection. Consistent with the diverse case study method, the field data 
contributed to the analysis of the complex and multi-layered social rela-
tions that produce and reinforce informality and exclusion (from social 
protection), and under what circumstances. 
The survey design relied on clustered, stratified and purposive sam-
pling, as discussed in detail in Chapter 5. For reasons of expedience, a 
cluster sampling approach26 was first adopted, selecting the cities of 
Machala and Loja (province capitals) within these provinces. These cities 
were good candidates for cluster sample design. Within each of these clus-
ters, a stratified sampling design was implemented, based on access to 
BDH benefits. Stratified sampling27 was then implemented in such a way 
that it took into account information about the target population structure, 
as codified in the household registries provided. Knowing that only a share 
of the eligible population included in the registries were eligible for BDH 
transfers, and that eventually some would be ‘graduated’, that is, would no 
longer receive BDH transfers, the sampling aimed at accounting for 
enough variation. The sampling sought to include (1) respondents in 
households that at the time of the survey received BDH transfers; (2) re-
spondents in households that were not receiving BDH transfers at the 
time of the survey, but had received it in the past (i.e. had graduated); and 
(3) recipients in households that had not received any BDH transfer at all, 
although they were considered eligible (part of the target population as per 
the Registro Social records). The decision to stratify the sample was based 
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on the need to assure a certain degree of representativeness in these sub-
samples, given their reduced size. Yet, after a first immersion in the field, 
the procedure was somewhat adapted, as summarised in Figure 1.1 and 
discussed at length in Chapter 5, in response to a more grounded and con-
textualised understanding of social protection and employment in these 
cities. Following a nested approach, the analysis of quantitative data pro-
ceeds as in Figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 Nested research design 
 
Source: The author. 
 
Data is taken mostly from publicly available statistical sources, mainly28 
ENEMDU survey data (for descriptive statistics, see Table 1.3). Although 
the ENEMDU survey includes a module for generating indicators on in-
formal sector employment and informal employment, it should be noted 
that data accuracy is dubious. As mentioned in Chen et al. (1999), national 
employment statistics fail to capture the less visible activities within the 
informal sector, such as home-based female workers. Nevertheless, time 
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series analysis of labour survey data is used to lay the groundwork for the 
study of informality, following official definitions29 adopted by INEC. 
Table 1.3 Descriptive statistics ENEMDU data 2007–2015, selected variables 
  Woman Age Married 
Cohabit-
ing Single 
House-
hold 
head Spouse 
2007	 mean	 0.505	 28.902	 0.255	 0.123	 0.284	 0.249	 0.169	
	 s.d.	 -0.5	 -21.021	 -0.436	 -0.329	 -0.451	 -0.432	 -0.374	
2008	 mean	 0.508	 29.681	 0.256	 0.123	 0.297	 0.248	 0.168	
	 s.d.	 -0.5	 -21.266	 -0.436	 -0.328	 -0.457	 -0.432	 -0.373	
2009	 mean	 0.507	 30.706	 0.258	 0.12	 0.305	 0.249	 0.165	
	 s.d.	 -0.5	 -21.749	 -0.438	 -0.325	 -0.461	 -0.433	 -0.371	
2010	 mean	 0.506	 31.502	 0.256	 0.121	 0.306	 0.254	 0.165	
	 s.d.	 -0.5	 -22.047	 -0.437	 -0.326	 -0.461	 -0.435	 -0.371	
2011	 mean	 0.511	 32.024	 0.27	 0.125	 0.291	 0.268	 0.173	
	 s.d.	 -0.5	 -22.213	 -0.444	 -0.331	 -0.454	 -0.443	 -0.379	
2012	 mean	 0.509	 33.027	 0.263	 0.123	 0.311	 0.269	 0.17	
	 s.d.	 -0.5	 -22.492	 -0.44	 -0.329	 -0.463	 -0.444	 -0.376	
2013	 mean	 0.509	 33.027	 0.263	 0.123	 0.311	 0.269	 0.17	
	 s.d.	 -0.5	 -22.492	 -0.44	 -0.329	 -0.463	 -0.444	 -0.376	
2014	 mean	 0.505	 29	 0.237	 0.152	 0.276	 0.258	 0.174	
	 s.d.	 -0.5	 -20.851	 -0.425	 -0.359	 -0.447	 -0.438	 -0.379	
2015	 mean	 0.506	 29.091	 0.235	 0.16	 0.271	 0.268	 0.178	
	 s.d.	 -0.5	 -20.839	 -0.424	 -0.367	 -0.444	 -0.443	 -0.382	
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Em-
ployed 
Unem-
ployed Inactive 
BDH re-
cipient Migrant 
Labour 
income Urban 
2007	 mean	 0.444	 0.002	 0.554	 0.075	 0.17	 306.14	 0.663	
	 s.d.	 -0.497	 -0.044	 -0.497	 -0.263	 -0.376	 -617.68	 -0.473	
2008	 mean	 0.428	 0.002	 0.569	 0.08	 0.163	 313.14	 0.663	
	 s.d.	 -0.495	 -0.048	 -0.495	 -0.271	 -0.37	 -629.79	 -0.473	
2009	 mean	 0.433	 0.002	 0.565	 0.099	 0.15	 303.87	 0.664	
	 s.d.	 -0.496	 -0.04	 -0.496	 -0.298	 -0.357	 -434.98	 -0.472	
2010	 mean	 0.423	 0.001	 0.575	 0.098	 0.151	 346.36	 0.664	
	 s.d.	 -0.494	 -0.039	 -0.494	 -0.297	 -0.358	 -592.73	 -0.472	
2011	 mean	 0.431	 0.001	 0.569	 0.102	 0.125	 368.19	 0.664	
	 s.d.	 -0.495	 -0.029	 -0.495	 -0.302	 -0.331	 -468.11	 -0.472	
2012	 mean	 0.431	 0.001	 0.568	 0.114	 0.193	 403.03	 0.664	
	 s.d.	 -0.495	 -0.028	 -0.495	 -0.318	 -0.395	 -651.56	 -0.472	
2013	 mean	 0.431	 0.001	 0.568	 0.114	 0.193	 403.03	 0.664	
	 s.d.	 -0.495	 -0.028	 -0.495	 -0.318	 -0.395	 -651.56	 -0.472	
2014	 mean	 0.425	 0.001	 0.574	 0.061	 0.243	 469.41	 0.678	
	 s.d.	 -0.494	 -0.034	 -0.494	 -0.239	 -0.429	 -677.95	 -0.467	
2015	 mean	 0.431	 0.002	 0.568	 0.057	 0.25	 485.53	 0.68	
	 s.d.	 -0.495	 -0.042	 -0.495	 -0.232	 -0.433	 -783.91	 -0.466	
 
Note: Labour income expressed in US$. Dummy variables expressed as yes=1 | no=0. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ENEMDU survey data (INEC) 2007–15. 
 
This in turn is complemented by fieldwork data, a survey and a series of 
interviews collected by the author between 2013 and 2015, in three ex-
tended field visits in the provinces of Loja and El Oro in southern Ecua-
dor. The sampling for the fieldwork survey30 was disproportionately 
weighted towards cash transfer recipients (see Table 1.4), about which 
population there is only thin data in national employment statistics 
(ENEMDU data). Thus, it is neither generalisable to the rest of the female 
population nor representative of the totality of the labour force. However, 
it centres on a marginal population, that is, female informal workers, in-
sufficiently accounted for in national data. The survey was fielded using a 
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large national database on BDH beneficiaries, Registro Social survey, as 
the initial sampling frame. Registro Social is the database used to record 
and identify information on poor households for later allocation of trans-
fers under the BDH scheme. The sample was restricted to the cities of 
Machala and Loja and their surroundings and urban centres within these 
provinces. The survey followed a two-stage sampling design: first, by se-
lecting census blocks within Loja and Machala cities; second, by selecting 
households,31 over-sampling those who were relatively close to the poverty 
line set for the BDH programme, yet accounting for enough variation and 
the inclusion of ‘graduated’ recipients. Additional observations were in-
cluded, since the random sample based on Registro Social failed to reach 
informal workers and transient households. These populations are partic-
ularly hard to see through conventional methods, for example random 
sampling, which is why other non-random sampling methods32 were ap-
plied in this phase. 
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Table 1.4 Descriptive statistics fieldwork survey data 2013,  
respondents 16 years old and above only  
 Loja Machala 
 mean s.d. mean s.d. 
Age 39.209  (13.714) 43.458  (15.661) 
Woman 0.900  (0.300) 0.884  (0.321) 
BDH (maternity) 0.419  (0.494) 0.251  (0.434) 
BDH (pension) 0.016  (0.124) 0.107  (0.309) 
CDH 0.006  (0.079) 0.019  (0.136) 
BDH (graduated) 0.266  (0.442) 0.351  (0.478) 
Time BDH (years) 11.137  (10.097) 6.019  (8.582) 
Never a recipient 0.284  (0.452) 0.270  (0.444) 
Active population 0.825  (0.381) 0.536  (0.499) 
Employed 0.781  (0.414) 0.445  (0.498) 
Unemployed 0.044  (0.205) 0.082  (0.274) 
Always inactive 0.109  (0.313) 0.201  (0.401) 
Dropped out labour force 0.066  (0.248) 0.273  (0.446) 
Education level (1=primary or 
more) 1.047  (0.420) 1.285  (0.586) 
Household head 0.441  (0.497) 0.492  (0.501) 
Has children 0.828  (0.378) 0.784  (0.412) 
Disabled 0.050  (0.218) 0.248  (0.432) 
Observations 320 319 
Note: Dummy variables expressed as yes=1/no=0. 
Respondents that did not indicate their age were dropped from the sample. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on fieldwork data, 2013. 
 
Due to the sampling design, which accounted for the most salient charac-
teristics of cash transfer recipients and informal workers, many variables 
are skewed. The chapter operationalises a methodological alternative, ex-
plicitly considering such data complexity. Multiple Correspondence Anal-
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ysis (MCA) is used for the visualisation of survey data, allowing for a mul-
tivariate exploration of the data and simplifying complex structures (Fer-
ragina et al., 2012). This is an application of Correspondence Analysis, as 
pioneered by Bourdieu (1979). The method is applied to explore the rela-
tionships among several categories (and categorical variables), allowing for 
incomplete a priori expectations as to the nature and direction of such 
relations. The approach is not probabilistic‚ therefore is not aimed at pre-
dicting any value. It is tailored toward examining the relations between 
categories of variables, by means of using contingency tables, represented 
in two-dimensional maps. Such transformation allows for a clear visuali-
sation between variables and categories of variables, useful in uncovering 
relationships. Yet it should be noted that this choice of method is suitable 
for small-n studies only (Asselin & Anh, 2008) and is presented as com-
plementary to large-N regression methods previously discussed.  
Correspondence analysis was chosen as an alternative to traditional hy-
pothesis testing, which focuses on verifying relations between variables 
and is usually couched at the micro level, for example individuals and 
households. In such studies, the most salient method is logistic regression, 
assuming the relationship between the outcome variable, for example sta-
tus in employment, and the predictors, for example access to social pro-
tection, are linear. To serve this purpose, the variables also need to be 
metric, and furthermore, normally distributed. However, many categorical 
variables pertaining to the study of access to social protection or status at 
work, if plugged into a logistic regression, would limit the analysis given 
lack of information on their extreme values. In addition, most probabilistic 
methods consider binary responses only, reproducing the bias in treating 
informality as a binary or dual outcome. More importantly, such choice in 
method would assume that the independent variables are not themselves 
highly intercorrelated. In the study of labour segregation and access to 
social protection, that is a problematic assumption. There are high levels 
of multicollinearity associated with the design of the cash transfer pro-
gramme. In quantifying the impact of cash transfers on informality, it is 
difficult to establish the direction of causation: recipients might qualify as 
such because they are informal workers, while others are staying in infor-
mality in order to secure eligibility for the programme. Ignoring this can 
lead to a causal fallacy.  
Following an inductive approach, MCA aims at identifying and explor-
ing systematic relations between variables without necessarily looking at 
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mere conjectures. Thus, a heuristic instrument serves the exploration of 
data and the visualisation of complex family-work relations operating and 
reinforcing each other. Adopting this approach for survey analysis makes 
it possible to explore patterns and trends without having to fully sacrifice 
the complexity of households. It also aims to provide a methodological 
alternative to the study of social policies and their influence on employ-
ment variables, explicitly considering the complexity and feedback loops 
that operate in the labour market. 
1.8 Dissertation outline 
This chapter has introduced the research project, describing the research 
problem and the method of inquiry, and introducing key concepts opera-
tionalised in the text. Chapter 2 continues the discussion on informality as 
a theoretical dilemma: do individuals choose to go or stay informal? It 
reviews the various accounts of informality and the documented conse-
quences in terms of social policy design. From a critical review of the main 
literature in informality, it seeks to contrast key insights from structuralist 
economics with the mainstream view on informality as perverse and par-
asitic behaviour. Following the focus of this dissertation, the primary doc-
umented interrelations between labour market functioning and state reg-
ulation are revisited in more detail, as per the main initiative devised in 
Latin America: cash transfers.  
Chapter 3 starts with an overview of the normative basis of social pro-
tection in Ecuador and how it has played out since colonial times, as one 
strategy of incorporation of populations has yielded to the next. It offers 
a historical account of social protection and associated employment re-
gimes prior to the turn to targeted social assistance in Ecuador as a means 
to counterweigh recent criticism of cash-based welfare initiatives, examin-
ing ongoing histories of dependency and exclusion that have accompanied 
welfare provisioning in Ecuador since its inception. This chapter describes 
the ways in which marginalised populations, in particular women and mi-
norities, have been partially incorporated into key transformations in so-
cial policy, sketching histories of ongoing exclusions that have accompa-
nied the expansion of social insurance and the creation of social assistance 
programmes. The chapter introduces the concepts of legibility, solidarity 
and (co)responsibility according to which welfare provisioning defines the 
subjects to be integrated into social insurance schemes or, more recently, 
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targeted by social assistance interventions. By doing so, it revisits the sim-
ultaneous gendered projects of legibility in Ecuador whereby mostly male 
mestizos living in urban areas were deemed visible as workers while most 
indigenous persons living in rural areas remained excluded from substan-
tive citizenship, let alone formal employment, and women, regardless of 
their ethnic background or location, were cast as inactive dependent sub-
jects. The chapter provides a close examination of social welfare provi-
sioning prior to cash transfers, for example the establishment of social 
insurance and pension funds, before transitioning towards the new social, 
as marked by the adoption of targeted social assistance in the country. 
Chapter 4 offers an institutionalist discussion on the adoption of social 
protection provisioning in Ecuador. It argues that social protection instru-
ments cannot simply be reduced to mechanisms of co-option as per ac-
counts that underscore the role of international financial institutions (IFIs) 
in the design and dissemination of CCTs, or the mere adoption of new 
bureaucratic rationalities as per results-oriented rationales aimed at assur-
ing taxpayers that public funds are well spent. Rather, recent institutional 
trajectories of social protection are interpreted as elements of governmen-
tal aspiration invested in by both international networks and local actors. 
Amendments and additions to the BDH programme reflect the intermit-
tent interest in addressing the labour market problem, without having re-
sulted in a substantive recoupling of social and employment policy. In-
stead, the inconsistent government attempts to set up an alternative social 
protection system fit into a rhetoric of technical poverty alleviation in-
formed by international and domestic experts’ networks. For instance, the 
balance shifted from risk management towards conditionality, or from 
conditionality towards building a social floor. Prioritised groups have also 
changed, for example from early childhood to the elderly. These changes 
are supported by documentary research and complemented with qualita-
tive work, as per conversations held during field visits to Ecuador. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the cities of Loja and Machala in southern Ecua-
dor and my experience conducting social surveys there. The chapter dis-
cusses some of the crucial methodological dilemmas found in combining 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. Surveys proved to be effective in 
reaching a large number of respondents and collecting comparable infor-
mation from across the group. This data contributed to sketching out gen-
eral patterns and contrasting preliminary insights obtained through inter-
views and participant observation. However, there was a deeper motive 
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behind the decision to field my own survey: to understand how the state 
uses these large-scale surveys to inform policy design. In this context, sur-
veys were revisited not only as a method for data collection but as a way 
to deconstruct how the state organises households, selects recipients and 
audits delivered social benefits. The survey, while yielding preliminary in-
sights on societal changes, also raised many questions and suggested a 
number of dark corners in this sort of statistical tool, such as the uneasi-
ness of locating informants, inconsistencies in official households’ regis-
ters, along with the well-known difficulties of applying survey question-
naires. Although this complexity could have been smoothed out and the 
focus turned toward building a representative sample of households, the 
decision was made to further explore the sources of these inconsistencies. 
There was something striking in this untidiness, in particular when con-
sidering the household as a fixed unit of analysis. In order to do justice to 
this complexity, this chapter focuses on the process of doing a social sur-
vey, not on the findings, and advances some reflections on the main chal-
lenges experienced in the field. By doing so, it sets out to break down the 
simplifications required to advance a household survey, and reveals some 
of its conceptual problems and methodological gaps. 
Chapters 6 and 7 provide an empirical basis for studying structural la-
bour market dynamics, by examining employment on both the macro and 
the micro level. By means of quantitative analysis based on labour market 
trends and exit and entry patterns across occupational categories using 
transition matrices, evidence is provided on the various structural con-
straints restricting employment choices, as well as on the broader condi-
tions generating and perpetuating informalisation. Such an understanding 
sets the stage for contending that cash transfers have been a marginal in-
fluence on informality. Chapter 733 analyses Ecuador’s conditional cash 
transfer programme, the Bono de Desarrollo Humano, at the micro level. 
The chapter examines the effects of BDH on labour market outcomes in 
Ecuador for the period 2007–14, with a particular focus on inactivity and 
occupational segregation, drawing insights from national surveys and 
more localised research conducted by the author. The key finding is that 
concerns about perverse incentives appear to be largely misplaced. By ex-
amining broader patterns of the institutionalisation of occupational sex 
segregation, it argues that the role of cash transfers is relatively trivial in 
comparison with other factors driving the deepening of informality and 
inactivity among recipients. A closer look at the cases of Loja and Machala 
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sheds light on the more specific aspects of segregation among the target 
population, often associated with the family system. The chapter stresses 
that the recent emphasis on targeted modalities of social protection have 
played a marginal role in the struggle against gender segregation—a struc-
tural configuration of the labour market—with limited transformative im-
pact on the marginalised mass of female part-time workers. Other individ-
ual qualifiers, such as age and ethnicity, are also considered in the analysis, 
as they interact with sex-based segregation to further segment the labour 
market and social protection systems.  
Chapter 8 returns to the more normative aspects accompanying the 
adoption of CCTs. The chapter argues that processes of discrimination 
and marginalisation, including informalisation, have remained poorly ad-
dressed by most recent cash transfer programmes. What is more, these 
processes have also been obscured by the emphasis on poverty reduction 
in recent policies, moving away from the objectives of universalisation and 
substantive redistribution. What could be interpreted as a mere collection 
of contingent processes in welfare provisioning in Ecuador is revisited in 
this chapter, thereby making sense of the changing modes of administer-
ing recipient populations and organising targeted programmes, which in 
turn allows us to re-assess the resulting fragmented or, more precisely, bi-
furcated nature of the social protection system. In this light, the govern-
ment can be seen as reactive, reorganising some dimensions of welfare 
provisioning to protect workers and their (future) labour capacity from 
detrimental choices, for example disinvesting in human capital, welfare 
dependency, inactivity and so forth. In fact, the creation of the BDH 
aimed at responding to the problems of high levels of informality in the 
country, arguably a residual of failed incorporation attempts into formal 
stratified regimes by the end of the twentieth century. Given its reactive 
nature, it has tended to mimic persistent gendered stratification in the la-
bour market, as per familism. Accompanying factors, such as stratification 
based on ethnic background, derived from differences across groups in 
employment attachment, have further stratified the labour market and 
continue to be translated into differences in access to social protection. 
To make sense of these changes, the chapter relies on recipients’ critical 
descriptions of the challenges of integration into temporary, sporadic, sub-
sidiary social assistance programmes, extending the analysis to narratives 
of partial integration in the labour market—as informality is often associ-
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ated with marginalised populations, mostly women and ethnic minori-
ties—and in the practices of social protection as narrated by social workers 
in southern Ecuador. By doing so, the chapter contests signals trajectories 
of differences resulting from the tensions and contradictions in social pro-
tection design. 
Chapter 9 brings the dissertation to a close. While it is the case that 
CCT programmes, as originally conceived, do not aim at correcting em-
ployment segregation in practice, they nonetheless have an impact on em-
ployment outcomes and social inclusion more broadly. Therefore the fo-
cus is on the theoretical relevance given to this model of social protection 
and the close examination of the various debates on whether these sorts 
of policies effectively shape recipients’ behaviour, employment in particu-
lar. Most of the studies on the impact of CCTs abstract them from the 
socio-economic processes and structural forces that drive poverty and ex-
clusion. Poverty tends to be reduced to the lack of ready cash and recipi-
ents treated as independent decision-making individuals. This dissertation 
has instead focused on bringing to the fore recipients’ economic and social 
position, as primary determinants of their actual choices. Such positioning 
is to a large extent conditioned by sex, age and ethnicity, pushing recipients 
into low-paying jobs and therefore leaving them unable to secure an in-
come or to contribute to a pension fund. Not only do these aspects affect 
the direct experience of poverty among recipient mothers, they also deter-
mine the prospects for welfare reform, due to the strong interdependence 
between employment structures and exclusionary social protection 
schemes. 
Notes 
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1 According to official estimates, about 28.6 per cent of children under 5 years old 
are placed in public childcare. Yet access is limited. It is reported that 98.26 per 
cent of the children spend six hours or less per week in childcare (author’s calcula-
tions based on ECV Living Standards Survey data, INEC 2014). 
2 While marginal, cash transfers nonetheless provide some sort of income support 
to an otherwise invisible, unprotected and marginalised segment of the labour force 
in a largely informalised context.  
3 Although the Ecuadorian cash transfer programme has not given as much em-
phasis to the monitoring of conditionalities as it has to targeting mechanisms, it 
still follows the regional trends in social protection. 
4 Citizens’ Revolution was the denomination used by the administration of Presi-
dent Rafael Correa (2007–2017) to denote the changes introduced in the country’s 
development agenda.  Other terms include: ‘Good Living’, as found in the first two 
National Development Plans of 2007–10 and 2009–13 (Secretaría Nacional de Pla-
nificación y Desarrollo, 2010); Socialism  of Good Living, used in the most recent 
National Development Plan (National Secretariat of Planning and Development, 
2013, p. 18); or 21st Century Socialism, as first used by former President Correa in 
April 2007 (Ecuador Inmediato, 2007). 
5 As noted by Weisbrot et al. ‘[T]he 2008 constitution reverses the mandate of the 
1998 constitution that had made the Central Bank formally independent of the 
government, with its most important responsibility to ensure price stability. The 
Central Bank became part of the economic team of the executive branch’ (2017, p. 
3). This, together with other ‘innovative and important reforms’ adopted under 
Correa’s administration, were underscored before the 2017 presidential elections 
by a group of acclaimed economists urging the Ecuadorian population to prevent 
a return of Neoliberalism (Chang & Galbraith, 2017), arguably represented by the 
opposition candidate, Guillermo Lasso. Nonetheless, some Ecuadorian scholars 
have challenged the ‘innovative’ character of this reform in particular, arguing that 
absorbing the central bank into the government’s executive branch should raise 
some concerns, as they argue, one of the main causes of Ecuador’s crisis in 1999 
crisis was precisely the lack of independence of the central bank (Uribe-Teran & 
Vega-Garcia, 2017). 
6 Namely, the introduction in 2009 of a domestic liquidity requirement (of 45%) 
for banks, increased to more than 80% by 2015 (Weisbrot et al., 2017). Next to 
expanded liquidity, monetary policy also kept interest rates low (International La-
bour Organization, 2014). 
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7 Although they warn that this expenditure is pro-cyclical: ‘the government spend-
ing cycle [for the period 2007:Q1–2016:Q3] almost perfectly matches the eco-
nomic cycle. It increases during expansionary periods and declines during slow-
downs’ (Uribe-Teran & Vega-Garcia, 2017). 
8 Fondo Ecuatoriano de Inversión en los Sectores Energético e Hidrocarburífero 
(FEISEH or Ecuadorian Fund for Investment in the Energy and Hydrocarbons 
Sectors), a fund fed by oil revenues that had legal locks limiting its use by central 
government to the energy sector only. 
9 Some Ecuadorian economists challenge this view, arguing Correa’s administra-
tion only marginally benefited from higher oil prices and increased revenues, 
namely, ‘oil prices and revenue during 2000:Q1 to 2006:Q4 were much lower than 
those during Correa’s administration, suggesting that Correa´s Revolución Ciudadana 
fell short in producing economic growth through government intervention, even 
in the presence of extraordinary revenue flows’ (Uribe-Teran & Vega-Garcia, 
2017). 
10 Related to this, note the mining acts of 2000 and 2009, which established the 
Ecuadorian state as ‘the owner of all mineral wealth in the country’ (Arsel et al., 
2014, p. 121). 
11 In the series 2006–2014 available at SIISE-BCE-eSIGEF (2017), the figures dif-
fer from those presented in Weisbrot et al. (2017) by +0.1 percentage points for 
the years 2008 and 2014. 
12 The Salario Digno or ‘dignified wage’ ‘was defined as the cost of a basic family 
basket divided by the number of household members. Components included the 
salary or monthly salary and the proportional part of the 13th and 14th salaries, 
profit sharing and reserve funds’ (International Labour Organization, 2014, p. 7). 
13 From a total economically active population of 4.431 million people (data for 
urban areas only). There are no estimates of informal employment available for 
rural areas (ILO, 2012). Although the most recent employment household survey 
(ENEMDU) is available, there is not an official domestic estimate of informal em-
ployment. The National Department of Statistics (INEC) estimates data for em-
ployment in the informal sector only, which reached 52 per cent of the population. 
14 After Paraguay, where the share of persons in informal employment outside the 
informal sector reaches 32.8 per cent (Statistical update on employment in the in-
formal economy, 2012). 
15 See Ferguson (2015) for a discussion on mineral extraction and other sources of 
(and obstacles to) distributive schemes.  
16 CEPAL estimates the total coverage by multiplying the number of beneficiary 
households by the average number of household members in the poorest quintile 
of the nearest year (Programas de Transferencias Condicionadas—Base de datos de programas 
de asistencia social en América Latina y el Caribe, 2012). 
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17 The retirement pension will only be accessible after 240 monthly contributions, 
that is, after 20 years of contributions (MCDS, 2017). 
18 It is worth noting that the official definition of employment in the informal 
sector in Ecuador changed over the years of this PhD project. Before 2015, the 
informal sector was defined in terms of the number of persons employed (that 
is, enterprises with ten workers or less), registration and bookkeeping practices. 
In 2015, the INEC changed its definition in terms of registration only (INEC, 
2015), resulting in a reduction in the share of informal sector employment, at 
least according to official estimates, thus confirming its contingent nature. 
19 This would imply the presence of a lax regulatory regime that allows for the 
‘informal’ option. 
20 Following Esping-Andersen, a system of stratification can be seen as ‘an active 
force in the ordering of social relations’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 23), mainly in 
relation to class, without a clear focus on other social structures, such as those 
determined by the sexual division of labour (Martínez Franzoni, 2008). 
21 Where the utility function is determined by !(#, %), with L indicating hours of 
leisure and C consumption.  
22 ' +) * − # = -% with N is unearned income (i.e. transfer), W is the wage 
rate, T is the total time available, L is leisure time, P is the price of consumption 
goods and C is consumption. 
23 While these early forms of social insurance excluded non-formal workers, this 
began to change in the late 1990s as Ecuador joined other Latin American coun-
tries in expanding social assistance to the informally employed. Arguably, the BDH 
programme was devised as a response to earlier failed attempts to integrate pau-
perised workers into formal protection schemes and, by default, into formal em-
ployment. Nevertheless, BDH funds are allocated at the household level, assuming 
collective benefits derived from labour income and state transfers. 
24 34 per cent, according to the Ecuadorian Central Bank (BCE) competitiveness 
report, retrieved from http://www.bce.fin.ec/documentos/PublicacionesNo-
tas/Competitividad/Estudios/ae17.pdf. 
25 For an extensive description of these dynamics, see RIMISP reports in rural 
poverty and Loja’s case study at http://www.rimisp.org.  
26 Following Lewis-Beck et al. (2004), cluster sampling is a probability sampling 
procedure in which elements of the population are randomly selected in naturally 
occurring groupings, e.g. clusters at the city level. 
27 This sampling technique allows for the subjects in the sample to be reflected in 
the same proportions as those in the population. 
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28 Complemented by Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida or ECV (Living Standards 
Survey) data for 2014, census data and administrative registries retrieved from 
INEC, various years. 
29 Note that both ‘informal employment’ and ‘employment in the informal sector’ 
refer to different aspects of the ‘informalisation’ of employment. For informal em-
ployment indicators, the chapter uses as a proxy the number of workers excluded 
from contributory social insurance. Employment in the informal sector refers only 
to those workers employed by informal enterprises—conditional on the country’s 
definition of what an informal enterprise is, e.g. unregistered enterprises. 
30 The survey was carried out mostly at the workplace to avoid excluding rural-to-
urban day migrants and to reduce disclosure of occupation or economic activity. It 
provides information on the respondent’s’ basic socio-economic conditions, work-
ing conditions and access to welfare support. The survey questionnaire contained 
103 questions distributed across 12 modules that solicited information on house-
hold composition, education, employment status (different modules for employed, 
unemployed and inactive respondents), conditions at primary and secondary occu-
pations, satisfaction with working conditions, compliance with labour regulation, 
conditions of participation in the BDH programme and access to CDH credit. 
31 Data was acquired from the household head or his/her partner for 84 per cent 
of the households listed in the sample obtained from Registro Social located in 
Loja and Machala across 44 different census blocks.  
32 Non-random methods included respondent-driven sampling and location-based 
sampling.  
33 An earlier version of this chapter was pusblished in the context of UNU-
WIDER’s series on the political economy of social protection systems, entitled 
‘Institutionalizing segregation: Conditional cash transfers and employment 
choices’. 2016/91. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. 
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2 Going Informal? Informality as a Theoretical Dilemma 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the 1990s, there has been a growing consensus on the deepening of 
informality. The share of workers in the informal economy has either 
grown or remained constant in the global economy. There has not been a 
sustained increase in formal job opportunities despite economic growth 
and expansion of global trade. Further, a growing proportion of workers 
in the formal sector are unprotected (Bacchetta et al., 2009). Informality 
has thus become the rule rather than the exception (Razavi & Hassim, 
2006).  
With the increase of informality, unregulated workers receive little, if 
any, access to welfare and work-related benefits. Because of this, more 
attention has been given to informal and/or non-standard employment 
and the accompanying erosion of state-provided welfare benefits 
(UNRISD-WIEGO, 2012). ‘Extending social protection to all’ is the call 
for action (led by ILO) at this time, and this call seems to be welcomed in 
policy making (Lund, 2009), and was even made part of the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development as a target under Goal 1: ‘Implement nation-
ally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including 
floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vul-
nerable.’1 The debate is now centred on the way in which social protection 
is understood and implemented, and the conditions under which it is made 
accessible to workers (or not). Informality has significant repercussions 
for social protection provision—and vice versa. In informal settings, the 
constitutive elements of formal and conventional employment relations 
are basically non-existent. As more and more people engage in informal 
activities, the demand for non-contributory social protection increases. 
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However, discussions on social protection and perspectives on informality 
remain poorly connected.  
Contemporary literature on social protection and employment out-
comes has tended to focus on incentives. It is thus claimed that workers 
opt into informality in order to access social assistance while evading con-
tributions and other fees, and therefore that if they are provided with the 
right incentives, informal workers will upgrade into formal (and more pro-
ductive) activities. However, when recalling more structural perspectives 
on informality, the interconnectedness between employment and social 
protection becomes more complicated. Stating that informality is an out-
come of individual choice becomes problematic in the light of the struc-
tural restrictions affecting employment levels.  
 Furthermore, the adoption of non-contributory forms of social pro-
tection has opened new lines of inquiry: have cash transfers led to a de-
linking of social and labour policies? Some would argue tjat conditional 
cash transfers, as non-contributory forms of social protection, have re-
sulted in a delinking of social and labour policies, inasmuch as the benefits 
provided through them are not directly linked to employment status. Ra-
ther, worker status in employment is seen as incidental. Yet it has been 
suggested that these policy instruments, cash transfers in particular, work 
most effectively when complemented by employment policies, as per the 
work of United Nations Research Institute for Social Development or 
UNRISD between 2011 and 2013 in the context of the project Labour 
Markets and Social Policy: Gendered Connections. Thus, despite ap-
proaches that distance social protection from employment, the connec-
tions between them remain strong. Consequently, this chapter sets out to 
integrate employment back into the discussion around social protection, 
as highlighted by authors such as Heintz and Lund (2012). There is an 
implicit risk in adapting to informality and remodelling policy instruments 
according to its reality, instead of incorporating strategies to change and 
improve workers’ conditions and employment opportunities.  
While most authors agree that informality persists, they offer different 
explanations for what is driving it. By exploring the main documented ac-
counts on informality as a category that problematises both labour and 
social policies, this chapter sets out to address the employment question 
first, then move to the tacit social policy responses, building upon the dif-
ferent conceptualisations of informality. As a result, various interrelations 
between labour market functioning and state regulation are contested. The 
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chapter begins by laying out the conceptual framework, drawing on a crit-
ical review of the main literature on informality and bringing to the fore 
key insights from seminal work on the topic. These definitions are used in 
the second section to organise the literature on social protection re-
sponses, in particular employment promotion policies. A critical assess-
ment of the assumptions implicit in the implementation of social protec-
tion schemes closes the chapter. 
2.2 The formal/informal dichotomy 
There is an important caveat in the study of informality as an analytical 
category. As Breman pointed out in the 1970s, the informal sector cannot 
be demarcated as a separate economic compartment and/or labour situa-
tion. What is more, he argued, interpreting the relationship to the formal 
sector in a dualistic framework with mutually exclusive characteristics ob-
scures the unity and totality of the productive system (Breman, 1976). De-
spite these limitations, informality as an analytical category is used insofar 
as it problematises the very heart of social policy design: the state ambit of 
regulation and protection. 
Scholars have advanced a wide variety of qualitative distinctions in their 
attempts to delimit the formal and informal segments of the economy. By 
and large, the literature is categorised under three dominant perspectives: 
dualist, structuralist and legalist (see Chen et al., 2004; Portes & Haller, 
2005; Jütting & de Laiglesia, 2009; Phillips, 2011). The dualist label in-
cludes the authors and theories that understand the informal sector as 
marginal and transitory (Lewis, 1954; Harris & Todaro, 1970; Hart 1973). 
They are regarded as dual because of the theoretical assumption underly-
ing their view of labour markets: informal activities are rooted in the lack 
of modern opportunities to absorb surplus labour (Chen et al., 2004). 
Early dualists assumed that informality would gradually disappear as mod-
ernisation and the expansion of formal markets created formal employ-
ment. Yet as modernisation spread in the 1970s, atypical employment ar-
rangements actually deepened.2 In fact, what Chen et al. (ibid.) labelled 
structuralist perspectives emerged as a strong critique of the optimism that 
accompanied early dualism. Authors such as Furtado (1965), Moser (1978) 
and Portes et al. (1989) presented informality not as marginal and transi-
tory but as functional to the capitalist system. They suggested that the in-
formal sector should be seen as the set of subordinated economic units 
and workers that serve to reduce input and labour costs to the benefit of 
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larger firms. Thus, small- and large-scale firms are considered part of an 
interdependent mode of production (Chen et al., 2004). Thinking along 
the lines of Li, this small-scale production results from labour that is sur-
plus to capital’s requirements (2010, p. 87), that is to say, by workers which 
are not gainfully absorbed by the capitalist system—mainly rural people 
dispossessed of their land. In this way, they are kept within the system due 
to their functionality, for example willingness to work at lower wages. 
Lastly, legalism emerged as a third wave in the study of informality, em-
phasising illegality and property rights. Legalists attempted to release in-
formality from the rigidities of the structuralist perspective. Popularised 
by de Soto (1989), this view interpreted the informal sector as comprised 
of micro-entrepreneurs, somewhat blocked by excessive regulation. Con-
sequently, proponents of this view advocate for deregulation alongside the 
formalisation of property rights.  
This interpretation differs somewhat from the categorisation explained 
above. Even structuralist interpretations of informality seem to adhere to 
a dualist perspective in as much as they insist on a rigid (yet systemic) 
divide between the formal and informal sectors of the economy. As both 
dualists and structuralists recognise informality as a segment of the labour 
market, they are grouped under a broad dual label. Under this dual label, 
two important groups can be identified. The first includes those accounts 
that make a stricter use of the dual framing, depicting informality as tran-
sitory and expected to disappear as development advances (as per mod-
ernisation theories). The second group includes those accounts that offer 
a more systemic view of informality, understanding it as an outcome of 
processes of marginalisation within development. Current approaches are 
more difficult to typify, as they often combine several of the aforemen-
tioned views, in particular dualist accounts. An additional third typology 
presented in this chapter synthesises the mainstream view, which is built 
upon neoclassical microeconomics. It includes the ‘legalist’ perspective in-
troduced by de Soto—which fits into the new institutional economics and 
the voluntary or exit option, which sees informality as a mix of incomplete 
markets, cost–benefit analysis and parasitic behaviour.  
2.2.1 Dualistic interpretations 
Most dualist authors define a theoretical line to divide the formal and in-
formal categories. Each of them has advanced their own version of this 
segmentation. For some, it results from the incomplete transition from a 
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rural economy to an urbanised one. Tania Li challenges such linear think-
ing, implicit in the ‘agrarian transition’, and further theorises the notion of 
‘surplus population’ as those dispossessed in the process, with their labour 
surplus to capital requirements (Li, 2010). For others, informality is rather 
intended. It is the outcome of marginalisation with capitalist production 
(see Moser, 1978).     
Implicit in the dual paradigm are two notions. First, informal firms are 
less efficient. Second, they exist because of the inefficiencies caused by 
segmented markets. Along these lines, informal activities might be ‘toler-
ated’ in the short term, but as soon as conditions improve they should be 
upgraded to avoid harming the efficiency of the economic system. Other-
wise, this segment of the workforce will remain at low levels of labour 
productivity, that is, underemployed. 
The legacy of modernisation theories 
Modernisation theories aimed to explain the transition from traditional 
and backward modes of production towards modern, organised and highly 
specialised ones (Eisenstadt, 1974). Lewis’s work is considered the corner-
stone of dualism in economic development, in particular his classic article 
‘Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour’ (1954). The 
author explained the notion of an unlimited supply of labour in countries 
where the population is too large relative to capital and natural resources, 
with a large segment of the labour force remaining at subsistence levels 
and negligible levels of labour productivity.  
Drawing on the idea of incomplete transition to modernisation, Harris 
and Todaro (1970) advanced a model to explain rural–urban migration in 
which traditional features persist in the labour market. This model (known 
as the H-T model) explained informality as the only option available for 
surplus labour migrating from rural to urban areas. Informality was seen 
as transitory, related to early stages of economic growth. This notion of 
incompleteness underpinned the ‘creation’ of the informal sector as an 
analytical category, as it is widely used today.3  
In the 1950s and 1960s, it was assumed that the informal sector would 
not survive the eventual modernisation of the economic system. Yet, by 
the early 1970s, underemployment had increased (Chen et al., 2004). Re-
gardless of whether modernisation advanced or not, petty trade and small-
scale production persisted. This ‘anomaly’ motivated a set of employment 
missions coordinated by the ILO. One of these missions gained particular 
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relevance in the fields of poverty and employment: the 1972 ILO Employ-
ment Mission in Ghana. Drawing evidence from the study of the migrant 
population in one Northern Ghanaian Group, the mission coined the 
terms ‘working poor’ and ‘informal sector’ to describe the lack of evolu-
tion of the traditional sector (Hart, 1973). In their view, the informal sector 
provided the means of livelihood for new entrants to the urban labour 
force. The mission used the term ‘informal sector’ to distinguish between 
wage employment, recruited on a permanent and regular basis for fixed 
rewards, and self-employment, related to all small-scale and unregistered 
economic activities (ibid.). According to this account, informality was seen 
as the outcome of the decrease in agricultural employment and the inabil-
ity to absorb the new pool of surplus labour in urban areas. 
 Other ILO missions ratified this view, presenting employment, rather 
than unemployment, as the matter in question. For instance, the report 
‘Employment, Incomes and Equality, A Strategy for Increasing Productive 
Employment in Kenya’ (1972) led to the recognition of a structural dis-
tortion of the economy, with a minority of highly rewarded employees and 
a very large number of working poor. The document highlighted the dy-
namism of self-employment activities. This dynamism led to the associa-
tion of informality with survivalist strategies. As a result, it was seen as 
having the potential to generate productive employment for the masses, 
generating optimism about the possibilities of economic growth built 
upon the dynamism of the informal sector.  
Hart had portrayed the informal sector as competitive, labour intensive 
and able to develop its own skills. Reviewers of Hart’s work argue that the 
dynamism he identified in the informal sector was lost when the concept 
was institutionalised within the ILO and redefined in terms of poverty 
(Breman, 1976; Portes & Haller, 2005). The ILO found that poverty and 
informality overlapped, arguing that most of the workers in the informal 
sector lacked access to markets and productive sources. The informal sec-
tor was consolidated then as a site of exclusion and marginalisation, the 
space of the working poor. 
2.2.2 The structural response 
Structural accounts emerged as a response to the theoretical and practical 
difficulties involved in the conceptualisation of the informal sector as it 
emerged in the 1970s. Structuralists clustered around a key assertion: that 
the informal sector did not exist in isolation. Instead, it was directly and 
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structurally connected to the formal economy (Phillips, 2011). Two addi-
tional notions are noteworthy: Marxist approaches and the notion of sur-
plus labour, and post-Keynesian perspectives and the notion of disguised 
unemployment, as advanced by Robinson (1936). 
Lewis hinted at Marx’s notion of ‘reserve army’ to account not only for 
displaced workers, but also for the self-employed and petty capitalists who 
are unable to compete with the large capitalist firms (1954, p. 144). Similar 
dynamics were identified by structuralists, such as Furtado and Prebisch. 
These early insights have influenced current structuralist perspectives by 
conceptualising petty production as intrinsic to capitalism and purposively 
incorporated by it (Harriss-White, 2006). Li, in her reading of Marx, noted 
that the concept of ‘relative surplus population’4 highlighted the continu-
ous tendency of capital to concentrate labour’s productive capacity into 
labour-displacing technologies (2010, p. 68). Labour was thus surplus in 
relation to its utility for capital. 
Post-Keynesian perspectives have also influenced structural accounts. 
The seminal work of Robinson (1936) introduced the concept of ‘dis-
guised unemployment’ to account for the number of ‘inferior’ occupations 
that dismissed workers take up when employment shrinks. Departing 
from the premise that full employment is only likely to occur in periods of 
‘abnormally rapid expansion’ (1936, p. 226), Robinson pointed out that a 
decline in the effective demand for work would not lead to complete idle-
ness of the workforce; rather, the lack of public income support would 
drive workers into a number of inferior occupations—those regarded as 
inferior because of their low productivity. Conversely, an increase in em-
ployment would only take place if the workers’ time were transferred from 
inferior occupations towards others with higher productivity. Yet it was 
not until 1982 that the ILO coined the official term ‘underemployment’ 
to account for workers who could not gain entry into the modern econ-
omy and remained in low-productivity activities (see Portes & Haller, 
2005). 
Informality as bifurcation 
An alternative to the Lewis dual model was developed by Furtado (1965), 
for whom dualism led to underdevelopment and not to capitalist expan-
sion as proposed by Lewis (1954).5 In a somewhat similar logic to Lewis’s 
thesis, Furtado argued that the main distinguishing feature of underdevel-
oped countries is the existence of a pre-capitalist sector (the equivalent to 
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Lewis’s subsistence sector). In his model of industrialisation, there is also 
a labour reserve (labour surplus, in Lewis’s terms), which is kept in low 
wages for the benefit of the capitalist sector. This assertion is important 
because of the weak linkages between production and consumption of 
these two sectors: workers in the capitalist sector are not consuming their 
output. Instead, their wage goods are being produced by the less produc-
tive sector (or being imported), thus the interest in keeping wages low. 
Labour productivity, also in Furtado’s work, is the core explanatory 
variable (1965).6 His variant accounts for the particular land tenure struc-
tures established under the colonial rule in Latin America. The model deals 
with an open economy moving from an export growth phase towards a 
substitutive industrialisation phase, fully integrated with international mar-
kets. He introduces a crucial component: for industrialisation to take place, 
capitalist firms import technology in order to increase capital density.7 
Subsequently, capitalist firms move towards capital-intensive production 
without the corresponding transfer of labour from agriculture to the man-
ufacturing sector. That is to say, firms move towards capital-intensive pro-
duction before surplus labour is exhausted, thereby leading to polarisation. 
In his view, the confluence of these factors led to an inefficient indus-
trial structure. For him, the main distinguishing feature of underdevelop-
ment was the existence of a pre-capitalist or traditional sector—equivalent 
to Lewis’s ‘subsistence sector’. This sector, which served as labour re-
serve—‘labour surplus’ in Lewis’s terms—was kept at low wages for the 
benefit of the large capitalist sector. In such conditions, workers did not 
consume their output. Dualism thus was seen as harmful for economic 
development: value added by labour was not translated into increased con-
sumption in the low-income sector. Instead, it benefited the owners of 
capital, causing further income concentration (Furtado 1973, p. 125). If 
this dualism were to be eliminated,8 in Furtado’s view, the gap between 
the wages paid in the agricultural sector and the manufacturing sector 
would be reduced, as would the disparities in living standards between the 
two (1965, p. 166). 
Informality as a mode of production 
A second group of structuralist authors stressed the functionality of seg-
mented labour markets, in particular the existence of a vast informal sec-
tor, for the expansion of the capitalist system. Weeks (1975), one of the 
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first authors to publish along these lines, advanced an analytical frame-
work to study the interaction between what he called the ‘enumerated’ and 
‘unenumerated’ segments of the economy—such categories can be seen 
as resembling the formal and informal labels. Building on previous in-
sights, Weeks argued that the informal sector produced a significant por-
tion of consumer goods for low-income groups, as noted earlier by Fur-
tado (1965), and that it had an inherent dynamism, which reflected Hart’s 
view (1973. This sector, in Furtado’s view, does not allow for much indus-
trial dynamism or gains in productivity. As a consequence, in later stages 
the lower tier of the sector is taken over by more advanced capital-inten-
sive sectors, further constraining employment. Hart’s view, in contrast, 
was rather optimistic. He claimed that an expansion of the informal sector 
would have a positive, income-increasing effect. Moser (1978) offered a 
less optimist account. Taking up Weeks’s idea, she also agreed on the con-
siderable advantages of having a vast informal sector: accumulation can be 
higher as it can produce (cheaper) goods for the low-income groups, and 
its benefits could be shifted towards a rather labour-intensive form of in-
dustrialisation (Moser, 1978). For these reasons, the informal sector was 
deemed to provide goods and services considered unprofitable by large-
scale firms. 
More recent perspectives have shifted the focus away from small-scale 
(or firm-based) informality towards informal employment. These have 
emphasised ‘atypical’ employment arrangements that occur in both the 
formal and informal sectors. Informality is then associated with a lack of 
contractual employment and explicit rights and duties at work. It is worth 
noting the work of Harriss-White (2003), who highlighted the centrality 
of social institutions in assembling and regulating employment. She 
pointed out at the various social structures that create and perpetuate the 
loss of workers’ control within the work relationship, and thus the under-
standing that in informal contexts, social regulation let alone is intrinsically 
exclusionary (see Harriss-White, 2003 2006).  
Another important contention advanced by more recent structuralist 
authors is based on the recognition of an internal heterogeneity within the 
informal sector. From a range of direct subsistence activities subordinated 
to production and traded in the formal sector, to autonomous informal 
enterprises with modern technology and capacity for capital accumulation 
(Portes & Schauffler, 1993), the informal sector became more than just 
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small-scale activities. This perspective on informality sees informalisation 
as both a ‘top-down’ and a ‘bottom-up’ process (Phillips, 2011). 
Similarly, Portes and Schauffler (1993), building on empirical evidence 
from Latin America, presented rural-to-urban migration as a much more 
complex process than just the survival of the poor. Inflows to the city 
supported modern capitalist accumulation through the creation of new 
niches in the labour market. Consequently, urban informality existed 
within and for the benefit of the formal or modern economy, in a struc-
tural articulation of formal central enclaves and self-regulation on the pe-
riphery. On this last point, Phillips (2011) argued that the distinction be-
tween a formal ‘core’ and an informal ‘periphery’ could be misleading 
when taken at a global scale. In his view, such a distinction does not cap-
ture the reach of informality and informalisation across all societies and 
economies, which has extended and deepened in the main urban centres, 
contrary to Portes’s argument.  
2.2.3 Mainstream interpretations: rational choice 
Most of the current studies of informality adhere to microeconomic foun-
dations to explain its emergence. Informality is described as a voluntary 
and individual option, an arena in which workers (and firms) choose to 
operate. Implicit in this notion is the idea of rational choice: workers (or 
firms) opt for informality because of the benefits it delivers to them. For 
instance, it is often claimed that firms opt for informality to avoid paying 
registration fees, or that workers prefer to remain informal as they can 
benefit from freely switching between occupations without contributing 
to social security.  
Along these lines, informality has been given a ‘parasitic’ meaning that 
stresses the illegal component of small-scale activities (Jütting & de Laigle-
sia, 2009). In later work, Maloney (2004) presented informal employment 
as a rational choice taken after analysing the entire package of benefits and 
opportunities offered by various jobs and state regulation—in a cost–ben-
efit fashion. He suggested reducing the incentives to drop out of formal 
employment, but noted that in the short term, informal employment could 
provide workers with the dignity that was not accessible to them in formal 
arrangements. More recently, Perry et al. (2007) continued the debate on 
the voluntary nature of informality. Their approach brought together the 
notions of incomplete markets and parasitic behaviour. The idea of in-
complete markets is advanced by looking at informality as an exclusionary 
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process—the consequence of the inability of the formal markets to absorb 
all workers. The second notion, parasitic behaviour, holds that workers 
opt for informality after analysing the options available for them. Both are 
seen as a manifestation of the contradictory relationships between eco-
nomic agents and an ‘inefficient’ state. The same point has been argued 
elsewhere, notably in the last World Development Report (WDR) (World 
Bank, 2012). The report draws on Perry’s findings to advocate for increas-
ing productivity among the innovative or transformative (micro) entrepre-
neurs who can then grow and create job opportunities for others (World 
Bank, 2012, p. 110). 
De Soto’s legacy: excessive regulation? 
De Soto rolled out the debate along the lines of property rights in the late 
1980s. His interpretation of informality as an outcome of incomplete mar-
kets builds on the assumption that informal firms only exist due to the 
inefficiencies caused by insufficient property rights in less-developed 
countries. The author, who epitomised a legalist approach, reformulated 
Hart’s original theme in his book The Other Path (de Soto 1989). He gave 
to informality a celebratory meaning: it constituted the popular response 
to the overblown state, inefficient bureaucracy and bad laws (ibid.). Thus, 
informal enterprises represented the irruption of ‘real market’ forces in 
those economies suffocated by state regulation. The urban poor were 
identified as actively entrepreneurial rather than passive and parasitic. In 
his assessment of informality in Peru and Latin America, he prescribed the 
simplification of laws, decentralisation of the state and deregulation of 
economic activity. It is worth mentioning that de Soto’s publication was 
in line with rational choice theory, which focussed on incentives, rather 
than structures, to shape behaviour.  
While de Soto’s work soon became very influential, widely cited in pub-
lications and adopted by mainstream international organisations,9 dissent-
ers contend that his study lacked academic rigour, including insufficient 
data to support his statements and leading to empirical and theoretical 
contradictions (Portes & Schauffler, 1993). To illustrate this last point, 
Portes and Schauffler recall that de Soto attributed the origins of infor-
mality not to the excess of labour supply but to the excessive regulation 
of the economy. However, if this were the case, they argue, other highly 
regulated economies would have vast informal sectors, but they do not. 
Despite this and other negative appraisals, de Soto’s ideas settled in and 
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brought about a renewed interest in the informal sector, on this occasion 
full of optimism about its claimed potential to lift people out of poverty. 
There are frequent references, for instance, to de Soto’s work in the latest 
WDR: Jobs (World Bank, 2012).  
Although de Soto’s legacy has been labelled ‘legalist’10 (Chen et al., 
2004; Chen et al., 2005; Portes & Haller, 2005; Jütting & de Laiglesia, 2009; 
Phillips, 2011), this label might be missing important distinctions and var-
iations within the specialised literature. Mainstream investigators adhere 
to thesis of the informal sector’s dynamism and argue that labour markets 
should be left alone in order for self-regulation to balance the field. In this 
sense, this logic could be better described as a ‘market obstruction’ ap-
proach, which is not about choice, but about intrusive regulation. 
The policy implications deriving from this orthodox understanding 
should be treated with caution. Removing all state regulation of economic 
activity might not be a desirable solution. Early development thinkers rec-
ognised that modern markets are indeed highly regulated institutions (Po-
lanyi, 1957 as found in Portes & Schauffler, 1993). Eliminating state regu-
lation would lead to a disarticulation of orderly economic activity, as 
informal sector workers are closely intertwined with and dependent on 
firms within the regulated sector. Furthermore, the claimed voluntarism is 
circumscribed to rather rigid labour choices, as constantly emphasised in 
the more structuralist accounts.  
As noted by Harriss-White, state retrenchment leads to other forms of 
social regulation taking prominence, even though many of these, for ex-
ample trade associations, ethnicity, religion and gender, might well be at 
the origins of inequality and exclusion (Harriss-White, 2006, p. 1242). This 
is particularly the case in Latin America, with high degrees of polarisation 
inherited since the start of the industrialisation process that, if left unreg-
ulated, will continue to be reproduced and could be exacerbated. Indeed, 
this is supported by the recent reduction in inequality in many Latin Amer-
ican countries, which have arguably been supported by more, not fewer, 
regulatory interventions in labour markets, such as the increase in mini-
mum wages and the formalisation of labour in Brazil, much more than 
what has been attributed to targeted social protection (Fischer, 2012, p. 
20).  
Building on the rhetoric that excessive regulation is the cause of infor-
mality, most economies by the end of the nineteenth century were pushing 
for greater labour market flexibility (Cook & Razavi, 2012). The rationale 
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followed de Soto’s thesis: to remove regulatory market obstructions. In 
theory, deregulation has attempted to reduce the barriers to formal em-
ployment. However, this has not necessarily benefited informal workers. 
Instead, it has meant greater freedom for business from organised labour, 
with the consequent erosion of protective and pro-collective labour regu-
lations (Cook & Razavi, 2012, p. 6). Deregulation has thus been translated 
into lower wages and inadequate (and even completely absent) provision 
of social security at work. 
The exit choice: opting out for informality 
A counter-argument to the earlier dual accounts of informality, which pre-
sented it as a place of exclusion and marginality, states that workers them-
selves ‘exit’ the formal sector. Workers, dissatisfied with the performance 
of the state, opt into informality. This argument departs from the notion 
that the informal sector is itself a multi-segmented sector. Within it, when 
workers opt for informality, they face a second choice: to survive or to 
grow. This theoretical assumption can be traced back to the work of Fields 
(1990). Based on his research in urban Costa Rica and Malaysia, Fields 
suggested that the informal sector comprised two qualitatively distinctive 
branches: a lower tier, characterised by easy entry and low-wage unorgan-
ised and unprotected work—as described in most of the residual and 
structural perspectives; and a new category composed of the upper tier of 
the labour market, with restricted entry to self-employment activities. He 
claimed that the rationales of these two sectors differ: people in lower-tier 
activities seek to get out them, aspiring to engage in the upper-tier segment 
of the self-employed. The upper-tier segment has potential. They just need 
an extra push to increase their size and generate more employment. Argu-
ably, the logic of informality in this segment is largely related to tax and 
regulatory evasion. Hence, the idea of voluntary informal employment is 
clearly manifested in this work, although Field remarks that ‘given the con-
strained choices available to them, a great many of informal sector workers 
are in that sector voluntarily’ (1990, p. 65).  
In line with Fields’s arguments, Maloney (2004) draws on empirical ev-
idence from Latin America to suggest that the informal sector in the region 
should be understood as the analogue of the voluntary entrepreneurial 
small-scale sector found in advanced countries. He continued the notion 
of dynamism by rejecting the idea of a disadvantaged and residual segment 
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in the labour market. Instead, he presented informal employment as a ra-
tional option, chosen after analysing the entire package of benefits and 
opportunities offered by various jobs—in a cost–benefit type of analysis. 
Derived from this logic, his proposition is to reduce the incentives to drop 
out of formal employment—he considered that formal workers have little 
to lose, as they perceive social benefits to be inefficient anyway—and to 
increase the size and productivity of the formal sector. In the meantime, 
he reasoned, employment in the informal sector could provide workers 
with the dignity that formal employment does not provide.  
More recently, Perry et al. (2007) continued the discussion on the exit 
or voluntary nature of informality. This approach brings together the no-
tions of incomplete markets and parasitic behaviour: the first along the 
lines of informality as an exclusionary process—the formal market cannot 
absorb all workers; and the latter when stating that workers opt out for 
informality—again, as the result of a cost–benefit analysis of the options 
available to them. Perry, in his study of informality in Latin America, stated 
that informality could be considered a manifestation of the contradictory 
relationships between economic agents’ preferences and a state that has 
failed to correct for market failures, as opposed to ‘over-regulated’ labour 
markets. The same point has been argued elsewhere, notably in the last 
WDR (World Bank, 2012). The report draws on Perry’s findings to state 
that in the Latin American region, entrants into self-employment tend to 
be workers who have already accumulated physical capital while working 
for a wage or a salary—that is to say, workers that have opted out for 
informality leaving behind their formal occupations. The argument con-
tinues indicating ‘those [workers] who achieve higher productivity levels 
are more likely to stay in business, grow, and create job opportunities for 
others’ (2012: 110).  
The renewed interest in productivity is evident in the ‘Jobs’ WDR of 
the World Bank. In this regard, a distinction is made within the informal 
sector between innovative or transformative entrepreneurs and replicative 
or subsistence entrepreneurs.11 Thus, it is suggested that in order to 
achieve a greater impact in terms of employment generation, it is necessary 
to identify the ‘constrained gazelles’, a term coined by Grimm et al. 
(2012)—work cited in the WDR—in order to unlock their potential and 
support them to become successful entrepreneurs.12 This response is in-
spired by the ‘missing ingredient assumption’ (Berner et al., 2012): once 
provided the ingredient, entrepreneurs can start climbing to success. The 
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report suggests that training, access to basic infrastructure, financial re-
sources and compliance with a good investment climate will remove the 
obstacles to firms’ growth. However, these promotion interventions con-
tinue the already controversial focus on growth-oriented entrepreneurs 
only. Separate protection interventions are suggested to address the needs 
of informal workers and self-employed survivalists, oriented towards sup-
porting their income. These interventions often consist of targeted mo-
dalities of social protection, even though the report advises caution in its 
provision because of the possible disincentives for formal work.  
2.3 Informalisation: a policy dilemma? 
The dominant viewpoint, that the drop in formal employment is the result 
of a perverse idleness encouraged by social protection, has been exten-
sively criticised. Returning to an earlier point, this section brings to the 
fore the concept of disguised unemployment. Robinson (1936) identified 
the lack of unemployment support as the main process leading to dis-
guised unemployment—one could also think of it as inadequate employ-
ment—and driving dismissed workers into low-productivity activities. 
Lacking unemployment benefits, dismissed workers have to take up any 
job available, often one that is less productive and poorly rewarded. Work-
ers are left with no option but to live from their own (desperate) efforts, 
instead of getting access to sufficient public income support to queue for 
the ‘right’ job. This would benefit not only the unemployed, but the eco-
nomic system as such, to the extent that workers would be able to gainfully 
use their skills and increase output. In a similar fashion, Mkandawire 
(2007) noted that if social policy does not actively respond to the retrench-
ment of labour resulting from increased informalisation, gained skills will 
devaluate. Thus, reducing informality may raise the time horizon of work-
ers, who will not be accepting precarious job conditions anymore, opting 
instead for planning and commitment for their long-term benefit. In his 
view, social policy can help an economy to advance towards a better stage, 
by stimulating the demand for skilled labour and by insuring workers 
against the implicit risks of moving up the skill chain (ibid.). 
The deepening of informality has two important implications. First, an 
increasing number of people engage in informal employment and thus 
have very limited access to welfare and work-related benefits. This posits 
a challenge in the design of welfare provision, if there is any interest in 
expanding the coverage to informal workers—current trends indicate that 
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there is. Second, while informality remains, it is assumed that welfare pro-
vision would have to adapt to a vast share of the population not contrib-
uting to the welfare system in a consistent way. This second implication 
brings into the debate the widespread claim that non-contributory welfare 
is counterproductive: it disincentivises formalisation of employment. To 
put it simply, if informal workers access benefits that they have not paid 
for—via taxes or direct contributions—they will have the perverse incen-
tive to remain in informality.  
Besides, the current emphasis on targeted social assistance, particularly 
CCTs, has not overcome the historical bifurcation between social insur-
ance and social assistance. What is more, to reduce attractiveness to the 
non-needy population—and not sanction idleness—social assistance ben-
efits are often set at a very low level. In fact, most of the new agenda for 
social protection brings active labour market policies to facilitate the tran-
sition from assistance to work (Cook & Razavi, 2012). These policies 
(based on the European experience with active labour market policies) are 
currently seen by some as the preferred toolkit to address market obstruc-
tions impeding inactive workers being gainfully employed in Latin Amer-
ica. A critical assessment of the assumptions implicit in the implementa-
tion of labour market policies is advanced in the following, together with 
a discussion of their potentially problematic implementation in highly in-
formal settings. 
In this light, it is worth asking whether it is even possible to make a 
living from social assistance alone. In most of countries in the global 
South, social assistance benefits are kept rather low and unemployment 
insurance is also low or even simply non-existent. In such contexts, the 
labour market does not function effectively, for people are compelled to 
move back to employment due to liquidity constraints. Social protection 
tends to be channelled to marginalised populations through social assis-
tance by means of targeted cash transfer programmes. Can it even be ar-
gued, then, that benefit recipients have the incentive to remain in idleness, 
considering that cash transfers do not even reach the minimum wage and 
are often conditional on very specific commitments? What might be hap-
pening instead is that the large share of informal employment is rooted 
precisely in the lack of social protection, not in its vicious use, leaving 
workers with no other option but to take up any job available—even if it 
guarantees no rights at work.   
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2.4 The interweaving of informality and social protection 
The deepening of informality has two important implications. First, an 
increasing number of people engage in informal employment, receiving 
very limited access to welfare and work-related benefits. This posits a chal-
lenge for welfare provision, provided the necessity of increasing its cover-
age to informal workers. Second, and as informality remains, it is assumed 
that welfare provision schemes will adapt to a vast share of the population 
not contributing to the welfare system in a consistent way. The next sec-
tion explores the most common welfare provision responses to the deep-
ening of informality. It is worth noting that although most authors agree 
on the fact that informality has deepened, they advance different argu-
ments about what is driving it. Therefore, it might be useful to bring to-
gether different conceptualisations of informality and explore their tacit 
implications for the design of social protection systems. 
Social protection well captures changes in the agenda for social policy. 
It is worth noting that early discussions on what is now denoted as social 
protection provisioning revolved around the welfare state, understood as 
the ‘state responsibility for securing some basic modicum of welfare for 
its citizens’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 19). As discussed by Esping-An-
dersen, the level of the state’s responsibility was often measured against 
social expenditure. Early ideas of ‘social citizenship’, as per the seminal 
work of Marshall (1950), had informed notions of social provisioning, 
with the state involved in granting social rights (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 
p. 21). Going a step further, Esping-Andersen noted that the sole presence 
of social assistance or social insurance does not necessarily tackle social 
stratification, unless the ‘service is rendered as a matter of right’ (1990, p. 
22). Situating this approach in the Latin American context, of particular 
interest in the context of this dissertation, scholars have adapted the classic 
welfare states typologies of Esping-Andersen, categorising regional 
schemes as an assemblage of ‘conservative-informal’ welfare regimes, 
based on corporatist notions rather than universalism as in the Northern 
European welfare states, which seem to be transitioning towards a ‘liberal-
informal’ variant (Barrientos, 2004; Martínez Franzoni, 2008). 
By the late 1980s, however, the ‘safety nets’ discourse that emerged 
among international financial organisations, particularly the World Bank, 
confined social protection to minimalist social assistance provisions to the 
poor (Devereux & Sabates-Wheeler, 2004). As noted by Barrientos and 
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Hulme, ‘the initially dominant conceptualization of social protection as 
social risk management is being extended by approaches grounded in basic 
human needs and capabilities’ (2009, p. 439), with a strong focus on re-
ducing poverty and vulnerability (Barrientos, 2010, p. 4). The World Bank 
identifies the role of social protection, in combination with labour market 
programmes, as that of helping ‘individuals and societies manage risk and 
volatility and protect them from poverty and destitution’ (World Bank, 
2011, p. XIII). Moreover, although workers remain central to the discus-
sion of social protection, the shift towards non-contributory forms has 
been welcomed by most development agencies. The ILO, which until the 
late 2000s maintained an interest in more traditional forms of contributory 
social insurance (as documented in de Haan, 2014), joined this advocacy—
as per the Social Protection Floor initiative.13 
Nonetheless, social protection systems are often blamed for a variety 
of negative (unintended) impacts, as revised in Devereux (2010): perverse 
incentives (also known as the ‘dependency syndrome’), the crowding-out 
of other protection mechanisms (mostly informal, e.g. remittances), moral 
hazard (or misuse) and increase in fertility rates. Along the lines of ‘per-
verse incentives’, social protection is seen as problematic as it discourages 
(paid) work. Increasingly, social protection schemes are designed and im-
plemented in order to minimise ‘interference’ with market mechanisms. 
The idea underlying this, arguably a neoclassical view, is that labour mar-
kets are neutral arenas where buyers and sellers of labour interact, a notion 
challenged by Cook and Razavi (2012), amongst others. Neoclassical ac-
counts tend to theorise the poverty observed among informal workers as 
a function of their low human capital. With low human capital, no job, 
formal or informal, will guarantee an exit from poverty: people’s status at 
work is thus seen as incidental (Maloney, 2004, p. 1173). Along these lines, 
the role of social protection is simply to assist in unlocking the potential 
of poor households by increasing human capital and skills formation in 
order to improve their employability. In this connection, social protection 
and labour policies share a similar aim: to improve the working of the 
labour market. In this connection, informality is conceptualised as transi-
tory: the assumption is that increased investment in health and education 
would boost human capital formation and later contribute to economic 
growth, transferring surplus labour from the traditional sector to the mod-
ern sector.  
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The current trend in social assistance programmes, cash transfers in 
particular, is indeed aimed at increasing human capital and skills for-
mation, with the ultimate objective of increasing labour productivity. The 
mechanism works as follows: gains in skills translate into increased labour 
productivity. As schooling is negatively correlated with informality, social 
assistance improves labour market outcomes (Barrientos 2006). Sandberg 
(2012) presents two main obstacles to the operation of the aforemen-
tioned. First, age-based exit rules, considered in most CT schemes, result 
in many beneficiaries entering the labour market with limited qualifica-
tions, without having completed secondary education. Hence, basic edu-
cation alone has little effect on mobility or formality. Second, investments 
in business productivity will most likely require significantly larger 
amounts than those being transferred (ibid., p. 1354). In sum, coveted for-
mal jobs, which require higher levels of education and capital, continue to 
be dominated by the more privileged who already have access to these 
elements and already perform well. The problem seems to be rooted not 
in the lack of investment in ‘raw’ human capital, but in the inability to 
generate and absorb a more qualified labour force. Human capital inter-
ventions deal with the supply side: training a workforce to meet the de-
mands of a growing economy. However, on the demand side, most devel-
oping economies have encountered challenges to consolidating a modern 
sector that would advance on the scale necessary to absorb a better-quali-
fied labour force.  
This discussion could also be placed in the context of dual labour mar-
kets. Those authors who present informality as an outcome of bifurcation 
use labour productivity as the core explanatory variable. Certainly, increas-
ing labour productivity occupies a central position in social and employ-
ment policies. A renewed interest in labour productivity is evident in the 
WDR (2013) which emphasises training and access to finance and other 
accompanying rsources. While this is a high priority when building capac-
ities, it should by no means be transformed into a call to make poor people 
‘work harder and better’, but rather should start a discussion on remuner-
ation and address the way in which work is valued across different sectors 
and geographies (Fischer, 2011).  
Indeed, one of the insights of the study of informality as bifurcation 
touches upon income gaps. Authors such as Lewis (1954) and Furtado 
(1965) stressed the gap between the wages paid in the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors. What is seen in most developing countries is that 
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workers who have moved out of the agricultural sector have not been fully 
absorbed in a formal manufacturing sector, and so end up in the service 
sector (Fischer 2011). As a result, the vast majority of employment, and 
informal employment in particular, takes place in the service sector. The 
question, then, is how to measure labour productivity in the service econ-
omy? As proposed by Fischer (2011), the valuation of work in the service 
sector is only marginally related to labour productivity, if at all. Therefore, 
a comprehensive social policy approach to reduce the income inequalities 
would not overemphasise increasing labour productivity, without first reg-
ulating work valuation and compensation.  
Most mainstream interpretations emphasise the point that people opt 
into informality. By default, therefore, state efforts should focus on reduc-
ing the attractiveness of social benefits. Levy (2008),14 for instance, sug-
gested that social benefits are key in explaining the prevalence of infor-
mality, further segmenting the labour market. The assumption is that 
formal workers contribute to social security while informal workers simply 
benefit from social protection without properly contributing to the secu-
rity system. Due to the association of informality with perverse incentives, 
there is increasing pressure to decouple social protection from employ-
ment (Lund, 2009). Orthodox scholars, concerned about the decrease in 
formal employment, have pushed for an agenda centred on productivity-
enhancing instruments—although at the risk of being turned into a pow-
erful ethos for disciplining the workforce (Fischer, 2011, p. 525)—and the 
reduction of disincentives for labour formalisation. This means better tar-
geting of social risk management (for the lower tier of the informal sector 
only) aligned with objectives of higher productivity and growth (directed 
to the upper tier of growth-oriented micro-entrepreneurs). In addition, the 
World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and other or-
ganisations have suggested the delinking of social security from formal 
work altogether, positing that the state must provide only minimal social 
provision for the rest, tied instead to citizenship claims (Lund, 2009).  
In particular, the World Bank, in its last World Development Report, 
advocates for Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs). In their view, these 
policies can fill the gap when employers or workers underinvest in train-
ing, mitigate economic risk by providing workers with temporary employ-
ment, or create incentives for employers to hire (World Bank, 2012, p. 
267). The rationale underpinning ALMPs fits within the exit argument 
used to explain informality. The logic builds on the perversity argument, 
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assuming that unemployment is a result of both market failure (e.g. skills 
mismatching) and disincentives to work. Active labour programmes are 
thus expected to increase employability and encourage jobless workers to 
abandon their unemployment status, and are alleged to be their voluntary 
option (Marshall, 2004). The argument to bring ALMPs to middle- and 
low-income countries has also been pushed by the ILO. Grouped under 
the label ‘productive insertion’, the set of ALMPs proposed by the ILO 
includes: training and improving skills for work, technical assistance, ac-
cess to credit, support for commercialisation, support for cooperativism 
and various other forms of economic solidarity (ILO/STEP, 2006). 
ALMPs belong within the group of supply-side policies aimed at pro-
moting employment (Rueda, 2006). Although the term can be used in dif-
ferent ways, it roughly refers to improving the functioning of the labour 
market by providing, for example, income support and wage subsidies, job 
search assistance, job-related skills and direct job creation (Martin, 1998; 
Bonoli, 2010; Kluve, 2010). The ‘active’ component combines placement 
services with stronger work incentives, time limits on recipiency, benefit 
reductions and the use of sanctions, which has been coined ‘workfare’.15 
Most definitions of ALMPs underscore employment promotion rather 
than just providing income support, among those with low skills or little 
work experience—the bulk of the unemployed and welfare recipients 
(Heckman, 2000; Kluve, 2010; Rueda, 2006). However, these policies dif-
fer on the relative emphasis on each type of service, the target population, 
the total resources spent on them, how resources are spent and the range 
of employment and training integration within other programmes such as 
social assistance (Heckman et al., 2010, p. 1872). 
Active labour market policies have a long trajectory. Most authors agree 
that ALMPs were born in the 1950s with the so-called Rehn-Meidner 
model implemented in Sweden in a context of labour shortage (Bonoli, 
2010). They were originally conceived to achieve a tripartite objective: 
equality in wage distribution, sustainable full employment and the mod-
ernisation of industry. These labour market policies were applied with the 
objective of improving the match between demand and supply of labour 
in the context of a rapidly evolving economy (2010, p. 440). The basic 
instrument consisted of financing extensive vocational training pro-
grammes to deal with unemployed workers.16 Italy, France and Germany 
followed a similar track to reinforce the active dimension of unemploy-
ment protection. The rationale was to retrain jobless people so they could 
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provide the labour needed by expanding industries in the post-war years. 
These were by no means ‘passive’ policies, as argued by Boloni. On the 
contrary, during the post-war years the goal was to reinforce the active 
dimension of unemployment protection, essentially through vocational 
training, as required by the expanding industries. Over the past two dec-
ades, ALMPs have spread across Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) countries, but the context changed dra-
matically after the oil crisis of the 1970s. Mass unemployment challenged 
the effectiveness of these policies. An emphasis on occupation, that is, 
keeping jobless people busy, could be seen in this period (Bonoli, 2010, p. 
446). During the post-crisis years, occupation remained an important 
function of ALMPs, but with an ideological turn17 towards workfare-type 
policies—as re-emerged in the UK and the USA in the 1980s (Torfing, 
1999, p. 17). The increasing reference to the term ‘activation’ led to the 
development of a new role for ALMPs, which emphasised stronger work 
incentives, employment assistance and reduction of unemployment bene-
fits (Bonoli, 2010). 
Several typologies have been advanced to further distinguish the labour 
activation component in ALMPs, ranging from human capital investments 
to sanctions or negative incentives to move people away from social assis-
tance into employment. Bonoli offers an appealing framework to catego-
rise ALMPs, based on the degree of compliance with labour market ob-
jectives and the level of investment in human capital. Using these criteria, 
he specifies four typologies: occupation, incentive reinforcement, employ-
ment assistance and vocational training, that is, ‘upskilling’ (2010, p. 442). 
This categorisation is based on a previous differentiation between active 
and passive policies advanced by OECD (Martin, 1998), which turned the 
debate away from passive income support towards more active measures 
designed to get the unemployed back into work—for Bonoli, the more 
pro-market kind of policies.  
An OECD analysis of the effectiveness of ALMPs ‘is not terribly en-
couraging’ (Martin, 1998, p. 28). European experiences with these policies 
are highly controversial. It has been held that they undermine competition 
and wage moderation (Marshall, 2004). Yet the problem has been consid-
ered to be in the policy design itself. Working-for-the-sake-of-working 
(Torfing, 1999) might not be the best way to lead people out of poverty.18 
Many workers find no particular reward for hard work if there are no pro-
spects for promotion or if the work they are performing is not considered 
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a ‘real job’. Regarding ALMPs geared more toward human capital building, 
it is worth noting that training courses are by no means a substitute for 
proper access to education. In addition, other instruments such as job 
search and intermediation only work if there are firms creating jobs which 
are accessible to the workers. To sum up, ALMPs might not solve, and 
could even exacerbate, stratification in the labour market.  
The World Bank, in its most recent WDR, advocates for ALMPs. It 
argues that these policies can fill the gap when employers or workers un-
derinvest in training and that they can mitigate economic risk by providing 
workers with temporary employment or creating incentives for employers 
to hire (World Bank, 2012, p. 267). After an exploration of various expe-
riences, they conclude that ALMPs’ effectiveness is dependent on the 
country’s institutional capacity. It becomes a problem of policy design in 
which labour policies should be aligned to the needs of the labour market 
and address market imperfections only. Active labour programmes are 
thus expected to increase employability and encourage jobless workers to 
abandon their unemployment status, allegedely a voluntary choice (Mar-
shall, 2004). ILO, along the lines of training and improving work skills, 
providing technical assistance, access to credit, support for commerciali-
sation, support for co-operativism and various other forms of economic 
solidarity (ILO/STEP, 2006), has also joined the group of organisations 
advocating for ALMPs.  
While ALMPs might sound pioneering, they fall into the long-standing 
rhetoric of workfare programmes that have accompanied poverty relief 
for centuries. Conditional rights linked to work obligations have their own 
history, with a particularly famous episode in the English Poor Laws. The 
law was designed to protect the [rural] poor while maintaining work in-
centives. In the market liberal narrative, the help provided to the able-
bodied led to negative dynamics: perverse incentives. Block and Somers 
(2003) advanced an alternative narrative of the Speenhamland policies—
completely valid in the present-day trend in social protection. In their 
view, poor relief did not hurt the poor. Instead, it helped to protect them 
from structural changes in the economy, which had negatively affected the 
sources of meaningful work and family income in rural areas. Transposing 
this to current debates: ‘it is time to reject the ideological claim that the 
best way to fight poverty is by imposing increasingly stringent conditions 
on ever shrinking transfer payments to poor households’ (2003, p. 314). 
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All over the map of social and labour policies, the idea of ‘perverse 
incentives’ lingers. In order to explain either the drop out to informality 
or the misuse of social policies, incentives are used as the ultimate variable 
explaining (lack of) development outcomes. The perversity argument is 
closely tied to the idea of self-regulating markets: any public policy aiming 
at changing market outcomes automatically becomes noxious interference 
with beneficent equilibrating processes (Hirschman, 1991, p. 27). Yet the 
evidence of informal employment within the formal sector is vast.19 It can-
not be stated that employment in the formal sector is any guarantee of 
social protection and observance of labour regulations in general. There-
fore, Levy’s understanding of an informal sector squeezing benefits from 
its formal counterpart seems to overlook the rigidities of segmented la-
bour markets that transcend the formal vs informal divide. Following this 
perversity argument, however, might deliver clear advantages to the state, 
as they can downsize social assistance and avoid politically costly regula-
tion of labour, in the light of the argued voluntary option for informality. 
Barrientos (2006) offers an alternative account of the work (dis)incen-
tives associated with non-contributory social protection. His analysis de-
parts from the usual distinction of social protection: a component of social 
assistance, non-contributory and tax-financed, targeted at those who are 
economically inactive, and a social insurance component, contributory and 
covering formal workers. Based on the premise that growing informalisa-
tion leads to an increased demand for social assistance, because of the re-
duction in social insurance coverage to the formal segment of the labour 
force, the author makes a strong case to maintain targeted social assistance, 
as it might be the only protection that informal workers have access to. 
Further, the author finds a positive effect of social assistance on labour 
outcomes, namely, a reduction in the labour supply of children and the 
elderly when accompanied by education subsidies and/or non-contribu-
tory pensions for these groups (2006, p. 175). Yet the question remains: 
who compensates for the loss in labour supply? Standing (2011) points 
out that poor communities (in rural areas in particular) usually rely on the 
work input of children. Is social assistance reimbursing for the loss of 
these labour income sources and/or loss in production? Standing argues 
that income support such as cash transfers and associated policies should 
at least accompany children continuing in the education system to mini-
mise such effects in the long term. Furthermore, he argues, there is a press-
ing need to deal with poverty and income inequality rather than expecting 
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labour markets to deal with these fundamental features of a market econ-
omy (2011, p. 268).  
2.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has advocated for the re-linking of social and labour issues 
in an interdependent way, as proposed by Heintz and Lund (2012). Nev-
ertheless, while there is enough awareness that labour and social policies 
can work together in order to frame solutions to promote employment, 
the type of policies matters. Differences between instruments and priori-
ties advanced through active labour market policies should be treated with 
caution. Building the transition from targeted assistance, that is, CCTs, to 
work requires a careful consideration of the structural elements that per-
petuate segregation in the labour market, as per the discussion initiated in 
the next chapter and pertaining to the Ecuadorian case. The possibility of 
improving the working of the labour markets depends on the broader eco-
nomic environment in which jobs are created (Cook & Razavi, 2012). 
Moreover, the quality of jobs definitely matters, considerably more than 
the number of jobs, as shown by the increase in informal employment 
accompanied by a dilapidation of working conditions. Differences be-
tween formal employment, self-employment and non-standard employ-
ment greatly influence social rights attached to paid work. 
 The dominant viewpoint, that the drop in formal employment is the 
result of a perverse idleness encouraged by social protection, has been 
contested from a structural angle. Given the limitations to access and se-
cure a formal job, it is hard to argue that the poorest segment of the labour 
force, more likely to lack education credentials and/or experience, volun-
tarily chooses informality.  
Social policy interventions are increasingly being recast as having a 
transformative role: they are not just responding to poverty but building 
human capital, supporting future generations (Lund, 2009). It is argued 
that they can set the foundation for a virtuous circle of less poverty, in-
creased human capital and economic growth. Yet this association needs to 
be re-evaluated in the light of widespread informality. Analysis of human 
capital formation should be made with caution in informal economies. In 
a context of dual labour markets and income inequality, increased human 
capital does not necessarily translate into increased labour productivity. 
The prevalence of small-scale enterprises and pauperised labour evidences 
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the lack of decent job opportunities. In addition, even if all workers were 
absorbed in the modern sector, other conditions, for example occupa-
tional segregation, may impede that human capital being translated into 
increased labour productivity.  
However, most mainstream accounts are concerned with economic ef-
ficiency, which is best served by making the informal sector formal. In the 
short term, however, some see in the informal sector a convenient solu-
tion—even a dignifying one, due to its capacity for absorbing low-skilled 
workers and arguably providing them with some sort of autonomy. If, by 
engaging in the informal sector, workers end up in poverty, it is often at-
tributed to their individual condition as unskilled workers. In the end, 
however, this logic dictates that state efforts should be aimed at favouring 
supply-side interventions: investing in human capital formation and ulti-
mately increasing labour productivity, whilst helping firms to formalise. 
These interventions need to be complemented with demand-side tools 
that ensure a proper ‘matching’ for the newly qualified workforce. In other 
words, without appropriate job opportunities, there is no actual choice left 
for workers.  
Besides, there is a high risk in embracing informality and remodelling 
institutions to it. Social protection programmes might simply be reduced 
to adapting to this reality, instead of incorporating strategies to change and 
improve workers’ conditions and employment opportunities. It is often 
unclear who is responsible for the fate of informal workers. The dominant 
trend is to make individuals responsible for their own fate. For instance, 
microcredit schemes require poor people to supply their own employment 
as entrepreneurs. This solution, however, works only for those who are 
already better off, as noted elsewhere (Li, 2010; Berner et. al., 2012). 
Notes 
1 As stated on the United Nations website dedicated to Sustainable Development: 
Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld [Last 
accessed on 9/01/2017). 
2 Most recent work on informality has emphasised the rather heterogeneous and 
multi-segmented character of labour markets, allowing for the study of informality 
as integrated with the formal system (see Chen et al., 2005; Bacchetta et al., 2009). 
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3 Early dualist theories were optimistic about industrialisation and its capacity to 
absorb surplus labour. Yet the perspectives on how to absorb this labour in the 
context of transition economies were quite divergent. In Lewis’s model, the trans-
fer of labour from the subsistence sector to the capitalist sector was presented as 
beneficial. Lewis held that the wages to be paid by the capitalist sector were deter-
mined by what people earned in the subsistence sector. Therefore, an expanding 
capitalist sector would be interested in holding down productivity in the subsist-
ence sector to ensure greater profits. The H-T model assumed that the urban min-
imum wage was fixed in terms of the manufactured good (1970, p. 132). This is a 
fundamental difference from Lewis’s view. 
4 From a Marxist stance, ‘surplus’ concerns the people (mainly rural) displaced by 
capital-intensive production. 
5 For a brief overview of Furtado’s work and a comparative discussion of Lewis’s 
model, see Kay (2005). 
6 A point of caution should also be made when discussing informality and linking 
it to low productivity. Analysing how ‘well’ working people fare depends not only 
on their labour productivity, but also on how this productivity translates [or not] 
into labour earnings—that is, how people’s work is valued (Fischer, 2011). Valua-
tion is often only marginally related to productivity. As pointed out by Fischer: 
‘much of what we are picking up in most conventional measures of productivity 
actually amounts to price or wage differences, not actual effort or output, especially 
in economies that are increasingly based on services’ (2011, p. 3). 
7 This is the core argument of dependency theory, which is not pursued in the 
present chapter. 
8 As he observed, reservoir sector wages remained stable in the region, leading to 
greater polarisation due to the above-discussed pattern of bifurcation in the labour 
market. Later, he reframed his model in terms of a context of growth, rather than 
stagnation. 
9 Many of se Soto’s ideas were included in the structural adjustment type of reforms 
introduced in the 1980s in Latin America (Bromley, 1990). 
10 Suggesting legalisation of de facto informal property rights, without mentioning 
the sources of their incompleteness. 
11 Further references that deserve citing in this distinction are Jütting and de Laigle-
sia (2009), who collect the view of OECD on informal employment varieties and 
its policy implications; and Berner et al. (2012), who conducted an extensive liter-
ature review on the two rationalities found among entrepreneurs and pointed out 
the reduced attention given to the survivalist type of entrepreneurs. 
12 Where a successful entrepreneur is being defined in this report as someone who 
employs others and is not living in poverty (World Bank, 2012). 
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13 Following the 100th Session of the International Labour Conference in 2011, as 
indicated on the ILO’s website (2017). 
14 Who is also the architect of CCTs in Mexico: Progresa—Oportunidades. 
15 Understood ‘[a]s the subordination of social policy to economic demands for 
greater labour-market flexibility and lower public social expenditure’ (Torfing, 
1999, p. 23). 
16 In Sweden, the imposed wage levels pushed less competitive companies out of 
the market, as they were not able to cope with higher labour costs. Labour market 
policies emerged as a strategy to deal with the workers that were made redundant 
when these companies were pushed out of the market (Bonoli, 2010). 
17 Partisan effects on ALMP spending are also at the core of the debate, as they can 
favour (or not) labour parties. See Rueda (2006) and Bonoli (2010). 
18 These sets of policies need to be contrasted with earlier (and current) Keynesian 
proposals of guaranteed employment. See Torfing (1999) for a brief account of 
Keynesian and Schumpeterian approaches to welfare provision. Covering that 
analysis would exceed the scope of this chapter. 
19 See the statistical update on employment in the informal economy by the ILO 
(2012). 
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3 Historicising Social Protection in Ecuador 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Considered either in terms of budgetary restrictions to incorporate infor-
mal workers into state-provided social schemes or as moralising concerns 
about the argued intrinsic perversity of non-contributory schemes, the 
provision of social protection is increasingly being contested. These no-
tions have had a bearing on the uptake of cash transfer programmes, lead-
ing to a tightening of targeting and conditionalities, as discussed in this 
dissertation for the Ecuadorian case. Yet it is worth noting that questions 
of dependency have accompanied welfare support from its very inception 
and are not simply a reaction to more recent alternatives devised in the 
global South. Debates on the desirability of welfare provisioning have 
travelled from the global North1—formulated in terms of the challenges 
of providing, expanding and financing contributory insurance for the for-
mally employed and their dependents—to the South—often framed 
around ideas of incompleteness and exclusion, speaking of the stratified 
nature of social protection systems. What is arguably different is the re-
sponse to such claims, which instead of directly sanctioning non-compli-
ance, as per workfare regimes, pay for ‘good behaviour’ (Peck & Theo-
dore, 2015), emphasising self-improvement, active engagement and 
(co)responsibility among CCT recipients (Schild, 2007; Peck & Theodore, 
2015; Schild, 2015). Thus it is necessary to re-evaluate dependency claims 
in the light of the historical context in which the social role of the state, 
also referred in the literature as ‘the social’, emerged in the South, in par-
ticular in Latin America (for a variety of accounts of the emergence of the 
social, see DiQuinzio & Young, 1995; Schild, 2007; Molyneux, 2008; 
Schild, 2015), in processes as old and diverse as formations of the nation-
state in post-colonised territories. 
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The study of states’ welfare provision is usually approached using the 
comparative framework of Esping-Andersen (1990), which stresses issues 
of de-commodification, social stratification and the broader distribution 
system—as informed by welfare rationalities advanced in Western coun-
tries. According to Esping-Andersen, de-commodification relates to social 
rights and ‘the degree to which they permit people to make their living 
standards independently from pure market forces’, in the sense that ‘social 
rights diminish citizens’ status as “commodities”’ (1990, p. 3). The role of 
social policy, he argues, is to ‘address problems of stratification’ (ibid.), by 
allowing citizens to freely opt out of work (when necessary) without any 
affect on their job status, income or welfare (1990, p. 23). Note the poten-
tially problematic emphasis on citizenship, which as discussed in this chap-
ter, is inattentive to the restrictions placed on national membership in 
post-colonised territories. 
Nonetheless, Esping-Andersen’s framework has been applied to the 
study of welfare states in the Latin American context, acknowledging that 
welfare provision has roots in specific regional contingencies. In this light, 
it is argued that most Latin American countries have shifted from a ‘con-
servative-informal’ towards a ‘liberal-informal’ welfare regime (Barrientos, 
2004). Yet, as discussed by Martínez Franzoni (2008), grouping the very 
diverse and complex systems of welfare provision in the region under a 
single category can result in a highly problematic exercise. Instead, Mar-
tínez Franzoni offers a more localised account: her analysis is attentive to 
the structural informality prevailing in the region, which not only leads to 
labour income inequalities, but demands an analysis of non-market prac-
tices, often centred in the family. She argues that in highly informal re-
gimes, as is the case in most Latin American countries, social protection is 
stratified: tied to employment status, in the case of formal workers, or to 
income and/or family characteristics, as it occurs amongst most informal 
workers. In response to this, most Latin American states have focused on 
encouraging paid formal work whilst developing non-contributory instru-
ments to protect those excluded from it, usually on grounds of solidarity 
with those in need. In her analysis, Ecuador is located in the group of 
‘informal familist’ regimes, given the low levels of paid (formal) work and 
the minimal de-commodification2 of social protection, with informal 
workers highly dependent on their labour income and supporting family 
strategies to provide care, to confront risk such as disease and to finance 
retirement (ibid.). 
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Finally, other authors have interpreted recent changes in welfare pro-
visioning in the region as an abandonment of elements of European-style 
welfare states pursued during the 1950s and 1960s (Barrientos et al., 2008) 
and moving towards what has been termed the ‘New Social Policy’ in Latin 
America (as discussed in Molyneux, 2008). 
This chapter sketches the various ways in which the social protection 
system incorporated social groups: formal workers, the military, the police 
forces, rural workers and, more recently, carers (e.g. mothers with depend-
ent children). Beginning in the colonial period and continuing to the pre-
sent, trajectories of ongoing exclusions, and even relegation, accompanied 
the expansion of contributory social insurance, fragmenting the system 
and adjusting to the claims of specific social groups. Social and economic 
pressures eventually resulted in the creation of subsidiary social assistance 
programmes, as per the conditional cash transfer scheme Bono de Desar-
rollo Humano, further discussed in Chapter 4. In order to make sense of 
these changing government rationalities with regard to social protection, 
the conceptual focus of this chapter is ‘the role of ideologies and institu-
tions in the determination of the agenda of state intervention’ (Chang & 
Rowthorn, 1995). The chapter is organised around the axis of legibility—
linked to visibility and thus targeting— solidarity and (co)responsibility, 
concepts that aid in capturing the changing aim of the social, its design 
and its implementation in Ecuador. Different rationales deriving from var-
ious interest group representation (or visibility) are highlighted, signalling 
processes of recognition and incorporation but also marginalisation and 
exclusion accompanying welfare provision in Ecuador. The study of these 
processes helps explain contemporary reforms, in particular the turn in 
welfare provisioning towards conditional cash transfers in the 1990s. Sec-
tion 3.2 introduces the concepts of legibility and solidarity that help ex-
plain the processes of incorporation or the way in which welfare provi-
sioning has defined the social groups integrated into social insurance 
schemes, and more recently targeted by social assistance interventions. 
This section revisits the gendered projects of legibility in Ecuador in the 
early twentieth century, whereby mostly male mestizo formal workers liv-
ing in urban areas were deemed visible as contributors whilst most indig-
enous workers, in particular female workers, in rural areas remained ex-
cluded from employment and derived social rights. Women, regardless of 
their ethnic background or location, were prevented from working and 
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recast as inactive dependent subjects in the earlier years of contributory 
social protection. 
3.2. Normative basis of the social: legibility and solidarity  
3.2.1 Legibility and ‘the invention’ of the social 
Discussions about human development revolve around ‘the social’, which 
some have argued has regained prominence with the dissemination of 
more innovative tools for social protection. Interpretations of the social, 
as an abstract category, vary greatly. For instance, Razavi and Hassim the-
orise the social as ‘the cluster of social and political institutions, norms, 
and relationships that define the boundaries of market exchange, reduce 
transaction costs and enhance social and political stability’ (2006, p. 1). 
Indeed, there is a trend toward interpreting this as a ‘rediscovery of the 
social’, both in academia and in policy making circles. This has been closely 
related to the recovery of the role of the state as both regulator and pro-
vider of (social) welfare. Other authors adopt a broader definition of the 
social role of the state in the constant redefinition and demarcation of 
state–society relations. Scott, for instance, identifies the rise of the social 
as ‘a reified object’ (1998, p. 91) in the aggregation of populations under a 
distinct category separate from the state. Donzelot (1979) also relates the 
emergence of ‘the social’ to the production of aggregate statistics.3 Drinot 
(2011), following Donzelot’s definitions, expands the social to identify the 
emergence of social politics and the beginning of the welfare states (in 
both North and South). As explored in detail in this dissertation, the social 
emerged in the South, in particular in Latin America, under specific con-
tingencies, arguably connected to nation-state project formations in post-
colonised territories. In recent discussions about development, the South 
is increasingly playing an important role in unpacking the very complex 
ways in which social policy is filtered through social institutions (Razavi & 
Hassim, 2006, p. 1). 
Legibility, following Scott, pertains to the ‘state’s capacity for large scale 
social engineering’ (1998, p. 2). It could be asked to what extent this is a 
question of state capacity or even effort, by which the state would seek to 
make specific populations legible. Legibility is necessarily based on simpli-
fication. And the process of simplification is on its own a central problem 
in statecraft (ibid.). With regard to welfare provisioning, legibility runs 
through the transition from the moral, coupling scattered welfare support, 
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with individual features and/or failings, to the definition of the social aim 
of the state—or what authors denote as the social, in the redefinition and 
demarcation of state–society relations. The production of statistics was 
crucial in informing new disciplinary moral technologies: what in the past 
were considered moral failings, with the help of measurement tools could 
be reinterpreted as social facts (Scott, 1998; Ferguson, 2015). Statistics 
provided the basis for governing populations, a means of ruling individu-
als that ‘once enumerated, elicited specific interventions’ (according to 
Chaktrabarty, 2002, as found in Radcliffe, 2015, p. 21). Society4 was rede-
fined as a separate entity, different from the state and thus subject to meas-
urement and calculation by the application of simplification and rationali-
sation tools.5 These tools were assembled by a set of institutions to 
observe, measure, manage and govern6 society via state interventions.  
In order for the state to make society legible, it required abstraction 
tools, a narrowing of vision that could localise societal problems, but was 
thus necessarily unable to fully capture the complexity of it. Scott (1998) 
identifies the application of the cadastre—originally used to systematise 
land holdings—to populations as the first effort to standardise them into 
new subjects of development, that is, society. This new conception of the 
state’s role in servicing society represented a fundamental transformation: 
providing welfare to the population became both an instrument for na-
tional strength and the state’s ultimate objective (ibid.). Although inter-
ventions were directed to the nation-state, the working poor were the first 
subjects of scientific social planning under modernism, Scott argues.7 
Modern welfare state rationalities established in the North by the end of 
the nineteenth century aimed at universalising coverage, yet were linked to 
citizenship regimes. These reforms are often seen as an effort to secure 
economic progress in the light of the imminent threat of an organising 
working class, or what Chang and Rowthorn denote as the role of the state 
as ‘conflict manager’ providing insurance to the members of society (1995, 
p. 16). As noted by Mkandawire (2009), the Bismarckian welfare system is 
a case in point,8 with the state’s efforts aimed at pre-empting the radicali-
sation of the labour movement. 
In post-colonised territories, the normative basis of the social over-
lapped the domestic processes of nation-building after decolonisation 
(Mkandawire, 2009). While for some, the social aimed at addressing con-
flicts rooted in social differentiation according to class, ethnicity and gen-
der that remained unresolved within nations in the South, for others it 
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was—from its very inception—exclusionary, leaving out oppressed pop-
ulations. Li (2013) favours the interpretation of a fragile (social) incorpo-
ration, with the state integrating those already formally employed, and thus 
excluding invisible populations: ‘dependent’ women, minority groups and 
rural populations. In his revision of social policy in a development context, 
Mkandawire interprets the exclusionary route undertaken by Latin Amer-
ican countries as a political weakness, with states unable to close the gap 
between universalist proclamations and the actual reach of their policies. 
From its establishment in the region, he argues, universalism was stratified 
and integrated only those populations visible to the nation-building pro-
ject, such as the state bureaucracy and the military, and later to the indus-
trialisation project (2005, p. 4). Supporting an argument for segregation, 
in his analysis of the Peruvian experience Drinot (2011) flags the specific 
ways in which labour and social policies served a racialised process of na-
tion-formation, resulting in a binary construction of society, antagonising 
white, mestizo and (rural) indigenous populations. In a similar vein, Prieto 
(2004) argues that enumeration in Ecuador, with the first national census 
conducted in 1950, racialised the population, identifying a modern urban 
pole, mostly white and mestizo, and a traditional one confined to rural 
territories and associated with indigeneity. Economic and social policies 
serviced these ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ populations differently (ibid.). 
Although systematic processes of enumeration aided in the institution-
alisation of the social in the region, welfare provisioning preceded the pro-
duction of national statistics. The Ecuadorian state, like many newly inde-
pendent states in the region, recorded, instituted practices for and serviced 
diverse populations way before the production of national statistics, chal-
lenging the ‘invention of the social’ argument discussed for most states in 
the global North. A common denominator, however, was the absence of 
women and indigenous groups, who, following Prieto (2004; 2015), were 
erased from the early post-colonial experience: the newly independent na-
tion was constituted by (male) citizens only. Following the Bourbon re-
forms introduced by the end of the nineteenth century, the use of the cat-
egory indios (Indians) was abolished, and instead the denomination indígenas 
(indigenes) was introduced (Prieto, 2004). The ‘indian tribute’ was recast 
as an indigenous contribution (ibid.). However, by 1857, under a regime 
of customary citizenship, the management of indigenes was delegated to 
criollo landowners (Guerrero, 1997), a hierarchical structure that remained 
mostly unchanged until rather recently. The question of legibility resulted 
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in a clear distinction between citizens, workers, insured and uninsured 
populations, an element that continued to exist in more recent social pol-
icy instruments in postcolonial Ecuador, as suggested by Radcliffe (2015) 
and discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. 
     3.2.2 Solidarity after legibility: who is visible to the state? 
Solidarity, understood as a connecting principle between citizens, is a rhet-
oric that came to represent a certain logic for social insurance schemes. As 
a speech act, the use of the word solidarity by the state calls for unity 
among citizens around a common interest, entailing mutual support and 
(individual) responsibility. Thus, it serves a performative function, creating 
a sense of community around ideas of connection and mutuality. Esping-
Andersen, in his study of the welfare state as a stratification system, poses 
the question: ‘does [the welfare state] create dualisms, individualism, or 
broad social solidarity?’ (1990, p. 4). He evaluates the prospects for soli-
darity as ‘solidarity of the nation’ (1990, p. 25). In processes of state for-
mation and consolidation of the social, solidarity is thus a key concept. 
Claims of unity and commonality are inherently built on legibility: individ-
uals and/or groups have to be made visible to the state and society in order 
to mobilise solidarity. According to Ferguson and following Calhoun: 
‘while the nation form may provide an admirable basis for solidarities 
within its membership boundaries (Calhoun, 2007), it inevitably implies a 
certain exclusion of those who lie beyond those boundaries’ (Ferguson, 
2015, p. 208). By outlining the different moral economies found in the 
colonial, early post-colonial, modernisation and industrialisation phases in 
Ecuador, this chapter connects varying understandings of solidarity with 
projects of legibility pertaining to the social. 
Following Molyneux (2008), social protection in Latin America during 
the colonial phase could be interpreted as philanthropic welfarism. Organ-
ised under the Catholic Church, social welfare was minimal in scale, pro-
tecting mostly the ruling elites. It set the foundations for a vertical, pater-
nalistic and highly stratified social welfare scheme. The very few activities 
aimed at supporting those in poverty were based on social differentiation, 
with charity as a morally vindicating act grounded on religious values, as 
discussed for the Ecuadorian case by Kingman Garcés (2002). With the 
encyclical issued in 1891 by Pope Leo XII entitled Rerum novarum (revolu-
tionary change), the foundations for social Catholicism were also imple-
mented in the newly independent states, including Ecuador (Molyneux, 
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2008). Schild, in her account of the Chilean experience, notes the influence 
of Catholic understandings and practices of solidarity, as originated in the 
Nueva Cristiandad or Christian Renewal, and used ‘to regain its cultural and 
political position in a rapidly changing world as a “civilizational” force, a 
third way between capitalism and communism’ (as found in Schild, 2015, 
p. 552). A similar rationale has been documented for the Peruvian case by 
Drinot, who argues that social Catholicism reinforced the role of the state 
in the labour question (2011, p. 30). The influence of social Catholic 
thought can be associated first with discourses of distributive justice in the 
region, best expressed in the creation of institutions, such as mutualist 
funds, that provided protection to (formal) workers. By that time in Ec-
uador, the scattered integration of the poor took place via charity institu-
tions of orphanages and hospices, which in the urban centres served as 
recruitment places for unpaid domestic work (Kingman Garcés, 2002). In 
addition, Rerum novarum was opportunely interpreted by Ecuadorian land-
owners and the state as a moral mandate: patrones (landowners) had the 
responsibility to morally educate ‘their’ indigenes, keeping them in a con-
fined residence where they could abandon their nomadic ways and opt for 
a stable family, whilst protecting them from the threat of public education 
and civil marriage (Prieto, 2004). Rural workers’ welfare was coordinated 
not by the state, but by landowners, estate managers and terratenientes (Rad-
cliffe, 2015). 
In the early modernisation phases, the moral economy of social pro-
tection remained basically unchanged: paternalistic but disciplinary in na-
ture. By the end of the nineteenth century, with the reforms introduced 
by liberals,9 the dominance of the Catholic Church and the residual pov-
erty relief came into question in Ecuador (Kingman Garcés, 2002). With 
the Ley de Manos Muertas (Dead Hands Law), the Alfarista government 
transferred religious assets to the state, and with the Ley de Beneficiencia 
(1908) further separation between the state and the Church was achieved, 
now in terms of social welfare (Paz y Miño Cepeda, 2007). Rhetorically, 
poor populations were granted ‘the right to life’ (Paz y Miño Cepeda, 2007, 
p. 85). First labour legislation on women and children’s employment was 
introduced, aimed at protecting them from exploitative work such as min-
ing (ibid.). Although during Alfarismo the first conversations about concer-
taje10 and female unpaid work were held, the focus moved towards issues 
of indigeneity and national legislation (Prieto, 2015). These early reforms 
confronted modern notions, informed by a global climate of increasing 
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workers’ agitation and reformist pressures in the North, reinterpreted as 
the individualisation of state–society relations—which in the case of in-
digenous populations occurred without granting them citizenship (Prieto, 
2004), with the old rhetoric of master, patrón and concierto, following the 
‘traditional’ moral economy of the hacienda regime.  
In this light, a process of modernisation preoccupied with nation-build-
ing and informed by notions of solidarity first entered the debate among 
ruling groups and strategic sectors. Embryonic pension and insurance 
schemes were established, but only to cover the predominantly masculine 
sectors of employment, for example a retirement pension fund for teleg-
raphists (1905) and a disability pension for firemen (1908), who, recalling 
the concept of legibility introduced in the previous section, were more 
visible to the state in the early phases of export-led growth in Ecuador 
(Acosta, 1995). Most of the workers who turned to these growing eco-
nomic sectors were male. Note that the twentieth century began in the 
midst of the cacao boom, and Ecuador was ‘the world’s major producer 
at the turn of the century’ (Larrea & North, 1997, p. 915). Consonant with 
agro-export centres, there were some initial debates about agrarian reform 
and the normative basis for the ‘improvement’ of indigenous labour ca-
pacity, by ‘redeeming the Indian and working towards the spiritual reha-
bilitation of their race, building their technical capacity, mostly agrarian, 
whilst defending them from alcoholism and religious exploitation’ 
(adapted from Asamblea Liberal September 1923 as found in Paz y Miño 
Cepeda, 2007). Yet a powerful oligarchy, deriving from landholdings con-
centration in the coastal river system, soon controlled cacao production, 
banking and exports (Larrea & North, 1997). 
Consequently, despite the progressive tone of early phases of liberalism 
and the introduction of the social question of the nation, tensions between 
national unity and social hierarchy remained.11 Labour-repressive agricul-
tural systems were based on the ‘racist denigration of the highland indian, 
coastal black, and mixed races who were denied citizenship rights and the 
possibilities of socioeconomic advance’ (Larrea & North, 1997, p. 916). 
Concertaje and huasipungo further structured social hierarchies in the Andean 
Highlands, whilst legislation limited the possibility of cacao workers to ad-
vance independent cacao production (ibid.). In 1918, prison sentences for 
unpaid debt (or apremio personal) were abolished, followed by additional ex-
onerations from taxes and fees, eventually freeing the indigenous from 
concertaje.  Yet the transition was made from indigenous forced workers or 
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conciertos to indigenous wage workers, operating under the huasipungo re-
gime (Radcliffe, 2015). Their incorporation into the labour market oc-
curred in precarious conditions, keeping their remunerations low whilst 
serving national needs (Prieto, 2015). The situation was particularly disad-
vantageous for rural indigenous women under the huasipungo regime, who, 
in addition to farming activities, had considerable social reproductive re-
sponsibilities: ‘female huasipunguero family members were obliged to con-
tribute to cooking, cleaning, and generally maintaining the landowner’s 
house under tribute relations called huasicama’ (Radcliffe, 2015, p. 8). Ad-
ditional social responsibilities hindered women’s claims to agricultural land 
and associated benefits, contributing to the erosion and invisibility of their 
labour. 
Huasipungo feudal labour became the subject of liberal debate, leading 
to the creation of social welfare institutions, such as the Ministry of Social 
Provision and Labour (Radcliffe, 2015). Under liberalism, the national as-
sembly stressed the principle of ‘public protection’ and advanced strategies 
to centralise state protection and national integration, framing it around 
values of equality and unity that ought to be promoted by a single secular 
public administration, that is, the central government. Despite the central-
ity of social cohesion in the public discourse, in practice citizenship re-
mained fragmented: substantive rights were postponed for the indigenous 
population and (indigenous) women’s position was obscured (Prieto, 
2004). Indigenous populations remained excluded from labour policies 
and welfare provisioning, and had to subsist from the huasipungo regime 
which incorporated rural communities, exchanging subsistence plots and 
supplementary wages for labour quotas. It would not be until the 1960s 
that these servile relations between landowners and peasant families were 
eliminated, albeit without substantially affecting the old agrarian regime or 
addressing underlying inequalities in terms of access to land, paid work 
and welfare support. 
In the mid-1920s, with the end of the liberal revolution in Ecuador—
or what was known as the Alfarista period (Paz y Miño Cepeda, 2012)—
social protection was further concentrated under the absolute rule of the 
elites. Except for the creation of a retirement pension for teachers in 1917 
in response to workers’ organisation and demands, welfare schemes had 
secured army and public sector employment only. In 1922, a number of 
unions sought recognition of their labour rights: transportation workers, 
factory workers, artisans and construction workers engaged in general 
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strikes and outbreaks of violence, with hundreds of workers (artisans 
mostly) killed by the police on 15 November 1922 in the coastal city of 
Guayaquil (Paz y Miño Cepeda, 2007). These events led to a coup d’état 
in 1925, marking the beginning of the Revolución Juliana, which some 
interpret as a military regime aimed at counteracting the abusive actions 
of the financial elites (ibid.). In this period, a military pension was estab-
lished, followed by the creation of the Caja de Pensiones, providing regis-
tered workers access to a pension and civil annuity funds, including a monte 
de piedad, or literally a ‘mount of piety’, a mutualist institution—historically 
associated with charity—established to care for its members’ needs in case 
of infirmity.  
The collapse in international trade that followed the Great Depression 
of 1929 impacted Ecuadorian exports as well, with exports reaching their 
lowest point since 1878 in 1933 (Acosta, 1995, p. 327). Factory workers 
turned to the streets, demanding protection in a context of economic cri-
sis. In response to this, liberal reforms introduced during the first phase 
of Velasquismo aimed at addressing the labour question. Under Ve-
lasquismo, labour was properly constitutionalised, with the creation of la-
bour inspections and a labour code (1929) (ibid.). Social security was also 
decreed a mandatory regime. Dependent employees were granted access 
to health insurance—provided by the Instituto Nacional de Previsión, yet 
mostly benefiting public sector employment. However, the regime at the 
beginning excluded the indigenous from social protection, as they were 
not seen as part of the formal pool of labour in the cities. Later attempts 
to extend coverage included the creation of an Indigenous and Montubios 
Trust, which would later become the Seguro Social Campesino (or Peas-
ants Social Security Fund), perpetuating segregation and the prevailing as-
sociation of indigeneity with peasantry. By 1937, welfare was extended to 
private sector workers with the creation of Caja de Seguro Social. In mak-
ing populations legible, the first efforts in Ecuador can be located during 
this period, with the production of statistics on the working conditions of 
obreros (Suárez, 1934), incarcerated populations (Cruz, 1938) and the indig-
enous population (Santiana, 1941).  
Informed by productivist logics and following the state’s preoccupa-
tion with the ‘indigenous question’ aimed at integrating Highlands indi-
genes, national legislation consolidated agricultural units into comunas 
around 1937 (Radcliffe, 2015). Although, by law, either men or women 
could claim comunero membership, in practice, rural populations did not 
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partake in the benefits of this new political organisation (2015, p. 48). 
These interventions designed at the community level established the 
state’s inability to address the indigenous individually as citizens—and fur-
ther obscured the position of women. Instead, indigenous women were, 
according to Prieto (2015), positioned rhetorically as both legitimate (lo-
cal) authorities and mediators between community members and the 
state—in what could be interpreted as early co-responsibility.  
Issues of legibility persisted. Those who were visible to the state as in-
sured workers were those actively engaged in formal employment. It was 
argued that indigenous families were ‘traditional’ in nature, with a distinc-
tive morality (Prieto, 2004). If there was any need for the state’s interven-
tion, it had to be related to the moral role of education and the improve-
ment of their labour capacity, but not to social protection proper, as the 
latter was seen as an equalising force—which was not necessarily the 
state’s rationale. The late and differentiated incorporation of indigenous 
work could be understood as a national strategy to source labour, yet they 
were seen as a resource that ought to be improved and developed through 
state policies. It is worth noting that discussions about female work had a 
strong moral component as well. In general terms, state policies would 
discourage it, considering female participation in the labour market an un-
necessary hazard deriving from desperate choices by those families living 
in poverty. Prieto stresses the gendered and racialised aspects of labour 
policies at the time. Collecting material on the various forms of represen-
tation and media that intersected with national development processes 
pertaining to (women in) the family in the second half of the twentieth 
century, she notes the visibility of women as ‘mothers of the territory’ 
(2015, p. 101). Around 1945, media attention turned to indigenous 
women, whose motherhood was highly respected and celebrated—as a 
representation of marianismo—while at the same time they were signalled 
as impoverished and neglected. This realisation led to a discourse of unity 
in citizenry: the nation as a large family. Solidarity with indigenous mothers 
was thus urgently demanded (ibid.). Charitable activities targeting indige-
nous mothers followed. 
By the 1940s, international pressures contributed to the centrality of 
the ‘indigenous question’ (Drinot, 2011; Prieto, 2015). With the visit of 
the Misión Andina, created by the ILO, the Ecuadorian government set 
up the first development plan that aimed at addressing rural territories and 
improving the living conditions of farmers (Prieto, 2015). This mission 
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was part of a global process of decolonisation, with international organi-
sations overseeing activities undertaken by emerging nations. The ILO 
had decided to intervene in the integration of indigenous groups, as these 
populations were often found in precarious occupations with no access to 
social protection, which, it was argued, were factors that kept them in pov-
erty (ibid.). Informed by anthropology, the mission suggested ‘cultural in-
tegration’ (2015, p. 136), incorporating what researchers defined as the in-
terconnected aspects of the indigenous way of life. Thus, the emphasis 
was on apartness, which exacerbated processes of segregation of the in-
digenous, whilst suggesting that the Ecuadorian government should ad-
dress processes of subordination, deemed as a necessary condition to 
achieve equality and unity, linked to solidarity in the national territory. The 
mission also initiated many women in the occupation of front-line workers 
or trabajadoras sociales, a gendered face of the state that remained through-
out new formulations of the social. A new bureaucracy dealing with com-
munity development emerged under the so-called revolución de los olvidados. 
The Catholic Church was again invited to be involved, this time as a stra-
tegic actor necessary to break through the resistance found among indig-
enous populations (Prieto, 2015).  
In what could be considered a second effort to centralise welfare pro-
vision, a state-led national scheme was established in 1942, with a subsi-
dised component: 40 per cent of the contributions were covered by public 
funds (Acosta, 1995). Intra-sector solidarity was probably far-fetched, de-
spite ‘a growing awareness that populations who would not reach the sta-
tus of full citizen but whose needs could be addressed’ (Radcliffe, 2015c, 
pp. 49). Reforms introduced in 1948 gave preferential treatment to the 
army, providing severance payments and financed retirement, followed by 
increasing settlements for the army and police components of the social 
security system in 1950, the creation of the Army Trust in 1957, and the 
establishment of a full government subsidy for the army and police pen-
sions in 1959. By 1962, these funds were split due to marked differences 
in sectorial wages across the army and police sectors (ibid.).12  
The first determined attempt to provide universal access to social pro-
tection in Ecuador can be traced back to the 1950s under Cepalinos influ-
ence (from CEPAL, as per the Spanish acronym for the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean). Renewed 
notions of modernisation guided policy making, again antagonising the 
growing modern urban centres and the traditional indigenous family. An 
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export-led growth strategy concentrated efforts on banana production and 
the first attempts to diversify production, including trading traditional 
handicrafts. With the banana boom by the end of the decade, export rev-
enues aided what authors have identified as a failed attempt to articulate a 
developmental state in Ecuador (Acosta, 1995; Larrea & North, 1997; Paz 
y Miño Cepeda, 2007). The developmental state constituted a political pro-
ject for rapid industrialisation, as per a ‘statist political economy’13 (Fish-
wick & Selwyn, 2016) or structuralism (Molyneux, 2008), with direct im-
plications for the structuring of the social and national market formation. 
As noted by Chang and Rowthorn, when a process of radical economic 
transformation such as industrialisation is in progress, ‘new interdepend-
ences will appear and old ones disappear’ (1995, p. 9). Massive highland-
to-coast migration occurred during the banana cycle, allowing the creation 
of a wage-labour force and the intensification of international trade (Lar-
rea & North, 1997, p. 916). 
Following the influence of the Cepalinos school, which prioritised hu-
man capital investments serving the needs of a growing industrial sector, 
new welfare regimes were established in the region following the needs of 
late industrialisation. Furtado, one of the key contributors to structuralism, 
flagged underdevelopment not as the absence of economic growth, but as 
‘a discrete historical process through which developed economies have 
not necessarily passed’ (Kay, 2005, p. 1203), suggesting state-assisted in-
dustrialisation. In the peripheries, this process necessarily took place late 
in relation to advanced industrial countries, which controlled access to 
capital and technology. Prebisch, in such a context, advocated for rapid 
industrialisation as a means to raise productivity and labour incomes (Po-
lanyi Levitt, 2005), with the derived policy prescriptions: economic plan-
ning and programming, abolition of feudal land tenures (or hacienda re-
gimes), income distribution, regional and subregional economic 
integration, and measures to encourage industrial exports to centres, that 
is, industrialised countries (ibid.). These prescriptions required careful co-
ordination, thus major state involvement, to respond to and shape the de-
mands of late industrialisation. 
Cepalinos influence in Ecuador resulted in the first discussions about 
universalisation of social services. Social policy, broadly speaking, had a 
productive function: integrating and protecting the growing labour force, 
whilst endorsing solidarity amongst citizens by granting them universal 
access. Solidarity, however, remained questioned. With the creation of 
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Junta Nacional de Planificación (the National Planning Board) in 1954, a 
rapid process of industrialisation was initiated, albeit without affecting the 
pre-existing fragmentation, dominance of exporting sectors and preva-
lence of the huasipungo and hacienda regimes. The social should have re-
sulted from full employment, with entitlements defined around attach-
ment in the areas strategic for rapid industrialisation. However, the set of 
industrial and social policies failed to tackle the structural bifurcation of 
the labour market, resulting in the coexistence of a precarious agrarian 
sector—in terms of workers’ compensation—and an emerging modern 
manufacturing sector, concentrated in the urban enclaves (Paz y Miño 
Cepeda, 2007). Whilst urban and predominantly male employment ex-
panded, the gap between the agricultural and manufacturing sectors re-
mained. Salz (1955) flagged the possible tensions, even confrontations, 
that accompanied a process of industrialisation unable to fully integrate 
rural agrarian populations into the production sphere in a reorganisation 
of production and territories, which left hierarchical structures practically 
unaffected and failed to implement much-needed land reform. Instead, 
government-supported colonisation processes led to the emergence ‘of a 
sizeable rural middle-class in parts of the export zone’ (Larrea & North, 
1997, p. 917). 
During the 1950s, the first modern national census14 was conducted in 
Ecuador, as in other countries in the region. The process of enumeration 
focused, amongst many other aspects, on ethnicity. Indigenous status was 
determined by criteria such as linguistic identification, clothing such as 
footwear, and dwelling conditions such as living in a hut and not being 
equipped with a bed, as indicators of the traditional life (Direccio ́n General 
de Estadística y Censos, 1960). With this census, the notion of nuclear family 
was introduced amongst the indigenous population: although enumerators 
were instructed to record as household head the name provided by the 
family, it was usually indicated next to it that it was ‘the husband’, even 
though the maintenance of the family was often shared among men and 
women (Prieto, 2015). It also categorised most women as inactive, alt-
hough they were performing paid and unpaid work in traditional occupa-
tions (ibid.). Indigenous women were at a crossroads: considered hard-
working but ‘domesticated and submissive’, not participating in the labour 
force and excluded from social services (for extensive documentary re-
search, see Prieto, 2015).  
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In the 1960s, in what authors denote as ‘the development decade’ (Paz 
y Miño Cepeda, 2007, p. 142), structural changes were implemented in the 
country. In 1963, a military junta overthrew the government of Carlos 
Julio Arosemena. The junta took office for three years, and adopted both 
a conservative posture towards labour movements—criminalising and de-
porting ‘communist’ activists—and a developmental agenda aimed at 
modernising the incipient national business sector. In 1964, an agrarian 
reform was implemented under the Ley de Reforma Agraria y Colo-
nización, directed at abolishing precarious agrarian regimes: the huasipungo, 
characteristic of the Andean haciendas, which exchanged limited access to 
land for work amongst impoverished indigenes; and the latifundio, charac-
teristic of the coastal provinces, with extensive parcels of privately owned 
land seized by terratenientes from neighbouring peasants. The expected out-
come of this reform was the introduction of wage labour in the agrarian 
sector, resulting in the expansion of domestic demand (ibid.). In practice, 
however, the reform legalised landholding amongst huasipungueros (or hac-
ienda owners), barely redistributed latifundio properties—only those that 
were considered underused—and led to further concentration of land 
amongst the ruling elites, including the military. This failed agrarian re-
form, together with the development of the manufacturing sector and to 
some extent the financial sector, resulted in accelerated urbanisation 
(Acosta, 1995).  
With more workers in the public sector, coverage of social insurance 
increased and led to the creation of the Caja Nacional del Seguro Social 
(Social Security Fund) from the fusion of the pension and insurance com-
ponents in 1963. Emergent sectors obtained support for mutualist socie-
ties and workers’ associations, aiding to the integration of private business 
schemes into an embryonic public welfare scheme, resulting in the Insti-
tuto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social (Ecuadorian Institute for Social Se-
curity) in 1970. By this time, however, and following processes of urban 
migration, the ‘traditional indigenous family’ was already being challenged, 
as seen in the increase in illegitimate children, consensual unions and over-
all higher fertility rates (Prieto, 2015). A new representation of the indige-
nous family as in the process of disintegration emerged. Education policies 
then focused on preparing women for family life (ibid.). Whereas women 
in urban formal employment were covered by labour legislation, for ex-
ample maternity-related policies, women in rural areas were excluded from 
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any of this. Yet it is worth noting that many urban women joined the la-
bour force as domestic servants or seamstresses (Kingman Garcés, 2002), 
but following labour norms and inapt statistical procedures, despite their 
large numbers they remained invisible and excluded from social protec-
tion. As such, ‘non-productive’ workers—women, indigenes and rural 
populations—lingered in the margins, only partially incorporated under 
peasantry or campesino schemes (Acosta, 1995). Late efforts aimed at inte-
grating rural workers led to a pilot project for peasants in 1968, following 
a renewed social Catholicism which set its ‘preferential option for the 
poor’, impacting the design and practice of the social in the region (Schild, 
2007; 2015).  
With regard to industrial policy, the military junta implemented an in-
stitutional reform under the first official development programming, Plan 
de Desarrollo (1964–73), which included protection of domestic indus-
tries, financing of strategic sectors, attraction of domestic and foreign in-
vestment, and provisioning of tax credits and other complementary sub-
sidies (Paz y Miño Cepeda, 2007). The junta faced significant limitations, 
both in terms of legitimacy—authors signal this as a top-down approach 
driven by modernisation motives (Larrea & North, 1997; Paz y Miño 
Cepeda, 2007)—and budgetary constraints, unable to affect the taxation 
structure in the aftermath of the banana boom and the fall in export rev-
enues (Acosta, 1995; Paz y Miño Cepeda, 2007). Subsequent military re-
gimes, as per the Gobierno Nacionalista y Revolucionario (1972–76) and 
the Consejo Supremo de Gobierno (1976–79), further prioritised indus-
trialisation and regional integration under the Pacto Andino. Manufactur-
ing industries were highly dependent on imported inputs and capital 
goods, increasing the country’s debt (Larrea & North, 1997). Budgetary 
pressures were addressed by increasing the taxation base and with initial 
attempts to nationalise extractive industries, until the oil boom started in 
1973, which marked the beginning of the petrolismo in two years of sus-
tained increase in export revenues. Infrastructure, telecommunications, 
governmental and military organisations and commerce benefited from 
this bonanza. Foreign direct investment increased in this period, directed 
at the growing domestic industrial activity (Acosta, 1995; Paz y Miño 
Cepeda, 2007).  
The normative basis of industrial, labour and social policies, as de-
scribed in the document Filosofía y Plan de Acción of 1973, rested on the 
principle of solidarity as ‘national unity’, calling upon the resurgence of 
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civic values amongst the population whilst advancing a ‘moralising, popu-
lar, programmatic, anti-feudal, anti-oligarchy, functional, austere and sta-
ble’ state, and declaring ‘nationalist, independent, integrationist, humanist 
and disciplined’ political aims (Presidencia de la Republica del Ecuador, 1973). 
Centralising and authoritarian, albeit with some leftist inclinations (Paz y 
Miño Cepeda, 2007), the governments of the second phase of industriali-
sation in the late 1970s strongly intervened in strategic sectors such as 
production, commercialisation and services, and centralised economic ac-
tivities, oil extraction in particular, whilst delinking them from foreign cap-
ital (ibid.). Official documents refer to a newly emergent ‘“racial democ-
racy” if only a few “racial barriers” were removed, to be replaced with 
“intercultural relations [thereby] creating new possibilities of access for 
marginal social groups’ (adapted from Junta Nacional de Planificación, 
1970, p. 8, Ecuador Bienestar Social as found in Radcliffe, 2015c, p. 50). 
The racialized aspects of this project are best captured in the following 
quote ‘Todos nos hacemos blancos cuando aceptamos los retos de la cultura nacional’ 
(Or ‘we all become white when we take up the challenge of national cul-
ture’), attributed to General Rodríguez Lara, as found in Walsh (2009a, p. 
25).  
Given the marked social heterogeneity, however, efforts to integrate 
marginal populations were accompanied by resistance from white and 
mestizo groups. A second attempt at agrarian reform in 1973 faced such 
resistance from terratenientes that the government abandoned the proposal. 
Later, in 1974, a social fund was created, Seguro Social Campesino, aimed 
at covering rural agricultural workers. By 1981, this fund was expanded to 
provide health insurance, disability and death coverage, and old age pen-
sions to the campesinado. From its inception, tensions with mestizo rural 
workers emerged, as they could be identified with the peasantry but had 
neither indigenous nor montubios background, the legibility criteria that ac-
companied the creation of this peasantry fund.15 With the increased rural–
urban migration that took place in the 1970s, racial segregation in access 
to welfare schemes seemed to disappear gradually (Radcliffe, 2015c). 
During the period of state-led industrialisation, informality expanded 
significantly to the central enclaves in Ecuador (Lawson, 1990). Industrial 
policies implemented during the 1970s resulted in higher rates of eco-
nomic growth, yet different from other economies in the region, growth 
was mostly driven by primary commodities: oil, the food industry and tex-
tiles. Manufacturing activities were concentrated in the urban centres in 
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Pichincha and Guayas, and were highly reliant on foreign technology and 
external funding. The tertiary sector, in particular banking and commerce, 
also expanded during this period. Rising income inequality across these 
sectors, resulting from the inefficient industrial structure, hindered the do-
mestic capacity, further neglecting rural-peripheral territories. The rural 
infrastructure was inadequate, and to the extent that it existed it was con-
trolled by large producers whilst peasant producers were relegated (Larrea 
& North, 1997). The stagnation of the agrarian sector led to massive rural–
urban migration and employment in the lower tier of the urban informal 
sector (ibid.). Meanwhile, in the urban areas, workers’ organisations mo-
bilised and gained recognition, forming the Frente de Unidad de Trabaja-
dores by the end of the decade, in an attempt to counteract the gran patrón 
(or great master) logic associated with the hacienda regime and replicated 
in newly established urban businesses (Paz y Miño Cepeda, 2007). By mid-
1970, the book Los Indígenas de altura del Ecuador (Bonifaz, 1975) exacer-
bated these tensions, putting together the first thesis of infantilisation of 
rural populations, linking their poverty to biological factors. The author 
argued that only the most capable indigenous people were migrating to 
the urban centres while the ‘less-innovative’ remained in the agricultural 
sector. In her reading of Bonifaz, Prieto flags the denial of social and his-
torical processes whilst serving the thesis of improvement of the indige-
nous (2015, p. 48).  
The 1980s were marked by the dismantling of the Cepalista model16 
and the universalist rhetoric. This coincided with the external debt crisis 
and structural adjustment policies pushed by international financial insti-
tutions. Between 1982 and 2006, a process of neoliberal restructuring was 
introduced and the principle of solidarity abandoned, both rhetorically and 
in practice. The orthodox neoliberal governments of León Febres 
Cordero (1984–88), Sixto Durán Ballén (1992–96) and Jamil Mahuad 
(1998–2000) tried variations of structural adjustment programmes, fol-
lowed by right-wing populist experiments such as those by Abadalá Bu-
caram (1996–97) and Lucio Gutiérrez (2003–05). Scattered efforts to re-
spond to economic downturns followed in this period, some more 
responsive than others. For instance, only by 1986 was security for agrar-
ian workers (still referred to as campesinado) declared mandatory, four years 
after the El Niño event that affected agrarian activities. Note that in 1987 
two major earthquakes hit the country, resulting in 1,000 casualties and 
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the collapse of the oil infrastructure—significantly affecting the Ecuado-
rian economy (Uribe-Teran & Vega-Garcia, 2017). By and large, the trend 
was towards privatisation: an attempt to privatise general social security 
funds—and abandon the solidarity-based public model—was rejected via 
referendum in 1995. It was in the aftermath of the 1999 financial crisis 
that informality intensified, within a much more urbanised labour force 
than before. Benería and Floro (2006) argue that most of the reduction in 
formal employment in 1999, or informalisation, was due to the increased 
participation of women in paid work during the times of crisis, albeit in 
precarious conditions. Informal employment constituted a larger source 
of employment for women than for men after the crisis. With the crisis, 
the decline in formal employment and the dynamism of the informal econ-
omy enhanced the relative attractiveness and the predominance of the lat-
ter, particularly for women, as informal and casual work arrangements 
could be overlapped with household activities—at the cost of reaffirming 
gender as a major axis of differentiation in terms of work. In times of 
crisis, the informal and household economy expanded to pick up the slack 
in the formal economy. The authors also attribute informalisation pro-
cesses to the flexibilisation of labour and the weakening of labour regula-
tion that took place by the end of the 1980s.  
The social and economic instability ended in a financial crisis17 in 1999 
followed by a series of mobilisations: the first cash transfer programme 
Bono Solidario (Solidarity Grant) was created in this context. The BS was 
introduced to compensate poor and informal sector workers for the elim-
ination of the subsidy on cooking gas. Formal sector workers were com-
pensated through an adjustment in the minimum wage. Thus, it could be 
said that the cash transfer programme in Ecuador was designed in explicit 
recognition of informal sector workers’ lack of protection. Yet its practice 
was related to previous processes. Some have flagged the influence of 
Catholic understandings of solidarity towards the poor in the workings of 
BS, which as already mentioned could be traced back to colonial times. 
The idea of solidarity was revived and reinterpreted under the new social, 
with cash-based welfare policies dealing with the poor as a collectivity (a 
similar discussion has been advanced for the Chilean case by Schild, 2015). 
Authors have documented how most recent configurations of social assis-
tance under the New Left still constitute a call for action on behalf of the 
poor (Radcliffe, 2015c; Schild, 2015), or what can be interpreted as new 
understandings and rhetorical use of solidarity. In this light, solidarity, as 
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associated with recent reforms, ‘could be reimagined as existing in sustain-
ing relation to one another through collective politics that looked toward 
the state to dispense justice’ (Grandin, 2004 in Schild, 2015). Insofar as 
strategies for economic inclusion and re-regulation of labour activities 
have been recently implemented in Ecuador, for example non-contribu-
tory social protection, enforcement of social security affiliation and, for 
the first time, guaranteeing coverage for women working in domestic ser-
vice, some authors envisage that informality, as a space for precariousness, 
will decrease (Ghosh, 2012).  
In sum, for most of the post-independence period, the incorporation 
of workers into the welfare system followed specific demands, for example 
rapid industrialisation, nationalist projects and failed agrarian reform. Ar-
guably following the Bismarck model for welfare provisioning, based on 
mandatory mutualism (Castel, 2003), or national unity built on solidarity, 
in the second half of the twentieth century the state insured most visible 
workers and gradually widened the basis of inclusion into a unified regime, 
limited by political factors (in terms of recognition) and socio-economic 
structures (related to economic inequality and social heterogeneity), result-
ing in what Mkandawire denotes as ‘stratified universalism’ (2005, p. 4). 
Import substitution industrialisation, in the light of the contingencies dis-
cussed above, perpetuated the urban bias, creating what authors identify 
as labour oligarchies (Acosta, 1995; Paz y Miño Cepeda, 2007) or labour 
aristocracies (as discussed in Mkandawire, 2005 with a more regional fo-
cus) and marginalising ‘less-strategic’ populations. As discussed, following 
various modernisation agendas did not imply ‘a substantive break with the 
landlord past although Ecuador became an urban society’ (Larrea & 
North, 1997, p. 924). Following Li (2010; 2013), this confirms that not all 
citizens of a state can belong to the social on the same terms: ethnic groups 
living in the margins (non-white and/or mestizo), landless rural workers, 
rural–urban migrants joining the tertiary sector, unpaid care providers of-
ten legible as ‘dependent’ women—who remain unnoticed in the making 
of the social during these decades unless formally working for public ad-
ministration or legally married to a worker entitled to social insurance, il-
legible to the state’s ambit of regulation and strategic protection—re-
mained excluded from labour policies and social welfare schemes, or only 
had access to the most fragile forms, such as subsidiary peasantry funds, 
or late and provisional access to income support.  
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Except for a few interventions pertaining to social assistance in the 
1980s, with the creation of the Ministry for Social Welfare by National 
Decree No. 3915, it can be argued that new ways of governing welfare 
were only installed in Ecuador in the late 1990s, with the merging of the 
Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Social Welfare into a new entity: 
the Ministry of Work and Social Action (Ministerio de Trabajo y Acción 
Social). In 2000, in the aftermath of the crisis and dollarisation, the admin-
istration of social assistance returned to a reintroduced Ministry of Social 
Welfare, now with the mandate of improving citizens’ living standards, 
especially among the poor. New administrations introduced reforms to 
government organisations pertaining to social assistance administration 
and servicing, changing the Ministry’s denomination from Social Welfare 
into Human Development in 2003, and to the Ministry for Social and Eco-
nomic Inclusion in 2007. Given the extension of income support to his-
torically excluded populations on the basis of renewed understandings of 
solidarity, new legibility rationalities and the introduction of (co)responsi-
bility—a dominant discourse shaping welfare interventions under the New 
Social in the region—a new moment in social protection provisioning can 
be identified by the end of the 1990s in Ecuador, which is discussed in the 
next section. 
3.3 The new social: another moral economy? 
[To] talk about the Welfare Regime of Good Living or for Good Living 
entails a normative conceptualisation, that introduces a vision of a society 
to be aimed at, and thus, linked to a set of institutional instruments and 
concrete public policies to achieve it.18 (Muñoz & Ubasart, 2015, p. 154, 
translated by the author) 
The expansion of social assistance, and to some extent of related social 
services such as education, to historically excluded groups marked a trans-
formative tendency in the late 1990s that continues to the present in Ec-
uador. Attempts to recover state-led development, or what some have re-
lated to neodevelopmentalism (as discussed by Escobar, 2010 or more 
recently Fishwick & Selwyn, 2016), met those of transformation, empha-
sising self-sufficiency, inclusion and social citizenship (Secretaría Nacional 
de Planificación y Desarrollo, 2013). The dominant discourse of individual 
co-responsibility that shaped welfare interventions under the new social in 
the region, following Molyneux (2008), proved to be useful in reconciling 
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these tendencies, by enlisting recipients as co-partners in the process of 
social transformation whilst vindicating industrialisation objectives—and 
subsidiary human capital investments—rather than prioritising universal-
ism (Fishwick & Selwyn, 2016). It is also argued that, with recent restruc-
turing processes that have taken place in the region, there seems to be a 
different conceptualisation of the state as having a moral responsibility to 
safeguard the rights of their citizens alongside economic growth (Grugel 
& Riggiriozi, 2012), although others argue that the emphasis on co-respon-
sibility diverts the attention from top-down forms of social responsibility 
(Peck & Theodore, 2015). Whether these changes constitute an alternative 
to neoliberalism or even to development, as discussed by Walsh (2009b), 
Escobar (2010), Lind (2012), Villalba (2013), Webber and Carr (2013) and 
Radcliffe (2015c), remains questionable.  
As noted by Lavinas (2013), one of the most important tools for pro-
moting (individual) responsibility has been the provision of cash, via CTs 
or microcredit, only if conditions are met. The cash transfer model, in 
particular, encapsulates a new rationality of social protection different 
from those of universal coverage discussed above, providing entitlement-
based transfers. Instead, CTs, and CCTs in particular, articulate a response 
to the ‘behavioralist deficiency model of the poor’ (as discussed in Peck & 
Theodore, 2015), adjusting inappropriate behaviour, for example welfare 
dependency or underinvestment in schooling, by indoctrinating more pro-
ductive and responsible subjects; or following Radcliffe (2015c), in search 
of pro-active, self-generating subjects. Thus the emphasis is on social pro-
motion: exits from poverty (or graduation), re-connecting welfare with hu-
man capital investments and expected gains in economic growth (ibid.).  
What is more, these interventions are often framed as ‘best practice’ and 
evidence-based (Fiszbein & Schady, 2009), and thus disconnected from 
domestic politics. Fostering an experimental ethos (ibid.), the CCT model 
encapsulates a new rationale of social protection different from the nation-
building projects associated with universal coverage, linked to citizenship 
regimes and to the state-delivery system. 
In Ecuador, co-responsibility was first introduced in the constitution 
of 1998: ‘[t]he state should promote co-responsibility among parents and 
the compliance of duties and reciprocal rights among parents and children’ 
(Art. 69 translated from República del Ecuador, 1998). It is worth noting 
that co-responsibility was defined in terms of the nuclear family—parents 
and children—entering the realm of care but without direct mention of 
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the state’s role. Art. 83 reaffirms reciprocal obligations, appealing for an 
equal share of care work among father and mother and for intergenera-
tional solidarity, as children should take up care duties from their parents 
if needed (ibid.). Co-responsibility was reasserted in 2008, with the enact-
ment of a new constitution following a referendum called by the Citizens’ 
Revolution—a project formulated by Rafael Correa’s administration—
which ratified aspects of reciprocal obligation within the household, main-
taining the same principles governing care as in 1998, but integrating a 
stronger role for the state’s ambit of regulation and protection of paid 
employment and care (unpaid) work, by promoting access to care-related 
services, for example childcare centres and nursing homes, and expansion 
of social insurance coverage to unpaid workers, aimed at reconciling paid 
employment and the domestic sphere (adapted from Art. 333 Asamblea 
Constituyente, 2008). Further, the Organic Law for Civil Participation and 
Social Control of 2010 designated ‘[co-responsibility] as the legal and eth-
ical compromise assumed and shared by citizens, state, civil society organ-
isations, to manage the public’ (extracted and translated from República 
del Ecuador, 2010). Renewed understandings of responsibility and soli-
darity accompanied this new formulation. Responsibility, as an individual 
and collective obligation, was to be shared by citizens, the state and civil 
society organisations, to pursue Buen Vivir (living well). In like manner, 
solidarity was redefined in terms of cooperation and mutual support 
amongst persons and collectives (ibid.).  
Under the new social, responsibility has been framed as co-responsibil-
ity (corresponsabilidad), bringing together, in their social rhetoric, moral and 
social obligations of the state to its citizens. Responsibility, a recurrent 
term found in official documents pertaining to social policy, suggests the 
condition of having a social duty, e.g. responsible citizens, yet ought to be 
fulfilled individually e.g. as individual citizens. It can be framed as a moral 
concept related to deservedness: citizens are entitled to rights because of 
good societal service. The most recent emphasis on individual responsi-
bility or co-responsibility to self-improve entails learning ‘how to market 
themselves’ (Gledhill, as found in Schild, 2015). To this aim, the CCT 
model has made the fulfilment of conditionalities a social obligation. Co-
responsibility, in the new social, bridges claims to self-development and 
solidarity. With this, moral and social values are operationalised via the 
state’s realm, emphasising mutually responsible behaviour and thus soli-
darity (Prieto, 2015). 
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In most recent reports and documents pertaining to social protection 
in Ecuador, co-responsibility is defined as a shared or reciprocal respon-
sibility between two or more individuals (and/or institutions), comprising 
actions implemented by population(s), the state and private actors to ad-
dress social problems (Buitron, 2015). In particular, co-responsibility fo-
cuses on the active participation of families in the provision of care and in 
the processes of social mobility. The provision of care relies on the family 
as the fundamental space of production, maintenance and attention (ibid.). 
This assertion helps bridge the provision of cash transfers with self-pro-
motion: families should comply with conditionalities as a means to gener-
ate their own capabilities and involvement in the process of generation 
and in search of opportunities for economic inclusion (ibid.). In other 
words, co-responsibility encompasses two dimensions: a familial one, per-
taining to production, income generation and provision of care; and an-
other one pertaining to social promotion and the generation of capabilities 
for a permanent way out of poverty, that is, graduation. Very rarely these 
reports address the racialised aspects of poverty, access to social protec-
tion and provision of care. Buitron (ibid.) summarises qualitative analysis 
conducted amongst different communities in Ecuador on the topic of co-
responsibilities and care. She comments, regarding interviews with indi-
genes in the Highlands, that respondents tend to interpret co-responsibil-
ity as being more responsible within the household, as well as charged with 
a moral component, discerning between right and wrong. Thus, co-re-
sponsibility is seen as a moral obligation. 
Lastly, the connection between co-responsibility and civic values is 
made in the Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir: ‘if we all assume co-responsi-
bility for our destiny as a society, we will abandon the passive attitude that 
leaves us expecting the state to solve our needs. Co-responsibility is em-
bedded in the “culture of citizenship” that guarantees our rights” (trans-
lated from Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo, 2013). Thus, 
co-responsibility is recast as a concept that goes beyond the moral; instead, 
it is a societal concept, linked to certain framings of citizenship and pur-
suing Buen Vivir. That being said, co-responsibility is a new addition to the 
moral economy of social protection in Ecuador. Early attempts to provide 
income support responded to specific contingencies, as previously dis-
cussed, with incremental adaptations serving what one could argue is a 
more normative configuration for governing social welfare as experienced 
in recent years. The shift away from old understandings of solidarity and 
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the introduction of co-responsibility are presented below via a detailed 
account of Bono Solidario and Bono de Desarrollo Humano, cash transfer 
programmes implemented under the new social.  
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has revisited ‘the social’ in Ecuador, acknowledging that in 
most post-colonised states, integration into the formal labour force, for-
mal welfare systems and substantive citizenship more broadly, has only 
been possible for the most visible segments of the population: ‘the effec-
tive denial of citizenship rights to the indigenous peasantry’ helps explain 
the urban bias, or one could argue the male mestizo/white bias, of gov-
ernmental projects. Many ‘dependent women’ (following Mies’s denomi-
nation, 1982) remain in the margins, only seen by the state in sporadic 
ways and through the most salient aspects of their ‘social citizenship’: con-
ditions of poverty, ethnic minority, motherhood, old age and so forth. On 
this account, it can be noted that in discursive and practical terms, many 
women from indigenous, black and montubio backgrounds remain, due to 
their low labour attachment, less visible to policy instruments originally 
devised for the formally employed. On the other hand, CCTs adopt a hy-
per-gendered perspective, as per the role of mothers as care providers. 
This emphasis on most traditional gendered roles, however, obscures the 
aspects of exclusion and marginalisation related to ethnicity as discussed 
above. 
Looking beyond the specific features of social welfare provisioning in 
Ecuador, one could return to the work of Martínez Franzoni (2008) and 
interpret the legacy of the ‘old social’ as an inability to fully incorporate 
historically marginalised groups into the labour market and integrate them 
into state welfare systems. In a process somewhat similar to what occurred 
under the Cepalino influence, the preoccupation with the social is accom-
panied by elements of nation-building, now framed in terms of intergen-
erational reduction of poverty, that is, investment in the next generation 
of urban workers (Radcliffe, 1999; Radcliffe, 2015c), functional for re-
newed industrialisation strategies (Fishwick & Selwyn, 2016)—neither 
consistent nor effectively implemented in the light of domestic and inter-
national limitations. The recent focus on informality, as a residual of failed 
industrialisation, urban bias and discursive abandonment of universalism, 
can be reinterpreted in this respect. 
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A central claim of this chapter is that, in order to understand current 
social protection alternatives, it is necessary to revisit earlier experiences 
and ask the question: was there a deliberate social aim of the state before 
cash transfers? Many current accounts of social protection in the region 
seem to largely decontextualise the recent expansion of social assistance. 
What is more, by flagging processes of segregation in terms of access to 
formal employment and derived benefits, the background of post-colonial 
exclusion is brought to the fore, collecting the different normative princi-
ples, institutional arrangements and academic currents that affected the 
configuration of the social in Ecuador. More recent experiences, in partic-
ular CCTs, are contingent on these historical processes whilst largely in-
formed by external influences. In this light, the CCT model, as designed 
in academic centres in the North and diffused, together with funds, by 
international financial organisations, has served the purpose of depoliticis-
ing and decontextualising these interventions. The Ecuadorian experience 
has been revisited and further discussed in this context, flagging the un-
solved tensions that are found when trying to make populations visible to 
the state and subject to interventions whilst advancing diverse—even con-
tradictory—developmental agendas. 
Notes 
1 Ferguson (2015) flags the predominantly Eurocentric formulation and discussion 
of the social. His work, although focused on southern Africa, opens a new line of 
inquiry in the chronological narrative of social provisioning in the global South. 
2 De-commodification, according to Esping-Andersen, ‘refers to the degree to 
which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living 
independently of market participation’ (1990, p. 37), necessary for the system’s sur-
vival. 
3 Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that social policy was not unknown prior to mod-
ern capitalism and associated statecraft, but its nature and organisation became 
transformed. For Mkandawire, the social question, as it emerged in the nineteenth 
century, pertained to ‘securing economic progress in light of the political and moral 
threat posed by the condition of the working class’ (2009, p. 132). 
4 Following Scott, the separation of society from the state, and thus the reification 
of society, defined it as a system with regulable and calculable properties (Scott, 
1998). 
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5 With these processes, there was a suppression of what were considered obscure 
and barbaric communities, resulting in the establishment of a ‘new cultural unity’, 
expressed and promoted by setting uniform standards (Scott, 1998, p. 90). 
6 Following David Scott (as found in Drinot, 2011, p. 9), ‘governmentality is emi-
nently transposable to (as an analytics), and evident in (as a form of exercise of 
power), colonial and authoritarian or, more generally, illiberal societies’.  
7 Understood as ‘a strong version of the beliefs in scientific and technical progress 
that were associated with industrialization in Europe and North America’ (Scott, 
1998). 
8 Other responses, such as Beveridge models of universalism, followed a different 
rationale.   
9 Liberalism in Ecuador can be located between 1895 and 1925, after the Liberal 
Revolution of 1895. This period, largely informed by political liberalism, advanced 
a governing rationale towards universalism, thus standing against conservatism, ac-
cording to Paz y Miño Cepeda (2012). Liberalism has also been interpreted as the 
convergence of economic and political interests of coastal elites, associated with 
cacao exports and sugar plantations and thus preoccupied with international trade, 
expansion of the labour supply and the promotion of modern institutions serving 
such aims (Ayala Mora, 2008). 
10 A system of forced labour, based on an agreement between landowners and rural 
workers, by which (mostly) indigenous populations undertook work indefinitely 
without salary.  
11 Operationalising Radcliffe’s theorisation of social hierarchy as the continuation 
of social difference (2015, p. 4)  
12 Nevertheless, the control exerted by the army and police prevailed: The Army 
Social Security Fund was created in 1992, followed by the creation of a Police Se-
curity Fund in 1995, both granting preferential access to funds to these sectors.  
13 In the aftermath of the 1929’ crisis, the structuralist school emerged in Latin 
America (Polanyi Levitt, 2005), articulating insights from classical political econ-
omy, Marxism and the German historical school (for instance List’s work) and 
contemporary with Keynes, Hirschman, Kaldor, Kalecki and others (Fishwick & 
Selwyn, 2016), as a critique of liberal economics, rejecting the thesis of global inte-
gration based on comparative advantage, particularly from the late nineteenth cen-
tury onwards, and flagging the challenges of late industrialisation identified among 
Latin America countries (Kay, 2005). 
14 Population data, before the national census of 1950, was unreliable. Depending 
on the source consulted for the period 1940–50, the share of lowland indigenous 
population fluctuated between 3 and 23 per cent, of highland indigenous between 
20 and 80 per cent, of mestizo between 15 and 45 per cent, and of the white pop-
ulation from 1 to 28 per cent (for an extended revision, see Prieto, 2015). After the 
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national census, official figures estimated that 40 per cent of the total population 
was indigenous (Ibid.). 
15 It is worth noting that the association of campesinado with indigeneity lingers on. 
In the government’s rhetoric, the seguro campesino is a space of multi-culturality: ‘aquí 
están los cholos, los indígenas, los mestizos y afro ecuatorianos beneficiarios del Seguro Social 
Campesino que creen en el cambio de la Revolución Ciudadana’ (here are the cholos, the 
indigenous, the mestizos and the Afro-Ecuadorian benefiting from the Seguro So-
cial Campesino who believe in the change introduced with the Citizens’ Revolu-
tion) (Correa, 2015). 
16 The reasons for abandonment of this model are highly debated. While some ar-
gue it was due to country differences in state capacity in the region (Barrientos et 
al., 2008; Fishwick & Selwyn, 2016), others emphasise external and domestic ele-
ments such as the financial crisis, accelerated by persistent fiscal deficits and the 
gradual transformation from national industrial capitalism to global capitalism, 
overly reliant on international finance and trade (Filgueira, 2014). A deeper exami-
nation of these debates is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
17 It is also worth noting that in the period 1997–98, the country had to cope with 
the effects of El Niño (Uribe-Teran & Vega-Garcia, 2017). 
18 From the original Spanish text ‘[H]ablar del Régimen de Bienestar del Buen Vivir 
o para el Buen Vivir comporta ya un concepto normativo en el que se introduce 
una visión de sociedad a la que se quiere llegar, y por lo tanto, va vinculado a un 
instrumental de institucionalidad y política pública concreta para conseguirla’ (Mu-
ñoz & Ubasart, 2015) (translated by the author). 
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4.1 Introduction 
Conditional cash transfers are often regarded as a ‘radical’ new idea for 
welfare provisioning conceived in the South (Barrientos et al., 2008; Levy, 
2008; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009; Hanlon et al., 2010). Its design is simple: 
a target population—usually poor mothers with school-age children—re-
ceives a periodical stipend subject to conditions related to human capital 
investments, for example school attendance and/or medical check-ups. 
The CCT model pioneered in Mexico and Brazil in the early 1990s has 
been replicated in many low- and middle-income countries and increas-
ingly in high-income countries, defining a transition from collective insur-
ance towards more individualised social protection regimes. Although in-
serted in national social protection systems and adapted to their varying 
needs, the CCT model has kept its foundational ideas: providing targeted 
income support whilst introducing behavioural changes. Some authors 
(Lavinas, 2013; Schild, 2015) trace these ideas back to the team of econo-
mists trained in the USA, that is, the Chicago School of Economics, and 
established in Chile’s department Odeplan under Pinochet’s administra-
tion, who in 1981 created the Subsidio Único Familiar (Unique Family 
Subsidy), the first CCT prototype in the region; while others see in Pro-
gresa, Mexico’s programme, the refinement of the CCT model in the early 
1990s with the full integration of conceptual definitions advanced by mul-
tilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank (Peck & Theodore, 2015). In all, there is an emergent con-
sensus that the CCT model was not an exclusively Latin American 
invention but has been co-produced by academic centres in the global 
North and by multilateral development agencies (Molyneux, 2008; Lavi-
nas, 2013; Ferguson, 2015; Peck & Theodore, 2015; Radcliffe, 2015c; Roy 
& Crane, 2015; Schild, 2015). 
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Though the rationale and most essential features of the cash transfer 
programme in Ecuador have remained basically unchanged in the last two 
decades, moving between an unconditional and conditional scheme, the 
different administrations have enacted diverse practices of enumeration, 
selection and graduation of recipients. These practices can be seen as ei-
ther contingent on domestic constraints and/or needs, or as adapting and 
re-interpreting international discourses of ‘what works in development’ 
(Reddy, 2012, p. 60) and notions of best practices. This could be theorised 
under what Peck and Theodore denote as model power (2015), whereby 
the diffusion of an original structure meets the aspirational project or de-
sire to reconstruct such structure on another site. To some extent, changes 
introduced to the Ecuadorian cash transfer scheme Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano can be interpreted as an aspirational projection—or even a gov-
ernmental aspiration (Drinot, 2011)—of ‘successful’ schemes, promoted 
by multilateral development agencies, from which states can derive ideo-
logical presuppositions about what is right (James, 2006).  
What could be interpreted as a mere collection of contingencies in wel-
fare provisioning in Ecuador is revisited in this chapter, making sense of 
the deliberately changing ‘political technologies that act both to problem-
atize poverty and to govern the poor’ (Roy & Crane, 2015, p. 37). In trac-
ing different interpretations of social assistance, from residual income sup-
port to the establishment of a social floor, this chapter seeks to study the 
genealogy of the new social in Ecuador, by means of situating ways of 
thinking about poverty in historically specific configurations and re-as-
sessing the resulting fragmented or, more precisely, bifurcated nature of 
the social protection system in Ecuador. The chapter problematises the 
representation of poverty as a technical problem, which pertains to the set 
of practices concerned with representing ‘the domain to be governed as 
an intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics … 
defining boundaries, rendering that within them visible, assembling infor-
mation about that which is included and devising techniques to mobilise 
the forces and entities thus revealed’ (Rose, 1999 as found in Li, 2007, p. 
7). As noted by Li, ‘[q]uestions that are rendered technical are simultane-
ously rendered non-political’ (Li, 2007, p. 7). This is particularly relevant 
to the study of cash transfers, which have been accompanied by a resur-
gence of technocratic policy makers. Heavily reliant on statistics and quan-
titative analysis, the CT model has employed a number of experts in the 
fields of poverty, health, nutrition and so on, with a marked tendency to 
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approach (social) problems in technical terms. Nonetheless, experts tend 
to exclude the structure of political-economic relations from their diagno-
ses and prescriptions: ‘they focus more on the capacities of the poor than 
on the practices through which one social group impoverishes another’ 
(ibid.). 
Drawing on the concepts of legibility, solidarity and (co)responsibility 
introduced in the previous chapter, this chapter argues that recent institu-
tional trajectories of social protection can be best understood as elements 
of governmental aspiration (Drinot, 2011), co-produced by international 
networks and local actors (Peck & Theodore, 2015), reorganised by dif-
ferent administrations to respond somewhat to the challenges of provid-
ing welfare in a highly informalised context. Determining interventions 
targeted at the poor ‘is often a process of social action and political en-
gagement that reveals how they must evolve if they are to be effective’ 
(Reddy, 2012, p. 64). The vast informality existing in Ecuador, as argued 
in this dissertation, rather than a result of individual choice and evasive 
practices, is a residual of (failed) incorporation attempts, both into the la-
bour market (see Chapters 5 and 6) and into social protection systems. 
Contributory stratified regimes established during the twentieth century 
only partially integrated less visible populations such as women and ethnic 
minorities, whereas non-contributory schemes seemed to have integrated 
otherwise marginalised populations, although with no deliberate racial tar-
geting—rather a gendered one. Nonetheless, the resulting configuration 
of social protection shows the highly gendered nature of cash-based wel-
fare in Ecuador, despite a rhetoric of technical poverty alleviation and 
(universal) rights-based policy making, arguably informed by international 
debates and expert networks. 
The chapter sketches the way in which marginalised populations were 
incorporated into key transformations in social protection by the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century, by means of tracing fragmented trajecto-
ries, often leading to exclusion and difference—a legacy of the stratified 
contributory insurance scheme set up in the 1930s—still very much pre-
sent in the recent expansion of contributory social insurance and the cre-
ation of the social assistance programmes Bono Solidario and Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano. The first section deals with the design and imple-
mentation of the first cash transfer programme Bono Solidario and sub-
sequent efforts to establish the conditional variant Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano, with the intervention of international organisations such as the 
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Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The second section discusses 
the recent reforms introduced by the Citizens’ Revolution after 2007, in 
what some argue constitutes a post-neoliberal alternative—a view increas-
ingly challenged by scholars in the light of the ongoing process of exclu-
sion and marginalisation.  
The analysis relies on documentary research, examining legislation, of-
ficial reports and supporting documentation. It is further complemented 
with qualitative research from a series of field visits made to southern Ec-
uador between 2012 and 2015, working with cash transfer recipients, for-
mer recipients (or, adopting the lingo of multilateral organisations, ‘grad-
uated’ recipients), unregistered workers (or workers in informal 
employment) and front-line workers associated with the cash transfer pro-
gramme BDH. Qualitative work helped to map out the extent of institu-
tionalised segregation, not fully captured in official statistics, that places 
recipients among the most disadvantaged — pushed to the margins of 
regulation and protection. Recipients provided critical descriptions of the 
challenges of integration into temporary, sporadic, subsidiary social assis-
tance programmes, assisting the analysis of narratives of partial integration 
in the labour market—as informality is often associated with marginalised 
women. This labour market segregation is translated into a stratified social 
protection system. Trajectories of social provision signal at various pro-
cesses of visibility resulting from institutional efforts to tackle historical 
exclusionary state practices, whilst evidencing the prevalence of poverty 
amongst marginalised populations. It is worth noting that under the New 
Social, international financial organisations and national decision-making 
circles have begun to pay more attention to processes of exclusion in order 
to ensure that income support targets populations more effectively, and in 
doing so, they have contributed to making these populations more visible. 
4.2 Bono Solidario: solidarity—with whom? 
In 1998, Bono Solidario was created to compensate poor households for 
the elimination of a subsidy on cooking gas, just one of the frantic actions 
taken to create some fiscal space in a context of financial crisis and general 
turmoil. The programme was not established under the social council, but 
was the result of a joint proposal by the Ministry of Finance and the Con-
sejo Nacional de Modernización (CONAM, or National Council for Mod-
ernisation) (Pardo, 2003). The programme was publicly known as Bono 
de la Pobreza (Poverty Grant) and was attacked both by the conservative 
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media as a paternalistic policy and by the (academic) left as yet another 
charity act led by the state and the Church (Kingman Garcés, 2002). The 
BS programme started as an unconditional transfer of 120,000 sucres (about 
US$11.50) per month, reaching about 1.3 million households.1 As origi-
nally conceived, BS was meant to be temporary (Schady & Rosero, 2007). 
Individual payments made by BS were small but its scope, in terms of 
number of recipients, was relatively large. The programme funding, as of 
2002, was assigned 0.75 per cent of GDP (ibid.). 
The target population included women with at least one dependent un-
derage child—18 and younger—and living in poverty, determined by a 
monthly income ceiling of 1 million sucres. To remain eligible, neither the 
recipient mother nor her spouse could be in regular (formal) employment 
(Martínez, 2016). No conditionalities were imposed on recipients. Because 
the BS was implemented as a hasty alleviation response, the programme, 
despite having a targeting protocol, resulted in numerous targeting errors 
(ibid.). At first, households signed op on a first-come, first-served basis. 
Information on household composition and income levels was self-re-
ported in local parish churches (Kingman Garcés, 2002). Hardly any cross-
checks with other administrative records, for example the Civil Registry, 
IESS database or companies’ payrolls, were conducted to detect misre-
porting. Implicit in the design, however, was the applicant’s moral obliga-
tion, that is, responsibility, to provide accurate information about the 
household’s situation. The result, however, was not satisfactory: it was es-
timated that 49.8 per cent of families in the poorest quintile received trans-
fers and 27.4 per cent of families in the top two wealthiest quintiles re-
ceived transfers (Schady & Rosero, 2007). 
In the same year, an additional component, targeted at persons 65 years 
old and above, was implemented. A similar income poverty threshold was 
used to determine eligibility: the household monthly earnings could not be 
higher than 1 million sucres and the applicant could not be in regular (for-
mal) employment. A monthly stipend of 50,000 sucres (about US$4.80) was 
allocated to households meeting the eligibility criteria. 
This social assistance programme was presented as an instrument based 
on principles of solidarity. It is worth asking, however: solidarity with 
whom? In the analysis of social provisioning, solidarity is discussed in 
terms of universalistic projects, which promote ‘equality of status’ 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 25). Implicit in this project is an egalitarian 
structure that can allow for ‘cross-class solidarity, a solidarity of the nation’ 
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(ibid.). This understanding of solidarity—granted this specific class struc-
ture—is more apt to describe ‘flat-rate’ insurance, but falls short in ex-
plaining the preference for targeted modes of social assistance whereby 
‘the poor rely on the state and the remainder on the market’ (ibid.), further 
exacerbating stratification in social provisioning, as discussed in Chapter 
3. 
4.2.1 Reforms to Bono Solidario 
In 1999, the stipend was increased to 150,000 sucres per month, adjusting 
for inflation and the deepening of the financial crisis. Yet the number of 
recipients could not exceed an allocated budget of 1.9 billion sucres per 
annum. Thus, the increase in the size of the transfer was accompanied by 
reforms aimed at tightening targeting and restricting the number of recip-
ients. New eligibility criteria were added: neither the recipient mother nor 
the spouse could be affiliated to any social security regime, and in case the 
mother had been deserted, an affidavit should be provided by the appli-
cant. An amendment was introduced in the same year, allowing IESS pen-
sioners, persons affiliated to Seguro Campesino and/or those affiliated to 
voluntary regimes to remain eligible for BS transfers—for the components 
directed to mothers and persons with disability. For the BS component 
directed to the elderly population, pensioners could remain eligible only if 
the monthly IESS allowance was not greater than 500,000 sucres.  
A second reform to the BS was introduced in the same year, aimed at 
including persons with disability in the cash transfer scheme. The target 
population included persons aged 18 to 65 with a permanent disability of 
at least 70 per cent, as certified by CONADIS (the National Council on 
Disability). It relied on eligibility criteria similar to those applied to the 
elderly population: the household’s monthly income could not be higher 
than 1 million sucres (about US$40) and the applicant could not be in reg-
ular (formal) employment. Underage applicants were required to submit 
an affidavit stating the death of the mother. The three BS components 
directed to (1) mothers with underage children, (2) elderly persons and (3) 
persons with disability were mutually exclusive. That is, a household could 
only apply for one of these components at a time.  
The BS administration relied on self-selection and self-reporting: 
households’ members had to present themselves to local parishes admin-
istered by the Catholic Church or Evangelic Church to collect the appli-
cation forms. Applicants were requested to hand in a written statement 
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(actually an affidavit) stating their condition of poverty related to the so-
cio-economic conditions of the household, for example income, number 
of children and state of the dwelling. The information regarding house-
hold head and spouse was digitalised and (occasionally) verified using pub-
lic and private databases, namely: civil registries (deceased members, cross-
check of ID numbers, children’s age, members of retirement age, dupli-
cates), banking risk management (loans and warrants), social security 
(IESS or general regime, ISSPOL or police regime, ISSFA or army re-
gime), migration, utilities (electricity and phone bills), persons with disa-
bility (as certified by the organisation CONADIS), tax records and payroll 
data. This application system, to some extent, replicated unemployment 
insurance in the North, soliciting people themselves to apply for welfare 
support, after which means tests were applied, which is different from 
more recent interventions whereby the state actively sorts and seeks recip-
ients amongst eligible groups.  
Under a new administration in 2000, in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis and dollarisation, BS transfers were increased, first to US$11 and 
later in the same year to US$12 dollars per month for the mothers’ com-
ponent, and to US$6 and later to US$7 per month for recipients with dis-
ability or in old age. The purpose of the programme was changed to pov-
erty reduction, although the target population remained the same: mothers 
with underage children, persons 65 years old and above, and persons with 
permanent disability aged 18 to 65; and the selection criteria were only 
modified for the mothers’ component, now excluding IESS pensioners, 
persons affiliated to Seguro Campesino and/or those affiliated to volun-
tary regimes. The total number of recipients was determined by a budget-
ary restriction of US$12.8 million per annum. 
By 2001, the administration developed a household means test. Most 
families living in rural areas and some of the poorer urban areas were sur-
veyed, after which they were assigned a poverty index or SELBEN index. 
Transfers were considered small, estimated as being on average not more 
than a tenth of the household’s income (Schady & Rosero, 2007). The 
programme ruled that BS transfers should be made to women only—if 
there were any adult woman permanently living in the household—and it 
was requested that women themselves should go to a nearby bank to re-
ceive the stipend (ibid.). 
Beca Escolar (BE, or School Grant), an addition to BS, was imple-
mented in 2002. Designed as a conditional cash transfer programme, it 
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aimed at preventing school dropout amongst the poor. It awarded school-
age children (aged 6 to 15) a bimonthly stipend of 125,000 sucres (about 
US$12). Official reports indicate it was successful in terms of targeting—
using the SELBEN survey—but had low coverage: approximately 150,000 
households. Ultimately, the programme was restricted to a budget of 
US$6.6 million per annum. The eligibility criteria included school enrol-
ment and an attendance rate of at least 90 per cent. Consistently with the 
programme design, to remain eligible, children had to continue to be en-
rolled and attending school.   
Together, these interventions aimed at providing subsidiary income 
support. Rhetorically, they were performed by the state as acts of solidarity 
among all citizens, whilst for the media and some academics they seemed 
to resemble marianismo (Prieto, 2015), given the arguably normative pref-
erence towards poor mothers—a recurrent theme in welfare support in 
Ecuador—whilst reinterpreting old acts of vertical charity, inherited from 
early interventions associated with a more passive state—thus, the popular 
epithet Bono de la Pobreza to designate BS. 
4.3 Reciprocal obligations: conditionality 
In 2003, the BS and BE were merged into a conditional scheme, Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano, aimed at reducing inequality, increasing access to so-
cial services, providing income support and working towards a general ob-
jective of (social) inclusion. The creation of BDH was accompanied by a 
retargeting of the recipient population using SELBEN,2 a proxy-means 
test estimated from a national survey, administered by the Programa de 
Protección Social—an independent unit within the Ministry of Social Wel-
fare. Education and health conditionalities, in Spanish corresponsabilidades, 
framed recipients as co-partners in this intervention.  
To protect and promote human capital accumulation among individuals and 
families living in poverty or at risk of becoming poor. The objectives are to 
1) safeguard minimum consumption levels among poor families through 
direct monetary transfers; and 2) provide incentives for human capital accu-
mulation by conditioning these on fulfilment of education and health co-
responsibilities. (Registro Oficial, 2003) 
The new scheme included the same target populations: mothers with 
underage children, elderly persons and persons with permanent disability. 
However, the household, as allocation unit, became more visible in official 
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documents, selection criteria and mapping tools.3 All households in the 
lowest income quintile were deemed eligible, and according to their com-
position, they were assigned to different components: a conditional one, 
directed at households with school-age children (ages 0 to 16), or an un-
conditional one, covering elderly and disabled persons. Health- and edu-
cation-related conditionalities were imposed only on poor households 
with school-age children. With regard to health controls,4 these were only 
intended for children ages 0 to 5. In terms of schooling,5 conditionalities 
were aimed at households with children aged 6 to 16 years. With the ex-
ception of a few pilots, monitoring of the BDH education and health con-
ditionalities were not observed in practice. 
The BDH included two types of benefits. For households in the lowest 
income quintile, with no dependent school-age children, and where the 
household head or spouse was (1) aged 65 years and above or (2) had a 
permanent disability without school-age children, the transfer was set at 
US$11.5 per month. For households with dependent children aged 0 to 
16 years, regardless of whether these were headed by elderly and/or disa-
bled persons, the transfer was set at US$15 per month. For the conditional 
component directed at poor households with children, transfers were 
channelled to women—framing this as a gender-conscious policy; in ex-
ceptional cases these were made to any other adult in the household in 
charge of food preparation and medical controls and responsible for chil-
dren’s school attendance. Transfers were cashed on a monthly basis but 
up to three payments could cumulate—in consideration of the circum-
stances that poor households located in remote areas had to face, in terms 
of time and money, to collect the cash. Note that this would change later, 
as the administration determined that failure to collect the transfer was 
indicative of discontinuance in the programme.6  
BDH was marketed as a ‘social programme’ (Schady & Rosero, 2007). 
Following institutional restructuring, an advertising campaign was 
launched, including spots on national television and local radio stations. 
These spots stressed that the BDH was meant to benefit poor children 
only, although there was no actual procedure to verify the conditionalities. 
Schady and Rosero argue that publicity may have led households to spend 
transfers according to the goals of the programme, as individuals tend to 
keep ‘mental accounts’ in their expenditures, internalising values such as 
‘fairness’ and ‘reciprocity’ spread by the media (ibid.).  
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In 2006, in a context of institutional reform, the Ecuadorian govern-
ment, via the Secretaría Técnica del Frente Social (Technical Secretary for 
Social Affairs), contacted the IDB for a funding operation to implement 
reforms in the social sector aimed at poverty reduction and human capital 
development among poor families. Access to IDB resources involved a 
series of conditionalities pertaining to efficiency, impact and quality of 
public social spending. The disbursements were done in phases, upon 
completion of (1) the transformation of the BDH programme into an ef-
fective7 conditional cash transfer programme; and (2) improvement of the 
design of the programme, in terms of monitoring and evaluation, target-
ing, developing complementary social policy instruments and promoting 
graduation, that is, self-sufficiency, of poor families. The first phase for 
US$60 million extended over four years: US$5 million financed technical 
assistance, while the remaining resources (US$55 million) financed trans-
fer payments by the central government to BDH recipients.  
Complying with the conditions imposed, a retargeting exercise was im-
plemented in 2006. About 50 per cent of the BS recipients (more than 
500,000 households) were disqualified and stopped receiving benefits, 
whilst another 500,000 households were newly registered as potential re-
cipients. The retargeting scheme, certified as SELBEN II, used data on 
household demographic composition, assets and other welfare-related 
variables. Transfers to recipient households that had not had a SELBEN 
interview were suspended. In case they missed the visit or wanted to be 
included, they had to contact MIES administration themselves.  
‘We wanted to apply, but they [MIES officers] asked me to bring two 
carnets: the cédula (or citizen identification document), and the one they 
give you as a disabled person. I didn’t have those things. See, they did not 
register my name. They go and offer things, but at the end, nothing hap-
pens for us. They will tell you “come back later”, but then when we came 
back, nothing!’ (Interviewee-H, 2013).  
About 1.1 million households were integrated into the BDH pro-
gramme. The administration had set the goal of covering only households 
in quintiles 1 and 2 of SELBEN. However, many households that partic-
ipated in the BS did not meet these criteria but were headed by elderly 
persons or persons with disability, which were still included in the re-
formed BDH. However, for the group of elderly and disabled, affiliation 
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to any social security regime except Seguro Campesino led to the auto-
matic discontinuation of BDH transfers. Such restrictions did not apply 
to households with school-age children. 
4.4 Incrementalist mutations: tightening of targeting and 
introduction of the perversity rhetoric 
They do not ask what the money is for. They do not care. They think they 
get to know us with a survey […] they asked me what did I use the money 
for […] I just gave them any answer and signed a document, I do not know 
what for. (Interviewee-S, 2013) 
As noted by Peck and Theodore (2015), CCTs in Latin America to a large 
extent have been co-produced by multilateral development agencies—in 
the Ecuadorian case, the IDB was involved in overwriting the operating 
costs of BDH in 2003 (Martínez, 2016). IDB’s financing helped foster an 
experimental ethos amongst policy makers and consultants associated 
with the Programa de Protección Social (PPS or Social Protection Pro-
gramme), requiring the inclusion of evaluation tools (BID, 2003). Expert 
networks were formed to provide evidence for the policy development 
process. One of the main topics of concern was nudging, or how to facil-
itate ‘better’ choices amongst the poor: experts were asked to quantify the 
nudge that BDH should provide to the poor, which would help to effec-
tively enforce the programme’s conditionalities, in what Peck and Theo-
dore identified in similar operations as policy-based lending (2015, p. 104).  
Schady and Rosero joined the team of experts appointed to fine-tune 
the design of the BDH programme, producing the report ‘Are cash trans-
fers made to women spent like other sources of income?’ (2007). The au-
thors conducted an experiment: a randomised introduction of an uncon-
ditional cash transfer to poor women in rural Ecuador. They split the 
sample into bi-parental households, assuming the parents had shared or 
joint responsibility for the household maintenance; and households 
headed by an adult woman. The expected results were: an increase in the 
food Engel curve among bi-parental (adult) households and no effect 
among female-only households. The authors explain the difference in re-
sults according to what they identify as bargaining possibilities: there was 
only gain among bi-parental households where bargaining was considered 
an issue, for example the initial control of women over resources was weak 
(before the transfer); whilst there was no identifiable gain among female-
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only households where, they argue, there was simply no man to bargain 
with. Education was used as a proxy for women’s bargaining capacity.  
The experiment was conducted as follows: the first half of the house-
holds in the sample were randomly assigned to a treatment group, that is, 
the lottery winners, and the second half to a control group, the lottery 
losers. Households in both groups lived in the same neighbourhoods. Alt-
hough random assignment was successful, the authors warn there was an 
imperfect match between assignment to the study group and actual receipt 
of BDH transfers (Schady & Rosero, 2007). Lack of information, costs of 
travelling to a bank and stigma were discussed as plausible reasons for 
some households refusing to receive the transfers. There was also ‘con-
tamination’ in the baseline: about 42 per cent of households assigned to 
the control group received transfers, which were not withheld after-
wards—this was judged to be politically imprudent (ibid.).  
In the experiment, it was noted that there were clear differences in the 
baseline across households that received BDH transfers and those that did 
not. Comparison calculations were limited to households with children 
aged 6 to 17 years old only. BDH recipients had lower food expenditures, 
and they tended to be larger in terms of number of household members, 
although parents had on average an extra year of education compared with 
non-recipients, who were approximately two years younger and somewhat 
more likely to be male. Households in BDH tended to be poorer than 
other households. In a prior version of this experiment, Schady and 
Araujo (2005) had found that the increase in enrolment was greater among 
those who believed that it was conditional. Yet these results were depend-
ent on income. The condition made no difference in enrolment rates 
among low-income households—only among better-off households. A 
later version published in Fiszbein and Schady (2009) dropped the results 
disaggregated by income, only presenting the general outcome of the ex-
periment which favoured the imposition of conditionalities. 
The above-mentioned example is just one in a series of randomised 
experimental trials implemented by IDB in the context of the BDH. A 
recent paper published by Araujo et. al. also makes use of data on BDH 
eligible households, with households within selected parishes8 randomly 
assigned to control (51 parishes) and late treatment (26 parishes) groups: 
the ‘early treatment’ group began receiving BDH transfers in 2004, while 
the ‘late treatment’ group only became eligible for transfers three years 
later (2016, p. 4). The authors indicate that although transfers were made 
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available to both groups after 2007, the control group ‘never fully caught 
up with the early treatment group’ (2016, p. 10), suggesting this might have 
‘occurred because some households in the late treatment group never re-
alized that their eligibility status had in fact changed’ (ibid.).  
The societal consequences of these experiments are not discussed in 
this or similar studies conducted by IDB. Yet scholars have pointed at the 
ethical concerns of conducting randomised trials in the context of social 
policy: ‘where there are ex ante reasons to believe that a particular benefit 
should go to one person rather than another (for ethical reasons or for 
reasons of efficacy), to allocate the benefit randomly instead is to deliber-
ately misallocate resources, at the cost of the individuals denied the treat-
ment’ (Reddy, 2012, p. 67). The expected value of the ‘knowledge’ gener-
ated by these trials has to be counterweighted with the possible harms that 
unjustified and arbitrary selection of recipients might cause to communi-
ties’ cohesiveness and individuals’ sense of visibility and attachment. As 
discussed elsewhere, marginalised populations live by hanging on the edge 
of assistance programmes, in constant fear of being excluded from the 
state’s interventions.  
Quite apart from these ethical issues, investments in these costly ran-
domised trials can be also problematised based on their most basic econ-
ometric identification issues. These experiments are driven by a rationale 
of best practices: ‘providing the best means of arriving at an inference that 
is not polluted by the impact of “confounding” variables’ (Reddy, 2012, p. 
61). Yet individual choices cannot be isolated from the macro settings 
where they operate. For instance, Araujo et. al.’s results seem discouraging. 
As stated by the authors:  
our regression discontinuity results show that 10 years after one group of 
households became eligible for transfers and another one did not, young 
women in transfer-eligible households had modestly higher secondary 
school completion rates than those in transfer-ineligible households. How-
ever, this did not translate into a higher probability of attending university 
or some other tertiary institution. Moreover, there is no clear effect on the 
probability that these women work. The broad pattern of results indicates 
that cash transfers prevented a small fraction of women from dropping out 
of secondary school, but did not have a measurable effect on their subse-
quent education and work choices. (2016, p. 14)  
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The authors speculate on the possible reasons, challenging the mod-
elled direction of causality, or as a last resource, turning to simplistic ‘cul-
tural’ (read naturalising) explanations: ‘there may be cultural reasons or 
problems in labour markets that keep women from turning their (mod-
estly) higher schooling levels into higher employment rates’ (2016, p. 15). 
Such insights, however, entered the debate too late. Back in the early 
2000s, the assumption was that cash transfers did have an impact on em-
ployment outcomes. In another IDB report released in 2006, it was sug-
gested that recipient households are inclined to decrease the amount of 
labour supplied to the market by various household members. It argued 
that, if this was caused by a decrease in child labour, the effect on employ-
ment outcomes could be considered positive, whereas if the decline in la-
bour supply were to occur among other household members, it could be 
linked to greater dependency on government assistance, that is, welfare 
dependency. Stricter depuration controls followed these concerns,9 relying 
on digitalised methods for identifying, recognising and paying recipients 
of cash transfers. A summary of the various crosschecks implemented ap-
pears in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 BDH eligibility criteria 
Database BDH  
component 
Target  
population 
Frequency Description 
IESS Conditional Mothers with  
underage children 
Every 4 to 6 
months 
Households under the SELBEN  
threshold are not cross-checked 
Unconditional Elderly population Persons affiliated to IESS regime 
and pensioners are not eligible 
 
Unconditional Disabled  
population 
ISSFA Conditional Mothers with  
underage children 
Monthly Households under the SELBEN  
threshold are not cross-checked 
Unconditional Elderly population Persons affiliated to ISSFA regime 
and pensioners are not eligible 
 
Unconditional Disabled  
population 
ISSPOL Conditional Mothers with  
underage children 
Monthly Households under the SELBEN  
threshold are not cross-checked 
Unconditional Elderly population Persons affiliated to ISSPOL regime 
and pensioners are not eligible 
 
Unconditional Disabled  
population 
Public 
servant 
registries 
Conditional Mothers with 
underage children 
Monthly All public sector workers in reg-
ular employment (and their depend-
ents) are not eligible 
*Cross-check with central  
government information only 
 
Unconditional Elderly population 
Unconditional Disabled  
population 
Population 
records 
Conditional Mothers with  
underage children 
Monthly Deceased recipient 
Unconditional Elderly population 
Unconditional Disabled  
population 
Source: Adapted from Martínez (2016). 
 
As of 2015, depuration with social security databases (IESS, ISSFA and 
ISSPOL) was being conducted every four to six months for the groups of 
elderly and disabled, the unconditional component, but not for mothers 
with underage children, the conditional component. As mentioned in or-
ganisational reports (as compiled by Martínez, 2016), data validation with 
IESS is rather complicated. Although the IESS administration has 
monthly data on payments and contributions, frictions with these organi-
sations result in an average of two cross-checks per year. Information 
from public service registries (payrolls) is verified on a monthly basis for 
the entire BDH target population. Challenges remain, though. In an inter-
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view with a former director of SELBEN, and in reference to last enumer-
ation waves, he stated: ‘It is so difficult to keep track of households. Peo-
ple do not report any changes’ (Interviewee-C, 2014). 
4.4.1 Co-produced transformations: self-sufficiency and transition 
towards a ‘social floor’ 
I have heard that the BDH for mothers, either single or married, will come 
to an end. They will only give it to the disabled and the elderly. (Interviewee-
V, 2013) 
In 2007, the BDH programme was restructured again, standardising exist-
ing social assistance programmes. The size of the transfers allocated to the 
elderly and disabled population was levelled up to meet the conditional 
component, reaching an amount of US$30 per month—increased to 
US$35 in 2009 and to US$50 in 2012;10 and the eligible population in-
creased from the lowest quintile to households in the two lowest income 
quintiles. The eligibility criteria for disability were relaxed, reducing the 
percentage of permanent disability from 70 to 40 per cent, as verified and 
certified by CONADIS. Overall, between 2009 and 2012, in what authors 
identify as a phase of expansion, consolidation and expectation (Santillana 
Ortiz & Webber, 2015), the number of recipients and the budget signifi-
cantly increased. Along with the inclusion of new beneficiaries, a continu-
ous process of depuration led to the exit (or graduation) of recipients who 
moved to the third quintile, migrated, were deceased or were affiliated to 
social security. 
However, after 2012 the administration started what some identify as a 
phase of ‘conservative restoration’ (ibid.). Preliminary studies were com-
missioned to evaluate the possibility of massive graduation of BDH recip-
ients.11 To complicate things further, due to the appreciation of the dollar 
and the fall in oil revenues, the government faced important budgetary 
restrictions. In 2013, by Ministerial Decree No. 000197 (Registro Official, 
2013), an accelerated process of ‘graduation’, that is, reduction in the num-
ber of recipients, was implemented. Social mobility, defined in terms of 
economic inclusion and self-sufficiency, became central for poverty erad-
ication, determining a permanent way out of poverty. In this light, a set of 
criteria for graduation was determined. First, the SELBEN index thresh-
old was reduced from 36.6 to 32.5, leading to the automatic exit of 232,978 
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households.12 Second, a thorough check with central government regis-
tries led to the exclusion of all households in which at least one member 
was working as a civil servant with monthly earnings above US$280. Third, 
pensioners (IESS, ISSFA or ISSPOL) could no longer receive BDH trans-
fers—neither in the conditional nor the unconditional scheme. MIES also 
cross-checked information with private sector and local government agen-
cies, further depurating data on recipients.  
They came to interview us in 2008. They talked to my husband. I tried telling 
them my husband was sick. Still, they removed me from the programme. 
The month after, I went to withdraw my BDH money and I was told I will 
not receive BDH transfers anymore. Back then, my husband was still work-
ing. Now, he is retired. But the pension he gets is not enough. Besides, I 
have to stay by his side; he cannot be left on his own. He cannot even read 
no more. He suffers convulsions. I have to be there, for him … I have tried 
signing up again for BDH transfers, told them he is disabled. But the answer 
is always no, because he receives an IESS pension. When I visited MIES, I 
was told they are not including new people in the register. But people keep 
on telling me that I should go back and insist, because the pension he gets 
is not enough for his medicines. And we are looking after my daughter’s son 
who is attending school. (Interviewee-B, 2013) 
In addition, the BDH seems to be shifting away from the conventional 
CCT model linked to human capital investments—targeting households 
with underage children—and emphasising the social floor component,13 
targeted at persons of old age without a pension, or persons with disability. 
According to official reports, the BDH conditional component targeted 
at households with underage children, or more precisely at mothers, 
should be interpreted as a temporary transfer aimed at smoothing con-
sumption, whereas the BDH pension component was recast as a perma-
nent entitlement targeted at the elderly population (65 years and above) 
and the disabled (with a CONADIS certification of 40 per cent disability 
and above) living in poverty. Such trends are illustrated in Figure 4.1, 
where the steep decline in the number of BDH recipient mothers com-
pared with other recipient groups is noticeable. 
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Figure 4.1 Number of BDH recipients over time (in millions MM), 2000–2014 
Source: BDH administrative registries (MIES 2016), author’s own calculations. 
 
More than 800,000 recipients were graduated after 2012. It is not clear if 
this followed budgetary pressures14 or a change in the focus and scope of 
the programme, as suggested in conversations with key informants in 
Quito. The budget allocated to the BDH increased from US$867 million 
in 2012 to US$1.1 million by 2013—the highest historical level—then de-
creased to US$710 million by 2014 (CEPAL, 2016). Although the total 
budget allocated to the BDH and the total number of recipients were re-
duced significantly, the composition of the budget also changed, confirm-
ing a transition towards a non-contributory pension and away from previ-
ous notions of human capital investments—as per the CCT model. In 
recent years the participation of the BDH conditional component (tar-
geted at mothers) drop from 40 per cent to 26 per cent between 2014 and 
2015, whereas the pension component (elderly pension) increased from 
26 per cent to 31 per cent and the disability pension increased from 5 per 
cent to 8 per cent in the same period (ibid.). 
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The identification of this shift was put forward by a key informant (In-
terviewee-L, 2014) at MIES who indicated an explicit change in policy pri-
orities, making of the BDH a more integrated system favouring non-con-
tributory pensions, similar to the Chilean experience with Chile 
Solidario—during one of the author’s visits to the organisation it was pos-
sible to discuss these with Chilean consultants who were then working on 
a technical proposal along these lines—next to a decision to reduce the 
overall number of recipients. In other words, the administration intended 
to end the BDH programme as a conditional cash transfer and transition 
towards a social floor alternative. 
Regardless of whether or not the reduction in beneficiaries was con-
nected to a change in focus in the programme, what is striking is that no 
protest followed this process of massive ‘graduation’. There was no clear 
organisation of voices from below—alternatively, no class mobilisation as 
anticipated by Esping-Andersen (1990). In 2013, the process of ‘gradua-
tion’ had already started. Amongst those graduated recipients, 58 per cent 
had not been informed about the reason for their exit (Survey data, field-
work, 2013). Of the remaining 42 per cent who were informed, 61 per cent 
repeated the MIES automated response: ‘you do not need it, others need 
it the most’. In conversations with former (or ‘graduated’) recipients dur-
ing my visits to southern Ecuador, they speculated about the reasons of 
their exit, providing a a variety of reasons, from accessing school grants 
scholarship, access to subsidised mortgages, the purchase of a refrigerator 
or other home appliances, or gaining access to public services such as elec-
tricity supply. A former BDH recipient interviewed in Loja articulated the 
feelings of frustration and uncertainty accompanying the exit from the 
BDH programme: 
I went to the MIES office on three occasions. I begged them to include me 
back in the BDH programme. But, they said no. That I am not in the register 
anymore. They told me they checked and I should have enough for a living. 
And I thought it might be true, because I got a new electricity meter. Alt-
hough I cannot understand, we live in a single room. (Interviewee-F, 2013) 
Graduated recipients seemed to have given their silent consent to a 
process of top-down graduation—one might simply call graduation ‘exit’ 
as there is no follow-up on the situation of the former recipients. Some 
would argue that it is the poor’s lack of organisation that allows the mas-
sive graduation of recipients without facing much resistance. This can be 
130 CHAPTER 4 
 
attributed to the nature of welfare policies and poverty interventions (Roy 
& Crane, 2015) that bring together notions of dependency (paternalism 
even) and erosion of the social base (and possibilities of organisation 
around their interests). It is also plausible that historical processes of ex-
clusion have resulted in an internalised oppression, a resignation to (their 
own individual) failure—as the rhetoric of emancipation suggests (Schild, 
2015). Under the New Social, with the adoption of cash transfers, social 
policy shifted from collective schemes towards individualised solutions, in 
which the costs of ‘self-improvement’ have been imposed on recipients 
themselves. The moral economy of conditional access to welfare is also 
key in explaining this: the appeal to co-responsibility is strategic in terms 
of individualising choices and keeping recipients in check, morally ac-
countable for the nation’s development. With the generic answer ‘hay fa-
milias que lo necesitan más que usted’ (there are families who need it [BDH] 
more than you do), graduated recipients15 were reminded that there were 
poorer families than theirs, appealing to values of responsibility and soli-
darity.  
Yet it seems that completely terminating the BDH programme is not 
an option. Justified as a technical—rather than political—option, official 
reports argue that the cost of abandoning the programme is equivalent to 
an increase of 12.6 per cent of persons living in poverty and 44.2 per cent 
of those living in extreme poverty (Secretaría Técnica para la Erradicación 
de la Pobreza, 2014). In this document, it is also mentioned that the BDH 
has positive effects on households’ consumption, nutrition and education, 
school enrolment, reduction of child labour and, what is particularly im-
portant for the central claim of this dissertation, it does not create distor-
tions in the labour market (ibid.). Supporting this view, a recent report on 
the effectiveness of the BDH in reducing (future) poverty (Araujo et al., 
2016) finds that the programme has ‘at most small effects on the trans-
mission of poverty from one generation to the next’ (ibid., p. 15).  The 
authors suggest the BDH is best interpreted as a way of reducing current 
poverty only. 
Nonetheless, and given its reactive nature, the BDH has tended to 
mimic persistent gendered stratification in the labour market, as further 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. At the intersection with age and ethnicity, 
women face difficulties securing a formal job and derived social benefits. 
Without an explicit accompanying agenda aimed at tackling segregation 
processes in the labour market, these differences continue to be translated 
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into the social protection system. Patterns of segregation, associated with 
the condition of vulnerability and poverty, are absorbed into the targeting 
process, arguably obscuring the root causes of (intergenerational) poverty. 
4.5 Conclusions 
The chapter has mapped out the institutional trajectories followed in the 
provision of targeted social protection designed and implemented under 
the New Social. One structural problem is the reactive nature of social 
welfare provisioning, which although it aims at providing some sort of 
security to informal workers, resembles the stratification found in the la-
bour market into patterns of access to substantive social security, pensions 
and other employment-derived entitlements. Despite the relatively exten-
sive coverage of the BDH programme, which has, however, been down-
sized in recent years, it has failed to substantially contribute to objectives 
aimed at improving employment outcomes.  
Returning to the central claim of this dissertation, the different trajec-
tories advanced at the institutional level, and thus presented to recipients, 
amount to a complex array of priorities and practices of social protection. 
This allows for the reinterpretation of individual outcomes, for example 
uninsured status, informality and/or inactivity, as social practices condi-
tioned by broader institutional structures that determine what choices re-
cipients have. Following Wacquant, ‘institutional mechanisms produce, re-
produce, and transform the network of positions to which its supposed 
members are dispatched and attached’ (2015, pp. 247–8). In the interweav-
ing of segregated labour markets and reactive social protection design, 
populations are confronted with the unpredictability characterising social 
protection instruments, negotiating their attachment. Thus, the necessary 
focus on the various institutional trajectories and not simply on the iden-
tification of resulting fragmented groups, that is, vulnerable populations. 
The BDH, although it has kept the basic CCT model, cannot be re-
duced to a mechanism of co-option only. The role of international finan-
cial institutions and expert networks in the design and dissemination of 
CCTs is undebatable. Yet this model, once it enters domestic decision-
making, meets with government priorities and developmental objectives, 
and is recast and adapted to serve them—though not always in a system-
atic way. Next to this, the adoption of different bureaucratic rationalities 
further informs the appropriation of such a model. Nonetheless, social 
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protection has maintained its mostly residual and reactive nature, adopting 
changes in an incremental way.  
Notes 
1 By executive Decree 129, published in the Official Gazette 29, dated 18 Septem-
ber 1998. 
2 SELBEN or Sistema de Selección de Beneficiarios (beneficiary selection system) 
was developed during 2001 to 2003 in order to tackle poor targeting. The SELBEN 
uses a proxy-means test, collected directly at the household site in urban areas and 
self-reported in rural areas. 
3 Operationalising the concept of legibility already discussed, households, as plan-
ning units, constitute a simplifying fiction required by the state but inevitably leav-
ing out elements that are essential to their actual functioning as living units. 
4 Children ages 0 to 1 were expected to visit a health centre every two months; for 
children ages 1 to 5 the visits were organised every six months. 
5 Children ages 6 to 16 were expected to enrol in school and keep attendance rates 
of at least 80 per cent for each schooling year. For children in bilingual (indigenous) 
schools, the threshold was lower: 70 per cent. 
6 Mothers interviewd noted that those who had accumulated certain stipends pay-
able to them were often subject to closer monitoring, which might lead to their exit 
from the programme if it was found that the transfer had been used for their own 
consumption and not for health and education expenses. 
7 Effectiveness, according to IDB documentation, was assessed in terms of im-
provements in the targeting, coverage, conditionalities, institutional capacity and 
impact evaluation. 
8 As indicated in the report, ‘parishes are the smallest administrative units in Ecua-
dor’ (Araujo et al., 2016). 
9 A study conducted in 2001 by León et al., nonetheless, had found no significant 
labour supply effects of BS transfers among adults in recipient households. 
10 For a total subsidy of US$304.3 million. 
11 The graduation strategy combined income criteria: monthly earnings above 
US$280 and a SELBEN (or welfare) index above 36.5 points.   
12 Of which 103,018 remained following the ministry’s safeguard criteria tailored to 
protect vulnerable groups such as pregnant women, persons who are retired but 
do not receive a pension, or BDH recipients who have an outstanding CDH debt. 
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13 The ILO has been taking up the cause for the provision of a ‘social floor’, rein-
terpreting social security as a human right (for an extended description of ‘muta-
tions’ of the CCT model, see Peck & Theodore, 2015). 
14 Note ‘that the collapse in oil prices in 2008–2009 and in 2014–2016 resulted in a 
severe slowdown of the economy in 2009 and in a deep recession in 2015 and 2016’ 
(Uribe-Teran & Vega-Garcia, 2017).  
15 About 62 per cent of respondents who were graduated at the time of the survey 
(2013) indicated this was the reason provided.  
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5 Embracing the Messiness: Fielding a Survey in Southern Ecuador 
 
 
5.1 Doing fieldwork in Loja and Machala, southern Ecuador 
This chapter sets out to reflect on the choices behind the specific methods 
employed in the field research and later analysis.1 It discusses the theoret-
ical, practical and ethical dilemmas derived from my methodological 
choices. In my field visits to southern Ecuador I had the intention of iden-
tifying the changes that have come about in informal employment among 
cash transfer recipients, juxtaposing this with more structural explanations 
of informality and broader processes of exclusion and marginalisation. 
Since I was looking at two fronts—state-provided social protection and 
informality—I located respondents that could inform my understanding 
of both processes: individuals who were (or had ever been) cash transfer 
recipients or could be categorised as informal workers—or both, as was 
often the case.  
Data collection proceeded from qualitative to quantitative. During the 
first visit, from April to September 2013, I spent a few weeks simply talk-
ing to people in order to reflect on the realm of the problem before con-
structing a survey questionnaire. The questionnaire design followed offi-
cial guidelines, namely the ENEMDU survey (Spanish acronym for 
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo or National Sur-
vey of Employment, Unemployment and Underemployment), as fielded 
by the National Statistics Department (INEC) and set out to integrate the 
most pressing issues raised in interviews. During a second visit, from De-
cember 2013 to March 2014, I met with key informants in the government 
and implemented documentary research: reports, policy briefs, legal doc-
uments and studies that could inform me about social protection and in-
formality in Ecuador. I also followed up with some of the informal work-
ers I had contacted during the first visit. During my last field visit in 
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August 2014, I met again with key informants and obtained access to ad-
ministrative registers, for example BDH monthly payment records and 
other documentary material relevant to my topic. 
Data collection methods included two main activities: interviews and 
surveys. Interviews consisted of open-ended questions and conversations, 
whilst surveys involved about 700 observations. Interviews took place in 
a few home visits but mostly in public spaces such as health centres and 
open markets. Surveys were conducted mainly at the residence of the in-
formant, open markets and streets, with the help of research assistants. 
The selection of informants followed a range of sampling methods, which 
are explained in more detail in Section 5.2.2. Aside from these specific 
activities, I also engaged in everyday conversations and informal observa-
tion of routine activities, and took notes of all the tacit information as it 
emerged from the field. Aside from data collected, this research also makes 
use of ENEMDU labour survey data, official records of Registro Social as 
available for 2003, 2008 and 2013, BDH monthly payments and limited 
access to social insurance databases (as registered at IESS). 
5.1.1 My position in the field 
I conducted an analysis of national social policy in tandem with local re-
search, inspired by Harriss-White’s notion of field economics. To advance 
this, I visited two cities, Loja and Machala, located in southern Ecuador. 
As noted earlier, the selection of Loja and Machala cities was a combina-
tion of background, logic and expedience. I am from southern Ecuador, 
so I considered myself rather familiar with the context. In seeking a site 
for initiating my study, I chose to be based in my home city, Loja. I trav-
elled to Machala (on the coast) once a month during the five months I 
stayed in Ecuador. As expected, doing research at ‘home’ delivered some 
clear benefits: I knew the context, the language and local customs. I could 
easily blend in. Nevertheless, it also brought about some tensions: there 
was a level of performance in respondents’ communication with me. They 
could react to my ethnicity, my age and my socio-economic stratum, relate 
it to a last name—and a family—and many preconceived ideas that could 
have informed their interaction with me. In Machala, the situation was 
slightly different. Although I found effective ways to approach people and 
advance my research, I was always seen as a ‘serrana’ (a woman from the 
Highlands). This position as ‘the other’ produced favourable results in 
most cases. I was able to ask the ‘obvious’, and people were willing to talk 
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to me due to plain curiosity—and to ask many questions as well. Overall, 
it seemed they did not consider me a threatening figure—I found out later 
that people in the Coastal region consider serranos to be quite naïve and 
harmless. However, it also rendered negative connotations. People in 
Machala immediately recognised that I was not from ‘the Coast’ (la Costa) 
and kept a precautionary distance, as I was often confused with a public 
officer—and the state is not always welcome in these settings. Besides, I 
had to be cautious. I knew it was not ‘my territory’ and I had to be alert 
for my own safety—as some authorities had instructed me to do. In fact, 
a police officer in Machala approached me at one point. He was shocked 
when he learned I was visiting some neighbourhoods labelled as ‘sketchy 
places’—not a good location for a serrana, a female researcher from the 
Highlands. It should be noted that my security was not threatened. On the 
contrary, I met warm and welcoming people who let me sit next to them 
for a few minutes or full afternoons and opened up about their life stories.  
 In Loja, it was better to reach informants at their workplace. Informal 
employment is very intense; people work long hours and navigate a hostile 
version of the city. In conversations with informal workers in Loja, I 
learned that women who work as street vendors wake up early in the 
morning to buy their products at the local fair, or start food preparation 
(often plantain chips or sweet snacks such as espumilla) and head towards 
the city centre before 6 a.m. to catch early customers such as kids going 
to school or office workers. Domestic workers would have to get up early 
to get their kids ready, drop them off at school and take a bus to the city 
centre to the various houses they would have to visit during the day. In 
Machala, I found a totally different work routine. Many women were 
found to be working from home, as there is a predominance of door-to-
door sales for international brands such as Avon, Nature Garden and so 
forth. Other women would work in the vicinity, just a few houses away. 
Domestic work in Machala was more likely to happen within their own 
neighbourhood, suggesting that both housing and domestic work were 
less stratified in Machala than in Loja. In this regard, data collection was 
easier in Machala, as I was able to find most of the informants at their 
homes. 
When conducting interviews, I tried to establish a familiar situation 
where communication remained open. I learned from the first interviews 
that an artificial situation was detrimental for communication and led re-
spondents to perform certain roles, perhaps motivated by the inaccurate 
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assumption that I was related to the government or could, somehow, help 
them out. By simply approaching interviewees, I did not always succeed 
in getting an interview or discussing the subject of my research. On a few 
occasions, I encountered resistance. For instance, in Loja, when I ap-
proached an old couple and even before introducing myself, they reacted 
to my presence with a ‘No, thank you, miss. We are happy with our Cath-
olic religion’ (No, gracias, señorita. Estamos contentos con nuestra religión católica). 
They later explained to me they were afraid I was a foreigner and had 
associated me with the Jehovah’s Witnesses as they also visit people from 
house to house. In Machala, a mother confused me with a social worker 
and broke down in tears when I approached her, asking me ‘not to take 
away her children’. MIES officials and the police had threatened her that 
if she continued begging on the streets with her children, she would lose 
custody of her kids. Aside from these isolated yet extremely informative 
events, interviews ran quite smoothly.  
Breaking the ice was not an easy task. I learned that sharing my personal 
stories with interviewees helped in ‘levelling the field’. Going back to my 
recordings, I noticed that in most of the interviews with women I would 
break the ice by engaging in small talk about cooking. My approach to 
food did not fit the preconceived idea of the mestizo woman living in the 
city, but had a rural colouring, thanks to the things I had learned from my 
nanny Rosa, the rural–urban migrant and domestic worker who inspired 
this PhD research. My informants and I would exchange recipes for what 
could be considered rather modest cuisine: no meat, just beans and corn. 
This seemed to break through our performative roles of researcher and 
interviewee, and most importantly, make of social distance something less 
important, at least for a short while. We would share details about our lives 
and the narrative(s) could follow easily. My marital status also seemed to 
help. Being a single childless woman in my late twenties triggered some 
curiosity. I was asked about my life choices, sometimes with actual con-
cern—’aren’t you afraid of dying alone?’ someone asked me—and other 
times with genuine interest. Their stories would sometimes be framed as 
a counter-narrative to my life. Many women I interviewed who were about 
my age, or even younger, already had a couple of children: ‘if you have no 
children, then who is going to look after you when you get old and sick?’ 
This close interaction was transformative: I also changed in the process. I 
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learned how to avoid otherwise intrusive ways of approaching people, re-
spect their dignity and silence, and avoid talking to informants in an in-
strumental way. 
My research project not only benefited from the interaction with cash 
transfer recipients and informal workers, but required a closer interaction 
with the administration, at first to request information, then, slowly but 
certainly, to try to understand its contradictory motives and practices. 
When I approached the state as a random citizen using public means, for 
example filling out information requests online or addressing them with 
formal letters, to ask about the workings of the cash transfer programme 
or how to access employment statistics, I was ignored. Letters were sent 
to the head of governmental agencies such as MIES, INEC, the Labour 
Department (Ministerio de Relaciones Labourales) (MRRL) and munici-
palities. Being an independent researcher, not part of any known consul-
tancy firm or an overseas development project, exposed my own experi-
ence of invisibility. I had to make use of rather informal channels alongside 
formal requests for information. It was not until I was backed up by the 
head of the INEC, who agreed to be the local supervisor of my research, 
that some organisations started to respond, albeit still with some caution. 
I was granted access to statistics, booklets, reports I could not have had 
access to in any other way. I also received advice on data collection from 
experienced enumerators. They commented on their own experiences 
fielding surveys, showed me maps of the city and alerted me to what they 
considered unsafe locations. 
Visiting other government agencies after a few phone calls to former 
colleagues working in the public sector also affected (positively) my posi-
tion as a researcher in Ecuador. I noticed that people of my generation 
working in the government were willing to help. Arguably this was due to 
my position: I was perceived as a young female scholar from a small city 
who managed to study abroad. In this narrow circle of economists, which 
I used to frequent in my studies and my former job, my new position 
seemed of benefit. Note that the current administration is well known for 
employing very young professionals, most of them economists graduated 
from my former university, known for its strong quantitative focus. I knew 
that to be recognised within this community, I had to be strategic and 
show I had some experience with data analysis. For them, having someone 
who used their lingo was quite comfortable, and they were willing to tell 
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me the details of policy documents or explain the methodological discus-
sions behind official figures. Gender was surprisingly salient in this con-
text, ranging from actual surprise when encountering a young female PhD 
researcher, to stigma and plain sexism. Aware of my position, I tried to 
level gender concerns with academic rigour and claims of mutual respect. 
It could be said that I often managed to turn it in my favour. 
Through this approach I was able to access crucial information, open-
ing up some spaces to discuss policies and test some preliminary ideas (e.g. 
validate what I had identified as main employment trends and speculate 
on the causes of informality). To a certain extent, this was a process of 
reciprocal instrumentation. I was often asked about the perception that 
European scholars might have about the political process unfolding in the 
region, the most recent academic developments in the field of social pro-
tection and the most frequently used methodologies being applied at the 
moment. I presented my research project in a seminar organised at 
FLACSO (Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales or Latin Amer-
ican Faculty of Social Sciences), which attracted various academics and 
some key people in the policy making circle. After this event, I was invited 
to discuss my project in detail with some high-ranking government offi-
cials. More than once, I was asked to join the central government again. 
Yet, at the same time, many networks and data were restricted, beyond my 
reach, following explicit or implicit rules specific to the public administra-
tion or closed networks I did not have access to. Many fascinating con-
versations had to follow secrecy rights and have remained purely informa-
tive, with no possibility for me to include them in this dissertation. All 
things considered, the many talks, seminars, meetings and conferences 
gave me a clear picture of how knowledge is used and produced for policy 
making, providing me with nuance and context. 
5.1.2 Interviews: some methodological dilemmas   
The time scheduled for the first field visit to southern Ecuador included 
some weeks simply talking to people in order to reflect on the realm of 
the problem before trying to construct a survey questionnaire. This pre-
liminary immersion in the field allowed me to gain a better understanding 
of the most pressing themes regarding employment and social protection, 
as reported by the informants. The interviews pointed at a complexity that 
later quantitative methods such as surveys failed to capture, alerting me to 
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the dynamic interactions affecting not only the experience of social pro-
tection but also the complex and fluid configuration of households. In my 
survey design, I tried to incorporate the most significant subjects that came 
up in the interviews. However, even when well advanced in the survey 
data collection, I kept on conducting interviews.  
Aware of how critical sampling decisions are, I gave careful thought to 
the selection of informants. Yet as I advanced with my field research, I 
realised that I could not pretend to have control over who participated in 
the interviews: it was better to be open and flexible and let some unex-
pected informants, places and situations be included in the research. In 
the end, the selection of interviewees followed different strategies: proba-
bility sampling, location sampling and respondent assisted sampling. At 
first, I randomly selected 30 households (for each city) from the Registro 
Social listings. With the contact information provided there, I started look-
ing for the listed households. Not surprisingly, I noticed that the listings 
were pointing at the wrong addresses and that in general, data on house-
holds’ composition was not up to date. In addition, urban planning had 
also changed. Major urban renewal projects had taken place, making the 
addresses provided obsolete. At that point, I tried contacting informants 
using the phone number provided in the listings, but only a few house-
holds had a valid phone number. Moreover, all of those who picked up 
refused to participate in the interview. As expected, people were reluctant 
to talk on the phone about the cash transfer programme or to provide any 
contact information. In this manner, after two weeks of exhaustive search-
ing, I only managed to locate and successfully interview two of the selected 
households. 
Disappointed, I decided to spend a couple of days collecting infor-
mation from governmental agencies, to give myself a rest from the unsuc-
cessful search for recipients. In an interview with an officer of the regional 
Employment Department, I learned that the easiest way to contact cash 
transfer recipients was to visit the public health centres—recall that the 
cash transfer programme BDH is conditional on taking the children to 
periodic medical check-ups. Following the programme’s logic, I visited 
health centres on an almost daily basis for about a month. Health staff 
members allowed me to advance my interviews and were very accommo-
dating. They introduced me to the people as a ‘social worker’, believing 
that people would be more willing to talk to a staff member. With this 
label, I was free to sit and talk to people while they were waiting for their 
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appointment. The receptionist also helped me by redirecting cash transfer 
recipients to me, filtering them at the check-in and indicating that while 
they waited for their turn, they could talk to the ‘social worker’. However, 
implicit in this strategy was a question of ethical conduct. I was not com-
fortable with the arrangement. I realised that people might have expecta-
tions about our talks or frame their answers in a strategic way. I decided 
to carry credentials with me that would clearly indicate that I was a PhD 
researcher taking testimonials on the experience of the BDH programme. 
This, instead of affecting participation, seemed to encourage informants 
to approach me and tell me more about their experience of the BDH pro-
gramme. 
After a month of visits to the health centres, I became aware that I 
might be overrepresenting the most readily accessible and visible popula-
tion: mothers accessing (and in need of) public health. Apart from this, I 
noted that I had saturated the narratives on social protection. In search of 
richness and variation, I decided to sample individuals who visited specific 
locations often associated with informal employment: open markets, arti-
sanal markets, waste disposal units, laundry facilities and so forth; and 
simply started walking in the city and casually engaging in conversations 
with street vendors. I also had the chance to build empathetic relations 
with domestic workers employed by my family. It is worth mentioning 
that it is quite common in Ecuador to have paid domestic work in middle-
class households. Of course, this approach to domestic workers brought 
about tensions with my family, as they felt quite uncomfortable with the 
close ties I had developed with ‘their employees’. I think they would have 
preferred me to leave research work outside my home. Nevertheless, I just 
could not let go such a rich opportunity to get to know these women’s 
experiences, in a closer context of trust and mutual understanding. 
5.2 Fielding a survey 
Household surveys are regarded as useful instruments to organise eligible 
households, select recipients and audit delivered benefits. Because of these 
features, many schemes for social protection rely on these sort of data for 
the purposes of targeting. The BDH relies on household surveys to iden-
tify, categorise and monitor the target population: mothers with depend-
ent children, the elderly and disabled people. It is used to construct pov-
erty profiles, necessary to establish who is eligible for state support.  
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Household surveys are limited in scope. When used to construct offi-
cial records of households, it is possible to find significant gaps in data 
collection, missing values and serious inconsistencies. In fact, it has been 
largely agreed that the complexity of households makes of statistical in-
vestigation a very difficult task. Households might appear disorderly and 
often unintelligible. However, in an attempt to make them understandable 
and legible for social researchers and state intervention, data collectors 
have to rely on simplification. Such simplification might, however, misin-
terpret households’ dynamics and end up harming the effectiveness of tar-
geted modes of social protection.  
This motivated me to implement my own surveys in southern Ecuador 
as a way to contrast household data used to determine eligibility for the 
BDH programme and understand the challenges of fielding a social sur-
vey. Drawing on survey data in tandem with qualitative data obtained 
through interviews, my work focused on deconstructing some of the as-
sumptions required in quantitative research on households. To achieve 
this, the next section explores the implications of researching households 
and considering them as fixed units for the purposes of locating inform-
ants, fielding survey questionnaires and informing policy design. Issues of 
real life course trajectories, purposive misreporting and administrative er-
rors are explored as plausible sources for the partial perspectives identified 
in the state’s view of household dynamics. 
Reflecting on the task of fielding my own survey, I turned to theorising 
households as planning units, for the purposes of state regulation and pro-
tection, different from households as living units—the latter more fluid 
and complex. Although for the purposes of policy design it might be nec-
essary to see households as planning units, as fixed and bounded, what I 
learned from the field was that households are marked by diversity and 
change. My work pleads for a shift towards understanding households as 
living and fluid units, with their members constantly renewing in a very com-
plex context. From my field experience, I noted that targeting frames ideas 
of social citizenship or how social rights allow citizens to negotiate and/or 
access certain entitlements. Their familiarity with targeting schemes had 
provided possible recipients with a certain script to more effectively pre-
sent themselves as eligible for cash transfers. Many informants knew how 
the ‘deserving poor’ could be made visible to the state, enumerated and 
accounted for in some sort of official record. Many examples from the 
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field support this argument regarding selective reporting of household 
conditions.  
The official records used in this dissertation are constructed from large-
scale household surveys. These registers are distinctive in the sense that 
they are based on direct recording of households’ conditions with the ex-
plicit intention of knowing the population and targeting resources to them, 
including (factual) information on access to public programmes as well as 
respondents’ perception of their own situation. To be specific, the data 
contains information on social benefit applicant and/or recipient house-
holds, which is why the data set has been named the Social Register (Reg-
istro Social). The Social Register consists of a comprehensive enumeration 
of households deemed eligible to participate in the cash transfer pro-
gramme. Following Mortelmans and Pasteels (2013), I used these official 
records as my sampling frame in the process of implementing my research. 
The authors point to some benefits of using official records: data on tar-
geted populations are quickly available, structured, comprehensive and 
without missing values. What is more, the official nature of the data serves 
social research, both by saving time, as information has already been col-
lected by public agencies, and by bearing out any further analysis on formal 
institutional grounds. After all, the data have been collected by the bureau-
cratic apparatus of the state. The listings provide useful information on 
recipient households: full names, address, contact phone number, house-
hold composition, data on livestock, access to public services, sources of 
income, exposure to risks and other factors used to calculate the pro-
gramme’s poverty line and determine households’ eligibility.  
Yet, when exploring the household listings in detail, I noticed that the 
data were neither accurate nor up to date. As I fielded the survey and 
started looking for the households selected in the sample, I became aware 
of the problems of relying on official records for conducting social re-
search. For instance, I noticed that certain groups, such as informal work-
ers, were extremely difficult to find and remain misrepresented in the of-
ficial listings. What is more, I found that the sample unit, that is, the 
household, could not be neatly defined once in the field. In the light of 
these issues, I had to opt to interview individuals only, since the nuclear 
family as it appeared in Registro Social listings did not necessarily match 
the group of persons listed as part of the same household. Note that the 
definition of household used for statistical purposes accounts for the num-
ber of people sleeping under the same roof, which as argued by Martinotti 
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(in Byrne, 2002), is not the most important aspect of their lives. In the 
midst of my survey data collection, updated listings started to circulate and 
corroborated the rapidly changing nature of households that I had alleged 
was not captured fully in the official records. 
Although I could have smoothed out this complexity and focused on 
building a representative sample of households only—various methods 
have been advanced to reduce the bias introduced by non-response and 
attrition (see Deaton, 1997; and a supplementary discussion in Lavrakas, 
2004)—I decided to explicitly incorporate the untidy and complex context 
I encountered and flag some of the assumptions behind surveys for the 
purposes of social research. In the main, I am interested in exploring to 
what extent it is possible to capture the rapid changes in household(ing) 
and organise them sufficiently and truthfully to inform policy design. The 
chapter outlines three connected contentions that can be held accountable 
for the fickleness found in official household records: real life course tra-
jectories, purposive misreporting of household data and administrative 
flaws.  
Instead, primary quantitative data (e.g. the survey conducted by me) is 
used to explore some commonalities operating in the field. In the analysis 
of complementary qualitative work, close attention is paid to the con-
straints that the family system and other institutional arrangements place 
on employment choices and access to welfare. The purpose is to docu-
ment some of the reasons why formal employment is low among cash 
transfer recipients, and to provide a basis for understanding how and why 
some modalities of social protection are related to informality and, more 
broadly, to labour segregation. The coupling with local research also sets 
out to deepen the study of labour dynamics based on elements not ac-
counted for in official statistics. National employment surveys are less 
likely to capture the dimensions of informality associated with female-in-
tensive low-paying jobs, whereas my fieldwork had as its starting point the 
exploration of such features. My qualitative work benefited from a more 
detailed and contextualised illustration of employment choices. The atten-
tion is focused on the specific situation of recipient mothers in the labour 
market. How employable are they? What kinds of jobs are available to 
them? Is there any evidence of transition from formal to informal occu-
pations among recipients? If they had graduated from the cash transfer 
programme, what difference does it make in terms of job search, labour 
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income, employment span, mobility and access to contributory social pro-
tection? By means of a detailed analysis of contrasting accounts, evidence 
is provided on the various structural constraints restricting employment 
choices, taking the discussion to the broader conditions generating and 
perpetuating informalisation. It should be noted that the interplay between 
structure and agency is constantly brought into the analysis, but is dis-
cussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6, which explore the structure in which 
recipients operate, and the various ways in which they reflect on it and 
find ways for negotiating a living. From the outset, I should be clear that 
I see agency not as a synonym of choice, but as a determinant of change, 
as non-reflexive action can also constitute agency.  
5.2.1 The role of research assistants 
In order to implement the survey, I required the help of research assistants 
who could help me to enumerate and interview respondent households. 
Knowing from the interviews that most of the survey respondents would 
be women and that the interviewer’s gender did matter, I preferred to hire 
women from the community rather than undergraduate students, as is the 
common practice among junior researchers. The enumerators had previ-
ous experience doing surveys, had participated in community projects, and 
a couple of them had even worked for MIES in collecting household data 
for the cash transfer programme. I provided the assistants with some basic 
training on interview techniques: how to approach respondents with an 
open and respectful attitude and how to explain the questions in a simple 
and friendly way. We also discussed the meaning and purpose of each sur-
vey question, and I explained the goals of the research so that they could 
convey them to the respondents.  
I joined the assistants during the first days of data collection, then con-
tinued to monitor them systematically. They developed a deep commit-
ment to the research project and showed great empathy for respondents’ 
life stories. They submitted weekly reports on the experience of data col-
lection, and we had lunch together every second week to exchange some 
thoughts about the survey activities. At times, I spoke with them by phone 
almost every day. At the beginning, they called me to ask for clarification 
on how to look for the addresses, use the city maps, explain a question or 
confront refusal. After several days, the content of the phone calls 
changed. It was rather related to the realities they were getting to know. 
They wanted to share what they had witnessed. When I started receiving 
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the first questionnaires for revision, I found plenty of side notes in the 
margins. The notes would further explain the specific problems faced by 
single mothers, or break down fixed categories that they felt did not cap-
ture fully the reality in the field (e.g. occupation categories). As expected, 
when doing some consistency checks I did find incoherent answers and 
gaps in data collection, in which case I could ask the enumerator to revisit 
the household or call the respondent to complete the questionnaire. How-
ever, these problems were of minor concern. On the contrary, I think that 
by hiring women from the local community I not only managed to enter 
otherwise secluded spaces, but also got a rich account of local dynamics 
as experienced by community members themselves.  
It is worth noting that in view of the various concerns I had regarding 
interviewing people, I designed credentials for the research assistants and 
myself. The most pressing concern had to do with expectations. I wanted 
to avoid delusory expectations by indicating in advance that we did not 
work for the government and therefore did not have the power to secure 
their acceptance in the programme or favourable treatment for anyone. In 
addition, I tried to avoid response bias, assuming that if people knew that 
no direct benefits would result from their participation in the survey, they 
would be less likely to shape their answers to the questionnaire. Yet the 
above scenarios occurred anyway: people asked whether we could help 
them; underreported information on their economic situation; or simply 
refused to participate for fear of risking their participation in the pro-
gramme. 
 In retrospect, I can see that the selection of research assistants 
proved more complex than I had perceived in the field. Although employ-
ing local people greatly facilitated access to recipient households in de-
prived areas, it also implied that non-recipient households did not neces-
sarily want to interact with them. Research assistants sometimes felt that 
they were not welcome in some more mixed neighbourhoods or were not 
in a position to ask certain questions: (enumerator) ‘do you receive or have 
you received cash transfers?’ (respondent) ‘can’t you see me? How would 
I be receiving cash transfers? I have a proper job.’ In addition, ethnicity 
added complexity to their role as enumerators. It suffices to state that 
when fielding the survey questionnaire, the great majority of people would 
indicate identifying as mestizo (mixed race) except when asked by one of 
the black researchers, to whom a significant number of respondents would 
report identifying as white. Although this implies that information on that 
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survey question cannot be trusted, it speaks of the segregation operating 
in these provinces. 
5.2.2 Sampling: some considerations 
Following Mortelmans and Pasteels (2013), I used BDH official records 
as my sampling frame in the process of implementing my research. The 
sampling for the quantitative research was disproportionately weighted to-
ward cash transfer recipients close to the poverty line set for the BDH 
programme, recognising that considerable income instability exists well 
above the poverty line even among ‘graduated’ recipients. The self-col-
lected survey was fielded using a large national database on BDH benefi-
ciaries (Registro Social formerly SELBEN) as sampling frame. Registro 
Social is the database used for targeting poor households and allocating 
transfers under the BDH. Compiled by MIES, it contains information on 
socio-economic variables, education and employment as well as demo-
graphic characteristics of all family members living in areas previously se-
lected by a poverty map, that is, geographical targeting. The data contain 
information on households at the national level, but following my focus 
on the southern provinces of Loja and Machala, I restricted the observa-
tions to the cities of Machala and Loja (urban capitals) within these prov-
inces. The survey attempted to deal with informal and transient house-
holds, beyond what was described in the social registers. 
The survey followed a clustered two-stage sampling design, first select-
ing clusters: Loja and Machala cities, in a first stage census blocks and then 
households. For each city, households listed in Registro Social were sorted 
according to a welfare index—a composite welfare used by the Social Cab-
inet to identify eligible households—to endow the sample of implicit strat-
ification. Next, a proportionate sample of households was picked from 
each census block—small areas defined by the Statistical Bureau—to ac-
count for geographical targeting used for the BDH programme. The idea 
was to allocate a number of recipient households to be surveyed in each 
block/area, based on their original proportions in the sampling frame. The 
design purposively oversampled working-age women close to the poverty 
line set for the BDH programme—a SELBEN index of 36.59 (MIES, 
2012)—as they are more likely to ‘graduate’. It also allowed for 20 per cent 
oversampling, anticipating absence of informants, attrition and refusal. Af-
ter sampling individuals from the data, I set out to interview as many peo-
ple as possible that were listed in Registro Social. I was able to acquire 
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direct data from the household head or his/her partner for 84 per cent of 
the households listed in the sample obtained from Registro Social, adding 
up to 474 observations, 252 in Machala and 220 in Loja (see Table 5.1), 
located in 44 different census blocks.  
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Table 5.1 Random sample Loja and Machala (2013):  
descriptive statistics for the household head or partner 
 Total Loja Machala 
  Share Std. Err. Share Std. Err. Share Std. Err. 
Sex (1 if female) 92% 0.023 94% 0.023 91% 0.032 
Age group       
10–17 years 3% 0.014 7% 0.048 1% 0.009 
18–24 years 22% 0.037 20% 0.035 24% 0.052 
25–44 years 48% 0.050 53% 0.069 46% 0.065 
45–64 years 22% 0.033 20% 0.048 23% 0.041 
65 and above 5% 0.016 1% 0.004 6% 0.022 
Education       
None 5% 0.017 6% 0.025 5% 0.022 
Literacy centre 5% 0.021 2% 0.012 7% 0.030 
Vocational training 1% 0.010 1% 0.008 1% 0.013 
Primary education 53% 0.057 79% 0.058 44% 0.073 
Secondary education 31% 0.057 10% 0.048 38% 0.075 
Higher education 4% 0.031 1% 0.008 1% 0.008 
Ethnic group       
Indigenous 2% 0.008 6% 0.029 0% 0.003 
Afro-descendant 0% 0.002 - - 0% 0.003 
Black 1% 0.010 - - 2% 0.014 
Mulatto 5% 0.018 - - 7% 0.025 
Montubio 1% 0.004 1% 0.004 1% 0.005 
Mestizo 84% 0.040 93% 0.029 81% 0.054 
White 6% 0.034 0% 0.002 9% 0.047 
Other 0% 0.003 - - 1% 0.005 
Marital status       
Single 29% 0.046 29% 0.065 30% 0.057 
Married 43% 0.050 53% 0.063 38% 0.062 
Living together 21% 0.035 9% 0.030 26% 0.047 
Widowed 4% 0.017 3% 0.013 4% 0.023 
Divorced 3% 0.007 6% 0.016 2% 0.007 
Employment status       
Employed 56% 0.047 79% 0.058 50% 0.061 
Unemployed 6% 0.024 7% 0.045 7% 0.030 
Inactive 34% 0.039 14% 0.045 43% 0.052 
Household size (average) 4.299 0.204 4.851 0.163 4.238 0.249 
Number of children (average) 1.830 0.153 2.426 0.198 1.692 0.197 
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 Total Loja Machala 
  Share Std. Err. Share Std. Err. Share Std. Err. 
SELBEN index (average) 40.76 1.582 34.49 2.601 42.57 1.829 
Proportion around threshold (+/– 10) 61% 0.044 61% 0.086 62% 0.055 
Non-recipients 34% 0.056 12% 0.045 39% 0.071 
BDH recipients 35% 0.055 51% 0.075 31% 0.069 
Graduated BDH recipients 31% 0.037 37% 0.064 30% 0.046 
Non-covered by social security 80% 0.053 90% 0.033 75% 0.077 
Workers in the informal sector 51% 0.045 78% 0.062 42% 0.058 
Number of observations 474 220 254 
Source: Fieldwork 2013. 
 
The majority of informants (92 per cent) in the random sample were 
women between 25 and 44 years old (48 per cent). Such a proportion of 
women replicates the actual share of working-age female recipients: 
ENEMDU data for 2013 reveals that 92 per cent of BDH recipients were 
women aged 40 years, on average. With regard to education, 52 per cent 
have completed up to a primary level. Most of them were from mestizo 
background (84 per cent). Some variation regarding marital status was 
found at the city level. Married informants were predominant in Loja (53 
per cent), compared to 9 per cent who were cohabiting, whereas in 
Machala 38 per cent reported being married and a significant share of re-
spondents (26 per cent) reported cohabiting. The average household size 
reported was approximately four people, composed of two adults (not 
necessarily a couple) and two minors. In Machala, a significant share of 
respondents (43 per cent) was classified as inactive, neither employed nor 
looking for a job. With regard to employment status, city differences were 
evident. Although the majority reported being employed at the time of the 
survey (59 per cent), Loja’s rate was much higher (75 per cent) compared 
with that of Machala (51 per cent). Of those reported employed in the 
total sample, approximately 89 per cent were working in the informal sec-
tor (measured at the firm level, accounting for those that lack registration 
or bookkeeping, or that employ fewer than ten people). Accordingly, in-
formality rates were higher among informants in Loja (98 per cent) than 
in Machala (83 per cent). Regarding informal employment, using as a 
proxy the share of informants who reported being employed but not cov-
ered by social security (IESS), 80 per cent of the informants belonged to 
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this category. Again, informality levels were higher in Loja (90 per cent) 
than in Machala (75 per cent). 
 Yet the random sample based on Registro Social seemed to fail in 
reaching out to informal workers. This is a group which is particularly hard 
to see through conventional methods such as random sampling, which is 
why other non-random sampling methods were applied for this phase. 
Non-random methods included respondent-driven sampling and loca-
tion-based sampling. Respondent-driven sampling consisted of asking in-
formants to help us with outreach to other cash transfer recipients living 
in the surrounding area. Location-based sampling consisted of visiting 
venues where informal workers could be found. Qualitative interviews and 
field observation helped to identify the most common places for informal 
work, including markets, open streets, work recruitment venues (central 
square, especially effective to reach construction workers), waste disposal 
units, laundry facilities and other outdoor spaces. Enumerators were asked 
to visit the listed locations on specific days of the week and to look for the 
appropriate timing for informants to be surveyed, for example visiting 
street vendors during Saturday mornings while locating waste pickers/re-
cyclers during evening hours. Although this strategy was effective in sam-
pling hard-to-reach informants, it might have led to the inclusion of simi-
lar elements in the sample.  
Following this strategy, the remaining 16 per cent of survey data col-
lected represents information from comparable individuals who were not 
part of the Registro Social survey, adding 221 observations (see Table 5.2). 
Migrant families, itinerant vendors, newly married couples and single 
mothers were among the various interest groups included in this group of 
respondents, assuming they were likely to be excluded from the random 
sample constructed from Registro Social listings. 
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Table 5.2 Pooled sample Loja and Machala (2013):  
descriptive statistics for the household head or partner 
 Total Loja Machala 
  Share Std. Err. Share Std. Err. Share Std. Err. 
Sex (1 if female) 98.6% 0.002 98.8% 0.002 98.6% 0.002 
Age group       
10–17 years 1.2% 0.0054 1.2% 0.0081 1.3% 0.0075 
18–24 years 12.4% 0.0134 13.0% 0.0195 12.1% 0.0186 
25–44 years 53.6% 0.0204 56.1% 0.0297 51.3% 0.0284 
45–64 years 25.4% 0.018 25.8% 0.0263 25.1% 0.0248 
65 and above 7.4% 0.0101 4.0% 0.0113 10.2% 0.0163 
Education       
None 7.9% 0.011 8.1% 0.017 7.8% 0.015 
Literacy centre 5.1% 0.009 3.9% 0.012 6.2% 0.014 
Vocational training 0.7% 0.004 1.1% 0.007 0.3% 0.003 
Primary education 63.7% 0.019 80.7% 0.024 49.0% 0.029 
Secondary education 20.3% 0.016 5.4% 0.014 33.2% 0.027 
Higher education 2.3% 0.006 0.8% 0.005 3.4% 0.010 
Ethnic group       
Indigenous 2.9% 0.007 5.1% 0.013 1.0% 0.005 
Afro-descendant 1.6% 0.005 0.4% 0.004 2.6% 0.009 
Black 2.0% 0.006 - - 3.8% 0.011 
Mulatto 6.1% 0.010 - - 11.5% 0.018 
Montubio 0.7% 0.003 0.8% 0.006 0.7% 0.004 
Mestizo 82.1% 0.016 93.3% 0.015 72.0% 0.026 
White 3.9% 0.008 0.5% 0.005 7.0% 0.015 
Other 0.7% 0.004 - - 1.3% 0.007 
Marital status       
Single 27.2% 0.018 23.1% 0.025 30.9% 0.026 
Married 40.7% 0.020 52.2% 0.030 30.4% 0.026 
Living together 20.3% 0.016 7.8% 0.016 31.2% 0.027 
Widowed 4.5% 0.008 6.2% 0.014 3.1% 0.009 
Divorced 7.3% 0.011 10.7% 0.019 4.5% 0.012 
Employment status       
Employed 60.2% 0.019 80.4% 0.023 41.7% 0.028 
Unemployed 7.2% 0.011 3.2% 0.010 11.0% 0.018 
Inactive 32.4% 0.018 16.4% 0.022 47.1% 0.028 
Household size (average) 4.553 0.093 4.663 0.121 4.459 0.141 
Number of children (average) 2.068 0.062 2.274 0.092 1.900 0.084 
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 Total Loja Machala 
  Share Std. Err. Share Std. Err. Share Std. Err. 
In Registro Social 68.6% 0.019 67.3% 0.028 69.6% 0.027 
Non-recipients 19.9% 0.016 14.4% 0.021 24.4% 0.024 
BDH recipients 40.9% 0.020 48.7% 0.030 34.6% 0.027 
Graduated BDH recipients 39.2% 0.020 37.0% 0.029 41.0% 0.028 
Non-covered by social security 89.2% 0.014 87.8% 0.020 90.7% 0.019 
Workers in the informal sector 56.6% 0.019 78.0% 0.025 37.1% 0.028 
Number of observations 679 325 354 
Source: Fieldwork 2013. 
 
Registro Social administrative records were linked to my own survey data 
where there was sufficient information available to identify matching re-
spondents. This linking process followed confidentiality and ethical con-
siderations. The linkage record contains information on survey respond-
ents who appeared in the universe of Registro Social. The records contain 
household and individual identifiers, which enabled the creation of a new 
data infrastructure, which in turn enhanced demographic details and 
tracked employment dynamics of the target population. The linking pro-
cess was used to explore the amount of under coverage of the informal 
population and the amount of attrition in transient households, and to 
evaluate the quality and biases in responses regarding employment status. 
A good example of the issues that can be explored in matched data is 
provided in Chapter 6, where information collected by MIES technicians 
is contrasted with recent survey data, showing a tendency to not to dis-
close paid work from public agencies. It should be noted that my survey 
questions, although wide-ranging, were not exhaustive. Mindful of this 
limitation, I complement the analysis of survey data with in-depth inter-
views.  
5.2.3 Enumerating households 
Eligibility for actual survey participation, considering the methodological 
challenges explained elsewhere, followed somewhat relaxed guidelines: 
participants had to be 10 years of age or older, report having (had) regis-
tered in the listings of Registro Social or having been a recipient of BDH 
transfers, or be engaged in informal work. Note that many informal work-
ers remain invisible to official survey data collection and therefore do not 
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appear in any listing. I instructed the other surveyors to interview the 
household head or his/her spouse. I failed to obtain information about all 
household members, as surveyors mostly found participants at their work-
places, and they were not keen to share such information in that context 
or simply were not willing to spend much time answering a survey. 
As I fielded the survey, we faced countless problems in locating the 
households in the sample. Registro Social listings were not accurate, criti-
cal contact information was missing, addresses were out of date and 
household data no longer matched the actual composition of families. 
Apart from this, I had to deal with the changes that had occurred in the 
cities due to urban renewal, which made the very few valid addresses ob-
solete. To tackle these issues, a mix of sample designs was advanced, trust-
ing that the combination of methods would benefit the research, as the 
weakness of one would be compensated for by others. With these ad hoc 
strategies, I managed to conduct 359 surveys in Loja, of which 210 
matched the individuals listed in original official records. In Machala, I 
collected 365 surveys, of which 228 matched the records. These data were 
coded in the field and analysed upon my return to the International Instit-
tute of Social Studies, ISS. 
Getting into the details of the various methods devised for sampling 
once in the field, at first, a location-based strategy was implemented. In 
each city, a quota of potential informants was identified following census 
area demarcations. I first tried to allocate a number of households to be 
surveyed in each area based on their original proportions in the sampling 
frame and managed to survey quite a few households with this strategy. 
Yet this required great amounts of time and effort looking for households, 
and did not address the issue of outdated listings. In fact, it deepened the 
problem of not knowing in advance the changes in households’ composi-
tion and modifications to urban topography, as discussed elsewhere. In 
the light of these obstacles, I had to rely on respondent-assisted sampling, 
that is, asking people in the neighbourhood to help us reach out to other 
cash transfer recipients and/or applicants living in the surrounding area. 
Although this proved effective for sampling hard-to-reach households, it 
might have led to the inclusion of similar elements in the sample, at the 
cost of reducing variability. In addition, focusing solely on households that 
were applying for or receiving cash transfers could have introduced bias 
in the survey. In search of variation, I started looking for cases of informal 
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employment regardless of access to social protection and contacted new 
sources for respondent-assisted sampling, now among informal workers. 
Availability-based sampling was also employed to enrol informal work-
ers. Selected informants were approached by the surveyor team and asked 
if they were interested in participating in the survey. Again, the respond-
ents helped us to locate and gain the participation of others. Yet it is worth 
noting that the way in which we approached informal workers might have 
oversampled already visible groups such as street vendors, at the expense 
of others such as indoor workers. In addition to this issue, the time allo-
cated for answering the questionnaire among informal workers inter-
viewed at their workplace was much reduced, as they wanted to get back 
to work quickly. Refusal rates tended to be higher among this group. Few 
of them were tactical in showing themselves as informal workers. They 
were very aware that the lack of formal employment is actually a good 
strategy to access social benefits. Knowing that the cash transfer pro-
gramme in Ecuador is specifically targeted at workers lacking social secu-
rity, they were quite reluctant to talk about any benefit at work and some 
seemed to have misreported this information.       
5.3 Keeping track of a changing context 
5.3.1 Large-N analysis: gathering official employment data 
The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 6 begins with the broader 
structure of the labour market in Ecuador. For this part, data were ob-
tained from the National Statistics Bureau, consisting of the publicly avail-
able labour survey data, ENEMDU, acknowledging that accuracy is 
doubtful with regard to the study of informality. Nevertheless, a compar-
ative analysis of labour survey data helps put together a general represen-
tation of the evolution of informality, following official definitions 
adopted by the Ecuadorian Statistics Bureau and in observance of ILO 
guidelines. This in turn is contrasted and/or corroborated with fieldwork 
data. In 2013–14, during three extended field visits, I collected infor-
mation, via interviews, official documents and informal conversation, that 
provided contrasting accounts of the political, economic, social and idea-
tional dimensions of social policy making. 
A comparative static analysis, based on repeated representative samples 
of the working-age populations, is used for the macro-analysis of employ-
ment data. It focuses on the evolution of aggregates, averages, medians 
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and compositions of key variables pertinent to my research problem. Alt-
hough this by no means captures the complexity of informal employment, 
it hints at the broad structure of the labour market, and the use of repeated 
surveys permits the study of change. Next, I couple the macro structural 
analysis with local research in order to gain insights on the specific work-
ings of informality and social protection, as presented in the next two 
chapters. Although ENEMDU data include a module for generating indi-
cators on informal sector employment and informal employment, there is 
a chance of missing less visible activities such as those of home-based fe-
male workers. The analysis of labour survey data presented in Chapter 6 
is used to lay the groundwork for the study of the connections between 
informality and social protection. Chapter 7 zooms in on the case studies 
of Loja and Machala. These cities exhibited an assorted scenario for stud-
ying the effects of social protection. The selection of contiguous provinces 
provided a greater degree of control over cultural, historical and ecological 
conditions. Due to commerce linkages and migration processes operating 
within the southern region, differences in levels of economic development 
and education are minimised. Nevertheless, constant comparisons with 
national-level (and main cities) estimates can help to balance the potential 
effects of contiguity.  
It is worth noting that the sampling for the fieldwork survey was dis-
proportionately weighted towards (former and current) cash transfer re-
cipients, a population about which there are only thin data in national em-
ployment statistics (ENEMDU data). Thus, it is neither generalisable to 
the rest of the female population nor representative of the totality of the 
labour force. However, it centres on female informal workers, a popula-
tion insufficiently accounted for in national data. This population is par-
ticularly hard to see through conventional methods such as random sam-
pling, and therefore other non-random sampling methods were applied in 
this phase to locate respondents. Due to the sampling design, which ac-
counted for the most salient characteristics of cash transfer recipients 
and/or informal workers, many variables are skewed.  
Chapter 7 operationalises a methodological alternative, explicitly consid-
ering such data complexity. Multiple Correspondence Analysis is used for 
the visualisation of survey data. The approach is tailored to examining the 
relations between categories of variables by means of using contingency 
tables, represented in two-dimensional maps. Such transformation permits 
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a clear visualisation of variables and categories of variables, useful in un-
covering relationships for small-n, and is presented as complementary to 
large-N methods discussed here. 
 
Notes
1 This chapter is written in the style of a reflective account of the author’s expe-
rieces fielding a survey in southern Ecuador. 
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6 A Macro-Analysis of Employment and Cash Transfers in Ecuador 
 
 
6.1 The setting: informality and social protection 
In recent decades there has been a growing consensus on the deepening 
of informality in Ecuador. The share of workers in the informal economy 
has remained constant, even increasing during the period 2015–16. Job 
finding rates are higher within the informal sector. There has not been a 
sustained increase in the share of formal job opportunities despite moder-
ate economic growth experienced between 2012 and 2013. The share of 
self-employment has increased and the absolute number of temporary 
jobs remained unchanged between 2007 and 2015. Further, a significant 
proportion of workers in the formal sector are still unprotected. The tra-
ditional mechanisms of social security, typically provided through entitle-
ments derived from formal employment, are still accessible for the most 
visible sectors of the workforce only. If workers remain in informal activ-
ities, the necessity of providing social protection through alternative, non-
formal work-based mechanisms becomes increasingly important. Indeed, 
the promotion of cash transfers in Latin America, Ecuador being no ex-
ception, can be identified as a response to such challenges of providing 
social security to informalised labour forces.1    
However, non-contributory social protection alternatives have been ac-
companied by criticism signalling issues of perversity and dependency. So-
cial protection, some argue, has distortive features: the cash delivered to 
individuals provides them with (perverse) incentives to remain in or opt 
for informal sector employment. A significant number of studies have 
tested this interrelation, centred on individual employment choices. How-
ever, these often do not adequately account for the structural impediments 
many workers face to enter into formal employment. If one considers such 
structural constraints, the role of cash transfers in conditioning people’s 
employment choices appears to be marginal. Put simply, what choice is 
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there if there are no formal jobs to queue for? Job availability, combined 
with poor qualification, largely restricts the options that can be taken. Nev-
ertheless, job search is not constrained by training only. Choices may also 
be constrained by sex, age and background, as discussed in Chapter 7. Fa-
milial demands, childrearing duties being the most pressing, seem to be 
quite restrictive in the Ecuadorian labour market. Societal and familial 
pressures to remain at home, the need to perform paid work to obtain 
some income, and the cost and unavailability of childcare centres, com-
pound each other and hamper the possibility of choice. Young workers, 
regardless of their sex and educational attainment, are most likely to be 
pushed into bogus self-employment and salaried informality, as companies 
profit from their lack of experience, sidestepping employment regulation. 
Though it might be the case that cash transfers are having an effect on 
informality, it might not be through the perverse incentives channel, but 
rather through the institutional channel of implementation of targeted 
modes of social protection: the eligibility by informal employment status 
or the condition of carer and/or motherhood. The shift towards non-con-
tributory social protection, although enhancing the poor’s income and in-
ducing human capital expenditures, is not sufficient to permanently affect 
the underlying causes of economic inequality, such as the valuation of 
work and instability of labour income, which affect informal workers’ cur-
rent and future prospects, for example the inability to accumulate 
(enough) pension funds. The focus of this chapter is precisely the structure 
in which recipients operate. 
The chapter is organised as follows. The first section offers a macro-
analysis of employment structures, signalling main trends obtained from 
labour survey data in Ecuador and exploring the structural constraints to 
accessing formal employment. Particular attention is given to informal em-
ployment arrangements, engaging in current debates on how to measure 
it and how sizeable it is. Then, by means of using longitudinal data, an 
estimation of employment transition matrices follows, aimed at under-
standing how workers shift among inactivity, unemployment and different 
employment categories. By doing so, the role of cash transfers in the per-
sistence of informality is put into perspective, closing the chapter with a 
reflection on the responsiveness of social protection to these structural 
limitations in the labour market. 
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6.2 Macro-analysis: employment structures in Ecuador 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the years following the implemen-
tation of targeted social assistance instruments in Ecuador, discussing at 
length the elements of continuity and change accompanying the Citizens’ 
Revolution. Recall that Ecuador’s first cash transfer programme Bono Sol-
idario was designed to compensate for the elimination of a subsidy on 
cooking gas, in a context of financial and economic crisis in 1999. Social 
protection systems had to react rapidly, thus not necessarily in a method-
ical way, to the volatile economic situation and political instability. Follow-
ing a hasty decision to dollarise the economy in 2000, real wages declined 
rapidly (Ponce & Vos, 2012b). In response, BS monthly transfers were 
increased, aimed at cushioning the impact of inflation on real wages. These 
residual measures, although helpful in recovering employment and real 
wages, could not stop the informalisation of employment and the increase 
in labour informality (ibid.).  
Labour informality is associated with a structural feature of the Ecua-
dorian economy: dependence on primary exports. Five commodities—
traditional agricultural export crops such as banana and cacao, non-tradi-
tional exports such as shrimp and flowers, and the most important, oil—
represented 77 per cent of total foreign sales in 2010 (Pellegrini et al., 
2014). This structure is not favourable for formal employment absorption; 
instead, it is associated with particular patterns of employment creation. 
During the 2000s, employment expanded, but mostly in the services sec-
tor. This factor is key in understanding processes of urban informalisation 
that coincided with the emphasis on human capital investments that ac-
companied the adoption of CCTs, increased social expenditure and recent 
efforts to regularise employment. Without a more dynamic structural 
change, the structure of labour demand (as captured by occupational seg-
regation, further discussed in Chapter 7) has remained basically unaf-
fected, unable to absorb the more educated labour force (Ponce & Vos, 
2012a).  
In fact, since 2007, and in a deliberate effort to recover the state’s role 
as central planner and investor, public investment has grown significantly. 
According to the official source SIISE-eSIGEF, accrued social expendi-
ture per capita increased from US$142 per capita to US$575 per capita (in 
current dollars). High commodity prices eased budgetary pressures and 
facilitated increased social expenditure even during the 2008–09 global 
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downturn, coinciding with a reduction in poverty incidence of nearly 9 
percentage points in four years (2007–11) (Pellegrini et al., 2014). Expan-
sionary fiscal policies, for example public financing of housing, and limited 
monetary policy, for example management of interest rates and banking 
reserves, helped cushion the impact of external shocks, with Ecuador ex-
periencing, in relative terms, ‘only a mild recession during the 2008–2009 
global downturn, a remarkable feat given that Ecuador has the U.S. dollar 
as its currency’ (Ray & Kozameh, 2012). Yet, by the end of 2014, a reval-
uation of the dollar, a drop in commodities prices and contraction of in-
ternational trade led to another recession, this time with lower response 
capacity (Ospina Peralta, 2015). This coincided with a reduction in the 
number of BDH recipients, creating new frictions in the labour market 
following controversial adjustments to the social security regime, manage-
ment of pension funds and changes in labour legislation back to more 
flexible work arrangements. Altogether, these elements amount to a com-
plex scenario for the analysis of employment structures, although hinting 
at deeply rooted aspects of informalisation and rather reactive policy mak-
ing.   
6.2.1 Structural labour market dynamics 
To set the tone for the discussion of employment structures in Ecuador, 
and in particular of informality, this section draws on ENEMDU data2 to 
present an analysis of labour market trends: active population, inactive 
population, employment rates, unemployment and underemployment 
rates, size of informal and formal sectors, status in employment (e.g. own-
account workers) and groups’ participation. Statistical findings are pre-
sented with various references to fieldwork interviews that shed light on 
the most pressing aspects of employment that have guided the selection 
and compilation of employment data. It is worth noting that this analysis 
is situated in the context of institutional changes introduced during the 
Revolución Ciudadana from 2007 onwards—as a means to closely exam-
ine the policies and practices introduced by the administration. This is also 
done for procedural reasons. Due to methodological changes introduced 
to the ENEMDU survey in 2007, various employment-related variables 
are not comparable with previous years. 
The analysis of labour survey data3 led to the identification of five main 
trends. First, after a marginal reduction in the share of workers in the in-
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formal sector, despite efforts to formalise employment and regulate infor-
mal firms, the reduction has stalled and the trend has started to reverse.4 
Second, the share of both contributing family workers and domestic work-
ers has decreased, and there is a growing consensus amongst analysts that 
this drop is an outcome of recent reforms in labour regulation. Third, alt-
hough unemployment rates have consistently declined since 2007, labour 
force participation rate remains flat and even decreased between 2010 and 
2013 (see Figure 6.1). Fourth, there has been some fluctuation in labour 
force participation. The data suggests that some people, in particular 
groups that face greater restrictions to (re)enter the labour market, might 
be dropping out the labour force (note the upward trend in Figure 6.1), 
rather than actively searching for jobs. This is indeed the case for women 
in childrearing years: the highest inactivity rates were found amongst 
women aged 21 to 40 years old. Fifth, although unemployment has been 
kept in check, it is worth evaluating these figures in terms of total labour 
force participation. For instance, as of 2013, the unemployment rate5 in 
Ecuador (4.7 per cent) was below the regional average (6.3 per cent) and 
considerably lower than in OECD countries (11.5 per cent) (ILO, 2014). 
Unemployment rates are thus not necessarily good indicators of the degree 
of underutilisation of labour. 
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Figure 6.1 Participation in the labour force 
 
*Absolute number and proportion of working-age population (15 years and older)  
**Economically active population: all persons who furnish the supply of labour during each year 
(see ILO 2014). More specifically, it accounts for the persons who were working in the reference 
week, or if they were not working, had a job or were available to work (see INEC 2014). 
***Economically inactive population: persons out of the labour force, accounting for those who 
are not in employment or are unemployed in the reference period (see INEC 2009). 
Source: ENEMDU surveys compiled from INEC (2016a) and calculated by the author. 
 
6.2.2 Informality: general trends 
Informality is generally associated with self-employment and small-scale 
activities—denoted as the informal sector.6 In Ecuador, the informal sec-
tor is defined with regard to (lack of) registration. Following this defini-
tion, labour survey data analysis suggests that in the period from 2007 to 
2015, the share of total (national) employment in the informal sector has 
remained at just above 40 per cent (see Figure 6.2). In urban areas, the 
share is close to the national average, while it has been substantially higher, 
at 65 per cent, in rural areas since 2007. This is consistent with the ILO’s 
report on informal employment released in 2013, which suggests that the 
share of workers in the informal sector did not change much between 
2007 and 2012.  
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Figure 6.2 Share of employment in the informal sector 
 
Source: Adapted by the author from INEC (2016a) using old calculation method  
(INEC updated the definition of informality and measurement of the informal sector in 2014). 
The figure excludes the share of non-classified workers and domestic workers as these groups 
cannot be categorised as formal/informal. 
 
Yet there are many other dimensions of informality that should be con-
sidered. The use of the concept of informal employment is useful to stress 
the regulation and protection dimensions not captured by the sectorial di-
vision of formal vs informal firm registration. What is more, the fact that 
much of the informal employment is taking place within the formal sector 
challenges the provision of social protection in highly informal and casual 
labour segments of the workforce. 
As a proportion of non-agricultural employment, own-account work-
ers, informal wage workers, casual day labourers and domestic workers 
prevailed and even increased in recent years, remaining as the most inse-
cure forms of employment despite institutional changes and public poli-
cies aiming at reducing this segment of the labour force. It could be argued 
that the persistence of self-employment (see Figure 6.3) is related to re-
stricted opportunities to access formal employment as dependent workers, 
a status that most interviewees seemed to prefer in terms of economic 
stability and access to social security.   
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Figure 6.3 Total labour force by status in employment  
(non-agricultural employment) 
 
Source: ENEMDU surveys compiled from INEC (2016a) and calculated by the author. 
 
With regard to the definition of informal employment, and observing the 
guidelines suggested by the 17th International Conference of Labour Stat-
isticians, access to social security criteria can be used to distinguish formal 
from informal employment. This distinction is particularly relevant in dis-
closing informal employment arrangements prevailing in the formal sector 
and even among wage workers. Although the proportion of workers con-
tributing to the social security system has increased among workers in the 
formal sector in recent years—in particular after the new constitution in 
2008 invigorated labour regulation—the proportion of those who can se-
cure a job and have a legal contract has stagnated. For workers in the in-
formal sector, the situation has even worsened. After a sharp increase in 
affiliation to social security among workers in the informal sector right 
after the enforcement of the new regulation—that is, after 2008—in the 
last couple of years the trend has reverted, speaking to a loss of security in 
this segment since 2010. A similar trend can be found among domestic 
workers, a process that can be associated with the inability of households 
to comply with increases in minimum wages and the enforcement of social 
security affiliation. Regardless of the causes of the recent deepening of 
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informality, it is worth noting that those most affected are women, who 
make up the great bulk of informal workers and domestic workers. Actu-
ally, the further down the chain of lack of protection and loss of security, 
the more women can be found.  
Often, responsibilities for unpaid household work reinforce gender-
based employment segregation (as discussed in detail in Chapter 7). Most 
of those reported as economically inactive people in labour data are 
women. Yet many of the women who appear in these statistics as eco-
nomically inactive still do some kind of work. From a closer look at labour 
survey data and inquiries about the reason these women are not looking 
for a job, most of them indicate it is because they ‘do not have time’. In-
deed, women are more likely to engage in unpaid household work. Inter-
views conducted during my field research helped to shed light on the ways 
in which women’s unpaid care work constrains their participation in the 
labour force due to limited access to a comprehensive social protection 
scheme, for example availability and affordability of child day care centres. 
Not only is women’s work misreported, but also such a data void can leave 
unnoticed the push for informalisation by which women choose flexible 
working arrangements compatible with household duties. 
Labour policies, pushed by a strong discursive change in the National 
Constituent Assembly, eliminated several typologies of precarious em-
ployment. Increases in minimum wages and employees’ compensation 
were also introduced in 2008 and have been accompanied by stricter mon-
itoring by the Labour Department. Later, in 2011, as an outcome of a ref-
erendum, voters were consulted and non-affiliation to social security 
(IESS) became a criminal offence. These policies seem to have had a 
greater impact among domestic workers and those employed in the formal 
sector, as shown in Figure 6.4. The share of workers without social secu-
rity in the formal sector has decreased. In the informal sector, the situation 
is more difficult to assess. After a transient improvement right after the 
enforcement of the new regulation, the share of workers with no access 
to social security increased again in 2013. 
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Figure 6.4 Share of employed workers affiliated to  
social security 
 
Source: ENEMDU surveys compiled from INEC (2016a) and calculated by the author. 
 
Although in recent years the proportion of workers contributing to the 
social security system has increased among workers in the formal sector, 
the proportion of workers who can secure a job and are working under a 
legal contract has remained the same regardless of the sector. Independent 
(or self-employed) workers usually do not contribute to the pension sys-
tem, and thus represent the most prominent proportion of labour infor-
mality. Nearly 40 per cent of the labour force is in self-employment (au-
thor’s own calculations based on ENEMDU data). Opinion is also divided 
on this issue. Some analysts argue that self-employment is a space for en-
trepreneurs to advance their business ideas, while others find it to be the 
result of ill-working labour markets and the dismantling of formal wage 
work. From field observations, self-employment was found to be a space 
of precariousness and vulnerability. On very few occasions, there were 
stories of people—in particular among the lowest strata—who were suc-
cessful in their ventures.7 It should also be noted that the dividing line 
between wage employment and self-employment is quite blurred (Rizzo 
et al., 2014). Informal arrangements are more prevalent in the services sec-
tor. This is better explained by an anonymised interviewee in Loja:  
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When you start a new job, companies would do anything as to avoid paying 
any work related benefits. A way to devise this is by asking you to apply for 
a tax number (RISE). It took my husband a year of struggle to convince his 
employer to sign for an employment contract. (Interviewee-I, 2013) 
Many employees are asked to apply for a tax number, after which they 
are treated as if self-employed, that is, own-account workers offering ser-
vices to the company. This means that although these workers often do 
not have an employment contract as dependent employees (or have a ‘ser-
vice contract’), they are economically dependent on a single employer 
and/or firm for their source of income. This is a loophole in the social 
security system that businesses seem to be exploiting. The emergence of 
this sort of work arrangement, a common practice even within the public 
sector, is not specific to Ecuador only, but has become a growing trend 
that some authors have coined as ‘bogus self-employment’. These employ-
ment relationships are the outcome of employers’ and firms’ strategies to 
avoid the payment of social security contributions and profit sharing. De-
spite holding a degree, workers fall into this type of labour informality. 
The significant share of salaried informal workers confirms the spread of 
these practices. 
6.3 Cash transfers and voluntary exit: size matters 
Work (dis)incentives associated with the BDH are often studied in two 
contexts: first, at the moment of entry to the programme, as individuals’ 
employment status might affect their choice to participate in the pro-
gramme or their eligibility; and second, to secure permanence in the pro-
gramme, as (changes in) employment status might affect the choice to re-
main in the programme or might result in an unintended exit (or 
‘graduation’) from the programme. Yet, and as noted earlier, most of the 
work effort models applied to CTs in the global South do not consider the 
size of the (dis)incentive (that is, the size of the transfer) in comparison 
with alternative sources of formal income. In fact, much of the discussion 
on incentives, as informed by the unemployment insurance literature ad-
vanced in the North, assumes a level of transfers rather close to formal 
minimum wages. However, the size of the transfer matters, in particular 
for the Ecuadorian case where the monthly stipend is fixed regardless of 
household size. Table 6.1 helps to contextualise this. As of 2014, the me-
dian wage for a full-time worker in the informal sector was considerably 
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less than that corresponding to a worker in the formal sector, even when 
accounting only for full-time work (that is, people working 40 or more 
hours a week). Even if working full time, a median worker in the informal 
sector earns 60 per cent of the labour income of his formal counterpart. 
In sum, there is a significant premium for working in the formal sector 
and the BDH, in this context, does not appear to be a strong incentive to 
exit the formal sector. 
Table 6.1 Median monthly labour income by economic sector  
(estimates for 2014) 
 
 (Gross pre-tax labour earnings in nominal US$)  
 
National  
urban  
workforce 
Part-time 
workers 
Full-time 
workers 
Formal sector 512 250 530 
Informal sector 250 125 320 
Domestic service 340 205 380 
Statutory minimum wage  340 - - 
Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) 
monthly stipend 50 50 50 
Source: ENEMDU surveys compiled from INEC (2016a) and calculated by the author. 
*Median value of the monthly labour income reported for the main job holding of a full-time 
worker (40 hours/week).8  
**Estimates for non-agricultural employment only. 
 
Minimum wages do not seem to be binding in the informal sector, as the 
difference between the statutory wage (US$340) and the median earnings 
reported by workers in the informal sector is significant, even more so 
among part-time workers. It is also worth noting that wages in the infor-
mal sector are much lower than their formal counterparts. Median values 
also signal that the majority of workers in the informal sector do not reach 
the statutory minimum regardless of the condition of employment, for 
example full- or part-time. Minimum wage increases have also been effec-
tive in improving the median income of domestic workers, as Table 6.1 
reports that labour income increased to US$340 in 2014 (total estimate), 
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though there are marked differences between part-time and full-time 
workers. The previous figures are purely informative, as median wages say 
little about other work-related benefits or gender wage differentials, and 
do not account for education or experience or for part-time jobs. If we 
reconsider Table 6.1 showing median earnings accounting for the propor-
tion of people in full-time work, other dimensions of income inequality 
arise. Whereas 93 per cent of the workers in the formal sector were work-
ing full time in 2013, 57 per cent of people in the informal sector reported 
to be working full time. This was the case for 64 per cent in the case of 
domestic work, based on estimates using ENEMDU data.   
Nonetheless, median values are illustrative to counter claims about in-
centives for informality, and most importantly to weigh the actual contri-
bution of cash transfers to personal labour income. With unemployment 
insurance factually non-existent,9 it is difficult to argue that cash transfer 
recipients have an incentive to remain in idleness, considering the stipend 
does not even reach a quarter of the minimum wage (US$340 as of 2014). 
For workers earning below the legal minimum or working part time, the 
BDH can support them and their family members. As articulated in an 
interview: 
My husband works as a security guard. He is paid per shift, but every time 
and then, he would earn nothing. Then, we would run out of money for 
food […] by the end of the month, I am eager to go and withdraw my 
[BDH] money. At least I know that we will have enough food at home. 
(Interviewee-M, 2013) 
The BDH represents an important source of income for the lowest 
segment of the income distribution. According to the survey data pre-
sented in income brackets in Figure 6.5, the US$50 monthly transfer ex-
ceeded the labour income perceived by 23 per cent of BDH recipients 
who reported earning less than US$20 per month, it was nearly equivalent 
to the labour income reported by the 34 per cent of respondents located 
in the earnings interval between US$20 and US$60 per month, and it could 
be said to play a significant role in cushioning income among the 41 per 
cent who reported earnings between US$60 to US$400 per month. Note 
that only 2 per cent reported monthly earnings above US$400 per month. 
 A Macro-Analysis of Employment and Cash Transfers in Ecuador 171 
 
Figure 6.5 Earnings intervals, reported labour income in Loja and Machala, 
2013 
*Original data reported in terms of weekly labour income, converted to months to facilitate the 
comparison with the BDH monthly stipend. 
Source: Fieldwork survey data, 2013. 
6.4 Labour mobility: employment and the BDH 
This section presents a descriptive analysis of pseudo-panel data aimed at 
flagging main labour dynamics in Ecuador. Note that conventional panel 
data permits tracking changes over time at the individual level. The 
pseudo-panel data presented in this section were built from a subsample 
of the national labour survey, ENEMDU. A note of caution should then 
be introduced on the use of this synthetic panel data, as it suffers from 
attrition problems and non-response bias, as well as the usual problems 
associated with employment data: response-error bias (in particular to dif-
ferentiate and code the inactive and unemployed population, which de-
pends on what is reported by the informant), exclusion of hidden popula-
tions (e.g. the poorest strata of the population living in remote areas, 
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people involved in illegal activities and the very rich segments of the econ-
omy), sampling issues, timing and coverage. Nevertheless, the data allow 
for a broad exploration of employment dynamics and the re-assessment 
of some common claims made about the choice of informality and the 
interactions with social protection. 
6.4.1 Annual labour transitions 
The ENEMDU survey follows a 2-(2)-2 scheme,10 in which there is a par-
tial overlap of the sample for consecutive periods. Although ENEMDU 
was not designed as longitudinal data, that is, panel data, by recovering ID 
numbers of informants, data can be matched as rotating panels with a 50 
per cent overlap—in absence of attrition. It should be noted that by 
matching ID numbers, INEC estimates about 86 per cent recovery of the 
original sample.11 If the sampling weights12 were applied to the panel ob-
servations, the pseudo-data would then represent a significant proportion 
of the working population. Three data sets were made available by 
INEC—December 2007–December 2008, December 2009–December 
2010 and December 2011–December 2012—during my field visit to Ec-
uador.  
Exploiting the features of the pseudo-panel data, a comparison be-
tween the states of employment through which individuals transitioned 
during a one-year window was implemented.13 Each worker who remained 
in the sampling frame of the labour survey data for at least two discrete 
periods was considered for the analysis. The combination of states in 
which each worker was observed was used to compute a (discrete time) 
transition matrix, in a one-year time window. Of course, workers’ flows 
happen at random times, but due to the survey design, it was only possible 
to capture changes in states for December of each year. What is more, 
since ENEMDU can be considered a rotatory panel and sample attrition 
is significant, it is only possible to compare a subsample of individuals over 
two consecutive years. Each two-year transition matrix only considers the 
probability of transiting to (or remaining in) the next stage based on the 
status, independent of what occurred in previous years. That is, there is 
no history dependence. Furthermore, the change reported might be regis-
tered late (in the next survey conducted at the end of the forthcoming 
year). Consider a worker who appears as unemployed in the first year (e.g. 
December 2007) but then moves to self-employment, fails in the enter-
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prise and then goes back to unemployment within months. The next sur-
vey (e.g. December 2008) would not detect any of these intermediate tran-
sitions.  
Computed table elements correspond to the transition probabilities,14 
which show two possible outcomes: unchanged states, captured in the ta-
ble’s diagonal, or transitions to other states, with inflows captured in each 
column, and outflows in each row (measured as a percentage of the initial 
state of workers). The probabilities computed tell about the changes in the 
stock of inactive, employed and unemployed population. Employment ac-
counts for non-agricultural activities only, and is further broken down into 
employment in the formal sector and employment in the informal sector. 
Adding the three main stocks gives us the total working-age population in 
the panel (people 10 years and above), while by adding unemployed and 
employed (in its various categories) it is possible to account for the total 
labour force.  
To illustrate the above, Table 6.2 presents the total working-age popu-
lation in the panel 2007–08. Rows account for initial values (2007) and the 
columns reflect the final values (2008). The matrix accounts only for non-
missing values in both periods, for a total of 10,195 people. For instance, 
of the respondents who were out of the labour force in 2007, 3,610 re-
mained unemployed, 178 transited to the formal sector, 518 transited to 
the informal sector and 169 reported being unemployed in 2008. In total, 
4,475 informants were out of the labour force. For workers in the formal 
sector, 1,964 remained formal, whereas 407 transited to the informal sec-
tor, 64 reported being unemployed and 138 dropped out of the labour 
force by 2008. Workers in the informal sector reached 2,820 people in 
2007, of which 1,960 remained informal, 358 transited to the formal sec-
tor, 78 reported being unemployed and 424 dropped out of the labour 
force in the final period. Finally, and consistently with trends in unem-
ployment in the country, only 327 informants reported being unemployed, 
of which 106 dropped out of the labour force, 74 found a job in the formal 
sector and 91 were absorbed in the informal sector. The final row gives 
the total for each employment category by the end of the period (2008).  
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Table 6.2 Occupational shifts among workers, 2007–2008  
(number of workers)   
  2008  
20
07
 
  OLF FS IS U TOTAL 
OLF 3,610 178 518 169 4,475 
FS 138 1,964 407 64 2,573 
IS 424 358 1,960 78 2,820 
U 106 74 91 56 327  
TOTAL 4,278 2,574 2,976 367 10,195 
OLF out of the labour force 
FS  formal sector 
IS  informal sector 
U  unemployment 
Source: ENEMDU panels compiled from INEC (2016a), frequencies calculated by the author. 
 
Absolute values hint at the variation in employment status over the 2007–
08 wave. Table 6.3 summarises the corresponding transition probabilities 
(or workers’ flows). The rows represent the initial states, whereas the col-
umns capture the final ones. The table reports the percentage of persons 
that changed status from inactivity (out of the labour force), unemploy-
ment, formal employment and informal employment. In measuring tran-
sition rates, estimates were weighted according to the survey probability 
sampling weights, calculating standard errors and coefficients of variation 
to assess estimates reliability.  
Between 2007 and 2008, workers stayed in unemployment with a prob-
ability of 17 per cent. Exits from unemployment, that is, job-finding rates, 
were more intense in the informal sector (29.5 per cent) than in the infor-
mal sector (23.3 per cent). A significant share of the unemployed (30.3 per 
cent) dropped out of the labour force. For the pool of the initially inactive 
(out of the labour force), 80.7 per cent remained out, whilst 10.7 per cent 
entered the labour force as part of the informal sector. With regard to 
inflows to the informal sector (see row values), most came from unem-
ployment, with a probability of 29.5 per cent. It is worth noting that work-
ers in the formal sector were more likely to stay formal than their informal 
counterparts, with a probability of 76.2 per cent.  
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Table 6.3 Occupational shifts among workers, 2007–2008  
(percentage of workers) 
 OLF FS IS U 
OLF 80.7** 4.1** 10.7** 4.5** 
FS 5.5** 76.2** 15.5** 2.6* 
IS 15.5** 13.0** 68.3** 3.2 
U 30.3** 23.3* 29.5* 16.9* 
OLF out of the labour force 
FS  formal sector 
IS  informal sector 
U  unemployment 
Based on the coefficient of variation (CV) discretion should be used when determining whether 
the estimates are appropriate for use, following: (**) reliable with CV under 10% (*) less reliable 
with CV between 11% and 15%. Estimates without asterisk are not statistically significant with 
a CV larger than 15%. 
Source: ENEMDU panels compiled from INEC (2016a), probabilities calculated by the author. 
 
The same method was applied for the 2011–12 wave. Table 6.4 presents 
absolute values for the various employment categories. The distribution 
of people of working age within categories is consistent with aggregate 
estimates for the reference period. Yet, while panel data might be repre-
sentative of the total population, it may not be representative of all sub-
population groups (Dang et al., 2014). In addition, recall there is a sub-
stantial attrition problem. The number of people (8,589) who were 
matched in the 2011–12 wave is lower than the total number matched for 
2007–08 wave (10,195), affecting the reliability of results. The sample of 
households does not follow a strict panel and therefore poses constraints 
when estimating transition matrices. In a recent study, Ponce et al. (forth-
coming) approach this problem by modelling a synthetic panel and calcu-
lating transition matrices utilising a non-parametric probabilistic model of 
income mobility. The authors estimate15 parameters based on the first year 
of the sample (2007) to construct a synthetic panel, that is, a new counter-
factual, for the households in the last year (2014). Although this method 
is well suited for the analysis of transitions in and out of poverty, as noted 
by Dang et al., its success depends, amongst other factors, on how accu-
rate the prediction of the dependent variable of interest is (2014). Since 
the goal was not to estimate informality but instead to flag the challenges 
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of quantifying transitions from, towards and within informality, the chap-
ter presents simple transition results at the cost of lower statistical signifi-
cance. 
Table 6.4 Occupational shifts among workers, 2011–2012  
(number of workers)   
  2012  
   OLF FS IS U TOTAL 
20
11
 
OLF 3,390 122 318 33 3,863 
FS 138 1,592 260 39 2,029 
IS 376 303 1,823 71 2,573 
U 14 30 70 10 124 
TOTAL 3,918 2,047 2,471 153 8,589 
OLF out of the labour force 
FS  formal sector 
IS  informal sector 
U  unemployment 
Source: ENEMDU panels compiled from INEC (2016a), frequencies calculated by the author. 
 
Although the general in the transitions between 2011 and 2012 sig-
nalled at a slight decline in informality (see Table 6.3), Table 6.5 suggests 
some constraints in formalisation. Job finds in the formal sector occurred 
with a probability of 34.5 per cent, whereas estimates for the informal sec-
tor or permanence in unemployment are discarded as not reliable. For the 
pool of inactive, the probability of remaining out of the labour force was 
88.3 per cent, next to low rates of entry into the informal sector (8 per 
cent) and the formal sector (3.1 per cent). With regard to inflows to infor-
mality, most of them were job finds, with a probability of 45.1 per cent, 
whereas informalisation, that is, transition from formal to informal, only 
occurred with a 10.9 per cent probability. Estimates of inflows into unem-
ployment are not reliable for this period.  
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Table 6.5 Occupational shifts among workers, 2011–2012  
(percentage of workers) 
 OLF FS IS U 
OLF 88.3** 3.1* 8.0** 0.9 
FS 6.5** 81.0** 10.9** 1.6 
IS 15.0** 11.2** 71.3** 2.6 
U 5.6 34.5** 45.1 14.3 
OLF out of the labour force 
FS  formal sector 
IS  informal sector 
U  unemployment 
Source: ENEMDU panels compiled from INEC (2016a), probabilities calculated by the author. 
 
The previous matrices hint at some structural constraints in the access to 
(formal) employment. It would seem that inactivity or informality are the 
most common targets. Yet, as argued before, the formal and informal sec-
tors division does not strictly capture labour informality. Informal employ-
ment can occur outside the informal sector, as employees are not covered 
by labour regulation, social protection or other employment-derived enti-
tlements.  
Following the methodological strategy advanced in employment stud-
ies produced in the region, the lack of affiliation to social security is used 
as a proxy for informal employment, measured as the share of workers 
not covered by (publicly provided) social security (IESS, ISSFA, ISSPOL 
or Seguro Campesino). Introducing this new typology, a second set of oc-
cupational shifts was computed for the 2007–08 and the 2011–12 periods. 
The matrices include four categories: (1) out of the labour force (same as 
above); (2) formal employment, as the share of the labour force in em-
ployment and with access to social security regardless of the sector in 
which they work; (3) informal employment, as the share of workers in 
employment not covered by social security, regardless of the sector in 
which they work; and (4) unemployment, defined in the same terms as 
above. Using this categorisation, there are signs of higher job finding rates 
in informality, in this case into informal (unsecure) employment.  
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Table 6.6 reports transition probabilities for the period 2007–08. Exits 
from unemployment towards informal employment happened with a 43 
per cent probability, whereas formal job-finding rates were less intense, at 
16 per cent. Moreover, note that once having landed a formal job, with 
social security coverage, the probability of remaining formal is the highest, 
as shown in the diagonal: 83.4 per cent. So, although formal employment 
is hard to get, it seems to be the most stable. After all, affiliating workers 
to social security involves a certain degree of regularisation of employ-
ment: employers have to provide legal documentation of their firm and 
employees in order to pay their contributions, following the procedure for 
Registro Patronal indicated at IESS, except for domestic workers (who 
can access social security benefits under a simplified procedure). Workers 
in informal employment, on the contrary, are more likely to leave the la-
bour force (12.8 per cent) than to find formal employment (6.6 per cent) 
or transition towards unemployment (3.5 per cent). In regards to inflows 
to formality, chances of formalising employment were 6.6 per cent, 
whereas inflows from formal employment were almost double that, at 12.1 
per cent. On balance, it seems that labour market forces are reshuffling 
workers into informality, albeit mildly given the overall trend in reduction 
of informal employment.  
Table 6.6 Occupational shifts among workers 2007–2008  
(condensed occupations) (percentage of workers) 
 OLF FE IE U 
OLF 78.9** 1.5 15.2** 4.4** 
FE 3.1 83.4** 12.1** 1.3 
IE 12.8** 6.6** 77.1** 3.5** 
U 29.2** 10.8 43.6** 16.3* 
OLF out of the labour force 
FE  formal employment 
IE  informal employment 
U  unemployment 
Based on the coefficient of variation (CV) discretion should be used when determining 
whether the estimates are appropriate for use, following: (**) reliable with CV under 10% (*) 
less reliable with CV between 11% and 15%. Estimates without asterisk are unreliable with CV 
greater than 15%. 
Source: ENEMDU panels compiled from INEC (2016a), probabilities calculated by the author. 
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Workers’ flows computed for the period 2011-2012 show a very similar 
pattern to that observed in Table 6.7. Formal employment (referring to 
the labour force in employment and with access to social security regard-
less of the sector in which they work) remains as the more stable state: 
83.9 per cent remained. Workers in informal employment—those with no 
access to social security regardless of the sector—stayed in this state with 
a 65.2 per cent probability. Nevertheless, a significant share of workers, 
16.3 per cent, transitioned towards formal employment. The probability 
of formalising or securing employment thus increased in comparison with 
the period 2007–08, perhaps due to the introduction of labour legislation 
in 2010 aimed at extending social security coverage.  
Table 6.7 Occupational shifts among workers 2011–2012  
(condensed occupations) (percentage of workers) 
 OLF FE IE U 
OLF 88.9** 2.8* 7.75** 0.1 
FE 6.17 83.9** 0.9* 0.0 
IE 15.8** 16.3** 65.2** 0.2* 
U 26.0 26.6 45.4* 0.2 
OLF out of the labour force 
FE  formal employment 
IE  informal employment 
U  unemployment 
Based on the coefficient of variation (CV) discretion should be used when determining whether 
the estimates are appropriate for use, following: (**) reliable with CV under 10% (*) less reliable 
with CV between 11% and 15%. Estimates without asterisk are not statistically significant with 
a CV larger than 15%. 
Source: ENEMDU panels compiled from INEC (2016a), probabilities calculated by the author. 
 
A different approach to informal employment would consider the catego-
risation of status in employment. Table 6.8 shows a detail of occupational 
shifts between 2007 and 2008 for the following categories: (1) out of the 
labour force; (2) unemployment; (3) self-employment, including employ-
ers and own-account workers; (4) informal salaried employment, including 
employees who get a remuneration but no access to social security; (5) 
formal salaried employment, including those employees who get a remu-
neration and access to social security; and (6) unpaid relatives, including 
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contributing family workers who do not get a remuneration for their work. 
The estimates suggest that job-finding rates are higher in informal salaried 
employment and self-employment. As above, formal salaried employment 
is the most stable occupation, with an 83.5 per cent probability of remain-
ing in a formal salaried job. There seems to be higher mobility from work-
ing as an unpaid relative toward other informal occupations, such as sala-
ried informality, and self-employment, suggesting that workers’ flows are 
quite intense within these states—for instance, from salaried informality 
to self-employment. What is more, it can be noted that self-employed 
workers and unpaid workers rarely transit towards formal employment. 
Yet this level of disaggregation was problematic; most table elements were 
not reliable. For the period 2010–11, the overall reliability of transition 
estimates was lower, for which reason the results were discarded.  
Table 6.8 Occupational shifts among workers 2007–2008 
(detailed occupations) (percentage of workers) 
 OLF U SE SI FS UR 
OLF 78.9** 4.4** 6.3** 5.6** 1.5 3.4** 
U 29.2** 16.3* 17.4* 24.0* 10.8 2.2 
SE 12.9** 2.3 66.2** 13.3** 2.9 2.5 
SI 9.5** 4.8* 16.4** 55.4** 12.2** 1.8 
FS 3.1 1.3 2.6 9.11* 83.5** 0.0 
UR 27.9** 4.3 18.0* 10.7 2 37.4** 
OLF out of the labour force 
U  unemployment 
SE  self-employment 
SI  salaried informal 
FS  formal salaried 
UR  unpaid relative 
Based on the coefficient of variation (CV) discretion should be used when determining whether 
the estimates are appropriate for use, following: (**) reliable with CV under 10% (*) less reliable 
with CV between 11% and 15%. Estimates without asterisk are not statistically significant with 
a CV larger than 15%. 
Source: ENEMDU panels compiled from INEC (2016a), probabilities calculated by the author. 
 
It is worth noting that most of the transitions take place from unemploy-
ment and unpaid relative categories and from salaried informal towards 
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formal salaried. This mixed result of, on the one hand, absorption into 
precarious employment (unpaid family work), and on the other hand, for-
malisation of salaried employment, speaks of the importance of the initial 
state, as patterns of employment creation are highly dependent on the in-
itial state. With regard to flows into self-employment, most transited from 
salaried informality and unpaid family work. The perverse incentive rhet-
oric contending that workers are discouraged by social security fees and 
choose to go informal in order to evade such payments is thus beside the 
point.  
Furthermore, the discussion seems to be shifting towards understand-
ing whether safety nets discourage job search and sustain unrealistic in-
come expectations. In particular, the issue of timing has been extensively 
debated, problematising whether people ‘get serious’ about looking for a 
job as their benefits are near expiration (assuming they know the end date) 
or when there is a constant threat of benefits revocation (as seems to be 
the case with the BDH). In public opinion debates, some criticise the lax 
graduation mechanisms and extended permanence in the BDH pro-
gramme, arguing that it triggers unrealistic expectations as individuals per-
ceive the transfer as a permanent source of income. Indeed, the BDH 
graduation criteria have changed over time and there is not enough dis-
semination of their specificities. Second, and despite the relatively long 
permanence of recipients in the programme—about five years as reported 
in the field survey16—they seem to perceive the transfer as a temporary 
income, uncertain about their continuation in the programme. With no 
certainty about their permanence in the programme and facing the con-
stant fear of exiting the programme, the profile of recipients seems to be 
of risk-averse agents rather than opportunistic users, as argued in the per-
verse incentives literature. For most recipients, the BDH plays no role in 
their permanence in the informal sector, which is instead the result of their 
inability to secure a formal job. Furthermore, in the highly informalised 
context where cash transfers operate, employers can put to wrong use the 
programme rationale to keep workers informal. For instance, [employer] 
families seemed to exploit the ambiguities in social insurance, convincing 
domestic workers that they should not claim social security as it would 
lead to an exit from the BDH programme, as noted in conversations with 
domestic workers during visits to Loja in 2013. Although in the initial years 
of the BDH programme this held true, it is no longer the case, according 
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to MIES: access to contributory social security (IESS) does not affect eli-
gibility for the BDH, as long as the household ranks below the poverty 
line set for the programme (Interviewee-L, 2014). However, there has not 
been a massive campaign to inform the public about such changes, allow-
ing for its misuse by employers in order to bypass employment regulation.  
A calculation of workers’ flows for the subpopulation of cash transfer 
recipients was conducted. However, since the ENEMDU panel data in-
clude a limited number of cases of BDH recipients (just above 800) it re-
sulted in estimates with no statistical significance. Yet, as discussed in de-
tail in Chapter 7 and using data collected in the field survey, accessing 
BDH benefits is indeed associated with informal employment. However, 
a very small share of recipients opted out for informality. That is, few were 
previously holding formal jobs; most of them had been transitioning 
within informality or from inactivity towards informality. Informal work-
ers usually hold more than one informal occupation, and constantly 
change jobs within a one-year time window—the time frame considered 
for the transition matrices. This can be illustrated by the case of an infor-
mal worker interviewed in Loja (2013), who reported as her main occupa-
tion informal retail trade, switching within the week between her job as 
informal vendor of seasonal products and as door-to-door salesperson for 
a global business that relies on social connections of stay-home mothers 
to sell cosmetics directly to friends and neighbours. She combined these 
activities with sporadic jobs, transitioning from sales to the services sector 
if available, for example working as a helper in a restaurant during the 
school season, all under informal arrangements (Interviewee-D, 2013). Sit-
uations such as this are difficult to capture in employment survey data. 
Regarding the prevalence of inactivity, as identified in previous work-
ers’ flows matrices, one could think of at least three plausible explanations 
at the structural level. First, there are issues with data reporting. Some peo-
ple would prefer to report being inactive as a way to conceal income-gen-
erating activities for various reasons such as tax bunching, underground 
activities and stigma. Targeted modalities of social protection might also 
give incentives to individuals to appear as poverty-stricken and conceal 
paid work. Second, there are issues of definition and measurement of un-
paid care work which appears as inactivity in employment data. Most 
working-age adults who are recorded as inactive in labour survey data are 
women. Yet many of the women who appear as inactive perform care 
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work. To support this argument, note that in the ENEMDU survey ques-
tionnaire, informants are asked why they are not looking for a job, with 
most of them indicating that they just ‘do not have any time to do it’. Care 
work is intense but unrewarded. Interviews conducted during the field-
work helped identify the various ways in which women’s unpaid care work 
constrains their participation in the labour force, as discussed in Chapter 
7. Along these lines, not only does women’s work tend to be misreported, 
but the reasons for their lower employment attachment tend to go unno-
ticed, although they might help explain the push towards informalisation 
in which women choose (or are pushed into) flexible working arrange-
ments compatible with household duties. Lastly, inactivity figures can hint 
at processes of continued marginalisation in the labour market. At the in-
tersection of age and gender, many women find themselves unable to land 
a job, that is, they are deemed ‘too old’ for the market. Because of discrim-
ination during the hiring process, many unemployed might end as discour-
aged workers. 
Before concluding this section, it should be noted that informality 
tends to be underestimated in labour surveys. Essentially, ‘informalisation 
means that many people who appear in statistics as economically inactive 
still do some kind of work’ (Hanlon et al., 2010). Second, it is also plausible 
to think that any employment, either formal or informal, could be purpos-
ively misreported among BDH recipients, for reasons already discussed. 
This is an important consideration in a highly informal context, where the 
employment situation is quite uncertain and the most stable source of in-
come is actually the state’s support via cash transfers. And while the role 
of cash transfers might seem marginal, it does provide income support to 
an otherwise less visible segment of the labour force.  
6.4.2 Cross-check: evidence of occupational shifts using 
administrative registers 
As mentioned above, statistical investigations, household surveys in par-
ticular, are limited in scope. Issues of non-response, attrition, missing data 
and others might lead to an incomplete understanding of employment 
choices. This section is then complemented with administrative registers, 
arguably a more accurate source of information on recipients’ status. It is 
worth noting that the information collected in administrative registers is 
recorded quite differently from that obtained through surveys. Adminis-
trative registers can be collected by the bureaucratic apparatus of the state 
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on such a scale of research that there is no comparison with what could 
have been carried out by an independent researcher. The official character 
of the data serves both policy design and social research. Basically, the 
information recorded in official administrative data is yielded not by ob-
servation—as would be the case in a conventional survey—but by the reg-
istration of events. For instance, by the end of the month companies have 
to present to the social security system their payrolls indicating how many 
days each employee has worked, the nominal salary received and a detail 
of severance payments. Alternatively, and as is the case for the registration 
of cash transfer payments, the programme’s administration keeps records 
of who has been paid each month and how much the person received; or 
Registro Social, the official cadastre for households’ poverty assessment 
in the context of allocation of BDH transfers.  
This section makes use of data17 on (1) SELBEN and Registro Social, 
two waves of household records on those deemed eligible to participate 
in the cash transfer programme; (2) Base de Pagos, which details payments 
received by cash transfer recipients, indicating who is effectively partici-
pating in the programme; and (3) official records of IESS (Social Security 
System) with information on salaries of employees, wages, bonuses and 
deductions. It is worth noting that administrative records only record in-
formation on the subpopulation reached by surveyors because of their sta-
tus as cash transfer recipients or formal wage workers. This can be better 
explained in Table 6.9, which details the number of people who were listed 
in IESS records as dependent wage workers in 2013. If they appear in 
IESS records, it implies that at some point they were affiliated to social 
security and thus in formal employment. The second row details the total 
number of BDH recipients who effectively received transfers in 2013, in-
formation obtained from Base de Pagos (MIES 2013). The last row indicates 
the proportion of BDH recipients who held a formal job in 2013, that is, 
those who were past of Base de Pagos and also had access to social security 
(as listed in IESS records). The result: only 5.5 per cent of BDH recipients 
were in formal employment in 2013. When further dividing employment 
into the economic branches, it was found that about 28 per cent (equiva-
lent to 27,000 people) of the BDH recipients in formal employment 
worked in agriculture, followed by manufacture and trade, with a share of 
15 per cent each. This certainly challenges the notion that non-agricultural 
employment is mostly informal. When tracing back the companies within 
agriculture for which this group of formal BDH recipients were working, 
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it was found that they were mostly employed by the exports sector, for 
example large-scale crops such as banana plantations in the coastal areas 
of Ecuador. Perhaps due to stricter international regulation or concerns 
with reputation, it would seem that exporters have started to adhere to 
labour regulations. Yet these registries do not allow for an evaluation of 
the quality and duration of employment in large-scale agriculture, an issue 
that was mentioned in interviews in Machala, a node of banana production 
in Ecuador, where precarious work persists. 
Table 6.9 BDH recipients in formal employment (absolute values) 
Category Number of people 
Dependent wage workers with access to social security 2,934,348 
Total number of BDH recipients 1,746,407 
Formal sector BDH recipients (accessing social security) 96,852 
Source: BDH payroll database and IESS official records (Fieldwork 2013), proportions calculated 
by the author. 
 
From Table 6.9 it can be noted that about 95 per cent of the BDH recip-
ients had no access to formal employment, at least based on what was 
recorded in the IESS database (2013). Note that recipients faced not only 
a constrained situation in the labour market but also a complex regime of 
disciplinary measures in order to maintain eligibility for the benefit. As 
noticed in the field visits to Ecuador, recipients were aware of key aspects 
that affect programme eligibility such as condition of the dwelling, alt-
hough there was also misinformation regarding its interaction with the 
contributory scheme IESS. In the past, affiliation to IESS might have re-
sulted in an exit from or non-eligibility for the BDH programme, whereas 
in recent years the objective is to expand contributory insurance amongst 
recipients. Used to strict levels of control, for example cross-checking of 
information with public employers or pension schemes, and the downsiz-
ing of the programme, many recipients seemed to have opted for insecure 
and informal occupations instead. Queuing for a job, claiming work-re-
lated benefits or investing in a business idea—all might end up truncated 
by speculations around the eligibility criteria for the BDH.  
186 CHAPTER 6 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The macro-analysis presented in this chapter indicates that informality and 
inactivity are the most frequent destinations of working-age adults actively 
participating in the labour market. The transition matrices showed that 
there is some movement (both ways) between formal and informal em-
ployment. If there is any choice between these states, it is a limited one. It 
is difficult to argue that cash transfer recipients have the incentive to re-
main in idleness, considering the stipend does not even reach a quarter of 
the minimum wage.18 What could be occurring, then, is that the large share 
of informal employment is rooted precisely in the lack of social protection, 
not in its vicious use. If BDH benefits are associated with a higher proba-
bility of remaining in informal employment, it should also be noted that a 
rather small share of recipients seem to have opted out for informality. 
That is, few were previously holding formal jobs. Their initial status was 
as informal workers. This configuration reminds us of the fact that the 
cash transfer programme was set up as a non-work-based form of social 
protection because informality was already high and formal jobs were hard 
to find. In this context, it is not surprising to find that recipients have 
failed to secure a formal job if there are not jobs to be found. In sum, the 
chances of accessing a formal job are limited, new incumbents are most 
likely to enter the informal sector and permanence in a formal position is 
difficult to secure. These rigidities in accessing formal jobs and/or upgrad-
ing from an informal one fit into the design of the cash transfer pro-
gramme which ultimately targets an important number of informal work-
ers. Recipients also tend to have lower levels of schooling and experience, 
restricting their options in the labour market. This not only speaks to the 
structural constraints faced by workers, but at the methodological level it 
indicates an endogeneity problem in the study of cash transfers and em-
ployment choices, as there might be a loop of causality in the identification 
of informality. After nearly two decades of the BDH (and earlier variants), 
recipients continue to face difficulties in securing a formal job, since the 
BDH has no formalising aim of its own. 
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Notes 
1 Within this context, the idea of the Bono de Desarrollo Humano is nothing new. 
It builds on already existing conditional cash transfers, popular schemes through-
out Latin America. Justified in terms of human capital within targeted modes of 
social assistance, BDH provides a stipend equivalent to US$50 per month to poor 
mothers with school-age children, conditional on school attendance and health 
check-ups. It also includes a pension component, targeted at poor adults above the 
age of 65 and disabled people, without need of fulfilment of any condition. 
2 The ENEMDU survey is designed to collect timely micro-data regarding employ-
ment status, income, poverty and living conditions.  
3 Due to a change in the ENEMDU labour survey methodology in 2007 that af-
fected both the sampling frame as well as the questionnaire design, it is not possible 
to construct a comparable series for a longer time frame. 
4 In this document, informality is understood as both a sector of the economy, 
following the vast number of studies on informality in Ecuador that keep on using 
the firm-based definition of informal sector; and, from the worker’s’ point of view, 
regarding access to social protection. 
5 Measured as the share of the working-age population who were not in employ-
ment, carried out activities to seek employment and were available to take up any 
employment (following the guidelines of the 19th Conference of Labour Statisti-
cians as found in ILO website, Geneva 2013). 
6 There is an important caveat in the study of informality as an analytical category, 
as noted in the literature review section. 
7 For instance, many street vendors indicated having combined their CDH credit 
with seed capital provided by the municipality to formalise their activities, ob-
taining a patent, uniforms and health permits. However, these were a small group 
of women who were lucky enough to hear about this pilot and signed up for it 
on time. Other street vendors did not access this information. Based on simple 
observation and a very informal chat, the beneficiaries were said to be doing great 
in their businesses. More than a celebration of microcredit, it speaks of the ben-
efits of comprehensive government’ support. And it indicates the exclusionary 
nature of this sort of programme and the early capture by those already better 
off in the localities (Fieldwork 2013).  
8 More than 90 per cent of the labour force reported holding one job only. The 
remaining workers who supplemented their primary activity by taking up a se-
cond job were excluded for the purposes of this document. It is possible to im-
pute data from administrative registers to obtain a more accurate estimate of 
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earnings in the formal sector and account for part-time jobs and secondary ac-
tivities in general. Most of the informal sector activities remain out of the records 
and thus no data imputation is possible. 
9 Consider that in order to access unemployment benefits, a worker is required 
to have contributed continuously to the security system for at least five years and 
be out of a job for at least three months. From the author’s own calculations 
using administrative registers, the average duration of formal employment (cov-
ered by social security) is about 370 days. In addition, informal workers, by defi-
nition, do not contribute to the social system at all. These elements suggest that 
unemployment insurance is unattainable for the bulk of the labour force. Recent 
reforms to unemployment insurance are tailored towards increasing coverage. 
10 Sampled units are interviewed for two consecutive quarters, then ‘rest’ for the 
next two, and are interviewed back again for another two quarters.  
11 Find a detailed description of the matching methodology at Proyecto matrices de 
transición laboural, Resumen Ejecutivo (2005), in INEC repository (last accessed in 
Septemer 2014).   
12 Sampling weights account for the number of individuals in the population that 
each observation represents according to the probability of being selected in the 
sample (Stata ® resources). 
13 The transition probabilities were computed in Stata ® and report the change 
in each one of the categorical variables over time as the sum of transitions from 
each observation to the next period. Labour transition matrices have been exten-
sively used in labour economics but have received greater attention in regional 
studies of informality following the publication of the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank: Andemic informality: Assessing labour informality, employment, and income risk 
in the Andes.  
14 The transition probabilities compute the transition frequencies for the actual 
panel data without accounting for sampling weights—which remain the same for 
each observation in the two waves. Multiplying by the sampling weight would 
result in the same matrix multiplied by a constant. However, there are more styl-
ised ways of dealing with weighted panel data that are not covered in this analysis. 
15 The author follows a similar approach to that adopted by Pesantez (2014), who 
also studies income mobility based on modelling ENEMDU repeated survey data 
as synthetic panel data for the period 2007–13. 
16 Author’s own calculations from fieldwork survey data (2014). 
17 These were the result of collaborative research with government agencies that 
provided assistance to my research project and allowed me to access documen-
tary information and limited anonymised records. 
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18 While marginal, cash transfers nonetheless provide some sort of income sup-
port to an otherwise invisible, unprotected and marginalised segment of the la-
bour force in an informalised context. 
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7 Institutionalising Segregation in Southern Ecuador 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the effects of BDH on labour market outcomes, 
more specifically inactivity and occupational segregation in Ecuador, for 
the period 2007–14. Ideally, the analysis of both social provisioning and 
employment dynamics would have benefited from a longitudinal study of 
the target population, documenting the interrelation between these two. 
However, the official labour surveys collected by the National Institute of 
Statistics and Censuses (INEC) were not devised to build longitudinal data 
from a representative sample of BDH recipients, nor did the BDH pro-
gramme registries accurately record information on recipients’ occupa-
tions. Consequently, the chapter relies on cohort analysis across recipient 
and non-recipient groups, obtained from official survey data and primary 
survey data collected by the author. Primary data collection was tailored 
towards reaching out to informal workers in the periphery in the southern 
cities of Loja and Machala in Ecuador. The coupling with local research is 
set out to deepen the study of labour dynamics based on elements not 
accounted for in official statistics. At the methodological level, the chapter 
problematises the prevalent use of the household as unit of analysis and 
the consequent de-gendering of employment choices, as recipient 
women’s labour attachment is further constrained by societal and institu-
tional processes determining rights and/or responsibilities within the 
household and in the labour market. A partial understanding of these as-
pects has led to the discrediting of income support for poor women, con-
testing its social desirability on grounds of welfare dependency.  
The findings are organised as follows. First, the chapter presents the 
most recent empirical work on the BDH and employment outcomes, 
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touching upon some theoretical aspects relevant to the study of employ-
ment choices and access to social protection among working-age women. 
It reviews neoclassical labour market theory, which anticipates that trans-
fers may lead beneficiaries to reduce job search efforts as a result of the 
income effect. Since transfers provide some income without requiring (ex-
tra) paid work, it is argued that recipients will be less likely to look for 
employment. Lastly, a closer look at the cases of Loja and Machala sheds 
light on the more specific aspects of segregation among the target popu-
lation associated with the family system. Operationalising Mies’s concept 
of ‘housewifization’ (Mies, 1982), it is found that at a normative level, re-
cipient women are grouped as dependents instead of as citizens with rights 
(Molyneux et al., 2016), adding to the rhetoric of ‘welfare dependency’ 
amongst cash transfer recipients, as discussed by Molyneux (2007). A dis-
cussion of the relational aspects of social protection provisioning and la-
bour market attachment concludes the chapter. The discussion is attentive 
to the more subjective changes that appear to follow participation in the 
BDH programme, as informed by ethnographic work conducted with 
BDH recipients in southern Ecuador. 
7.2 Recent literature on BDH and employment outcomes 
Few studies have dealt with the impact of BDH on labour market out-
comes, as compared with the attention given to studying education- and 
health-related outcomes. For instance, León et al. (2001), in their evalua-
tion of Bono Solidario, find that the programme had a mixed impact on 
work effort. The main negative effect was found in the hours of work: BS 
recipients reduced the number of weekly hours of work. That is to say, 
without this programme, work effort among recipients would have been 
higher—and arguably, earned income would have been higher too. Yet the 
authors find that this effect is discontinuous: for some households, the 
cash transfer does not translate into negative work incentives. The authors 
suggest that this could be due to dissimilarities in the intra-household com-
position and bargaining power differentials. Furthermore, they argue, the 
documented reduction in the number of working hours among recipients 
could deliver some long-term benefits, either resulting in a reduction of 
work effort among women in response to childcare duties, or in a reduc-
tion of child labour accompanied by increased school enrolment.  
A country evaluation of Ecuador’s cash transfer programme by Gon-
zalez-Rozada and Llerena Pinto (2011) adheres to moral hazard arguments 
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widely used in unemployment insurance literature, in which government 
transfers distort otherwise efficient employment choices. Using 
ENEMDU data, they find that the BDH increases recipients’ probability 
of remaining in unemployment or separating from their formal occupa-
tions, especially for the period between 2005 and 2006, with the effect 
fading out for the period between 2007 and 2009. Although they find no 
evidence that BDH transfers increase the probability of finding an infor-
mal job, they suggest they might play a role in financing the job search 
process, given the extended duration in unemployment among recipients. 
It should be noted, though, that unemployment rates are relatively low,1 
and data on the target population, that is, BDH recipients, are rather thin.  
Another study, by Mideros and O’Donoghue (2015), applies a unitary 
discrete choice labour supply model using Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, 
Desempleo y Subempleo Urbano y Rural (ENEMDUR, or Urban and Ru-
ral National Survey on Employment, Unemployment, and Underemploy-
ment) quarterly household data. The authors acknowledge that employ-
ment choices, for example occupation and working hours, are constrained 
among the poor. In their analysis, they find that BDH generates negative 
incentives on paid work. Yet the authors associate this with structural ele-
ments derived from gender inequality and family demands. For instance, 
the authors argue that participation in the BDH programme decreases the 
marginal utility2 of paid work for single adults and female partners, but has 
no effect on household heads’ labour participation. The authors find that 
BDH only generates a negative incentive on paid work among partners, 
albeit contingent on other factors such as dependency ratio, number of 
children under 5 years of age or the presence of old-age pensioners in the 
household. In sum, labour supply of secondary earners, that is, wives, is 
more sensitive to incentives than labour supply of primary earners contin-
gent on family demands. In this context, BDH might serve to finance 
childcare since the distortive effect fades out for women who have access 
to public nurseries (ibid., p. 19).  
From a sociological angle, Montaño and Bárcena Ibarra (as found in 
CEPAL, 2013), using time use survey data from Encuesta de Uso del Tiempo 
by INEC released in 2012, provide evidence of higher inactivity rates 
among BDH recipients. Yet the authors highlight the burden of responsi-
bility that care needs and state policies place on recipient women, finding 
that the amount of time that is spent on unpaid work is higher among cash 
transfer recipients. As of 2010, on average, recipient women with children 
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under 15 years spent 41 hours a week in unpaid work, compared with 33 
hours among non-recipients. This gap prevails even when controlling for 
poverty: non-recipient poor women spend 33 hours a week, on average, 
in unpaid work, compared with 38 hours a week for recipient poor women 
(2013). In a more recent study, Vásconez Rodriguez suggests that, for the 
total working-age population, women in rural areas spend on average 50 
hours a week in unpaid work, while women in urban areas spend 38 hours 
(2013). The burden in hours of unpaid work is particularly heavy when 
children are young and the women are in the early stages of motherhood, 
regardless of their status as BDH recipients.  
7.3 Descriptive analyses of trends in labour attachment 
and occupational segregation 
7.3.1 Overall trends in labour force participation: women’s 
increased employment 
In Ecuador, overall labour force participation rates are higher for men, as 
evidenced in Figure 7.1. In the period between 2001 and 2014, there were, 
on average, 1.7 males for every female employed in the formal sector be-
tween 2001 and 2014, increasing to 1.8 by 2014. The ratio of male to fe-
male workers in the informal sector stayed around 1.5, decreasing to 1.4 
by 2015. 
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Figure 7.1 Male to female ratio* in the formal sector and informal sector 
2001–2015 
Note: Series include standard error bars and min/max lines. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ENEMDU data from the National Centre for Statistics and 
Censuses (INEC) 2001–15. 
 
Similar to the rest of the region, social protection is fragmented in Ecua-
dor: men are overrepresented in traditional modalities, that is, contributory 
social insurance, following their higher proportion in dependent formal 
employment. In the period between 2001 and 2015, there were, on aver-
age, 1.4 males for each female contributing to social insurance, with the 
gender gap slowly decreasing by 2015 (see Figure 7.2). Alternative social 
protection instruments, such as non-contributory social assistance pro-
vided with the BDH, mostly reach women, although there is a slow in-
crease in participation by male recipients from 2009 onwards due to the 
recent emphasis on the old-age pension component geared towards com-
pensating the poor elderly population for the lack of pension funds, next 
to the decline in the maternity component of the BDH aimed at providing 
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funds to poor mothers as per the more traditional CCT design (Vásconez 
Rodriguez, 2014).  
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Figure 7.2 Male to female ratio in access to social protection 
Note: Series include standard error bars and min/max lines. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ENEMDU data from the National Centre for Statistics and 
Censuses (INEC) 2001–15. 
 
With vast informality, most contributory pension programmes are availa-
ble to formal sector workers only. While the pension system makes no 
difference between men and women previously employed in the formal 
sector in equal proportions, due to lower female participation rates in wage 
employment, an important gender gap in access to social protection re-
mains. From its inception in the 1960s, contributory social protection was 
designed based on the breadwinner model and extended to women (and 
children) only when their husbands were in formal employment and they 
were legally married. Yet the notion of a fixed male breadwinner and/or a 
stable nuclear family is less and less common in younger age cohorts: in 
the last decade, the number of divorces increased by 119.1 per cent while 
the number of marriages dropped by 8.9 per cent (2016). By design, this 
scheme had excluded single mothers, informal workers and unmarried 
couples. As patterns of marriage and fertility are distinctly different across 
income groups, it is among the poor that the prevalence of female-headed 
households and cohabitation is higher. Thus, it is at the lower end of the 
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income distribution that the male breadwinner model, the basis of tradi-
tional contributory social protection provisioning, has its most detrimental 
effect on women.3  
According to data from the last census (2010), of a total population of 
14.5 million people in Ecuador, 7.3 million are women. About half of Ec-
uadorian women, 3.6 million, are mothers: 71 per cent live with a partner 
while 29 per cent are single mothers. Nearly half (44 per cent) of mothers 
had their first child in their youth, between 15 and 19 years old. The per-
centage of adolescent mothers has increased in recent decades, behaving 
differently from total fertility, which has fallen consistently in the same 
period. Over the past decade, teenage birth rates have increased from 91 
to 111 per 1,000 females—note that the world’s average is 49 (2016). Re-
ports have associated teenage pregnancy with income poverty, indigenous 
background and poor education (Salinas et al., 2014). Such demographic 
patterns bear consequences in labour attachment, as shown in Figure 7.3. 
There is an important gap in participation in the labour force across all 
cohorts and the broad patterns have remained unchanged in the period 
between 2007 and 2015. Middle-age cohorts, aged 36 to 50 years of age, 
present the higher participation rates among women, whereas younger co-
horts (aged 15 to 25) present lower labour attachment, markedly lower 
than their male counterparts do. It is worth noting that labour attachment 
of the youngest cohort of women (aged 15 to 19) has decreased during 
this period, from 27.5 to 15.5 per cent. 
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Figure 7.3 Participation rates across age cohorts disaggregated by sex 
Note: Participation rates account for employed and unemployed population. Calculations 
exclude full-time students. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ENEMDU data from the National Centre for Statistics and 
Censuses (INEC) 2007–15. 
 
A closer look at fertility indicators and their differences across recipient 
and non-recipient women flags key aspects regarding labour attachment 
constrained by familial needs. Recipient women have, on average, higher 
and earlier fertility (see Table 7.1). They are more likely to be in ‘atypical’ 
family arrangements, for example single mothers or cohabiting. Single 
motherhood complicates their continuous attachment to paid work, with 
no partner providing income support and major obstacles to accessing 
full-time formal employment. If not in a legal partnership, women are 
more likely to remain excluded from contributory social insurance, with 
limited access to pension funds. As such, the problem of gendered differ-
entials in the employment trajectory becomes larger at retirement age (a 
similar argument is explored by Filgueira et al., 2011).  
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Table 7.1 Selected indicators of fertility and family arrangements by BDH 
participation for women(*) (national urban) 
  
Never a  
recipient 
BDH  
recipient 
Mean age of women at first child 21 19 
Women who were mothers by 18 years of age (%) 15 47 
Mean number of children 2 3 
Women managing households on their own with children of 
18 years or younger (%) 7 34 
Women cohabiting with men with children of 18 years or 
younger (%) 
7 16 
Note: *Women aged between 12 and 48 years old (fertile years). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ECV Living Standards Survey data INEC (2013-14). 
 
Due to unreconciled care needs, women usually have broken career paths. 
The expectation is that when children grow up and enter school, the effect 
of childbearing on economic participation and employment will become 
less salient, although it will not disappear. However, recent trends show 
that women have postponed childbearing—among the lowest income 
strata the fertility rates have reduced at a lower rate—adjusting their labour 
market prospects instead. 
7.3.2 Overall trends in occupational segregation 
Together with the responsibility for childrearing, employment segregation 
contributes the most to gender-based inequalities. Table 7.2 shows the 
mean, median and maximum labour income reported by employed work-
ers as of December 2014. Agriculture, forestry and fishing, together with 
activities of household as employer (which includes domestic service), are 
amongst the activities where workers report the lowest mean pay. It 
should be noted that this is reported labour income, that is, what inform-
ants said they earned. For various reasons, such as prestige, tax evasion 
and fear of being excluded from governmental programmes, there is a high 
chance of purposive misreporting, as previously discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Also, recall that these income figures are based on a sample, which is rep-
resentative of national, urban, rural areas and main cities, but not neces-
sarily of all members in the different economic activities. This is an im-
portant cautionary note, since for some activities there is a higher 
likelihood of workers being underrepresented due to their marginalised 
position—domestic workers in activities of households as employers, 
street vendors in wholesale and retail trade; or due to their privileged po-
sition—high-income earners in management, real state or financial activi-
ties. Thus, there is a chance of missing out information on the lower and 
upper ends of the income distribution. Median and maximum reported 
income are also shown in Table 7.2. The median is much more sensitive 
to changes in the distribution, and compared with the mean, provides a 
better basis for comparison, accounting for reported income dispersion.  
Table 7.2 Labour income (current US$) by economic activity in 2014, em-
ployed workers (15 years and older) 
 Reported labour income 
Economic activity mean median max 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 302 240 15,000 
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and  
remediation activities 390 265 2,960 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 447 340 42,161 
Activities of households as employers 316 340 865 
Accommodation and food service activities 396 350 17,300 
Manufacturing 474 380 10,880 
Administrative and support service activities 426 396 6,100 
Construction 449 400 72,300 
Transportation and storage 494 400 10,700 
Information and communication 614 400 8,999 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 513 400 2,960 
Real estate activities 768 470 6,400 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 780 500 5,590 
Human health and social work activities 812 619 6,000 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 725 640 4,180 
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 Reported labour income 
Economic activity mean median max 
Financial and insurance activities 931 671 7,200 
Education 767 699 6,600 
Mining and quarrying 1,107 720 8,450 
Public administration and defence;  
compulsory social security 1,027 900 13,000 
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bod-
ies 1,105 1,130 3,750 
Note: Categories according to the International Standard Industrial Classification of All 
Economic Activities (Rev. 4). 
Source: Author’s calculations using ENEMDU data from the National Centre for Statistics and 
Censuses (INEC) 2016a. 
 
With regard to absorption of employment into the different economic ac-
tivities, Table 7.3 shows the estimated share of employment as of 2014. It 
can be noted that agriculture, forestry and fishing; wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; and manufacturing ab-
sorb most of the employment. This trend has remained stable during Cor-
rea’s administration: as of 2007, agriculture absorbed 28.5 per cent of total 
employment, wholesale and retail trade 19.9 per cent and manufacturing 
10.9 per cent. As expected, most agricultural employment is located in ru-
ral areas, whereas trade and manufacturing absorb urban employment. 
Table 7.3 Share of total employment by economic activity in 2014 (em-
ployed population 15 years and older) 
Economic activity 
Urban Rural Share  
employ-
ment 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 22.5% 77.5% 24.5% 
Mining and quarrying 66.4% 33.6% 0.8% 
Manufacturing 74.3% 25.7% 11.3% 
Electricity, gas, steam and air con-
ditioning supply 
71.9% 28.1% 0.4% 
Water supply, sewerage, waste 
management and remediation activ-
ities 
94.3% 5.7% 0.7% 
Construction 68.6% 31.5% 7.4% 
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Economic activity 
Urban Rural Share  
employ-
ment 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair 
of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
86.5% 13.5% 18.9% 
Transportation and storage 81.4% 18.6% 5.9% 
Accommodation and food ser-
vice activities 
84.1% 15.9% 5.5% 
Information and communication 88.3% 11.7% 1.2% 
Financial and insurance activities 89.2% 10.8% 1.0% 
Real estate activities 87.3% 12.7% 0.2% 
Professional, scientific and tech-
nical activities 
93.9% 6.1% 1.6% 
Administrative and support service 
activities 
85.4% 14.6% 2.7% 
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security 
82.5% 17.5% 4.4% 
Education 83.9% 16.1% 4.5% 
Human health and social work 
activities 
88.3% 11.7% 2.3% 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 80.5% 19.6% 0.6% 
Other services 87.6% 12.4% 3.0% 
Activities of households as employ-
ers 
78.4% 21.6% 3.3% 
Activities of extraterritorial organi-
sations and bodies 
82.4% 17.6% 0.0% 
Note: Categories follow the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities Rev. 4). Rural and urban shares of employment show within row (economic 
activity) percentage. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ENEMDU data from the National Centre for Statistics and 
Censuses (INEC) 2016a.	
 
In terms of employment stratification by ethnic group, Table 7.4 suggests 
a concentration of employment in specific economic activities associated 
to group membership. It should be noted that disaggregating ENEMDU 
survey data into increasingly finer levels of analysis is problematic. Only 
major occupations are reliable, for example agriculture, manufacturing, 
wholesale and retail trade, public administration and so forth, whilst avail-
ability of data identifying ethnic minorities, for example  mestizo, montubio, 
Afro-Ecuadorian and white, is rather scant. Despite the paucity of data, 
the little reliable information available hints at the existence of labour mar-
ket stratification by ethnic group. Indigenous and montubio workers, for 
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instance, are more likely than other groups to be employed in agriculture, 
forestry and fishing. 
Table 7.4 Stratification by ethnic group and economic activity in 2014 
(share of employed population 15 years and older) 
Economic activity Indige-nous 
Afro- 
Ecua-
dorian 
Montu-
bio 
Mes-
tizo White 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 57.40** 21.55** 55.66** 20.43** 20.25 
Mining and quarrying 0.64			 1.37 0.68 	0.75** 	1.74 
Manufacturing 5.51** 9.32* 3.70 12.23** 12.69 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0.06 0.40 0.11 0.36* 	1.07 
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation 
activities 1.11 1.46 0.65 0.63* 0.33 
Construction 9.36** 7.34* 3.29 7.50** 4.50 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motor-
cycles 11.31** 16.99** 14.41** 19.84** 17.68* 
Transportation and storage 3.12* 5.91* 2.83 6.28** 5.54 
Accommodation and food service activities 2.08 7.14 5.29 5.62** 8.63 
Information and communication 0.47 0.74 0.33 1.27** 1.31 
Financial and insurance activities 0.32 0.00 0.18 1.08** 3.30 
Real estate activities 0.11 0.18 0.00 0.24 0.87 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 0.14 1.12 0.22 1.77** 2.29 
Administrative and support service activities 0.82 3.85 1.04 2.91** 0.94 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 2.14* 5.94* 4.24 4.53** 4.08 
Education 2.33* 4.23* 1.81 4.83** 5.67 
Human health and social work activities 0.46 1.81 1.15 2.52** 2.32 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.24 1.05 0.15 0.66* 1.50 
Other services 0.78 3.24 2.83 3.11** 4.19 
Activities of households as employers 1.58 6.31 1.42 3.42** 1.08 
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies 0.00	 0.05	 0.01	 0.01	 0.01	
Note: Categories follow the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic 
Activities (Rev. 4). Within column (ethnic group) percentage. 
Based on the coefficient of variation (CV) discretion should be used when determining whether 
the estimates are appropriate for use, following: (**) reliable with CV under 10% (*) less reliable 
with CV between 11% and 15%. Estimates without asterisk are unreliable with CV greater than 
15%. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ENEMDU data from the National Centre for Statistics and 
Censuses (INEC) 2016a. 
 
Replicating the results by sex and ethnicity, although only for the eco-
nomic activities that reported higher reliability, the share of indigenous 
women employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing reaches 65 per cent, 
whereas the share of montubio women in this sector goes down to 23 per 
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cent (compared with 66 per cent of montubio men). Wholesale and retail 
trade activities, second in importance in terms of total employment ab-
sorption, employ 24 per cent of mestizo women in the labour force—
compared with 16 per cent of mestizo men.  
With regard to status in employment, the share of own-account work-
ers, casual day workers, unpaid workers and domestic workers‚ while 
slowly declining‚ absorbs more than half of the labour force. Sex-based 
differences prevail: the share of casual day workers is higher among men—
one could think of most common casual occupations such as construction 
work or peón—while female employment shows a relatively higher share 
of unpaid work, as noted in Table 7.5. As mentioned elsewhere, non-
standard occupations are often insecure, poorly paid and unprotected.  
Table 7.5 Status in employment as share of total (male and female)  
employment, 2007–2015 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Employee 
Total 38.1** 38.7** 38.7** 40.0** 39.5** 40.1** 40.1** 42.7** 42.9** 
Male 40.3** 40.0** 39.9** 40.0** 40.3** 40.7** 40.7** 45.1** 44.7** 
Female 34.9** 36.8** 36.9** 39.8** 38.1** 39.3** 39.3** 39.1** 40.2** 
Day worker 
Total 12.2** 13.5** 12.4** 12.7** 11.5** 11.7** 11.7** 11.3** 10.9** 
Male 18.2** 20.1** 18.6** 19.2** 16.9** 17.4** 17.4** 17.2** 16.6** 
Female 3.2** 3.6** 3.0** 2.6** 3.1** 3.1** 3.1** 2.5** 2.7** 
Employer 
Total 4.9** 5.0** 4.0** 3.3** 3.4** 3.6** 3.6** 3.1** 3.2** 
Male 6.2** 6.4** 5.1** 4.3** 4.4** 4.6** 4.6** 4.1** 4.2** 
Female 2.9** 2.9** 2.2*  1.9** 1.9** 2.2** 2.2** 1.7** 1.8** 
Own- 
account 
worker 
Total 28.2** 27.7** 29.3** 30.5** 33.9** 32.1** 32.1** 30.3** 30.0** 
Male 26.6** 26.2** 28.5** 30.1** 33.2** 31.5** 31.5** 28.0** 28.3** 
Female 30.5** 30.0** 30.4** 31.2** 35.1** 33.1** 33.1** 33.7** 32.7** 
Unpaid 
worker Total 13.2** 11.5** 12.3** 10.5** 9.4** 9.9** 9.9** 9.4** 10.2** 
Male 8.4** 7.0** 7.5** 6.3** 5.1** 5.6** 5.6** 5.4** 6.1** 
Female 20.5** 18.2** 19.3** 17.0** 16.0** 16.3** 16.3** 15.3** 16.4** 
Domestic 
worker Total 3.4** 3.6** 3.5** 3.1** 2.4** 2.5** 2.5** 3.3** 2.7** 
Male 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2* 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3* 
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Female 8.1** 8.5** 8.2** 7.5** 5.8** 6.0** 6.0** 7.8** 6.3** 
Note: Within column share of total employment (in percentage), by group membership 
(male/female). Unpaid work includes work within and outside the household. 
Based on the coefficient of variation (CV) discretion should be used when determining whether 
the estimates are appropriate for use, following: (**) reliable with CV under 10% (*) less reliable 
with CV between 11% and 15%. Estimates without asterisk are unreliable with CV greater than 
15%. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ENEMDU data from the National Centre for Statistics and 
Censuses (INEC) 2016a. 
 
Table 7.6 presents the share of women employed within each occupational 
category. Service work remains the most frequent occupation among 
women, followed by sales, clerical and related work.  
Table 7.6 Share of female and male employment  
by occupational category, 2014 
 Male Female 
Administrative and managerial workers 64.2** 35.8** 
Professional, technical and related workers 46.3** 53.7** 
Clerical and related workers 58.0** 42.1** 
Office workers 46.1** 53.9** 
Service workers and sales workers 42.0** 58.1** 
Agricultural, animal husbandry and forestry workers 68.4** 31.6** 
Artisans and production related 80.2** 19.8** 
Production process workers (manufacture) 93.0** 7.0** 
Non-classified 56.3** 43.7** 
Members of the armed forces 98.8**           1.2       
Note: Within row share of total employment (in percentage) by occupational category 
Based on the coefficient of variation (CV) discretion should be used when determining whether 
the estimates are appropriate for use, following: (**) reliable with CV under 10% (*) less reliable 
with CV between 11% and 15%. Estimates without asterisk unreliable with CV greater than 15%. 
Source: Author’s calculations using ENEMDU data from the National Centre for Statistics and 
Censuses (INEC) 2016a. 
 
Informality is highly associated with occupational categories. As men-
tioned above, intermittence in employment is associated with informality, 
disproportionally affecting women in fertile years, as highlighted in the 
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cohort analysis presented earlier. Concentrating the attention in one year, 
2014, it can be noted that most women who are employed as agricultural 
workers, artisans, service workers and sales workers operate in the infor-
mal sector (see Table 7.7).4 With regard to informal employment, using as 
a proxy the share of female employment that is not affiliated to any social 
insurance regime such as IESS, ISSFA, ISSPOL or Seguro Campesino, it 
can be noted that, for the occupational categories of service workers and 
sales workers; agricultural, animal husbandry and forestry workers; artisans 
and production process workers; and non-classified, informal employ-
ment is considerably high. For other categories for which there is reliable 
survey data for this level of disaggregation, that is, office workers and pro-
fessional workers, informal employment is relatively low. 
Table 7.7 Share of employment in the informal sector and informal employ-
ment, female workers by occupation, 2014 
 
Informal  
sector 
Informal  
employment 
Administrative and managerial workers 
               
0.0                4.2 
Professional, technical and related workers 
               
1.3 
                
5.5* 
Clerical and related workers 
               
4.6 
             
10.7 
Office workers 4.5** 19.2** 
Service workers and sales workers 46.0** 70.4** 
Agricultural, animal husbandry and forestry workers 78.8** 69.8** 
Artisans and production related 52.5** 74.0** 
Manufacturing workers  
               
21.2 40.2** 
Non-classified 49.2** 67.1** 
Members of the armed forces              0.0 
                 
0.0 
Note: First column indicates the share of total female employment (in percentage) employed 
in the informal sector (aggregate of informal firms). Second column indicates the share of total 
female employment in informal employment (with no access to public/private social 
insurance).  
Based on the coefficient of variation (CV) discretion should be used when determining whether 
the estimates are appropriate for use, following: (**) reliable with CV under 10% (*) less reliable 
with CV between 11% and 15%. Estimates without asterisk are not statistically significant with 
a CV larger than 15%.  
Source: Author’s calculations using ENEMDU data from the National Centre for Statistics and 
Censuses (INEC) 2007–15. 
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Extensive informality in employment makes the care-related social protec-
tion policies stated in legal documents and regulations almost trivial. The 
vast majority of the female labour force has no access to childcare and a 
very low percentage is entitled to maternity leave‚ minimal measures for 
reconciling paid work and care. Instead, the informal sector seems to offer 
many women an alternative to fixed employment, if any. This is especially 
true for women at the bottom part of the wage distribution, who cannot 
afford childcare but nevertheless have to provide for their household. In-
formal work is the norm among BDH recipients. Of the total active pop-
ulation enrolled in the BDH programme in 2015, 75 per cent were em-
ployed in the informal sector, and only 7.5 per cent in the formal sector 
(author’s calculations based on ENEMDU data). The remainder is divided 
between unclassified workers (10 per cent), domestic workers (5 per cent) 
and unemployed (3 per cent). It follows that employment in the informal 
sector drives the pattern of general employment among BDH recipients.  
For recipient mothers, a combination of high fertility, differentiated 
access to childcare and occupational sex segregation leads to differences 
in labour market attachment. Families react to the challenges of balancing 
motherhood and labour market participation in a stratified way. Care 
needs are interpreted through fragmented schemes: poor families usually 
rely on the extended family or cohabiting in search of support for care 
provision, while affluent families are more likely to accommodate paid 
care or regulate this by having fewer children, as suggested by demo-
graphic data. Thus, informality is more severe among poor women, who, 
due to a lack of care support, tend to leave the labour market earlier than 
the rest of the female population—if there is another provider in the 
household—or opt for flexible occupations. As shown in Table 7.8, recip-
ient women, who are at the lower end of the income distribution, are em-
ployed in a reduced number of fields and in predominantly informal ar-
rangements, either in terms of employment in the informal sector as 
uninsured work or informal employment. These are critical nodes of un-
insured work, in the margins of regulation and substantive protection, of-
ten operating under precarious conditions. A note of caution is needed, 
however, as ENEMDU data on BDH recipients are thin, for which reason 
the analysis is later complemented with a self-collected survey in southern 
Ecuador.  
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Table 7.8 Share of employment in the informal sector and informal employ-
ment for BDH female recipients (by occupational category in 2014) 
 
Informal  
sector	
Informal  
employment	
Professional, technical and related workers 
                  
0.0 
                  
0.0 
Clerical and related workers 
                
42.5 
                 
55.6 
Office workers 
               
72.6 
                 
66.8 
Service workers and sales workers 73.8** 
                  
82.9 
Agricultural, animal husbandry and forestry workers 91.7** 78.4** 
Artisans and production related 80.2** 
                
85.4 
Manufacturing workers  
                 
85.2* 
                
97.2 
Non-classified 77.0** 
                   
79.3** 
Note: First column indicates the share of total female employment (in percentage) employed 
in the informal sector (aggregate of informal firms). Second column indicates the share of total 
female employment in informal employment (with no access to public/private social 
insurance).  
Based on the coefficient of variation (CV) discretion should be used when determining whether 
the estimates are appropriate for use, following: (**) reliable with CV under 10% (*) less reliable 
with CV between 11% and 15%. Estimates without asterisk are not statistically significant with 
a CV larger than 15%.  
Source: Author’s calculations using ENEMDU data from the National Centre for Statistics and 
Censuses (INEC) 2007–15. 
7.4 Sex occupational segregation in Ecuador 
Sex occupational segregation characterises the functioning of the labour 
market in Ecuador, even controlling for education.5 Figure 7.4 shows 
trends in occupational sex segregation from 2007 to 2015 for the total 
workforce. The dissimilarity index D is used as a proxy to capture sex 
segregation by occupation,6 showing the percentage of both men and 
women who would have to change occupations to make the gender dis-
tribution equal (as used in England, 2010). The scale shows 100 for com-
plete segregation and 0 for complete integration. Calculations suggest that 
the D index has remained unchanged. Controlling by education, occupa-
tional sex segregation is even higher and has intensified. In recent cohorts, 
a higher proportion of women have accessed formal education, closing 
the gender gap in terms of schooling years (INEC, 2016c) but not in terms 
of access to employment.  
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Figure 7.4 Sex segregation of occupations (male and female economically 
active population) 
Source: Author’s calculations using ENEMDU data from the National Centre for Statistics and 
Censuses (INEC) 2007–15. 
 
Yet recipient women tend to have lower educational credentials. As 
bluntly put by an interviewee when asked what she would do if given the 
chance to change her occupation: ‘Life is hard […] you’ve got to get used 
to it […] it doesn’t matter: I’ll do the same, I’m not like you, I don’t have 
a cartón [cardboard slang for degree].’ Recipients are most likely to be cho-
sen for unskilled jobs and receive lower remuneration. Domestic work is 
a common destination.7 This is a gendered field that fits with the historical 
role of women as carers: 95 per cent of domestic workers are women (au-
thor’s own calculations based on ENEMDU data, INEC). Caring is work 
that women are thought to do for free anyway, so it is left to the most 
desperate women to pick up the slack of domestic work. Legally, domestic 
work has not been accorded the same rights as other occupations. Inferior 
standards are often applied. For example, the occupational minimum wage 
for domestic workers remained lower than the national statutory wage un-
til recently (2012), with regard to statutory minimum wages and expansion 
of contributory social security. A constitutional reform following a refer-
endum in Ecuador conducted in 2010 and in observance of the ILO’s 
conventions determined that domestic workers should earn a living wage 
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and have better working conditions. After a higher minimum wage was set 
in 2010—matching the official statutory minimum—and offering long 
overdue social protection to domestic workers, consumers of domestic 
work—mostly middle-income households—adjusted their demand for 
domestic work, or simply did not comply with regulations, as discussed 
for the informal sector in general by Canelas (2014). This resulted in a 
contraction of the demand for domestic workers, with urban employment 
rates falling by about 3 percentage points in domestic work employment, 
from 11 per cent in 2009 (year before reform) to 8 per cent in 2015, or 
moving towards part-time arrangements, with the share of part-time fe-
male domestic workers increasing from 28 per cent in 2009 to 38 per cent 
in 2015, as a share of total domestic work (author’s calculations based on 
ENEMDU data).  
For the subset of cash transfer recipients, such changes seemed even 
less effective, as discussed in interviews (2013). One plausible reason is the 
wage compensation introduced by BDH transfers and misunderstandings 
around its interaction with contributory social protection—subject to mis-
use by employers. In the era of CCTs, the role of women as care providers 
is stronger than ever, further deprecating domestic work, an occupation 
that, as noted earlier, already takes place in the margins of regulation. As 
of December 2015, 90 per cent of female recipient workers who reported 
receiving BDH transfers earned less than the statutory minimum, com-
pared with 56 per cent in the case of domestic workers who did not receive 
BDH transfers (author’s calculations using ENEMDU data, INEC, 2007–
15). This gap has consistently increased. While in 2011, 72 per cent of 
female recipient domestic workers earned below the statutory minimum, 
compared with 63 per cent of the comparable non-recipient population, 
in 2007, 53 per cent of female recipient domestic workers earned below 
the minimum, compared with 40 per cent of non-recipient domestic work-
ers. As noted above, in 2007 the statutory minimum wage for domestic 
workers was still lower than the statutory minimum wage for any other 
occupation—that is, US$120 for domestic work, while the official mini-
mum wage was set at US$170 (author’s calculations based on ENEMDU 
data). Although differences in wages are usually explained by productivity 
differentials, in the case of domestic work this argument does not suffice 
to explain the difference in remuneration between non-recipient and re-
cipient domestic workers.  
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7.5 A closer look at the case studies: Loja and Machala in 
southern Ecuador 
There were some striking differences between cities in terms of employ-
ment status. Whereas in Loja, the majority of women reported working in 
the reference month (78 per cent), in Machala the share of currently em-
ployed women was substantially less (42 per cent). What is more, around 
80 per cent of the female respondents in both cities who were not em-
ployed were also not looking for a job. When asked about the reasons they 
for not looking for a job, the majority responded it was due to family re-
sponsibilities. It is worth noting that the wording of the question followed 
the INEC official questionnaire and explicitly asked: ‘does your family 
and/or husband not allow you to work?’ Again, the BDH could play a role 
in allowing women to switch to inactivity, in what could be similar to ma-
ternity leave, though at the cost of reinforcing intra-household disparities, 
as captured in the following quote: 
When I got pregnant, my husband asked me to stop working and stay at 
home … I did not plan to get pregnant, I was using contraceptives but 
something went wrong … during my pregnancy, I stopped working. We 
were living from my husband’s earnings only. A couple of days before birth, 
we had not enough money. My husband was jobless. And you know, even 
if you go to the public hospital you will have to cover some expenses. Over 
the weekend, I went to withdraw my BDH money. I was in labour pain 
while queuing. By the next morning, I was giving birth to my child. That 
money saved me! We bought baby clothes and medicines. My husband? It 
took him two weeks to get a job. (INEC, 2015) 
Indeed, non-contributory social protection provides some income sup-
port to an otherwise invisible, unprotected and marginalised segment of 
the labour force. It is a means to accessing state-provided benefits for low-
income informal workers, in particular for middle-aged women with chil-
dren. Income support plays a key role in helping mothers to provide care. 
However, the transfer alone cannot guarantee economic autonomy and 
security, both in terms of size of the transfer and duration in the pro-
gramme.  
Table 7.9 helps signal the main differences in terms of access to social 
protection. This exercise does not imply any causation. That is to say, it is 
not argued that differences are due to BDH only. Besides, generalisations 
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to the country level are not possible as the data represents the unique sit-
uation encountered among respondents in Loja and Machala. Yet, for il-
lustrative purposes and calling for deeper analysis, see below some com-
mon features found among current BDH recipients, non-recipients and 
graduated recipients (as a proportion of non-recipients).  
Table 7.9 Employment and BDH transfers: recipient, non-recipient and grad-
uated population 
Source: Fieldwork 2013. 
 
Most of the people who were not working in the reference week indicated 
that the last time they performed paid work was more than a year ago, 
showing no difference between BDH recipients and non-BDH recipients. 
Among those who reported looking for a job, 80 per cent indicated no 
preference for working as a dependent worker or an own-account worker. 
There is a minor difference between BDH recipients and non-BDH re-
cipients, where the former were more likely to be looking for a job as an 
own-account worker (12.5 per cent). Among those that were neither work-
ing nor looking for a job during the reference week, that is, those that were 
inactive, the main reason given for not looking for a job was family duties 
(34.8 per cent), followed by sickness and/or disability (32.9 per cent).   
In the survey, it was also asked about the employment situation once 
‘graduated’ from the cash transfer programme (see Table 7.10). More than 
 
Recipient Non-recipient Graduated 
Total respondents 283 399 219 
Average age 43 39 43 
Number of household members 5 4 5 
% female respondents 89.75% 88.69% 90.52% 
% male respondents 10.25% 11.31% 9.48% 
% respondents who worked in the 
reference week 
48.20% 36.22% 58.18% 
% respondents with more than one 
occupation 
2.88% 2.40% 2.93% 
% respondents who worked less 
than 40 hrs/week 
55.48% 49.80% 51.25% 
% respondents with no access to 
social security 
90.63% 86.06% 88.84% 
% own account workers 53.67% 52.58% 54.74% 
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half of respondents indicated that they had to work more hours after ex-
iting the programme.  
Table 7.10 Change in employment conditions once graduated from BDH pro-
gramme 
Graduated population Proportion 
% respondents who indicated had to work more 
hours (after exiting) 
57.69% 
% respondents who were not informed on ‘gradu-
ation’ 
57.62% 
Main reason provided: ‘others need it the most’ 61.54% 
Source: Fieldwork 2013. 
 
The process of ‘graduation’, an issue that tends to be overlooked in studies 
on the BDH in Ecuador, can offer an interesting counter-narrative on the 
impact of limited targeted modes of social protection on employment de-
cisions. As mentioned elsewhere, it is known that the administration in-
tends to downsize the programme, particularly by reducing the number of 
mothers with dependent children, and favouring the elderly and disabled. 
The problem of continuity in social assistance is a fundamental obstacle. 
The BDH programme was designed as a transitory programme, but after 
15 years it is still operating. However, recipients themselves acknowledge 
its transient nature. Consider that out of 1.9 million recipients, about 
250,000 exited the programme in 2013 and a similar number of recipients 
were graduated in 2014.8 Furthermore, there is no transparency about the 
graduation mechanisms. Aside from a few cases in which people were in-
formed that it was the result of cross-checking data with governmental 
agencies in order to exclude functionaries who were accessing the pro-
gramme, the great majority of graduated recipients did not know why they 
had exited the programme. The only explanation they received was in the 
form of a text message on their mobile phones indicating: ‘You do not 
need it; other people need it most.’9 There is no public scrutiny on which 
graduation is based. In the case of the most persistent former recipients 
who approached public officials, they were confronted with an explana-
tion of a highly technocratic process through with graduation is advanced, 
only to reinforce knowledge barriers between the state and recipients. As 
explained by a former recipient:  
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One day I went to withdraw my BDH money and I was notified that I was 
out of the programme. As soon as I could, I went to MIES. I asked them 
to go and see where I live […] I was told that the people who can get the 
bono are those below 33 points, and I have 37 points. Those above 33 points 
cannot get it anymore. Well, in the past, we used to. So, I went to MIES and 
I ask them again, por qué me sacaron [why did they take me out] if I have four 
children and my house is falling to pieces? I need the bono. And they told me 
to wait for the new surveys […] I stopped going to MIES. I have asked 
around whether they have already started with the surveys, but nothing […] 
I heard someone saying they will start surveying in August. (Canelas, 2014) 
I further inquired whether something had improved in her household 
situation, to which she answered:  
No, nothing improved. I don’t know what they took the BDH away. Same 
things I had in the past, I have now. This is why I went to MIES and ask 
them. See, when I started with the BDH I had two children. Now I have 
four. My situation has not improved, it has worsened. Two of them are at 
school, and the younger two are always with me. (ibid.) 
7.5.1 Women, life phase and employment 
Survey data collected in Loja and Machala suggest sex- and age-specific 
employment patterns among BDH recipients. In Loja, 78.1 per cent of 
female respondents were performing paid work at the time of the survey, 
with higher employment rates for the first and third age cohort, that is, 
women aged 19 and younger, and those aged between 46 and 65 years, as 
evidenced in Figure 7.5. In Machala, where employment rates are lower, 
44.5 per cent, marital status is significantly associated with higher inactivity 
rates, especially for the second cohort, aged 20 to 35 years old.  
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Figure 7.5 Employment status by age cohort for female household head or 
spouses (female respondents only) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on fieldwork data, 2013. 
 
Previous studies had found that participation in paid work among BDH 
recipients is conditional on the presence of a partner, that is, labour at-
tachment is more likely in mono-parental households or, alternatively, 
there is an incentive to remain in inactivity in bi-parental households. Mar-
ital status determines care needs as much as the number of dependent 
children in the household (Interviewee-G, 2013). Yet interviews indicated 
that not only do familial arrangements vary across Loja and Machala, but 
these are also undergoing continuous change.10 
When comparing data on employment and participation in the BDH 
programme, Loja presents higher participation rates among recipients in 
the age group from 46 to 65 years old (see Figure 7.6), with 84 per cent 
employed and nearly 2 per cent actively seeking employment at the time 
of the survey. In this age group, most of the employed respondents were 
either former BDH recipients, graduated or Crédito de Desarrollo Hu-
mano (CDH or Human Development Credit) recipients.11 As expected, 
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inactivity increased after retirement age (after 65 years of age), but this 
does not necessarily imply exiting the labour force, as survey data for Loja 
suggests. With regard to employment outcomes and social protection in 
Machala, age-specific patterns are less clear except among respondents at 
retirement age, where inactivity rates are higher. Instead, inactivity rates, 
as seen in Figure 7.6, seem to be associated with marital status regardless 
of participation in the BDH programme.  
 
Figure 7.6 Employment status by age cohort, conditional on participation in 
the BDH programme 
Source: Author’s calculations based on fieldwork data, 2013. 
 
Note that in Machala there is an important share of home-based workers, 
who do not always report their work as paid work in official surveys.12 
Door-to-door sales, in-house helpers (homemakers and hand-launderers) 
and dressmakers account for 50.4 per cent of the total employment among 
female respondents. These occupations are more common among single 
mothers.13 
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In Loja, all the respondents 19 years old and younger were employed 
at the time of the survey, mostly as street vendors. There were no students 
in the sample, confirming that the vast majority of young female informal 
workers had deserted school and supporting the low-qualification argu-
ment explored before. In the group aged 20 to 35 years old, respondents 
were less likely to be employed. Of those BDH recipients who were em-
ployed at the time of the survey, 48.9 per cent were working as street ven-
dors, 17 per cent worked as hand-launderers and the remainder were in 
other service-related occupations. For the group of respondents aged be-
tween 36 and 64 years old, the share of graduated recipients was higher. 
Most of the graduated recipients were employed at the time of the survey 
in street vending (63.3 per cent), retail trade (8.3 per cent) and service-
related occupations, including food preparation (11.7 per cent), hand-laun-
dering (3.3 per cent) and domestic work (3.3 per cent). In this age group, 
single mothers presented higher employment rates regardless of their par-
ticipation in the BDH programme, with street vending being the most fre-
quent occupation. Lastly, among the elderly, overall inactivity rates were 
higher than in other age groups, although a significant number of respond-
ents were employed—mostly single women. 
As a means of mapping the different familial, social and working 
spaces, MCA analysis was implemented for both cities. As a relational 
technique, it assists in exploring the associations between sets of categor-
ical variables such as access to BDH transfers, age cohort and employment 
status by displaying these associations graphically. The analysis was imple-
mented only for female respondents who at the time of the survey were 
neither full-time students nor had a permanent disability. Figure 7.7 pre-
sents the results of MCA, a variation of principal component analysis, for 
Loja. By analogy with principal component analysis, MCA projects a set 
of points representing all categories of the variables into a subspace that 
has as few dimensions as possible, the dimensions being new factors (fac-
torial axes) which are mutually orthogonal. The first dimension highlights 
the position between former recipients, current recipients and never re-
cipients, and between inactive, unemployed and respondents performing 
paid work. In the interaction of these categorical variables and supplemen-
tary variables—marital status, age cohort and educational level—three 
profiles can be identified: (1) recipients who are either spouses with de-
pendent children or elderly women, who are provided with some compen-
sation from the maternity component or the pension component of BDH, 
218 CHAPTER 7 
 
respectively; (2) graduated BDH recipients, who are more likely to be in 
paid work—older spouses (above 46 years old) without dependent chil-
dren are often found in this group; and (3) never recipients—following 
BDH inclusion criteria, childless women or underage mothers do not qual-
ify for BDH transfers. This last group, however, presents the higher edu-
cational level, since younger cohorts have had better access to education.  
 
Figure 7.7 Multiple Component Analysis (MCA) (Loja) 
Note: The figures display the rows and columns of cross-tabulated data. The coordinates of 
each category illustrate the proportion of the variance of the axis due to that point category. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on fieldwork data, 2013. 
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Figure 7.8 presents MCA results for Machala. In this city, inactivity was 
more common among BDH recipients. Yet there is another layer in the 
analysis of inactivity: marital status. Inactive recipient women were mostly 
spouses, with dependent children or otherwise. Those who had never 
been recipients were more likely to be in paid work. It is worth noting that 
in this city, home-based work, for example door-to-door sales, outweighs 
other occupations available to single mothers of younger age (between 20 
and 35), arguably due to the impossibility of leaving children alone.  
 
Figure 7.8 Multiple Component Analysis (MCA) (Machala) 
Note: The figures display the rows and columns of cross-tabulated data. The coordinates of 
each category illustrate the proportion of the variance of the axis due to that point category. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on fieldwork data, 2013. 
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7.5.2 Occupational segregation 
Across these cities, field research helps identify the two most frequent oc-
cupations among recipient and former recipient women: domestic work 
and street vending. Domestic work, as repeatedly mentioned in interviews, 
is the most common destination for rural to urban migrant women—es-
pecially if single. A key element of urban employment is access to accom-
modation for incomers. In both cities, Loja and Machala, there were a 
significant number of women who had migrated from rural areas and were 
engaged in domestic work. Most women who migrate to the city try to 
find a job as a live-in domestic, as a means to guarantee shelter. The job 
search period requires enduring dangerous and demeaning working and 
living conditions in the city. Fewer and fewer households are willing to 
employ such women full time. Urban families can no longer afford a live-
in helper. Domestic workers’ backgrounds further affect their position in 
the hiring process, devaluing their work, as migrant women are seen as 
meriting less pay. The author had the opportunity to witness a ‘job inter-
view’ of two young teenagers for roles as domestic workers in Loja (2014), 
during which they were reminded of their rural background (del campo) and 
how the woman (Interviewee-E, 2013) who would employ them would 
have to invest time in teaching them some ‘city manners’ (como lo hacemos 
en la ciudad). Such behaviour is deeply rooted in cultural and institutional 
mechanisms operating on a broader scale. Domestic work is segregated to 
poorly educated women from rural areas and with an indigenous back-
ground. Note that according to the last consulted ENEMDU data (INEC, 
2015), about 55 per cent of female domestic workers working in urban 
centres are internal migrants and, to a lesser extent, cross-border mi-
grants.14 Most migrant domestic workers (47 per cent) departed to follow 
their families, while nearly 40 per cent migrated to search for a job. Over 
85 per cent of migrant domestic workers are women of indigenous or eth-
nic minorities, exacerbating marginalisation and pushing wages down. Hir-
ing families tend to keep domestic work wages low, arguing they already 
provide food and shelter—valuable extras for migrant workers. The role 
of private recruiters and employment agencies in the sector in managing 
part-time placements among richer households further contributes to this 
trend.  
However, full-time and live-in domestic work is not an option for most 
single mothers with young children who have no access to formal or in-
formal care networks. Many women mentioned in interviews that they are 
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discriminated against at the hiring stage for domestic work if they mention 
that they have underage children. Lacking care options, many opt for flex-
ible jobs. In addition, women who have to take ‘breaks’ for childrearing 
are likely to choose jobs such as street vending that have a lower drop in 
wages when they return from home time. The activity offers mothers flex-
ible hours, although their income depends on daily sales—making this a 
very volatile source of income. Street vending also presents lower barriers 
to entry, facilitating the return to work after and/or during childrearing. 
Many women find a substitute for day care in the public space, taking their 
children with them during the working day—something not allowed in 
other occupations such as domestic work.  
 
 
Illustration 7.1 Street vendors in Loja (stadium area) (2013) 
 
A large number of home-based workers were also found during home vis-
its to BDH recipient households, most of them women with young chil-
dren. They produced goods within their own homes: preparing food, 
stitching garments, selling goods (cosmetics) or providing services (laun-
dry, hair cutting and beautician services), among other activities (field re-
search, 2013). Together with street vendors, waste pickers and domestic 
workers, home-based workers were one of the top preferred occupations 
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reported by BDH recipients. Some women highlighted the value of home-
based work, which provided them the opportunity to combine paid and 
unpaid work in a flexible schedule. However, home-based work pay is ra-
ther low and was often described as unreliable. In addition, workers ab-
sorb all production risks, directly affected by housing policies, transporta-
tion and relocation programmes. 
 
 
Illustration 7.2 Street vendor in Loja, city centre (2013) 
 
Through these examples, the field research in the cities of Loja and 
Machala helped identify processes of housewifisation, as coined by Mies 
(2012)—a normative category defining women in poverty as de facto 
housewives, dependent on the income of a husband or state support via 
cash transfers. This view contrasts with the stated objectives of CCTs, 
framed as empowering tools: by giving women more direct control over 
resources, dependency (from their partners) should reduce. The question 
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of dependency comes to the fore. In employment aggregates, women ap-
pear as inactive more often than their male counterparts. In more disaggre-
gated employment analysis of informal occupations, however, women ap-
pear closely connected to the labour market but in arrangements and 
spaces that cannot be neatly separated from the domestic sphere. These 
processes are better illustrated in the cases found across the most typical 
profiles of BDH recipients: (1) the ‘inactive’ dependent housewife (most 
frequent in Machala); (2) the domestic worker (most frequent in Loja; and 
(3) the home-based worker (most frequent in Machala).  
Policy documents and reports address BDH recipients as mothers, 
amas de casa or homeworkers, contributing to this categorisation. This is 
particularly the case in rural settings, where indigenous women’s work, 
since the first enumeration efforts in the 1950s, has been poorly recorded 
and labelled as inactivity (Vásconez Rodriguez, 2014). Some women might 
appear as non-working housewives in statistics although they perform 
sporadic paid work, just not with the frequency that would be recorded as 
unemployment—actively seeking a job. Others are simply not working for 
remuneration at all, but they are still performing vital care work and man-
aging the household. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily result in de-
pendence on their husbands’ income. There are alternatives to resource-
based decision-making. Headship of a household can be shared among 
partners. In fact, this was the ‘original’ household arrangement amongst 
indigenous families in the Highlands, as documented by Prieto (2004). The 
structure and fielding of censuses is biased towards a standard idea of a 
household: male breadwinner, spouse and children. Only when there is no 
husband due to a variety of reasons, for example single motherhood, di-
vorce and so on, would the enumerator register the woman as head of 
household. Taking this into consideration, the assumption of lesser con-
trol over funds or decision-making among impoverished women might be 
misplaced. This is not to say that there is no marginalisation of women 
within the household, but that the complexity of household relations can-
not be reduced to a one-directional relation of dependency.  
Returning to the previous example of domestic workers, it seems the 
normative use of amas de casa hinders workers’ chances to claim better em-
ployment conditions. Even if the provision of care and income support 
are core ideas of the BDH, the programme can play a critical role in sub-
sidising irregular and poorly paid employment among recipient women. In 
the case of domestic workers, this is often for the benefit of employers, 
224 CHAPTER 7 
 
that is, households, who are free from the social pressures from below, 
although they make it possible for the women who employ them to work. 
It was often mentioned in interviews that domestic workers had been told 
by employers that affiliating them to social security would threaten their 
permanence in the BDH programme. Others admitted that the pay was 
rather low, but since the BDH secured them some basics such as groceries 
and uniforms, they would accept the employment conditions at a lower 
rate. A similar dynamic was found amongst home-based workers in 
Machala, who would take sporadic jobs, such as door-to-door sales or sea-
sonal food preparation, and even use the BDH to finance their economic 
activities, and return to idleness when buyers bailed out or the season 
ended, without adding pressure to their providers to be compensated ac-
cordingly. Thus the BDH, although residual in terms of income support, 
is enough to divert the state’s attention from a more comprehensive 
agenda towards employment regulation, social provisioning and support-
ing care.  
In sum, criticisms of non-contributory social protection rely on an un-
derstanding of poor women as dependent spouses, an erroneous assump-
tion in the light of the evidence provided here. This is further supported 
by Mies’s insights which, although they emerged from research conducted 
nearly four decades ago in South Asia, can be applied to the Ecuadorian 
case. She noticed that another erroneous assumption when discussing the 
(low) participation of women in the labour market is that economic devel-
opment increases labour productivity to such an extent that the care costs 
are covered by the male wage. This situation, in the light of the demo-
graphic trends and the motivational and practical complexity of house-
holds discussed earlier, does not fit the reality of most recipient women. 
Second, she noticed that women’s care work is often depicted as non-work 
and hence open to unrestricted control and utilisation (ibid.). As illustrated 
by the examples of domestic work and home-based work, women’s work 
is depreciated partly due to the compensation obtained via BDH transfers. 
The analysis of Loja and Machala confirms that many recipient women 
perform economic activities in the margins of the productive sector, un-
reachable by public instruments of registration, regulation and protection. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a basis for understanding how and why some 
modalities of social protection are associated with informality and occu-
pational segregation. Cash transfer programmes, as originally conceived, 
do not aim to correct labour segregation, and very few of them focus on 
labour attachment at all. In practice, nonetheless, they might have an im-
pact on employment outcomes. This has led to growing pressure to study 
and integrate an employment component into these schemes, as some aim 
at incentivising and/or sanctioning workers’ choices, as per the disincen-
tive or moral hazard argument presented elsewhere. The perversity rheto-
ric has led to an impulse to further tighten the targeting at, and reduce the 
number of, working-age recipient women. Recent literature, abstracted 
from broader demographic and institutional processes that drive poverty 
and exclusion among women, has contributed to this retrenchment in 
non-contributory social protection. Nevertheless, social assistance seems 
to provide income support to an otherwise less visible, unprotected and 
marginalised segment of the labour force. Although a monthly stipend 
cannot on its own guarantee economic autonomy and security, it is a 
means for accessing state-provided benefits for low-income informal 
workers, in particular for working-age women with dependent children.  
Nonetheless, it should be stressed that sex occupational segregation not 
only concerns recipient women. The vast majority of the female labour 
force has no access to childcare facilities and a very low percentage are 
entitled to maternity leave, although both measures are key in reconciling 
paid work and care. The high levels of informality of the labour market in 
Ecuador have made the care-related social protection policies stated on 
the statute law almost irrelevant. Even within the formal sector, extensive 
non-compliance and weak enforcement attenuate the effect of recent 
measures. Thus it is worth asking to what degree BDH has substituted for 
the policy areas that could be deemed more significant for the social and 
economic integration of recipient mothers. As discussed in this chapter, 
there is uneven progress across policy goals regarding women’s education, 
social protection and participation in the labour market in Ecuador. The 
part of the transformation aimed at increasing human capital that called 
for girls to have equal access to education has been successful. However, 
the part that called for women to have equal access to jobs and to chal-
lenge the devaluation of care work has made little progress. The result is 
persistently low rewards for recipient women who, either by choice or 
226 CHAPTER 7 
 
constrained by institutional forces, have remained focused on mothering 
and/or locked in traditionally ‘womanly’ occupations, regardless of their 
participation in the BDH programme.  
The emphasis on targeted modalities of social protection has played a 
marginal role in the struggle against sex occupational segregation, a struc-
tural configuration of the labour market, with limited transformative im-
pact on female working-age recipients. Broader labour market structures 
work against recipient women, where a disproportionate number of single 
mothers are compelled to perform any work available, increasing the inci-
dence of precarious paid employment and unpaid care among recipients. 
This process has not only led to further polarisation of men and women, 
given the naturalisation of care services, but has maintained inequalities 
between recipient and non-recipient women rather than assisting in the 
integration of recipients into full formal employment. Social protection 
design can benefit from closer attention to the constraints that targeting 
the family system and other institutional arrangements places on both em-
ployment choices and access to social protection among women. Thus, 
policies aimed at decreasing structural disparities will have a greater impact 
on poverty if they acknowledge these structural disparities at the intersec-
tion of gender with age, ethnicity and background. Claims for a truly trans-
formative social agenda prevail, as the design of social protection systems 
meets with growing concerns from diverse social groups. 
 
Notes 
1 Unemployment rates in most Latin American countries are lower than in north-
ern welfare states, arguably poorly capturing labour market distress. In accordance 
with International Labour Organization (ILO) definitions, unemployment rates 
consider individuals actively seeking a job. Yet, in an informalised context, job 
search and labour absorption behave differently. In this context, unemployment 
analysis, as per the perverse rhetoric, is quite limited due to: thin data on BDH 
recipients in unemployment, the risk of labelling discouraged workers as inactive, 
underestimating unemployment and, more importantly, the exclusion of unpaid 
work, mainly performed by women, of crucial relevance in the study of BDH. 
2 The authors base their model on a household utility function dependent on the 
couple’s time allocation and household income. 
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3 With the enactment of a new Law on Social Justice, the government has priori-
tised the affiliation to social security for housewives, prioritising BDH recipient 
mothers. According to the Social Cabinet, 234,419 from a total of 444,562 BDH 
recipients are eligible to be integrated to contributory social security (Ministerio de 
Inclusión Económica y Social, 2016).  
4 Following INEC’s latest definition of informal sector, as the aggregate of firms 
that lack of registration (RUC or RISE certificate). 
5 Certainly, there is a link between qualification and the type of work people per-
form, regardless of their sex. In Ecuador, 70.7 per cent of workers who have not 
completed primary school and 50.5 per cent who have not completed secondary 
school are in inadequate employment—a category that describes situations in 
which individuals reported wanting to change their current work situation since it 
negatively affects their wellbeing (England, 2005). 
6  D index estimations using Stata®, DUNCAN module to compute the Duncan 
and Duncan segregation statistic. D was obtained for all pairwise combinations of 
groups e.g. occupations. If N(Mi) is the frequency of category i for men (e.g. the 
frequency of male domestic workers) and N(Fi) is the frequency of category i for 
women (e.g. the frequency of female domestic workers), then, the dissimilarity in-
dex D is defined as 
 
        D = 0.5 * sum | N(Mi)/N(M) - N(Fi)/N(F) |      i = 1,...,I 
 
where N(M) and N(F) are the overall group sizes. D may be interpreted as the 
proportion of males that would have to change category in order to get the same 
relative distribution as in the group of females, or vice versa. Adapted from 
StataCorp.  
7 Domestic work accounts for 2.68 per cent of the labour force nationally, which 
means that approximately 200,000 women participate in this activity. 
8 Key informant interview, Social Cabinet–Ecuador (Fieldwork 2014). 
9 As shared by various respondents who had exited the programme (Fieldwork 
2013). 
10 Divorce rates have doubled in Machala, from 0.729 in 1997 to 1.55 per thousand 
in 2014 (author’s calculations based on official registries, INEC 2016b). Divorce 
rates in Loja are lower (1.2 per thousand) than in El Oro (1.9 per thousand). In 
Machala, marriage rates are lower: 21 per cent, compared with 46 per cent in Loja; 
but higher in the case of mothers in informal unions, i.e. cohabiting, especially 
among the youngest, with 50.5 per cent of teenage mothers in Loja reporting to be 
married, whereas in Machala the share drops to 23 per cent (author’s calculations 
based on ECV data, INEC, 2013-14).  
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11 CDH provides BDH beneficiaries with the option of an annual loan of up to 
US$600 for micro-enterprises start-up, or up to US$350 to support existing pro-
ductive activities. 
12 It was found that 51 respondents concealed their employment status from the 
government, indicating they had no job at the moment and had not looked for one 
(Field research 2013).  
13 Note that in Coast, where Machala is located, the incidence of extramarital chil-
drearing is higher. 
14 In Loja, the share of migrant women in domestic work reaches 77 per cent, 
compared with 64 per cent in Machala. 
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8 Falling through the Cracks: Recasting Narratives of Dependence 
 
 
8.1. Introduction 
With the global expansion of CTs and CCTs, new instruments for cash-
based welfare provisioning introduced by the late 1990s, a new logic of 
social assistance was introduced. This logic encapsulated a new rationality 
of needs-based entitlement (Peck & Theodore, 2015, p. 104), that is, tar-
geting. Such a shift required a new project of legibility, an accurate map-
ping of ‘poor’ populations, as per the discussion on legibility advanced in 
Chapter 3. It also presupposed a shift in development priorities, privileg-
ing poverty alleviation over ‘problems of uneven development, economic 
dislocation, and social disadvantage’ (ibid.). In the particular case of the 
BDH, the provision of CTs followed the slow abandonment of the rhet-
oric of indigeneity in public policy and a narrow focus on the poor, and 
poverty alleviation strategies. However, the moral grounds of social pro-
tection were only marginally affected. Early experiences with cash trans-
fers, for instance, relied on self-reporting to the Catholic Church (and, to 
a lesser extent, to the Evangelic Church) at the level of parishes for recip-
ients’ selection. And although the state took over this task and adopted 
more formal targeting schemes, there were other forces steering the design 
of the programme, such as transnational actors who influenced its design, 
either through well-established channels such as funding, or indirectly 
through expert knowledge, for example networks of consultants. The 
adoption of CTs in the country thus supposed a new logic for defining, 
measuring and fine-tuning poverty assessment instruments.  
Along these lines, the registration of populations became central to the 
design of social protection. In the case of the BDH, it supposed the crea-
tion of a cadastre of households, devised as a single targeting tool. The 
national survey Encuesta SELBEN was thus designed to measure poverty 
230 CHAPTER 8 
 
levels by individual household, as discussed in Chapter 4. The SELBEN 
has been turned into a critical statecraft tool, given its adaptability to dif-
ferent mandates and institutional requirements: from generating 
knowledge about poor households, used by policy makers to provide data 
to national and international overseeing organisations, or used in impact 
evaluations and collecting evidence to further similar interventions. This 
chapter discusses the tensions accompanying this new project of legibility, 
as registration inevitably results in the exclusion of certain populations. 
These are evidenced in the impossibility to fully capture the complexity of 
households, as noted by both (current and former) recipients and social 
workers associated to the BDH. In addition, and returning to the discus-
sion started in Chapter 3, this chapter hints at old layers of legibility that 
preceded the adoption of the CCT model, and upon which the new system 
sits. By teasing out the lines of social difference such as sex, age, race-
ethnicity and background-location that have been prioritised in the design 
of social protection, the chapter brings to the fore the features of social 
protection systems that allow for the maintenance of difference and hier-
archy, and it helps identify those few elements of change that have been 
either assimilated or disregarded in the various trajectories followed by 
social protection in the past two decades.  
8.2 Cash transfers: familism and legibility 
Recent interventions that have expanded the range of state regulation and 
social services to historically marginalised groups in the region, for exam-
ple women with dependent children, could be interpreted as a step to-
wards integration and strengthening the social contract (Barrientos et al., 
2008). The adoption of non-work-based welfare is also celebrated as a step 
forward, moving away from employment-derived entitlements which, as 
discussed earlier, tend to replicate systems of segregation and difference 
regulating the labour market. Further, it has been demonstrated that it is 
among the poorest that the obsolete male breadwinner model of social 
insurance, as imported from the global North, might not only be inapt but 
could have detrimental effects (Filgueira et al., 2011).  
Even though social protection has been made accessible via cash trans-
fers, as in other post-colonised territories, questions of economic inclusion 
and assistance remain (Ferguson, 2015, p. 83). With the expansion of 
CCTs targeted at women, the personal and collective realms were recast, 
accentuating women’s role as responsible citizens capable of exercising 
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choice (Schild, 2015). In the design of these initiatives, however, structural 
constraints, such as processes of historical marginalisation experienced by 
indigenous and black women in the labour market that have hampered 
their access to meaningful sources of income, were displaced. Such si-
lences have led some to interpret the cash-based instruments adopted in 
the last decades as mechanisms of co-option of feminist struggles (Schild, 
2015), or as a convenient adoption of new bureaucratic rationalities 
(James, 2006), entailing new political technologies (Maurer, 2015).  
From a more theoretical viewpoint, feminist scholars (see Orloff, 2009 
for an extended discussion) had already contested the state–market binary 
present in most welfare analysis, as initiated with Esping-Andersen’s ty-
pologies, which obscured the role of women and the family in care provi-
sioning. Conventional analyses of welfare regimes have been criticised for 
perpetuating the separation between the market—the production 
sphere—and care—the reproduction sphere—putting women out of 
sight. On this account, it could be argued that reforms to welfare systems 
would have a greater impact if they first tackled gender inequality within 
the family, eventually affecting the position of women in the labour mar-
ket. However, the emphasis on care that has accompanied the expansion 
of CCTs has generated new tensions, as the characterisation of the family 
as an essential institution for welfare provisioning renders women as re-
sponsible for others.    
Yet some would argue that the renewed interest in human capital 
brought about by the new generation of cash transfers offers an oppor-
tunity to reconcile paid work and care. Mkandawire (2004), for instance, 
states that targeted social protection could be seen as an alternative to ad-
dress feminist concerns by positioning labour as a produced means of pro-
duction—and thus recognising women’s role in its production. In similar 
interpretations, some see in the emphasis on targeted social assistance di-
rected at poor households a step towards re-centring welfare in the family 
realm (Barrientos, 2004), although at the risk of framing the ‘extended 
family’ as a prototypical provider of social protection—often attributed to 
rural territories and indigenous communities—dispensing with state sup-
port. Others (Filgueira et al., 2011; Razavi, 2011) discuss the conflicts be-
tween care and paid work as the breakdown of the traditional institution 
of the family, both in its nuclear form, as evidenced in the rapid increase 
in female-headed households in the cities, and in its extended version, fol-
lowing the recent increase in ‘atypical’ household arrangements in both 
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urban and rural areas attributed to poorer households. Without getting 
into the debate on the actual trends in demographics and family composi-
tion in the region, this type of connection between welfare and family 
speaks of the problem of legibility of households, or to what extent the 
family—in its various forms of representation: household, nuclear family 
or extended family—is made visible to and accounted for by welfare pro-
visioning. 
How, then, to make sense of practices of care and societal membership 
(i.e. legibility) in the era of CCTs? With the expansion of CCTs, care prac-
tices that had remained less visible to a state that could provide social pro-
tection only in terms of paid work became central. These practices, how-
ever, were made legible following a rationale of human capital returns, that 
is, supporting the development of recipients’ children. In this new phase 
of welfare provisioning also adopted in Ecuador, interventions have not 
fully tackled the stratified nature of care, but have instead overstated au-
tonomy and self-sufficiency. Cash transfers, by design, rely on an individ-
ualistic conception of agency, shifting towards individual choice with the 
social costs of ‘self-improvement’ being imposed on recipients them-
selves. This individualisation, characteristic of CCTs, targets the behaviour 
of families by enlisting women as co-partners in social transformation (as 
discussed by Schild, 2015 in a regional context). The family then consti-
tutes the concrete locus where a variety of discourses, mostly related to 
human capital, self-sufficiency and dependency, converge—not without 
critical frictions. Although some welcome the shift away from the individ-
ual and tailored towards family-centred welfare provisioning (Barrientos 
et al., 2008), more are voicing their concerns about the naturalisation of 
women’s role within the household (Molyneux, 2006; Schild, 2007; 
Molyneux, 2008; Martínez Franzoni & Voorend, 2012; Schild, 2015; 
Medrano, 2016).  
There is another layer of analysis that concerns the recruitment of 
women, as recipient mothers or front-line workers, to solve the social and 
economic aspects of poverty, which is being done in name of their self-
improvement, social mobility and sufficiency (Schild, 2007; 2015). Co-re-
sponsibility, in this context, establishes a quasi-legal contract between 
women on one end as recipients, and the state on the other end, often 
represented by a female social worker. With regard to recipient women, it 
is worth revisiting the rationale to include them as co-responsible in the 
process, which is based on two premises: first, that women prioritise basic 
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needs when spending, more so than men, which would imply that the 
money given to them would more likely serve household welfare and in-
vestment in human capital; and second, that in many families, women 
command fewer resources, which is hampering their economic and social 
opportunities. By allocating funds to mothers, with cash transfers 
women’s role in raising household welfare (current and future) and in im-
proving their own opportunities would be strengthened. Yet these prem-
ises might have been ill-conceived. From a social and cultural angle, they 
tend to oversimplify household dynamics and fail to account for motiva-
tional complexity surrounding care choices. Further, and pertaining to a 
more substantive role of social and economic policy, these premises speak 
of the difficulties of lifting labour market constraints on female participa-
tion in better paid jobs that reconcile it with care and, overall, of tackling 
gender inequalities. 
8.3 Illegible households 
Families are often considered mediators between individuals and public 
policy (Ullman et al., 2014).1 For most of the twentieth century, in tradi-
tional social security schemes it was assumed that the family was com-
posed of a two-parent home with a male breadwinner (ibid.). In the logic 
of conditional cash transfers, the nuclear family (or household) is often 
conceived as the smallest unit for allocation of transfers. Although there 
is some discrepancy in official documents and statistics, with some arguing 
that the family, with all its members, is the direct recipient of the transfer, 
or that the children are the actual beneficiaries, the majority of them refer 
to mothers as the recipients and managers of BDH transfers.  
In simplifying information about household composition and assum-
ing permanence and cooperation among its members, official representa-
tions of households in statistics and registries inevitably leave out elements 
that are essential to the actual functioning of households as living and fluid 
units. Thus, the household as planning unit, subject to fine-tuned enumer-
ation tools and targeting techniques, is more of an aspiration. Through the 
various regulations, policies and programmes, the state shapes, favours 
and legitimises certain family arrangements that are legible, recognised and 
thus eligible for interventions. In this light, this section explores to what 
extent normative arrangements of domestic life are being shaped by the 
current design of the BDH programme. First, there is the challenge of 
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understanding the open nature of households, in terms of both mobility 
and internal composition, as illustrated in the following: 
Claro que yo lo necesito: ¡yo soy madre pobre! (Of course I need it [the BDH 
money]: I am a poor mother). I have two children that are still attending 
school, and a new-born, he is not even inscrito (registered). The MIES people 
have not visited us. They have not been to our home; nobody comes to 
Bello Horizonte, at least not in the four years that we live there. But we 
seldom stay there. We have to keep on moving; otherwise, the police would 
start to ‘joder la paciencia’. (Interviewee-A, 2013) 
As observed during fieldwork, understanding households as open units 
makes it possible to account for diversification. The openness of house-
holds gives their members space for flexible work arrangements, for ex-
ample opting for seasonal migration strategies or relying on relatives for 
the provision of care, sometimes leading to the emergence of extra-house-
hold informal provisioning networks. It was mostly amongst the youngest 
parents (couples or single parents) with dependent children that the nu-
clear family model was less applicable: when either parent would go to the 
city for work—for just a few hours, a full day or even a week—older mem-
bers, usually grandmothers and comadres (networks of godmothers, usually 
neighbours), would stay home and look after the children, given the lim-
ited access to childcare (as discussed in Chapter 6).   
When care duties are shared amongst the extended family and/or com-
munity, the recording of responsibilities, for the state’s registration pro-
cesses, becomes much more difficult. As a result, many women who are 
recorded as members of certain nuclear households might have obliga-
tions in a variety of different households too. These enlarged domestic 
units seem to allow their members to be more flexible, both in terms of 
work obligations and with regard to provision of care. However, these 
dynamics are incompatible with the statistical tools devised for the new 
social. Indeed, social protection, both in its traditional (i.e. old social) and 
targeted modalities, tends to place households at the centre of interven-
tions, often ‘informed by demographic, labour, and economic trends, but 
not by a more encompassing view of the family as a dynamic and changing 
social institution’ (Ullman et al., 2014, p. 4).2 
This fluid nature of households can also work to their benefit. In one 
interview, a ‘graduated’ recipient indicated that neither she nor her chil-
dren were eligible for the BDH programme anymore, since the household 
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head had retired and started receiving a pension. Yet her eldest daughter, 
from a previous partner, was registered under her last name—flagging is-
sues of registration that persist in particular for illegitimate children. Her 
situation turned, however, opportune. Because of this loophole, they were 
able to ‘trick’ the system: ‘they [MIES] could not relate my daughter to 
him [her husband] although she lives with me […] and that is a good thing, 
because she is also a single mother, like I was back then when I was her 
age, and she makes good use of the BDH money’ (Interviewee-K, 2013). 
 
 
Illustration 8.1 Girl with her grandmother in Loja (2013) 
 
During the course of fieldwork, it was noted that reporting marital status 
was a highly sensitive issue. Societal norms largely accounted for the war-
iness around indicating if the informant was legally married or cohabiting, 
or disclosing that they had been deserted. Likewise, women were unaware 
of the implications that the marital status indicated on their ID card had 
for the types of social protection they could access. Changes in status were 
seldom amended. A brief exploration of survey data, however, evidences 
the high variation in marital status among BDH recipients: by matching 
comparable households in the administrative registers available for Loja 
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and Machala for the years 2008 and 2013, it can be noted that approxi-
mately 25 per cent of recipients had changed their marital status from 2008 
to 2013—a figure estimated for both cities (as percentage of the total sam-
ple). In Loja alone, 18.02 per cent of recipients reported having changed 
their marital status. In Machala, the proportion of recipients who had 
changed their marital status increased to 34.52 per cent, with most of them 
indicating getting back to singleness. 
It is worth noting that it is only after recent constitutional reforms that 
domestic partnerships have been legally recognised, entitled to the same 
rights as those provided by civil marriage. Arguably, these reforms have 
increased the options for identification for women, providing some sort 
of security and guarantee as partners, regardless of their marital status. Yet 
misreporting marital status has a direct (and often negative) impact on ac-
cess to the BDH programme. Many women that had reported being mar-
ried in earlier cadastre waves mentioned during interviews having been 
separated but not divorced. Most separated women cannot afford a di-
vorce (Radcliffe, 2015c, p. 109), and thus are effectively blocked from ac-
cessing income support as their household situation is overstated. If a 
woman appears in the cadastre as married, the government will assume 
her partner is effectively contributing to the household and pooling his 
income, following a notion of joint utility or a collective family model, 
with all the problems that this assumption entails. What is more, if the 
husband is formally employed, that is, affiliated to social security, or re-
ceiving a retirement pension, in the process of depuration the household 
(and by default the wife) will not be deemed eligible. 
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Illustration 8.2 Men gathered around lunch table in celebration of Inti-Raymi. Women and 
children seated around on the ground. Loja (2013) 
 
The household, in the context of the BDH programme, corresponds to 
the nuclear family: married couple with or without dependent children, or 
paterfamilias (Deaton, 1997). For the purpose of the programme’s regis-
tration, each married couple was assumed to constitute a household. 
Mothers, regardless of their marital status, would signal ‘the creation’ of a 
new household. Note that the notion of the nuclear family was only intro-
duced in Ecuador around the 1950s, ignoring the alternative family ar-
rangements found amongst indigenous populations (Prieto, 2015). After 
decades, tensions in the identification of households in official statistics vs 
their actual functioning persist.  
Problems of identification transcend marital status amendments (or the 
lack thereof). Eligible populations need to provide a valid identity number 
for themselves and their children in order to be registered in the cadastre. 
However, according to the last census data, about 19 per cent of the total 
population in Loja, and 18 per cent of the population in Machala, have no 
identity card (cédula) (author’s own calculations using 2010 census data, 
INEC, 2016). Yet the BDH administration and evaluation relies heavily 
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on the cédula as a unique qualifier, as exemplified by the latest report on 
BDH effectiveness: ‘[I]n our estimates we test whether young adults in 
households of women for whom we have the cédula, as recorded in 
2000/02, have different schooling and work outcomes, as recorded in the 
2013/14 poverty census, depending on eligibility for transfer during the 
2003–09 period’ (Araujo et al., 2016, p. 12).  
Being in possession of this document, although crucial for BDH trans-
fers, makes little or no difference in terms of observance of labour regu-
lation or access to rights at work. For marginalised women reliant on in-
formal employment such as unregulated domestic work, being in 
possession of a cédula has not resulted in the recognition and registration 
of their labour and affiliation to social security (similar observation is made 
in Radcliffe, 2015c, p. 219 with regard to domestic work).  
8.4 Broken trajectories: cracks in policy making 
The theory of change underpinning cash transfer presupposes a linear im-
provement, a consistent chain of events that would lead to better devel-
opmental outcomes: protection of early childhood, access to education 
and labour market attachment, ending in insured productive life. The 
achievement of these stages is attributed to a combination of deliberate 
state policies and individual efforts, whilst failures are every so often at-
tributed to a lack of individual effort. Nonetheless, in conversations with 
(former and current) recipients, it could be noticed that they continue to 
see their trajectories as systematically broken. Life trajectories are non-lin-
ear, even more so when people have to navigate a segregated system. In a 
context of social heterogeneity, social distance and economic structures 
not only shape (or even break) individual trajectories, but inform state in-
terventions, either when determining goals or in actual practices of pro-
tection. It is worth asking, then, whether the differences in trajectory are 
the by-product of hasty and careless policy making or, on the contrary, are 
the result of deliberate changes in technologies of protection and admin-
istration of poverty. In the next subsection, the question is approached as 
one of incremental mutations, in which the design of the programme was 
marginally adapted in response to local needs and influenced by interna-
tional networks and discourses of what works in social protection, as nar-
rated by cash transfers and social workers in southern Ecuador.   
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8.4.1 Upsetting the model: pushing the boundaries 
In the re-appropriation of the CT model, as noted by Peck and Theodore 
in tracing the influence of Progresa in the region, administrations have 
pushed the boundaries of the model to establish new government ration-
alities pertaining to their social. For instance, in Ecuador, under Correa’s 
administration, there was at some point the intention to make of the BDH 
a platform to connect recipients with financial services (República del Ec-
uador, 2013), as could also be noted in the expansion of the credit pro-
gramme Crédito de Desarrollo Humano. Accompanying programmes 
such as Becas de Desarrollo Humano also made use of the targeting tool 
Registro Social to this aim. Next to these trends aimed at building on the 
programme’s design, there was a growing tension over whether to con-
tinue the BDH programme or to dismantle it completely—for various rea-
sons, including to break with the past as the BDH was inherited from 
previous administrations. Although the BDH is a relatively minor compo-
nent of social protection, it is a key factor during electoral debates, often 
coming up in popularity polls. In this light, Correa’s administration not 
only preserved the scheme, but decided to expand it during its first years 
in office. However, this was followed by a decline in total budget and 
number of recipients, downsizing the programme from 2012 onwards, and 
slowly abandoning the more conventional CCT model, transitioning to-
wards a smaller scheme covering mostly elderly and disabled populations. 
Governmental projects are not necessarily consistent and/or exempt 
from internal tensions. Face-to-face negotiations within the administra-
tion, given the attempt to integrate various voices, are certainly contingent 
and fragmented. Multiple voices have informed the most recent project 
Revolución Ciudadana, as can be noted in the change in focus across the 
various development plans for Buen Vivir (as discussed in Radcliffe, 
2015b). Pre-existing policies and programmes met with more recognition 
of social demands, explicitly dealing with discrimination and racism 
(Walsh, 2015), following a self-proclaimed socialist agenda, Socialismo del 
Buen Vivir, aimed at affecting the relations between labour and capital, at 
least rhetorically. In personal communications with high-ranking officials 
associated to the Social Cabinet (Interviewee-L, 2014; Interviewee-C, 
2014), it was mentioned that frictions were a common denominator in 
cabinet meetings pertaining to social policy. Many of these were associated 
with the perpetuation of gender biases in policy making, for example the 
influence of the Catholic Church in the formulation of the family planning 
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programme Plan Familia, the dismantling of the Consejo Nacional de Mu-
jeres (CONAMU or National Women’s Council), or the continuation of 
maternalist policies, as per the BDH. Lind, who challenges the notion of 
the radical character of the administration, notes: ‘Correa’s claim that the 
revolution has a ‘‘woman’s face’’ is not insinuating that women are auton-
omous subjects; rather, in many ways his discourse reinforces and pro-
longs the neoliberal discourse of the family and women in their roles as 
mothers and caretakers, in particular as the absorber of economic change 
and as the “subjects of others’’’ (2012, p. 543). Although neoliberal policies 
are often associated with the ‘individuation of the social’ (Molyneux, 2006, 
p. 439), in current social provisioning systems women are even more 
bound to the family as a means to secure social development objectives, 
as discussed in the first section of this chapter. 
Given the numerous changes to the eligibility and targeting schemes, 
the link between BDH and contributory social security has remained prob-
lematic, both in factual terms, complicating the selection process, and in 
discursive terms, introducing ideas of perverseness and dependency. Strict 
exclusion from the BDH programme is applied to household heads (and 
their dependent family) if affiliated to contributory social security (IESS) 
only if the direct recipient is 65 years or above and receiving a pension. 
Yet, in 2010, the population decided in a national referendum to enact 
stricter controls on the affiliation to social security. Although a necessary 
step towards regulating labour and derived welfare benefits, it was accom-
panied by contradictions, as noted by a former BDH recipient interviewed 
in Loja (at the time working as a part-time laundress):  
Since the government enforced social security affiliation our situation got 
much worse. People do not want to hire domestic workers, it is too expen-
sive: minimum wage plus social security? Families are not willing to pay for 
it! I used to make some money doing the laundry, ironing and doing some 
cleaning work in the houses I visited. Just a few hours, here and there. This 
is not possible anymore. People are afraid of hiring someone for a few hours 
only, they know is not allowed now. What happens, then? Less work for 
people like me. (Interviewee-R, 2013) 
Recently, with the enactment of a new Law on Social Justice, the gov-
ernment has encouraged the affiliation to contributory social security for 
homemakers, prioritising BDH recipient mothers. According to the Social 
Cabinet, as of 2015, more than half of BDH recipient mothers—roughly 
200,000 homeworkers (or amas de casa)—were to be incorporated into the 
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IESS security scheme.3 Yet there is controversy as to the actual choice 
recipients have. Whereas some government sites consulted indicate that 
homemakers’ affiliation to IESS requires BDH recipients’ review and ap-
proval, others indicate this is an automatic direct debit of US$2 per month 
(of a total transfer of US$50). It should be stressed that IESS has a public 
image of inefficiency. Long waiting lists, out of pocket expenses for items 
such as extra medication, and neglect are common issues associated with 
it: ‘IESS is too expensive, it is for rich people only’ (Interviewee-R, 2013).  
Returning to R, as interviewed in Loja in 2013, she shared her experi-
ence of the health system. Although her husband was in formal employ-
ment and had access to IESS services, she did not. She had been told that 
‘only her husband (el afiliado) and his children were entitled to medical at-
tention’. Instead, and in response to a liver condition for which she needed 
to undergo an operation, she tried public hospitals but did not receive 
timely attention: ‘I am not going to hang around there waiting until some-
one deigns to see me’ (Interviewee-R, 2013). Waiting times at public hos-
pitals and inconsiderate treatment by administrative staff discouraged her 
from seeking medical attention. She opted for a private hospital, borrow-
ing money from relatives in order to pay for the surgery. Meanwhile, she 
could not afford to not work (laundry) and lose her clients. On top of the 
health costs incurred, she had to compensate for the days of inactivity and 
ask a cousin to take over laundering while she was recovering. 
Next to these problems, there is information regarding who can access 
social insurance within the household of contributors, as explained by a 
BDH recipient: ‘He [her husband] is insured because of his work, so only 
he can go to the IESS hospital. Neither my son nor I can go there. No, we 
can’t. My husband was told that only he can go […] I have always taken 
my son to the medical centre or to a private hospital if it is an emergency’ 
(Interviewee-N, 2013). In theory, the spouse and children could access 
health care if the husband contributed 3.41 per cent of his salary. But most 
decide against it: ‘He already pays US$30 per month to IESS, and that is 
for him only! Paying extra money, for me […] no, it doesn’t make sense! 
We need his salary, how are we going to pay the rent then?’ (ibid.). Note 
that this informant was receiving BDH transfers, so there was a chance of 
purposively deciding against contributory insurance if it threatened her ac-
cess to BDH support. Nevertheless, it could be noted that in order to 
access contributory social insurance, and particularly health coverage, ‘de-
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pendent’ women still rely on their husbands’ contributions. Instead of up-
grading the household members to the contributory branch, the tendency 
is to reduce the level of contributions, even if that means no health cov-
erage, and to keep the BDH transfers. Issues of familism, as discussed in 
the first section of this chapter, permeate both the contributory and non-
contributory branches of social protection, with the accompanying ten-
sions in terms of recognition and visibility of women’s care work.  
8.4.2 Walking the path of front-line workers 
Lower levels of public administration are in charge of collecting infor-
mation, sorting out households, revising cases and informing recipients 
about graduation, suspension of payments and dissemination of accom-
panying programmes. For the most part, these are positions with low vis-
ibility, yet crucial decisions depend on them. Drawing on insights obtained 
during several days of fieldwork accompanying caseworkers in their daily 
activities and complemented with interviews with middle-range officials, 
this section discusses the making of social protection in the field, its con-
tradictions and its controversies at the local level, regarding selection and 
registration of potential beneficiaries. It also considers  the conflicts work-
ers face when distancing themselves from recipients, for example differ-
ences in norms and values pertaining to the family, and when having to 
notify families of their ‘graduation’ from the programme, a decision often 
taken by the central government in the capital, Quito. Most front-line 
workers showed actual commitment, strong empathy for and understand-
ing of recipient families’ situation.  
Between 2013 and 2015, in Loja and Machala, the author talked to re-
cipient mothers who recounted how they had to care for the family when 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and local governments stepped 
back. Of course, there were significant tensions deriving from front-line 
workers’ lack of cultural affinity, adapting this concept from the analysis 
of segregated lending found in Dymski et al. (2013). Note that the BDH 
administration has only recently been concentrated in the central govern-
ment. Until 2007, some NGOs and local governments were involved in 
the process, but under Correa’s administration, these activities were cen-
tralised. In practice, the BDH rules and regulations are somewhat reinter-
preted at local level. These ‘translations’ of national policy in the local con-
text yield different outcomes, as observed in the cities of Loja and 
Machala. Intergenerational bonds were functioning according to local 
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norms but also to compensate for a passive state (in particular, in 
Machala). The following section captures the experience of visiting house-
holds with caseworkers in Loja, Ecuador. 
 
 
Illustration 8.3 Child playing with MIES-CNH caseworker’s ball during home visit in Loja. His 
mother works in the city; he spends the day with his grandparents.(2015) 
 
Anita, Juana and Isabel invited the author to have lunch with them during 
one of my last visits to the field in Loja (Interviewees-MIES, 2015). They 
were taking a break from their weekly visits to families with children under 
5 years old, most of them BDH recipients, in Loja. They were part of the 
team of social workers of Creciendo con Nuestros Hijos (CNH or Grow-
ing Up with Our Children), led by MIES. They had years of experience, 
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having previously worked for the Instituto de la Niñez y la Familia (INFA 
or Ecuadorian Institute of Childhood and Family) or NGOs. It is worth 
noting that former PPS caseworkers, after this department was absorbed 
into MIES, were promoted to técnicos (or technical personnel) conducting 
and analysing household data and official registries for MIES. After all, 
cash transfers, as disseminated in the region, have a technocratic orienta-
tion to development whereby interventions are technical decisions taken 
from above and reliant on experts’ knowledge. Despite the appeal of tech-
nical knowledge-based placements, some refused this new position and 
remained as trabajadoras sociales (social workers) in direct contact with fam-
ilies through supplementary programmes such as CNH. These women be-
longed to that group. 
They had the perception that their work went unnoticed: ‘everything is 
decided in the offices in Quito, but we are here, with the families’ (Inter-
viewees-MIES, 2015). Further, they distanced themselves from the tech-
nical personnel: ‘they [técnicos] do not reach the families like we do; we see 
their children grow up … when we are assigned a neighbourhood, we 
sweep it completely.’ They were quite sceptical of Registro Social: ‘when I 
got the registries, the addresses made no sense, I could not use them to 
locate the families … the information was outdated’ (ibid.). Even though 
they had access to the official registries, they did not have to report to 
MIES the observance of the BDH conditions.  
‘One becomes like familia of these people’ said Anita, reflecting on her 
daily visits to children. The intimacy expressed by Anita stood in contrast 
to the experiences of an uncaring state that were encountered in other 
instances, such as at the MIES registration counters in the cities. There is 
an apparent tension between the norms dictated by the central govern-
ment governing the involvement in recipients’ cases, the actual involve-
ment of caseworkers and recipients’ expectations. ‘I cannot understand 
how so many families had exited the BDH. Frankly, I do not understand 
it […] they [recipient families] cannot do anything to improve, like work-
ing on their houses, or finding a job, they live in constant fear’ (Interview-
ees-MIES, 2015). To complicate things further, caseworkers are often 
asked to notify families about their graduation from the BDH programme: 
‘It is such horrible thing to do, do you realize? No wonder they don’t want 
us back [in their homes]. We can’t see the kids anymore. How would they 
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trust us? They think we reported them’ (Interviewees-MIES, 2015). Case-
workers would swap neighbourhoods among colleagues in such a situa-
tion, as a means to avoid facing the families they had worked with. 
As noted earlier, this view stands in contrast to the experiences of some 
recipients. Back in 2013, when fielding the survey, the research assistants 
referred to a woman who had started breaking down when they ap-
proached her with the questionnaire. She was a single mother of five chil-
dren—of which only the younger three lived with her—who had confused 
the researchers with caseworkers, for which reason she started begging 
them not to take her children away. After responding with tact and ex-
plaining from a critical distance the researchers’ position to her, she ex-
plained: 
They [caseworkers] told me they were going to report me. They do not 
like the idea […] that I am taking my children with me to the dumpsters. 
But, what else can I do? I cannot leave them alone. I prefer to have them by 
my side while I am working, in that way I can look after them. My oldest 
son, he gives me a hand while the youngest ones are playing nearby. Social 
workers do not understand in which conditions one has to work. (Inter-
viewee-U, 2013) 
Many women work collecting, sorting, recycling and selling waste. It is 
an occupation that, in principle, has lower barriers to entry: it is easy to 
learn and requires no formal education. The woman cited above worked 
at the bottom of the ‘recycling chain’ but had recently lost her access to 
the public dumpster after a night in which the police forced illegal workers 
out and took away a month’s worth of merchandise. She tried to return 
days later, but another family had taken over the dumpster. Access to 
waste is very restricted, with families competing for a space, having to 
change location after being constantly harassed by authorities. Waste pick-
ers are usually ignored by public policies, as they are considered a risk for 
urban planning and a threat to public health. Handling waste poses many 
risks to their own health; one could notice her children were malnour-
ished. They were at the health centre because the youngest had been suf-
fering stomach problems for a while—most likely from parasites. 
Waste picking is in most cases a family enterprise. The interviewee ex-
plained how she used to go with the children to the dumpster in the Pra-
dera neighbourhood in Loja. Her oldest son, 13 years old, helped her col-
lect and sort the waste: the items in best condition were sold to street 
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vendors (ambulantes), and the rest were kept for the family. Toys, clothing 
and furniture were found in the dumpster and taken home, plus some cash 
from the sales. Since she had lost access to the dumpster, she was relying 
on BDH transfers to sustain her family. She had been in the programme 
for about five years (at the time of the interview). Yet she expressed a 
constant fear of exiting the programme. She knew of neighbours who had 
been ‘graduated’. She had received a warning from the CNH social worker 
visiting her area: she might exit the BDH programme if she were found 
taking the children to a dumpster again.  
Walking their path, listening to their views on the programme, seeing 
their position in the system of provisioning, and understanding the dis-
tance they have to keep but the commitment they also show led the author 
to adopt a much more humane view of the state as experienced in the 
field. This more humane approach, however, does not imply that the cul-
tural and social distance between social workers and recipients is not wor-
rying, as illustrated in the previous case, or that preconceived ideas do not 
hamper the interaction between both sides. But it does speak of the am-
biguities in the implementation of, per design, technical solutions for pov-
erty alleviation and social welfare provisioning.  
8.4.3 Unsolved tensions 
Tensions between what scholars interpret as genuine (yet futile) efforts to 
integrate marginalised populations, and what others might consider pro-
jects to silence struggles from below in the realm of social protection, pre-
vail in the new social. As the Ecuadorian CCT programme has remained 
largely unchanged in purpose, mechanisms (or technologies) and expecta-
tions, for example reducing dependency, these tensions remain unre-
solved. It could be argued that the recent emphasis on poverty reduction 
has resulted in a new rhetoric that suppresses the discussions on aspects 
of marginalisation that accompanied state formation and policy design for 
most of the twentieth century. By focusing on poverty reduction, the state 
can evacuate politics from social policy instruments and perform them as 
technical solutions.  
Targeting, by design, leads to processes of inclusion and exclusion. Par-
allel projects of legibility accompanied welfare reforms, by which some 
segments of the population were seen as agents of progress and protec-
tion, as per the male urban formal employment sector, whilst others were 
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incorporated in special regimes such as the Seguro Campesino, which alt-
hough subsidised by the general regimes—IESS—pays relatively lower 
benefits; for example, as of 2014, monthly pension payments of Seguro 
Campesino reached US$57, compared with US$50 for BDH transfers. In 
a press interview, President Correa indicated:  
we are still ashamed of the US$57 pension provided in the current retire-
ment scheme [Seguro Campesino] pension, but at least we have managed to 
increase it to some extent. This value is almost equivalent to that of the 
Bono de Desarrollo Humano. Here is where we have to focus, above all, to 
substantially improve the pension for our farmers, our fishermen, so they 
have a dignified retirement after so many years [todavía nos da vergüenza los $ 
57 de la actual pensión jubilar, pero al menos hemos logrado aumentarla en algo. Ese 
valor es casi equivalente al Bono de Desarrollo Humano. Aquí debemos enfocarnos, sobre 
todo, en mejorar sustantivamente la jubilación de nuestros campesinos, de nuestros pesca-
dores para que tengan un retiro digno después de tantos años] (Correa, 2014). 
The bifurcation of the social protection system lingers on, with an up-
per tier of contributory social insurance covering the formal, mostly urban, 
segment of the labour force, and a lower tier of non-contributory social 
assistance targeted at poor families. As noted earlier, institutional segrega-
tion in access to social protection was not introduced with, but was exac-
erbated by, cash transfers. Following patterns of spatial and occupational 
segregation, rural populations, mostly indigenes, montubios and those of 
black descent, were integrated late and under different conditions to state-
provided welfare regimes. As for women with no access to formal em-
ployment, they were recently integrated to non-contributory schemes, as 
per the BDH. Nonetheless, in the interplay of sex, age and ethnicity, pop-
ulations continue to depend on traditional gender roles, more salient 
across certain age cohorts and emphasised or even romanticised amongst 
certain ethnic groups, as per the depiction of the indigena as the passive 
mother living in poverty (Prieto, 2015). 
Without a deliberate attempt to revert exclusionary practices, changes 
in the moral economy of social protection have mirrored economic struc-
tures. Capital-intensive growth has structured a model of metropolitan 
capitalism concentrated in the capital city, Quito, and Guayaquil port—
where urban informal activities also expanded—and dispersed, informal 
small-scale activities in rural areas (Larrea & North, 1997). This structuring 
was deepened by the high instability of export-led growth phases—start-
ing in 1888 with cacao production, shifting to bananas by the end of the 
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last century and later to oil in the 1970s—which have constantly shifted 
the social and occupational status of the labour force. Movements from 
rural to urban areas, from the Highlands to the coast, or from agricultural 
to artisan activities have led to increased informalisation, atomising the 
workforce. As a result, large labour force concentrations and union move-
ments, historically identified as the key source of pressure on the state for 
welfare provision, occurred in the country for a minority of occupations 
only (ibid.). 
Recent reforms to labour legislation and social protection, which re-
sulted in the affiliation of BDH recipients, could also be interpreted as a 
partial formalisation of unpaid care work, which has increased the total 
share of formal employment—defined as those workers who have access 
to contributory protection schemes—but only marginally improved their 
access to protection systems. Under the new scheme, affiliated homemak-
ers are not granted full access to health insurance, as is the case for formal 
paid workers affiliated to the IESS system. Instead, they are only conceded 
a retirement pension after 20 years of permanent contributions. Note that 
according to own survey data, a recipient remains in the BDH programme, 
on average, for five years. In these conditions, the actual benefits obtained 
from this formalisation of unpaid work are marginal, although an im-
provement in social protection outcomes is suggested at the aggregate 
level: the absolute number of affiliated workers has increased. Thus, this 
reform might not tackle the problem of access to substantive social pro-
tection, but might prove to be sufficient to blur the lines between formal 
and informal employment at the macro level. 
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Illustration 8.4 Informative talks held at MIES regarding the social security affiliation project 
for BDH recipients (photo credits MIES (2016) 
 
Public campaigns, nonetheless, frame this as a step towards integration. 
The photograph above, used by MIES in the press release announcing 
contributory social security affiliation for BDH recipient mothers, resem-
bles the campaign revolución de los olvidados, yet with no explicit mention of 
the racialised4 dimension of social policy that was present in the policy 
making of Ecuador in the second half of the twentieth century (for an 
overview, see Prieto, 2003). Although in the last decade contributory social 
protection to the general regime, IESS, has expanded, coverage has main-
tained its stratified nature, mostly benefiting men of mestizo and white 
background, whose participation in contributory schemes has more than 
doubled.  
8.5 Trajectories of difference: social difference and implicit 
bias in access to social protection 
Women of non-mestizo background seem to have only marginal access to 
employment and welfare support, as Figure 8.1 suggests. Indigenous 
women’s access to social insurance has only marginally increased between 
2001 and 2010, whereas the percentage of Afro-Ecuadorian women who 
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access social security has fallen. It is worth noting that the recognition of 
montubio ethnicity by the government only took place in late 2001, for 
which reason there is no comparable data for that year. 
 
Figure 8.1 Access to contributory social protection or IESS regime by sex and 
self-identified ethnic group in 2001 and 2010 (in percentage) 
Note: Columns display within ethnic group percentages.  
Source: Census data 2001 and 2010 (INEC 2016), author’s own calculations. 
 
In the study of segregation, the production of disaggregated data on 
women and minorities can also be interpreted as active practices rather 
than mere classificatory categories (Dymski et al., 2013). Misreporting or 
switching group affiliation can constitute an active practice, as in the in-
tersection of sex and ethnicity informants may negotiate their positioning 
to academia (e.g. towards the researcher) or to the state (e.g. towards the 
enumerator or the social worker). Radcliffe, in her study of national iden-
tities in Ecuador, suggests that ‘women’s racial positioning is arguably 
more ambiguous than it is for their male counter-parts’ (Radcliffe, 1999, 
p. 223). It is plausible to think of this ambiguity as a strategic response to 
segregated labour markets (as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7).  
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
Indigenous Mestizo Montubio White Afro-Ecuadorian
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
2001 Women 2001 Men 2010 Women 2010 Men
 Falling through the Cracks: Recasting Narratives of Dependence 251 
In an attempt to capture the processes of identification and enumera-
tion, race-disaggregated data is presented in Figure 8.1. The data should 
be taken as indicative of segregation patterns only, considering the limited 
sample size and the low representativeness of newly incorporated ethnic 
categories. Official statistics confirm this trend. Using SIISE-ENEMDU 
estimates, the implicit racial targeting of BDH that followed the expansion 
of 2007 under Correa’s administration can be noted. The number of re-
cipient households identified as ethnic minorities has increased in recent 
years. Yet it is worth noting this is data at the household level, which com-
plicates the question of ethnicity: the household is attributed the self-iden-
tification of the household head. For the majority of households, house-
hold headship is attributed to, if present, a male informant. Men, however, 
have been found to be ‘more confident about identifying with indigenous 
identity’ (Radcliffe, 1999, p. 223). This assertion points to the ambiguity in 
racial identification and thus the limitations of race-disaggregated statis-
tics. Yet the ambiguity in identification reveals the performative aspects of 
race, by which men and women adjust their racial positioning differently 
within the constraints set by history, hierarchies and location (1999, p. 
216).  
As computed in Table 8.1, there are some significant changes in re-
ported ‘belonging’ to different ethnic groups across different SELBEN 
(or Registro Social) waves. Data on ethnicity is reported by respondents 
following the question: cómo se considera? (a self-identification question). 
Nevertheless, there is a relational positioning, as evidenced in the author’s 
own process of data collection,5 with respondents ‘adjusting’ their ethnic-
ity in relation to that of the surveyor. 
It is worth asking, then, to what extent does the lack of reliable statistics 
hint at a low priority given to distributive and redistributive issues on the 
grounds of ethnicity/race? By questioning this, it is not implied that the 
state has not advanced any policies aimed at including marginalised popu-
lations, but the emphasis has been placed on public goods, such as infra-
structure projects—note the importance given to millennial schools, the 
building of hospitals—accessible to all citizens, no matter their age, sex or 
background. Although this falls under a universalistic logic, it also assumes 
a certain configuration of the social structure—that is, a more egalitarian 
one—that would enable all social groups to make use of these services. 
Returning to Radcliffe, she questions these projects, arguing they are pre-
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sented as deliberate modernising efforts that should eventually help alle-
viate poverty and marginalisation among Afro-descendant and indigenous 
populations (2015a, p. 30). The problem, she argues, is that this logic di-
verts attention from discussions on inclusion, on grounds that there would 
be no need for, or even the possibility of, singling out the populations who 
benefit the most from these investments. 
With the expansion of the BDH programme in the last decade, social 
protection coverage has increased, although the levels of benefits differ 
significantly between the contributory and non-contributory segments. 
Yet non-employment-based modalities of social protection offer the pos-
sibility to tackle employment segregation. By design, the BDH programme 
is inattentive to employment status. In principle, this should have made it 
possible to ‘correct’ segregation patterns prevalent in the labour market. 
And indeed, there has been a shift from the exclusion of indigenous, mon-
tubio and Afro-Ecuadorian women from contributory schemes to their in-
clusion into non-contributory ones. Yet this is still strongly related to their 
specific patterns of attachment to employment (rural and urban). Argua-
bly, this is due to their participation in the programme under their condi-
tion of poverty, based on individual qualifiers such as motherhood or old 
age, which overlaps with the features that maintain segregation in the la-
bour market.  
Table 8.1 presents estimates for access to social protection amongst 
women in working age by ethnicity in 2010 (percentage). The sample in-
cluded household heads and/or partners only, aware of the ambiguities 
regarding the definition of headship. The rows show the proportion of 
women and men, by ethnic group, who had access to private insurance 
schemes, IESS (or general contributory scheme), Seguro Campesino (or 
Peasantry Scheme), ISSFA and/or ISSPOL (army and police schemes, re-
spectively), and no access at all, that is, uninsured.  
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Table 8.1 Access to social protection amongst women of working age by eth-
nicity in 2010 (percentage) 
 White Afro-Ecuadorian Indigenous Mestizo Montubio 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
IESS/	
ISSFA/ISSPOL	 26.2** 33.9* 15.5** 22.0** 4.7* 8.7* 19.8** 26.8* 5.7 8.8* 
Private/	
semi-private	 11.2* 6.7 9.9* 3.8 1.2 0.5 10.6** 4.1* 41.9** 13.1* 
Seguro		
Campesino	 1.9 1.9 5.3** 6.6** 8.8** 10.4** 4.0** 4.6* 12.5** 13.0* 
None	 60.7** 57.5** 69.3** 67.7** 85.3** 80.5** 65.7** 64.5* 39.9** 65.1* 
Note: Working age defined as 15 years and older. Columns display within ethnic group 
percentages. Afro-Ecuadorian includes the categories black and mulatto. 
Based on the coefficient of variation (CV) discretion should be used when determining whether 
the estimates are appropriate for use, following: (**) reliable with CV under 10% (*) less reliable 
with CV between 11% and 15%. Estimates without asterisk are not statistically significant with 
a CV larger than 15%. 
Source: ENEMDU 2010 (INEC 2016), author’s own calculations. 
 
By 2010, the percentage of women of working age who had no access to 
social security decreased across all ethnic groups, confirming recent state 
efforts to include them in the contributory system. Yet it is also noticeable 
that the inclusion of minority women took place mostly in the targeted 
arm of social protection, as can be seen in Table 8.2 in the higher propor-
tion of women participating in the BDH programme, with more than 75 
per cent of indigenous women receiving cash transfers. Until very recently, 
access to social insurance was largely determined by employment status, 
although this has slowly started to change with the partial incorporation 
of homeworkers (mostly BDH recipients) into the contributory scheme. 
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Table 8.2 BDH recipients by sex and ethnicity in 2010 (percentage) 
 White 
Afro- 
Ecuado-
rian 
Indige-
nous Mestizo Montubio Total 
Wome
n	 1.6*	 3.7**	 10.9**	 54.1**	 8.9**	 79.3**	
Men	 0.3	 0.8*	 2.4**	 14.0**	 3.2**	 20.8**	
Total	 1.9**	 4.5**	 13.3**	 68.2**	 12.1**	
100.0*
*	
Note: Working age defined as 15 years and older. Columns display within ethnic group 
percentages. Afro-Ecuadorian includes the categories black and mulatto. 
Based on the coefficient of variation (CV) discretion should be used when determining whether 
the estimates are appropriate for use, following: (**) reliable with CV under 10% (*) less reliable 
with CV between 11% and 15%. Estimates without asterisk are not statistically significant with 
a CV larger than 15%. 
Source: ENEMDU 2010 (INEC 2016), author’s own calculations. 
 
According to the BDH administrative registries, among those who ef-
fectively received BDH transfers ever year, the mestizo category accounts 
for more than 70 per cent of total female recipients per year, followed by 
indigenous (around 12 per cent) and montubio women (around 11 per cent). 
Estimates for the female population follow the same ethnic-based stratifi-
cation described in Table 8.3. The number of black and mulatto female 
BDH recipients is much lower, consistent with national demographics. 
  
 Falling through the Cracks: Recasting Narratives of Dependence 255 
Table 8.3 Female BDH effective recipients by reported ethnic group  
2005–2014 
 Number effective recipients* per year 
Ethnic group 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Indigenous 
101
,268 
112
,572 
120
,108 
41,
692 
158,
989 
177,
894 
181,
267 
177,
235 
143,
555 
119
,352 
Montubio 
70,
623 
77,
236 
80,
680 
27,
657 
124,
719 
128,
630 
129,
846 
130,
347 
103,
299 
98,
940 
White 
26,
485 
29,
057 
30,
389 
10,
648 
45,4
92 
45,3
09 
45,2
21 
46,3
41 
36,2
35 
34,
668 
Mestizo 
554
,551 
605
,883 
632
,954 
218
,949 
929,
896 
897,
944 
888,
870 
906,
173 
710,
298 
665
,494 
Black 
19,
132 
21,
422 
22,
743 
7,8
63 
36,4
74 
37,2
80 
36,8
71 
36,9
67 
29,3
92 
26,
224 
Mulatto 
13,
527 
15,
041 
15,
974 
5,5
24 
24,2
62 
24,1
44 
23,6
13 
23,8
25 
18,6
02 
17,
389 
Other 
2,1
13 
2,3
22 
2,4
04 798 
3,43
2 
3,32
2 
3,28
3 
3,33
0 
2,57
3 
2,4
34 
Subtotal 
(SELBEN only) 
787
,699 
863
,533 
905
,252 
313
,131 
1,32
3,264 
1,31
4,523 
1,30
8,971 
1,32
4,218 
1,04
3,954 
964
,501 
Note: Number of recipients who effectively received BDH transfers in the referenced year (as 
recorded in MIES administrative registries). 
Source: MIES-MCDS administrative records 2005–14, calculations by the author. 
Table 8.4 Changes in ethnicity reported by SELBEN respondents between 
waves 2007/08 and 2013/14 
  2013/14 
 
 Indige-
nous 
Montu-
bio White Mestizo Black Mulatto Other 
Afro 
Ecuado-
rian 
20
07
/0
8 
Indig-
enous 
           
0.73  
           
0.00  
           
0.00  
           
0.26  
               
-    
           
0.00  
           
0.00  
          
0.00  
Mon-
tubio 
           
0.01  
           
0.30  
           
0.02  
           
0.64  
           
0.01  
           
0.01  
           
0.00  
          
0.01  
White 
           
0.01  
           
0.06  
           
0.09  
           
0.82  
           
0.01  
           
0.01  
           
0.00  
          
0.01  
Mes-
tizo 
           
0.01  
           
0.07  
           
0.02  
           
0.86  
           
0.01  
           
0.02  
           
0.00  
          
0.01  
Black 
           
0.00  
           
0.03  
           
0.01  
           
0.30  
           
0.30  
           
0.09  
           
0.00  
          
0.28  
Mu-
latto 
           
0.01  
           
0.03  
           
0.02  
           
0.61  
           
0.08  
           
0.18  
           
0.00  
          
0.09  
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Other 
           
0.04  
           
0.05  
           
0.03  
           
0.82  
           
0.02  
           
0.02  
           
0.01  
          
0.02  
Note: Data collection for the SELBEN wave 2013/14 was not finalised at the time of the field 
visit (early 2014), matched data corresponds to about 25% of the total registries. 
Ethnic categories differ between waves 2007/08 and 2013/14. 
Source: MIES-MCDS administrative records 2005–14, calculations by the author. 
 
Although there is a margin of error in reporting and registration of indi-
vidual qualifiers such as sex, ethnicity, age and so forth, there are also sys-
temic ‘errors’ or changes in group affiliation (Table 8.4), which could be 
attributed to the performative aspects of identification described previ-
ously. About 73 per cent of indigenes were positioned in the same group, 
while 26 per cent shifted their identification to mestizo. Controlling by 
sex, 27 per cent of surveyed indigenous women identified as mestizo in 
the 2013/14 wave, compared with 26 per cent for men. Identification as 
white and montubio was much more fluid. The majority of whites (82 per 
cent) identified as mestizo by 2013/14. Only 30 per cent identified within 
the same group, whereas 64 per cent shifted to mestizo for the second 
wave. For this group, sex differences are marked: 66 per cent of montubio 
women shifted to mestizo, whereas for men, this shift was recorded as 62 
per cent. It is also worth noting that 7 per cent of mestizos identified 
themselves as montubio in the 2013/14 wave. Lastly, there is some ambigu-
ity as per the affiliation as Afro-Ecuadorian, a category introduced in 
2013/14 only, with an almost equal share of blacks staying in the ethnic 
group and switching to Afro-Ecuadorian or mestizo. If anything, Table 
8.4 suggests ambivalence in mestizaje, as suggested by Radcliffe (1999).  
As a means to complement the official employment survey data pre-
sented above, Table 8.5 presents cross-tabulated data on the number of 
registered BDH recipients between 2005 and 2014 obtained from MIES-
MCDS administrative records, and information on ethnic self-identifica-
tion as reported in the SELBEN survey of 2008 (also known as the pov-
erty census). It can be noted that the great bulk of recipients are mestizo, 
a consistent trend throughout the period, followed by indigenous and mon-
tubio populations—notwithstanding a significant difference. Information 
for 2008, the year in which the referenced SELBEN was fielded, is not 
consistent with previous or later years. Most striking is the high number 
of missing values and duplicates for this year, including the same ID num-
bers recorded repeatedly during the year. With each SELBEN survey, 
there is considerable reshuffling of the target population and changes in 
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their eligibility status. As noted by Araujo et al., ‘36 percent of all house-
holds in the first poverty census had scores that placed them within 5 
points of the cut-off that determined eligibility for transfers. Among these 
households, 46 percent of those eligible for transfers by the first poverty 
census became ineligible, and 42 percent of households who were ineligi-
ble became eligible’ (2016, p. 7). 
Table 8.5 BDH effective recipients by reported ethnic group 2005–2014 
Ethnic group 
Number effective recipients* per year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Indigenous 
 
105,782  
 
120,636  
 
132,965  
 
47,133  
 
181,623  
 
207,445  
 
213,213  
 
209,813  
 
168,144  
 
145,095  
Montubio 
 
75,584  
 
84,942  
 
90,488  
 
31,612  
 
153,586  
 
163,978  
 
167,718  
 
169,961  
 
131,004  
 
131,763  
White 
 
28,361  
 
31,132  
 
33,126  
 
11,806  
 
52,531  
 
55,080  
 
55,960  
 
58,076  
 
44,591  
 
44,527  
Mestizo 
 
589,321  
 
647,883  
 
687,658  
 
242,313  
 
1,064,096  
 
1,081,423  
 
1,088,757  
 
1,124,951  
 
862,815  
 
847,570  
Black 
 
20,150  
 
22,690  
 
24,464  
 
8,591  
 
41,121  
 
43,535  
 
43,580  
 
43,969  
 
34,263  
 
31,762  
Mulatto 
 
14,199  
 
15,826  
 
17,020  
 
5,991  
 
26,986  
 
27,991  
 
27,783  
 
28,280  
 
21,666  
 
21,005  
Other 
 
2,203  
 
2,461  
 
2,575  
 
871  
 
3,882  
 
3,968  
 
3,995  
 
4,100  
 
3,063  
 
3,054  
Subtotal 
(SELBEN only) 
 
835,600  
 
925,570  
 
988,296  
 
348,317  
 
1,523,825  
 
1,583,420  
 
1,601,006  
 
1,639,150  
 
1,265,546  
 
1,224,776  
Not in 
SELBEN 
 
193,033  
 
175,853  
 
177,852  
 
62,451  
 
179,046  
 
134,321  
 
158,207  
 
209,057  
 
154,061  
 
177,810  
Total  
 
1,028,633  
 
1,101,423  
 
1,166,148  
 
410,768  
 
1,702,871  
 
1,717,741  
 
1,759,213  
 
1,848,207  
 
1,419,607  
 
1,402,586  
Note: Number of recipients who effectively received BDH transfers in the referenced year (as 
recorded in MIES administrative registries). 
Source: MIES-MCDS administrative records 2005–14, calculations by the author. 
 
According to Table 8.5, among those who effectively received BDH trans-
fers ever year, mestizo amounts for more than 70 per cent of total recipi-
ents per year, followed by indigenous (around 12 per cent) and montubio 
women (around 11 per cent). Estimates for the female population only, as 
indicated in Table 8.6, follow the same ethnic-based stratification de-
scribed in Table 8.5. The number of black and mulatto female BDH re-
cipients is much lower, though consistent with national demographics.6 
Comparing these figures with the total female population recorded in the 
last population census (2010), the allocation of the BDH transfers does 
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not follow overall population proportions. Instead, black women report 
the highest share of BDH recipients reported in 2010: of the total popu-
lation, 56 per cent are cash transfer recipients. This is followed by indige-
nous women with 36 per cent and montubio women with 26 per cent. White 
women and mestizo women, in the aggregate, report the lowest percentage 
of BDH recipients, 10 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. 
Table 8.6 Female BDH effective recipients by reported ethnic group  
2005–2014 
 Number effective recipients* per year 
Ethnic group 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Indigenous 
101
,268 
112
,572 
120
,108 
41,
692 
158,
989 
177,
894 
181,
267 
177,
235 
143,
555 
119
,352 
Montubio 
70,
623 
77,
236 
80,
680 
27,
657 
124,
719 
128,
630 
129,
846 
130,
347 
103,
299 
98,
940 
White 
26,
485 
29,
057 
30,
389 
10,
648 
45,4
92 
45,3
09 
45,2
21 
46,3
41 
36,2
35 
34,
668 
Mestizo 
554
,551 
605
,883 
632
,954 
218
,949 
929,
896 
897,
944 
888,
870 
906,
173 
710,
298 
665
,494 
Black 
19,
132 
21,
422 
22,
743 
7,8
63 
36,4
74 
37,2
80 
36,8
71 
36,9
67 
29,3
92 
26,
224 
Mulatto 
13,
527 
15,
041 
15,
974 
5,5
24 
24,2
62 
24,1
44 
23,6
13 
23,8
25 
18,6
02 
17,
389 
Other 
2,1
13 
2,3
22 
2,4
04 798 
3,43
2 
3,32
2 
3,28
3 
3,33
0 
2,57
3 
2,4
34 
Subtotal 
(SELBEN only) 
787
,699 
863
,533 
905
,252 
313
,131 
1,32
3,264 
1,31
4,523 
1,30
8,971 
1,32
4,218 
1,04
3,954 
964
,501 
Note: Number of recipients who effectively received BDH transfers in the referenced year (as 
recorded in MIES administrative registries). 
Source: MIES-MCDS administrative records 2005–14, calculations by the author. 
 
As illustrated above, if there is a bias against BDH recipients, it is likely 
to run from employment towards social protection: segregation in em-
ployment is translated into the social protection system. Overlaps between 
individual qualifiers that result in employment segregation but are related 
to inclusion in the BDH programme result in an institutionalisation of 
segregation, which denotes processes that either generate or deepen (so-
cial) difference. This means that the configuration of the social protection 
system in Ecuador permits the grouping of populations that are subject to 
segregation in the labour market. 
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In addition, although the contemporary Ecuadorian state, almost two 
centuries after independence, has distanced itself from ‘the colonial rule’, 
operating instead through discourses of citizenship and social rights, the 
stratification of the labour market and inequalities in access to social pro-
tection in Ecuador carry much of the sex- and ethnicity-based differentia-
tion inherited from the colonial past. Although this is not the central focus 
of the dissertation, the institutionalisation of social protection in Ecuador 
cannot be oblivious to the influence of the colonial rule which, as in other 
colonised territories, ‘operated by setting up visible, rigid, and hierarchical 
distinctions between the colonizers and the colonized. The physical and 
symbolic separation of the races was deemed necessary to maintain social 
distance and authority over subject peoples’ (Mohanty, 1991, p. 17). This 
social distance can be ‘transmuted to a moral plane’ (ibid.), legitimising the 
regulation of colonised territories and, more central to my argument, in-
forming the provision of social welfare. 
Radcliffe’s conceptualisation of social heterogeneity is useful in under-
standing ‘the continuously reproduced and ubiquitous existence of com-
plex lines of social hierarchy and meaningful difference’ (Radcliffe, 2015c, 
p. 13) evidenced in the Ecuadorian context. As the author explains, social 
heterogeneity7 is ‘used to refer to social distinctions arising through myriad 
power relations and inequalities’ (Radcliffe, 2015c, p. 282). This interpre-
tation differs from conventional analysis focused on separate individual 
qualifiers such as condition of poverty, sex, age and so forth, and instead 
emphasises relations of power. Radcliffe focuses on how these social hi-
erarchies are theorised, both on material and discursive levels. On the ma-
terial level, Radcliffe’s analysis speaks of the manifestations of poverty and 
marginalisation discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. With regard to the discur-
sive aspect, it counters the simplification and categorisation of subjects as 
‘target populations’ or ‘dependent recipients’, as discussed in Chapters 4 
and 7.   
Social heterogeneity has concrete manifestations in terms of access to 
resources and opportunities, in particular employment opportunities. Oc-
cupational sex segregation is built on social difference across men and 
women.Members of different social categories—men and women, mes-
tizo and indigenous, formal and informal, teenage mothers and childless 
elderly populations—are assimilated into employment and provided social 
protection in different ways. These processes do not necessarily imply a 
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direct pervasive bias against any of these populations. That is to say, dis-
crimination can occur even with ‘neutral’ preferences in terms of gender 
or ethnicity (Dymski, 2005). If there is a strong correlation between the 
affiliation to certain groups, for example BDH recipients, and some of the 
features that would generally affect their eligibility for paid work, for ex-
ample being female with dependent children, low educational level and 
number of years of experience, then there is a high chance of unintended 
bias against such groups (BDH recipients). This could be theorised, fol-
lowing Dymski, as a result of the association with a certain category rather 
than deliberate personal discrimination or bigotry—although the latter 
might take place as well.  
In theorisations of job allocation, individual members of the labour 
pool compete for a limited number of (formal) jobs. Jobs should be allo-
cated to individuals on the basis of education, training and experience. In 
practice, however, and since labour markets do not operate in a vacuum, 
aspects of social regulation determine the actual allocation of jobs. Women 
of a certain age and ethnic background are subject to structural disparities 
in access to employment, as they are associated with lower educational 
levels and inadequate training (they are more likely to work in the lower 
tier of the informal sector anyway). Following this logic, it is likely that 
poor women cannot accumulate sufficient experience: they are the ‘last 
hired and first fired’. According to a vicious logic, they are less likely to be 
chosen for formal jobs and more likely to be absorbed into non-traditional 
social protection schemes, such as the BDH. Although this is an overly 
simplified and deterministic narrative, it helps illustrate how social dis-
crimination exacerbates disparities in access to employment and social 
protection.  
8.5.1 Blurring lines: urban bias or marginalisation? 
Processes of marginalisation have persisted in the different commodity 
cycles experienced in the country. An alternative interpretation of the 
making of marginality can relate this back to state formation, class and 
ethnicity. In this context, and following Wacquant, the making of margin-
ality pertains to ‘the multilevel structural processes whereby persons are 
selected, thrust, and maintained in marginal locations, as well as the social 
webs and cultural forms they subsequently develop therein’ (2015, p. 247). 
What Larrea and North identified in the 1990s as an urban bias in policy 
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making (1997) can be supplemented with an analysis of the structural pro-
cesses that have pushed and continue pushing populations onto the mar-
gins of formal employment, and thus, the margins of substantive (social) 
citizenship. 
It was noticeable that a significant number of (one-time and current) 
female recipients living in the cities had strong links with the agrarian sec-
tor. In conversations with different generations of women (that is, grand-
mother, mother and daughter) the issue of land started to emerge. Older 
generations mentioned how they migrated from the rural areas to the city, 
combining subsistence agrarian production with sporadic employment in 
the informal sector or domestic work. Younger generations were already 
established in the city, but kept linkages with their families in rural areas 
and would return to them when working in the city became difficult. Ten-
sions with the BDH targeting scheme resulted from this. Due to their high 
rural–urban mobility, some women missed official household visits in the 
context of Registro Social. Others were deemed non-eligible due to late 
projects of legalisation (and associated funding) of their landholdings. Be-
ing in possession of land, in the logic of the BDH programme, is recorded 
as an improvement in the economic profile of the household, with little 
consideration of actual improvement of agricultural production. Many 
women (and households) were marked as non-eligible, thus ignoring the 
historical process of relegation that pushed landless workers, many of 
them of indigenous background, to the cities.  
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Illustration 8.5 Street vendors in Loja, various generations (2013) 
 
When asked whether her family had access to BDH transfers, an elderly 
woman interviewed in Loja answered with a candid smile ‘sí, recibimos el de 
desarrollo’ (yes, we receive the development one) (Interviewee-P, 2013). She 
recalled how the transfer increased from US$35 to US$50, adding ‘no al-
canza [it is not enough], he [her husband] is sick, our youngest daughter 
lives with us […] she gave birth to a premature child and now she cannot 
work’ (ibid.). She worked in agriculture, harvesting peanuts. With her in-
come she maintained her husband—who showed signs of senility—her 
daughter and her newborn granddaughter: ‘trabajo como el hombre de la casa’ 
(I work like the man of the house) (ibid.). She had to finance her daughter’s 
caesarean section and transfer to the city’s hospital. Her second daughter, 
who was constantly moving between her partner’s place and her mother’s, 
seldom helped them. None of the girls were BDH recipients, and she 
thought this was because they were still registered under her address—a 
small rural landholding. Blind spots—or what economists denote as ex-
clusion errors—in the targeting scheme let these young women fall 
through the cracks. 
A younger woman was sitting across the waiting room at a public centre 
in Loja, waiting for her turn. Her youngest son was complaining of severe 
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stomach aches. She also used to work in agriculture, but the landowner 
had asked her to leave his property. Since then, she had been constantly 
changing residency together with her seven children. She put together 
some income doing laundry and cleaning houses. In the early morning, 
she would leave the kids at one of the MIES childcare centres—she indi-
cated this was not a service free of cost but that she had to pay a monthly 
fee of US$15—and would pick them up by 4 p.m. Then, she would be just 
in time to help the oldest children with their homework, although some-
times she would bring them along to the houses where she worked and 
ask them to help her with cleaning and such. She mentioned: ‘there is pub-
lic [gratuita] education, but school activities are costly […] and we do not 
have enough’ (Interviewee-J, 2013). Her oldest son had dropped out of 
school and was working as a bus helper: ‘he gives me some money, but it 
is not enough’ (ibid.).  
Days later, the author met another woman, close to her sixties, who 
used to be in the BDH programme but had recently been ‘graduated’:  
I legalised the lote [landholding] where I was living, I guess that is why I do 
not get any BDH money any more […] I insisted, visited the MIES offices 
on three occasions, but they did not give me a clear answer. I guess it is 
because of this lote. But I live in a one-room house, together with my daugh-
ters […] see, they are single mothers, too. They have recently started work-
ing as caretakers of the neighbouring property, they are allowed to move in 
to a room in there, they have spare rooms. I guess we are going to stay there 
until the landowner kicks us out. (Interviewee-O, 2013) 
She worked next to Zaruma (a mining area on the border between the 
provinces of Loja and El Oro) cutting wood for a fixed rate of US$5 a 
day: ‘it’s hard work. You ruin your clothes, your shoes, your hands’ (Inter-
viewee-O, 2013). She landed this job via the landowner, who put her in 
contact with a broker. She did not know her employer: ‘every week we 
have to insist and insist for him [the broker] to pay us: some weeks he 
gives us US$10, others US$20’ (ibid.). She did not know about fixed em-
ployees; every week new people would join, up to 30 workers, and some-
times they would be reduced to six workers: ‘no estamos asegurados’ (we are 
not insured) (ibid.). 
Lastly, in an interview with an elderly couple, street vendors in Loja 
(Interviewees-C-D, 2013), they mentioned how they used to work in agri-
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culture, but when the production in the area decreased and once their chil-
dren had left home and were no longer contributing with their own work 
to the household economy, they were forced to venture into the city and 
try to earn a living by selling homemade sweets, bocadillos and alfeñique, at 
the age of 70. It was a lousy business idea: just a few metres away, well-
established shops were offering similar products. Yet they saw a window 
of opportunity in their locations, as they could stay on the streets and catch 
customers as they passed by. The author returned to the street corner 
where they were selling their products and noticed that some people would 
actually buy from them, but based on the interactions and volume of busi-
ness, it seemed more like an act of compassion than purely transactional. 
Since they did not have formal jobs in their pre-retirement age, they were 
not entitled to a retirement pension, nor did they qualify as BDH recipi-
ents, as the wife did not hold a valid ID: ‘I don’t get it, they asked me to 
bring two cédulas: a citizenship one, and another as disabled […] and that 
was all, they didn’t give me the bono. See, they offer things, but at the end, 
nothing happens. They just tell you “come back later”, and later, again 
nothing’ (Interviewees-C-D, 2013). As a result, they had to continue in the 
city as informal workers.  
Another elderly woman was found queuing with her grandson, seeking 
medical attention at the public hospital in Loja. She had severe back pain 
after months of working as a wood collector for a big corporation in the 
north of the province. Although she had stopped working for about 15 
years, after her husband got sick she had to look for a job to support her 
family, including her daughter’s children. She was 72 years old: ‘I was a 
father and a mother at the same time [when her husband fell ill]. Now that 
my daughter got a child and has no support, I have to provide for the two 
of them as well’ (Interviewee-Q, 2013). Often, when studying informal 
employment, attention is focused on pre-retirement security, severance 
payments and access to health services. However, informality has im-
portant implications for post-retirement welfare, as noted in the previous 
quote. Amongst the poorest strata, informal workers cannot accumulate 
for a pension, and are compelled to stay in (or return to) the labour force 
after retirement age to secure a living. Actually, the late emphasis on grad-
uation of mothers from the cash transfer programme together with the 
inclusion of more of the old-age population can be seen as a responsive 
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measure to post-retirement age poverty, in order to provide some protec-
tion to people who did not contribute to a pension system in the past 
because they were informal workers.  
8.6 Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this chapter has had to circumvent problems of 
data availability due to the intermittence of ethnicity in social policy, re-
lated to, on the one hand, collective efforts demanding recognition and 
self-representation in reporting race and ethnicity; and, on the other hand, 
the ability of the state to respond to these demands and officially register 
and visualise fluid racial categories. Although this kind of prejudice and 
relegation is less frequent in current policy making, economic inequalities 
continue affecting the position in women. This is particularly the case with 
regard to access to land and formal employment; where patterns of segre-
gation further relegate women of minorities. It is worth asking whether 
state efforts to address this situation—note that the Ecuadorian Constitu-
tion of 2008 ‘explicitly names racism, ongoing colonialism, affirmative ac-
tion, and restorative reparation—and their interrelation’ (Walsh, 2015, p. 
29)—can in practice tackle the gendered (CEPAL, 2013) and racialised 
dimensions of poverty (Ponce Jarrín & Acosta Espinosa, 2010) and exclu-
sion (Radcliffe, 2015a). There is a discernible difference in access to social 
protection related to the agrarian past often associated with indigenous 
background. The distancing from the ‘rural question’ associated with indi-
geneity, for instance, results in a contradictory assessment of informality 
and precariousness, whereby urban informal employment arrangements 
are seen as resulting from individual choices or celebrated as entrepreneur-
ial capacity instead of being informed by historical processes of relegation. 
At an institutional level, the tensions and trajectories presented in this 
chapter and the accompanying narratives of recipients and social workers 
provide a rather messy picture of the changes introduced to the social pro-
tection system in Ecuador. These changes cannot be reduced to mecha-
nisms of co-option—although some elements are present, in particular 
with regard to women’s positioning vis-à-vis the state—nor to careful 
planning following a results-oriented rationale. Internal contradictions ac-
companied these changes at different layers of policy implementation. The 
result is a population that has been exposed to various bureaucratic ration-
alities, not always able to catch up with the changes in the system, but still 
navigating it.  
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Notes 
1 The authors subscribe to what they identify as a Weberian explanation, whereby 
pre-industrial families—thus dealing with states in the North—are interpreted as 
independent economic production units, operating without state regulation and 
protection. With the industrial revolution and resulting urbanisation, the authors 
argue, the state became more active in the provision of welfare to families (Ullman 
et al., 2014). As discussed in Chapter 2, however, this type of narrative can be 
deemed applicable to the European context mostly, as most Latin American coun-
tries were under the colonial rule, and thus governed by different economic and 
moral rationalities, affecting the configuration of families. 
2 See also Filgueira et al. (2011). 
3 The most recently consulted figures indicate a total of 60,000 recipient mothers 
effectively affiliated to contributory social insurance. 
4 Where racialisation ‘refers to power relations that attribute racial difference to 
certain populations in ways that naturalize race as a system of social difference’ 
(Radcliffe, 2015, p. 3). 
5 When fielding my own survey with the help of research assistants, identification 
with various ethnic groups changed according to the positioning of the enumera-
tor, with more respondents identifying themselves as white if the interviewer was 
perceived as black, whereas mestizo interviewers would find most respondents 
identifying themselves as mestizo too (Fieldwork 2013). 
6 According to the last census data (2010), the female population can be divided 
into 73% mestizo, 7% indigenous, 6% white, 4% Afro-Ecuadorian, 1% black, and 
2% mulatto (values rounded to integer numbers, calculations by the author based 
on INEC-REDATAM data). 
7 The author argues it is precisely the emphasis on power that distinguishes social 
heterogeneity from intersectionality, which she seems to be confined to the recog-
nition of diversity. 
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9 Conclusions 
 
 
9.1  A matter of choice? From perverse incentives to 
structural constraints 
This dissertation has shed new light on the interconnectedness between 
informality and social protection in Ecuador. The research focused on the 
question of whether and how recent social protection policy initiatives 
have reinforced labour market informality, adjusted to the existing high 
prevalence of informality or reduced the degree of informality. A main 
conclusion is that the transformative capacity of the current social protec-
tion system has proven to be very limited. It has only marginally addressed 
existing inequalities in the labour market and has not altered the degree of 
informality in any substantive way.   
Traditional schemes of contributory social protection established dur-
ing the twentieth century in Ecuador failed to cover the vast majority of 
workers (and their families) in informal and unstable employment. Enti-
tlements were restricted to a minority of workers with formal sector jobs. 
New social protection schemes, cash transfer programmes in particular, 
aimed to provide social protection for the poor and those left out by tra-
ditional social security mechanisms. The first CT programme, Bono Soli-
dario, was introduced in the late 1990s. Its successor, the Bono de Desar-
rollo Humano, became the pillar of Ecuador’s social protection system, 
providing at its peak in 2012 income support to over 1 million households, 
which, multiplied by the average household size, represented about 40 per 
cent the country’s population. Targeted at the poor working outside of the 
formal sector, the programme was designed to adapt to the existing high 
degree of informality in the labour market.   
Critics of the programme have pointed to the perverse incentives that 
non-traditional social protection schemes could generate. Recipients 
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would be inclined to reduce work efforts or stop searching for better jobs 
because they could rely on a regular cash benefit without directly contrib-
uting to the funding of the programme and without having a taxable job. 
The present research finds that this perversity argument is largely mis-
placed. Whereas many studies have reported higher inactivity rates or 
prevalence of informal employment among recipients, this research finds 
that such labour market response is not so much caused by access to CTs, 
but rather is a result of prevailing labour market structures, for example 
segregation, which limit the access of impoverished populations (many of 
them informal sector workers) to the formal labour market segment. Stud-
ies associating informality with non-contributory social protection confuse 
the direction of causality. In effect, the expansion of the cash transfer pro-
gramme in Ecuador has had little to no impact on the degree of informality 
during the 2000s and early 2010s, as evidenced by the analysis of the em-
ployment data presented in Chapters 6 and 7. Given the structural imped-
iments to accessing formal sector jobs, approaches that assume free ra-
tional choices by individual workers regarding where to move in the labour 
market are bound to misjudge any influence that the receipt of social ben-
efits would have on occupational shifts. And while recent policies and in-
itiatives have come a long way in tackling the most salient practices of 
discrimination prevalent in the structuring of the labour force, in terms of 
access to secure employment and social rights, significant divides prevail. 
The study of informality as an analytical category helped expose the 
problems faced by the state in the categorisation and regulation of income-
generating activities, hence problematising the state’s realm of regulation 
(Harriss-White, 2010). Examined in the context of broader employment 
structures and the delimitation of formal work, the study of informality 
also spoke of diverging processes of labour commodification (Esping-An-
dersen, 1990), simultaneous projects of codification of labour (Drinot, 
2011) and categories of social difference (Radcliffe, 2015c). It should be 
noted that the problem of integration of populations into formal employ-
ment and derived benefits is not exclusive to Ecuador. The processes of 
informalisation and marginalisation mapped out in southern Ecuador are 
hardly unique. Previous research on women and informality (as per the 
scholarly work produced in the 1980s in this particular connection) has 
highlighted similar processes of marginalisation of women in relation to 
the informal economy and how these erode the social and economic base 
(Mies, 1982).  
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9.2 A reactive social protection system: adapting to 
informality  
As shown in the preceding chapters, the stratification of the labour market 
was accompanied by an incremental fragmentation, even bifurcation, of 
social welfare provision. This perpetuated the processes of marginalisation 
amongst disadvantaged workers,1 most of them in informal employment.  
In the late 1990s, when the first CT programme was set up in the coun-
try, the level of informalisation, expansion of self-employment and stag-
nation of job growth in the formal sector (and the industrial sector in par-
ticular) was significant. Scholarly work revisited in Chapter 2, and evidence 
provided in Chapters 6 and 7, supported the claim that the design of the 
new forms of social protection programmes was a response to existing 
labour market structures and outcomes. Existing patterns of employment 
affect the distribution of income, economic security and risk throughout 
the economy, with significant implications for social policy, a finding con-
sistent with the work of Heintz and Lund (2012). Informalisation has been 
associated with greater labour income inequalities (Amsden, 2010; Ams-
den & van der Hoeven, 1996; van der Hoeven, 2010) and has slowly but 
surely informed the way in which social protection is designed and imple-
mented in such contexts. Social protection systems play a key role in 
changing the distribution of income and employment outcomes. As intro-
duced in the literature review provided in Chapter 3, further discussed in 
the light of the institutional trajectories of labour regulation and welfare 
provision provided in the historical account of Chapter 2, and comple-
mented with the empirical analysis presented in Chapters 6 and 7, infor-
mality is directly and structurally connected to the formal economy.  
Yet next to this expansion of non-traditional social protection schemes, 
the prevalence of informalisation of employment has been accompanied 
by a weakening influence of employers and workers on social policy 
(Lund, 2009).2 It is plausible that the adoption of non-contributory social 
assistance helped shift the risk and responsibilities away from the employ-
ers towards the employees themselves, as suggested by the emphasis on 
self-improvement that CT programmes usually put on recipients and best 
illustrated in interviews with recipient domestic workers, one of the most 
vulnerable occupations when it comes to non-observance of labour regu-
lations given that activities take place within private homes. When employ-
ers do not follow labour regulations and workers do not have much option 
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but to engage in activities with fewer derived entitlements, informal em-
ployment becomes even more vulnerable. If the state fills these gaps with 
residual assistance programmes instead of fulfilling an actual distributive 
role, distributive claims are less likely to emerge. This finding could explain 
the lower levels of mobilisation amongst recipients, understanding social 
class as political agent in the configuration of welfare state regimes 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). The adaptation of social protection systems to 
the stratified structure of the labour market, for example the expansion of 
non-contributory social protection, may pre-empt collective claims for a 
fairer distribution of job opportunities and working conditions. 
The emphasis on structural informality and stratification of the labour 
market permitted the analysis of social protection systems in relation to 
employment structures. The study of social protection in Ecuador re-
quired special attention to the changing role of the state in terms of em-
ployment creation, regulation, codification and protection. Following the 
different institutional trajectories of social protection, as discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4, a case is made for the hasty formulations and contradic-
tory outcomes of state-provided social protection in Ecuador, which met 
with genuine efforts to organise and extend the formal employment base. 
Policies and programmes to expand social protection and regulate employ-
ment relations in Ecuador have been put in place with the main objective 
of expanding formal employment, that is, integrating informal workers 
into full formal (or modern) employment and extending derived entitle-
ments such as access to the IESS contributory regime. It should be 
stressed that, since the late 1990s, the state has advanced important re-
forms to extend social protection to informal workers. The creation of the 
BDH programme, as discussed in Chapter 4, constituted a step towards 
providing income support to informal workers, or more specifically, to 
provide targeted social protection regardless of recipients’ employment 
status. Given the high levels of inactivity and labour informality, these 
programmes played an equalising role in terms of income inequality. Yet 
this shift in social protection cannot be seen as an effort to formalise re-
cipients either. These processes raise new lines of inquiry regarding 
whether it is realistic to assign a transformative capacity, for example 
changing labour attachment patterns, to non-contributory social protec-
tion programmes alone. 
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9.3 Recasting state–family relations within the context of 
social protection 
With the expansion of the BDH programme, employment and social pro-
tection relations were recast, by providing the option of non-employment-
derived social benefits. By design, CCTs target those excluded from for-
mal employment with no access to contributory schemes, and thus with 
no cushion against shocks—including employment-related vulnerabilities. 
Recipient households are provided extra cash as temporary income sup-
port, which is aimed at preventing them from underinvesting in their chil-
dren. Down the line, the state and the family were also reconnected with 
the expansion of the BDH, since transfers are almost exclusively handed 
to women, with the intention to provide them with an independent source 
of income and secure the benefits of investing in their children’s human 
capital. In practice, state and family were reconnected under a child-cen-
tred logic. As noted by Molyneux, ‘even as women might be marginally 
“empowered” within these structures [CCT programmes] (through man-
aging the subsidy), such programmes in effect reinforce the social divi-
sions through which gender asymmetries are reproduced’ (2006, p. 438). 
The success of CCT programme depends on women fulfilling their tradi-
tional roles within the household, and offers a limited scope for levering 
the position of women outside the household.  
Paradoxically, although CCTs are rather conservative in their framing 
of state–family relations, as noted above, they are also accompanied by 
criticism along the lines of welfare dependency, for example reduction of 
paid work among recipients. As CCTs are targeted at mothers, assuming 
they will better use the money for their children, they are likely to reach a 
segment of the labour market categorised as ‘dependents’. More often that 
not recipient mothers are associated with lower job search effort and 
higher inactivity rates. Such accounts continue to assume the universality 
of ‘male wage labour’ (Ferguson, 2015, pp. 41–3) which together with the 
CCTs would finance women’s lower paid employment levels. That is why, 
parallel to the adoption of the CCT model, it is possible to identify the 
emergence of a discursive category: the dependent female recipient, a normative 
label for women in poverty who are dependent on state support for the 
continuation of their caring role within the household. Women’s care 
work, as noted by feminist sociologists, is in most situations considered to 
be non-work and therefore open to unrestricted control and utilisation 
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(Mies, 1982). CCTs exemplify the naturalisation of women’s work as car-
ers. In the light of these arguments, CCTs appear as restricted instruments 
for the adequate levering of women’s position in the labour market and 
vis-à-vis the state, inasmuch as women continue to be seen in their condi-
tion of poverty instead of as citizens (granted rights and entitlements). 
The importance of families and mothers in the workings of state-pro-
vided social protection has been previously acknowledged in research. The 
adoption of cash transfers has been accompanied by a vast number of 
impact evaluation studies that focus on family-level and/or household-
level expected effects of cash transfers such as nutrition and school at-
tendance. Although this is a welcome development in the scholarship, at-
tentive to household dynamics and aimed at improving the functioning of 
these programmes, these studies often see the outcomes as related to in-
dividual features instead of as systemic. This dissertation was preoccupied 
with examining state–family relations beyond the stated objectives of CT 
programmes and situating them in the structure in which they operate. 
This included accounts that questioned the moral ground on which the 
provision of social protection rests—indirectly or otherwise—as it per-
tains to women’s roles across different age cohorts and different ethnic 
groups.  
Until quite recently gender perspectives on social protection had re-
mained on the margins of mainstream research. Following Razavi and 
Hassim, this dissertation has joined the body of literature that is pushing 
gender more towards the centre of the study of social protection ‘by ex-
posing how the social institutions through which social policy is filtered 
are all indelibly bearers of gender––be it families and communities, mar-
kets, informal arrangements for care, or health and education systems, and 
the public sector’ (2006, p. XV). In the particular connection of social pro-
tection with employment, a gender perspective was crucial to understand 
the extent to which gender-based inequalities perpetuate informality and 
segregation in the labour market, eroding women’s job opportunities, 
wages and income, but also constraining access to state-provided protec-
tion and support. As noted by the authors: ‘[w]omen’s unpaid care work 
continues to form the bedrock on which social protection is subsidized, 
with erosions in state provisioning impacting most strongly on women’ 
(ibid.). My research has provided additional insights into the ways in which 
unpaid care work, formal paid work and social protection are related. 
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Despite the centrality of women as recipients of CCTs, their position-
ing is rather ambivalent, as noted in studies and documents pertaining to 
targeted social protection presented in Chapter 4 and complemented in 
Chapter 8. Some studies interpret these interventions as empowering poor 
women, whereas others point towards gendered contradictions prevalent 
in these schemes. In this dissertation it is argued that the interpretation 
cannot be reduced to gender. It is not only their position as (recipient) 
women that might affect their position in the labour market, but also 
broader processes of social difference marked along the axes of age and 
ethnicity, thus showing a variety of outcomes amongst recipients. These 
can be interpreted as relational axes,3 exacerbating social differences that 
are marked across social groups. Future research could pay closer atten-
tion to the intersectionality of gender with age and ethnicity, an intersec-
tion that was explored in this dissertation but that requires a closer exam-
ination in terms of its historical grounding and assimilation into the 
institutional framework guiding welfare provisioning. This could shed 
light on other processes that affect the efficacy and level of inclusiveness 
of current social protection provisions.  
9.4 Institutionalised segregation: implicit biases in the 
provision of social protection 
A final layer of the analysis was motivated by the need to historically 
ground the analysis of social protection systems. Chapters 2 and 3 traced 
the development of the social through recent Ecuadorian history, flagging 
the contingencies that led to the current configuration of the cash transfer 
programme that is operative in Ecuador. Early traditions in the field of 
social protection, as they emerged in the global North, had revolved 
around the welfare state. Along these lines, scholarly work has debated the 
state’s responsibility to secure basic welfare for its citizens. Discourses of 
social citizenship have also informed notions of social provisioning and 
the capacity of the state to grant social rights. Yet, as argued by Ferguson 
(2015, p. 68), the institutional apparatus of the social described in these 
accounts was only partly established in the global South. Studies support-
ing the perversity argument have been strongly criticised for adopting a 
Eurocentric perspective, approaching the recent turn towards targeted so-
cial assistance as the epitome of a failed structural transformation, a lag-
ging-behind in terms of welfare provision in the South or an incomplete 
modernisation of labour. The discussion of social provisioning in the 
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global South thus invites ‘new sorts of historical narratives to understand 
the contemporary struggles around distribution’ (2015, p. 68), understand-
ing and situating how we think about welfare in historically specific con-
figurations, and re-assessing the resulting provisioning systems.  
Whilst grounding the analysis of social protection historically and in 
relation to (intra)national developments, this work also placed it in a con-
text of globalisation, as per dominant conceptualisations of social protec-
tion as social risk management, now extended by approaches informed by 
human needs and capabilities frameworks. The Ecuadorian CTs are often 
depicted as part of a new embrace of risk management, resulting from the 
dissemination of the cash transfer model in Latin America by the end of 
the 1990s. While these programmes mimic global and regional develop-
ments in social policy, they also have deep roots in specific social and po-
litical national history. Chapters 2 and 3 integrated these global and local 
forces, shedding light on how the practices of social protection came to 
be and have taken the form they have. A critical revision of the genealogy 
of the social in Ecuador helped to historicise and situate the formulation 
of the BDH and also to re-evaluate the outcomes attributed to it.  
In the evaluation of the persistence of informality, ongoing processes 
of marginalisation of poor women in the labour market and state efforts 
to mitigate these processes were revisited from an institutional perspec-
tive. These processes could be seen as contingent on power relations4 that 
have permeated existing institutional practices, legislation and state poli-
cies. This work revisited these institutional histories, locating the current 
bifurcated systems of welfare provision in a context of segregated labour 
markets. This bifurcation is best exemplified by the coexistence of entitle-
ments derived from formal employment next to temporary interventions 
aimed at poor families and informal workers. 
In the process, the research suggested the existence of an unintended 
bias in the design of social protection systems. The mechanism usually 
runs from employment towards social protection: segregation in employ-
ment is translated into the social protection system. Overlaps between 
qualifiers that result in segregation and the criteria of BDH eligibility might 
have resulted in the institutionalisation of segregation, as discussed in 
Chapters 7 and 8. The institutionalisation of segregation denotes social 
processes that either generate or deepen difference. If the configuration 
of the social protection system allows for the grouping of populations that 
are subject to marginalisation in the labour market, under the category of 
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BDH recipients, sole income support will not fix and might perpetuate 
gender-based inequalities. In this regard, if there is an institutional bias 
against BDH recipients, it is plausible that it occurs without intent. How-
ever, if social protection policies and programmes are aimed at decreasing 
structural disparities, there is a need to acknowledge that redistribution of 
resources and opportunities is largely conditioned by these categories of 
social difference, which operate at a more systemic level.  
In sum, if social protection can be used to push the boundaries of re-
distribution, there is a need for a critical reflection on the broader context 
within which it operates. The challenge for scholars and policy makers is 
to locate this reflection in current discussions in the field of social protec-
tion. It is worth noting that the predominant technocratic character of the 
discussion obscures claims related to historical compensation, rights or 
discrimination. Once more, this work is appreciative of the empirical evi-
dence collected over the years of design and implementation of the BDH 
programme, which, for instance, tests implementation modalities and as-
sesses social and economic impacts. However, there is an emerging ten-
sion between the maintenance of these sorts of ‘technical’ instruments and 
their political viability. Since the provision of cash transfers and accompa-
nying reforms to contributory social insurance have not resulted in radical 
changes in the labour market structures in the country, there has not been 
a disruption of the segregated practices that underpin social protection 
provisioning. Instead, as social protection has been expanded through in-
cremental reforms, which have gained some legitimacy amongst the al-
ready visible social groups, claims for a truly transformative social agenda 
prevail. The transformation of social protection systems has met with 
growing concerns, amongst both critical scholarship and civil organisa-
tions, about the social and economic inclusion of marginalised groups and 
the guarantee of their social rights. 
9.5 Cash transfers: neither revolutionary nor perverse 
incentive 
Social protection policies and programmes have the potential to take a 
step toward integrating otherwise excluded groups into social citizenship. 
Depending on the scope, some social protection initiatives might encour-
age formal employment whilst changing the conditions under which pop-
ulations are integrated. This was partly the case in recent reforms to the 
276 CHAPTER 9 
 
Ecuadorian social protection system. There is an unsolved inclusion prob-
lem that has its roots in state provisioning of social protection that is not 
attached to any employment status. Although reforms were conceived to 
benefit recipients and help them lever their situation, these met with a 
strong reaction, amongst academics but also public opinion, along the 
lines of effort and deservedness. It seems that any poor person who re-
ceives state income support is likely to face strong claims on that account, 
mostly framed around discourses of dependency. However, as Ferguson 
(2015) argues, cash transfers do not introduce dependency: the poor are 
always dependent (2015, p. 153). In fact, it is because of relations of de-
pendence that most poor populations can navigate the system, as illus-
trated by the informal care networks operating in peri-urban and rural ter-
ritories, in locations and among populations historically neglected by the 
state. This dependence, nonetheless, is misjudged as inactivity, which in 
productionist logic disregards the various survival strategies of the poor. 
Processes of relegation, which following Wacquant can be seen when an 
individual, population or category is assigned ‘an obscure or inferior posi-
tion, condition or location’ (2015, p. 247), capture these processes and 
challenge the notion of perversity. 
As rigidities still persist in the labour market, they also speak of the 
limitations of the social protection system to transform social relations. 
The expansion of unregulated and unprotected urban employment and a 
passive residual response from the state in the late 1990s led to the relega-
tion of informal workers, many of them women, to the margins, making 
them highly dependent on precarious employment arrangements. State ef-
forts to address problems related to informalisation could not be assem-
bled around a clear logic that could break through the processes that were 
reinforcing them, as exemplified by the parallel processes of inclusion and 
exclusion of populations in social protection systems.  
To make sense of these processes, this work focused on the various 
projects of legibility, understandings of solidarity and (co)responsibility 
that have accompanied most recent social protection alternatives. Pro-
cesses of discrimination and marginalisation, including informalisation, 
not only remained poorly addressed by cash transfer programmes but 
seemed obscured by poverty reduction policies. CTs have a tendency to 
intervene around a single issue and/or feature, for example income sup-
port, without necessarily addressing the diverse axes that limit a substan-
tive integration into social protection schemes. The Bono de Desarrollo 
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Humano serves as a case to understand processes of legibility and their 
consequences for substantive citizenship from the viewpoint of the state. 
In a context marked by exclusion and marginalisation, the state aimed at 
integrating new advances in social protection, following global trends and 
domestic pressures. These contradictory efforts, this work argues, ham-
pered the possibilities to substantially reach and integrate populations in 
the margins of substantive (social) citizenship. 
All things considered, the emphasis on the structural impediments 
faced by recipients and the historical grounding of social protection initi-
atives served the purpose of counterweighing misinformed perversity 
claims, from a theoretical, empirical and normative stance. Processes of 
marginalisation could be further theorised as contingent on relations of 
power that permeate existing institutional practices and state policies. 
There was an initial effort to introduce such analysis in this dissertation, 
with the gradual dislocation of the study of the recipient population and 
the move towards unpacking state rationalities and practices towards the 
populations (recipient or else). The analysis flagged the limitations and 
tensions within policy making, nuancing the perversity argument. Whilst 
the dissertation does not trace a roadmap to tackle these problems, it 
points to the contradictions and tensions in both academic work and pub-
lic opinion, and relates them back to their more normative underpinnings, 
thus problematising the frame for understanding social protection. 
Against a tendency toward depoliticising poverty in social protection 
scholarship, this work has engaged with what would seem to be contra-
dictory agendas, challenging some notions that have guided the design and 
assessment of non-contributory social protection. 
The ethnographic and historical work in this dissertation exposed po-
tential lines of inquiry and exploitable tensions that require further explo-
ration. There is a case to be made for rethinking what social protection 
systems can actually deliver in the Latin American region, the Andes in 
particular. There is a critical potential for more historically grounded and 
qualitative approaches in tandem with evidenced-based policy making, of-
fering insights on how state programmes are conceived and (re)configured 
by the social relations they contain. Returning to the connection between 
social protection and informality, current social protection systems may 
not be conducive to a full formalisation of the labour force, in the light of 
historical contingencies. This work thus joins others in calling for a re-
definition of the nature of social protection in the region, along the lines 
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of the politics of redistribution that could inform its design. It is perhaps 
time to start asking a different set of questions in terms of inclusion, legit-
imacy and appropriateness of social protection initiatives, more in tune 
with the specific problems faced in the South. Targeted social protection 
has been effective in providing households a cushion to hedge against ad-
verse income shocks, and when designed properly, it has led to better out-
comes in terms of human capital, for example in education, health and 
nutrition. However, it could have generated better future employment op-
portunities for recipients. Since this depends on the overall structure of 
the labour market, radical structural economic changes will need to be 
pushed through economic and social policy. Admittedly, such changes 
transcend the compensatory role thus far given to targeted social protec-
tion. 
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Notes
1 In rethinking marginalisation in the context of social policy, it is worth introduc-
ing the work of Spivak, who argues ‘[...] the margins (one can just as well say the 
silent, the silenced center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men 
and women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the urban 
subproletariat’ (Spivak, 1988, p. 25). 
2 Several authors subscribe to this argument, in which informality is interpreted 
as offering clear advantages for capitalist development. See Lund (2009);, Har-
riss-White (2010); Heintz and Lund (2012). 
3 Gender and race are better considered relational terms, as ‘they foreground a rela-
tionship (and often a hierarchy) between races and genders’ (Mohanty, 1991, p. 12). 
This hierarchical nature helps explain aspects of bifurcation or stratification of wel-
fare provision resulting from segregation in the labour market. 
4 These relations are ‘not reducible to binary oppositions or oppressor/oppressed 
relations … it is possible to retain the idea of multiple, fluid structures of domina-
tion which intersect to locate women differently at particular historical conjunc-
tures’ (Mohanty, 1991, p. 13). 
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 Appendices 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 Keeping track of the current debate: ILO’s changing recommen-
dations 
 
Although the concept of informal sector has been waning since its ‘incep-
tion’, most scholars agree that it is relevant insofar as the reality that it tries 
to capture: unprotected employment. This is the shift that, in the last cou-
ple of decades, the ILO has tried to incorporate, developing a more holis-
tic understanding of the informal economy, away from a firm-based defi-
nition and centred around employment relations. Within this process, 
Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) 
has played a critical role, by locating the debate around informal workers, 
women in particular, on account of the large share of the global workforce 
and production that remains outside the world of full-time, stable and pro-
tected employment. 
This was the main motive underlying the change of focus towards the 
work dimension of informality in the 2000s. In 1993, the 15th Interna-
tional Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) defined employment in 
the informal sector as comprising all jobs in informal sector enterprises, 
or all persons who, during a given reference period, were employed in at 
least one informal sector enterprise (Hussmanns, 2004). This definition 
did not consider workers’ status in employment or whether it was their 
main or a secondary job. In 2003, the 17th ICLS established the links be-
tween the concepts of employment in the informal sector, informal em-
ployment and informal economy. The 17th ICLS was also clear on defin-
ing parallel notions, as per the non-observed economy. It specified that 
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informal economy should not be used interchangeably with the concepts 
of illegal/criminal and/or underground economy. Illegal production in-
volves activities that are forbidden by law—they represent a contravention 
of the criminal code. Underground production, on the other hand, is de-
fined as activities that are legal but deliberately concealed from public au-
thorities (Hussmanns, 2004). The reproductive or care economy was not 
included as part of the informal economy as defined by the ILO, as it is 
regarded as taking place outside the market economy (ibid.).  
 In accordance with ICLS recommendations, the informal economy 
should be defined as encompassing ‘all economic activities by workers and 
economic units that are—in law or in practice—not covered or insuffi-
ciently covered by formal arrangements’ (Hussmanns, 2004). The atten-
tion moved away from a firm-based definition of the informal sector to-
wards informal employment, defined as the total number of informal jobs, 
whether carried out in formal and informal sector enterprises, or in house-
holds (ibid.). Table A.1 presents the different job categories by status in 
employment, as recommended by the ILO. Informal employment corre-
sponds to cells 1–6 and 8–10, a greater segment of the informal economy 
when compared with the previous definition: employment in the informal 
sector. The ILO, arguing that they present different aspects of informali-
sation, measures both categories. 
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Table A.1 Job categories by status in employment 
Job by status in employment 
Pro-
duction 
units  
by type 
  
Own-account 
workers Employers 
Con
tributing 
family  
workers 
Employees 
Members of  
producers’  
cooperatives 
In
formal 
For
mal 
In
formal 
For
mal 
In-
formal 
In
formal 
For
mal 
In
formal 
For
mal 
For-
mal sector 
enterprises 
    1 2    
Infor-
mal sector 
enterprises 
3  4  5 6 7 8  
House
holds 9     10    
Note: Cells shaded in light grey refer to formal jobs; un-shaded cells represent the various types 
of informal jobs; and cells shaded in dark grey refer to jobs which, by definition, do not exist 
in the type of production unit in question. 
Source: Hussmanns (2004). 
 
As far as the notion of the informal sector is concerned, confusion about 
its definition and measurement accompanied its use in academic circles, 
not to mention the changing position of the ILO on the appropriate policy 
stance towards it (Standing, 2011). Informal employment, as defined 
above, has much more potential to explain current employment dynamics. 
Yet the concept of informal employment did not settle down with the 
same weight as employment in the informal sector did. As a means of 
illustration, Appendix 2 presents ILO estimates for informal employment 
and employment in the informal sector in Ecuador. Discrepancies in the 
inclusion of secondary and tertiary occupations, seasonality and inclusion 
of the agricultural sector, among many, affect the reliability of the calcula-
tions. See Appendix 3 for a detailed review of these diverging definitions 
and measurements for the Ecuadorian case.  
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Appendix 2 Estimates for informal employment and employment  
in the informal sector in Ecuador 
 
Official data on informality in Ecuador were obtained from labour force 
surveys. Although INEC calculations follow ILO recommendations 
(based on the 17th ICLS), figures for employment in the informal sector 
are slightly different. Only the ILO had released estimates on the share of 
informal employment as of 2013 (see Table A.2). 
 
Table A.2 
Employment in the informal sector and informal employment: Ecuador 
(2009) 
Ecuador (2009 IV Qtr.) 
Source 
Persons in informal employ-
ment 
Persons employed in 
the informal sector 
Persons in informal 
employment outside the 
informal sector 
   
Thousands 
% of 
non-agri-
cultural 
employ-
ment 
Thou-
sands 
% of 
non-agri-
cultural 
employ-
ment 
Thou-
sands 
% of 
non-agri-
cultural 
employ-
ment 
ILO/WIEGO 2,691 60.9 1,646 37.3 1,062 24.0 
INEC/SIISE n/a n/a 1,924 43.8 n/a n/a 
Note: Estimates for 2009 were chosen as it was the only year for which informality estimates 
are comparable across the three selected institutions. 
Source: Compiled by the author. Retrieved from:   
http://www.ilo.org/global/statistics-and-databases/WCMS_179795/lang--en/index.htm. 
http://www.siise.gob.ec/siiseweb/. 
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Appendix 3 Definitions, methods and actual measurements of informality in 
Ecuador 
 
The heterogeneity of views on the informal economy is mirrored in the 
variety of methods that are put forward to estimate the size and character-
istics of it. Informality is often defined at both the level of economic units 
and at the level of workers. Estimates emphasise the status of activities 
(registered or not), the size of economic units (mostly small scale) or work-
ers’ status in employment and access to social coverage. Most of the esti-
mates cover only urban areas and do not include the agricultural sector, 
which may provide only a partial perspective on the informal economy in 
the country.  
The informal sector in Ecuador: official definition 
The National Department of Statistics in Ecuador (INEC) defines infor-
mality using enterprise-based criteria, on account of their size and their 
registration status. Under this definition, all persons who work in small 
unregistered enterprises (both employers and employees), as well as self-
employed persons or those engaged in family business, are part of the in-
formal sector. More specifically, the informal sector is defined by INEC 
as comprising (1) all own-account enterprises (as defined in the 15th ICLS 
conference); (2) non-registered own-account enterprises; (3) enterprises 
owned/administrated by informal employers with fewer than 11 employ-
ees; (4) enterprises of informal employers which are not registered; (5) en-
terprises of informal employers whose employees are not registered; and 
(6) households with paid domestic employees—not part of domestic ser-
vice. 
Method 
The labour force survey of Ecuador, ENEMDU, uses a filtering approach 
to ask the conceptual questions aimed at identifying persons employed in 
the informal sector. It uses questions on status in employment and size of 
the establishment as filters for informality. Data on informal employment 
could also be obtained from this survey, but they are not estimated by 
INEC. The ILO uses the information gathered by ENEMDU surveys on 
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social protection coverage to characterise the qualitative aspects related to 
decent work conditions, as presented elsewhere.  
Measurement 
ENEMDU is based on a sample of 9,180 households in urban areas of 
Ecuador, with the exception of the Galapagos Islands. With quarterly pe-
riodicity of data collection in the months of March, June, September and 
December, it covers the usual residents present and the usual residents 
temporarily absent. The sub-annual survey results are not adjusted for sea-
sonal variations. The labour-related questions of the survey relate to the 
population 10 years old and over (and 5 years old and over for the child 
labour module). Table A.3 presents the estimates for employment in the 
informal sector that are comparable, that is, the surveys were conducted 
under the same methodological guidelines. Changes in labour force survey 
methods and coverage have affected the observed trends in informality, 
with an important break point after 2007 that makes time-series compari-
son a difficult task.  
Table A.3  
Employment in the informal sector: Ecuador (various years) 
Share of persons employed in the informal sector (above 10 years old) 
Area  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
National  50.29 50.77 51.13 52.53 52.37 
Rural  65.92 65.27 66.29 68.17 65.64 
Urban  42.08 43.64 43.41 44.63 45.83 
Note: Years 2007–11.       
Source: Compiled by the author. Retrieved from: http://www.siise.gob.ec/siiseweb/. 
 
Employment in the informal sector has also been measured by other or-
ganisations besides the ILO, compiling direct and/or indirect methods. 
For instance, ECLAC defines employment in the informal sector as the 
urban population employed in low-productivity sectors of the labour mar-
ket: enterprises employing up to five persons, domestic services or own-
account non-qualified workers. Other institutions deal with informality 
286 A Matter Of Choice?   
 
from other entry points. OECD uses self-employment as a proxy for in-
formal employment. The World Bank has attempted to measure the size 
of the informal economy by estimating the weight of informal activities in 
the gross national product (GNP), and using firm surveys to collect data 
from business owners and top managers. 
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Appendix 4 Field survey questionnaire 
 
Encuestas Socioeconómicas 
Hogares residentes en parroquias urbanas solamente 
Formulario Fase 1 
Proyecto: Protección Social e Informalidad en Ecuador 
 
A PARA USO DEL ENCUESTADOR SOLAMENTE 
1 ENCUESTADOR:  
2 CÓDIGO DE HOGAR 
3 RESUMEN: La encuesta fue efectiva en la vivienda? 
 1    Si 
 2    No 
4 NOMBRE DEL INFORMANTE 
5    RESULTADO DE LA ENTREVISTA  
 1 Completa 
 2 Rechazo 
 3 Nadie en casa 
 4 Vivienda desocupada 
 5 Dirección incorrecta 
 6 Otra 
 
B DATOS DEL HOGAR 
1 Zona 
2 Sector 
3 Localidad/barrio 
4 Calle principal 
5 Calle secundaria 
6 Nombre/número de casa 
7 Nro. Teléfono 
8 Nombre del (la) jefe(a) del hogar 
9 Relación de parentesco con el jefe/a de hogar 
10 Número de miembros del hogar  
 1 Menores 
 2 Adultos 
 
C INFORMACIÓN DEMOGRÁFICA (JEFE(A) DE HOGAR O CÓNYUGE) 
1 Sexo  
 1 Femenino 
 2 Masculino 
2 Edad (años cumplidos)  
288 A Matter Of Choice?   
 
3 Nacionalidad  
4 Ciudad de origen  
5 Provincia de origen  
6 Ciudad de residencia habitual  
7 Provincia de residencia habitual  
8 Estado Civil  
 1 Soltero 
 2 Casado 
 3 Unión libre 
 4 Viudo 
 5 Divorciado 
9 Cómo se identifica?  
 1 Indígena 
 2 Afro descendiente 
 3 Negro/a 
 4 Mulato/a 
 5 Montubio/a 
 6 Mestizo/a 
 7 Blanco/a 
 8 Otro/a 
10 Tiene alguna discapacidad permanente?  
 1 Si 
 2 No 
11 Sabe leer y escribir?  
 1 Si 
 2 No 
12 Cuál es el nivel de instrucción más alto que aprobó? 
 1 Ninguno 
 2 Centro de alfabetización 
 3 Educación básica 
 4 Bachillerato 
 5 Superior no universitaria 
 6 Superior universitaria 
 7 Postgrado 
13 Por los estudios realizados (…) obtuvo algún título de educación superior? 
1 Si 
2 No 
 
D CARACTERÍSTICAS OCUPACIONALES 
1 Qué hizo la semana pasada? 
 1 Trabajó al menos una hora 
 2 No trabajó 
2 Qué tipo de actividad (dentro o fuera de su casa) realizó para aportar al ingreso del hogar? 
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 1 Atender negocio propio 
 2 Fabricar algún producto 
 3 Hacer algo en casa por un ingreso 
 4 Brindar algún servicio 
 5 Ayudar en algún negocio familiar 
 6 Ayudar en el trabajo de algún familiar 
 7 Como aprendiz remunerado en dinero o en especie 
 8 Labores agrícolas o cuidado de animales 
 9 Estudiante que realizó algún trabajo 
 10 Trabajar para otra familia 
 11 Otra actividad por un ingreso 
 12 No realizó ninguna actividad 
3 Por qué razón no trabajó la semana pasada?  
 1 Vacaciones o días feriados 
 2 Enfermedad o accidente 
 3 Huelga o paro 
 4 Licencia con sueldo 
 5 Licencia sin sueldo 
 6 Suspensión temporal de trabajo 
 7 Otro 
4 Aunque no haya trabajado la semana pasada, tiene algún trabajo o negocio al cual seguro 
va a volver? 
1 Si 
2 No 
 
E CONDICIONES LABORALES (SOLO PARA PERSONAS QUE ACTUALMENTE TRABAJAN) 
1 Cuántos trabajos tuvo en la semana pasada?  
 1 Uno 
 2 Más de uno 
2 Cuántas horas (en todos sus trabajos) trabajó la semana pasada o la última semana que 
trabajó? 
 1 Menos de 40 horas 
 2 40 horas o más 
3 Por qué razón trabajó menos de 40 horas?  
    1 Porque su trabajo así lo exige 
    2 No pudo conseguir trabajo en otra parte 
    3 No pudo conseguir más trabajo 
    4 Reducción de las actividades económicas) 
    5 Por falta de materia prima 
    6 Motivos de salud, personales o familiares 
    7 Por estudios 
    8 Vacaciones o días feriados, huelga o paro 
    9 No desea o no necesita trabajar más horas 
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4 Está disponible para trabajar horas adicionales a la semana?  
 1 Si 
 2 No 
5 Cuántas horas adicionales a la semana estaría disponible para trabajar  
 Número (por semana) 
6 Por qué razón trabajó la semana pasada 40 horas o más? 
 1 Horario normal  
 2 Horas extras 
 3 Exceso de trabajo o clientes 
 4 Horas necesarias para obtener un ingreso suficiente 
 5 Otro 
7 Tomando en cuenta el número de horas trabajadas la semana pasada, desearía… 
  
 1 Trabajar más horas en su trabajo(s) actual(es) 
 2 Trabajar más horas en otro trabajo adicional  
 3 Cambiar el (los) trabajo(s) actual(es) por otro trabajo con más horas  
 4 No desea trabajar más horas  
8 En la situación laboral actual, usted 
 1 Logra ahorrar dinero 
 2 Se ve obligado a gastar sus ahorros 
 3 Apenas logra equilibrar sus ingresos y gastos 
 4 Se ve obligado a endeudarse 
 5 Ninguna de las anteriores 
9 En los últimos tres meses ha realizado alguna gestión para cambiar de trabajo, tal como:
  
 1 Buscar más trabajo 
 2 Registro en agencia de empleo pública o privada 
  2.a. Si ha aplicado a Socio Empleo, marque 
 3 Presentar solicitud a otros empleadores 
 4 Pedir ayuda a amigos o familiares 
 5 Buscar terreno, edificio, maquinaria o equipo a fin de mejorar o crear su propia em-
presa 
 6 Conseguir recursos financieros adicionales 
  6.a. Si ha aplicado a un CDH, marque (_) 
 7 No ha realizado ninguna gestión  
10 Cuál es la razón por la que busca cambiar la situación actual de su trabajo?  
 1 Porque no trabaja jornada completa 
 2 Inseguridad en su trabajo 
 3 Desea ejercer su profesión 
 4 Los ingresos no son suficientes 
 5 Por otras causas 
 
F SOLO PARA PERSONAS SIN TRABAJO 
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1 Trabajó anteriormente?  
 1 Si 
 2 No 
2 Cuándo fue la última vez que realizó algún trabajo remunerado? 
 1 Hace un mes 
 2 Hace tres meses 
 3 Hace un año 
 4 Hace más de un año 
 5 Nunca 
 6 No sabe 
3 Por qué motivos se encuentra sin trabajo?  
 1 Liquidación de la empresa 
 2 Despido intempestivo 
 3 Renuncia voluntaria 
 4 Supresión de partidas del sector público 
 5 Terminación de contrato 
 6 Le fue mal en el negocio 
 7 Se terminó la temporada de trabajo 
 8 Se jubiló 
 9 Razones familiares 
 10 Otro 
4 Ha buscado trabajo en el último mes?  
 1 Si 
 2 No 
5 Qué tipo de gestión ha realizado en el último mes (o más) para buscar trabajo:  
 1 Salir a sitios de reclutación de personal (Ej. Plaza central) 
 2 Registro en agencia de empleo pública o privada 
  2.a. 
 3 Presentar solicitud a empleadores 
 4 Pedir ayuda a amigos o familiares 
 5 Buscar terreno, edificio, maquinaria o equipo a fin de mejorar o crear su propia em-
presa 
 6 Conseguir recursos financieros adicionales para iniciar su propio negocio 
  6.a. 
 7 No ha realizado ninguna gestión 
6 Usted está buscando trabajar como  
 1 Trabajador asalariado o en relación de dependencia 
 2 Trabajador independiente 
 3 En lo que salga 
7 Por qué razón no buscó trabajo?  
 1 Tiene un trabajo esporádico u ocasional 
 2 Tiene un trabajo por empezar 
 3 Espera respuesta a una gestión para empresa o negocio propio 
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 4 Espera respuesta de un empleador 
 5 Espera cosecha o temporada de trabajo 
 6 Piensa que no le darán trabajo o se cansó de buscar 
 7 No cree poder encontrar 
 8 No tiene necesidad o deseos de trabajar 
 9 No tiene tiempo 
 10 Su conyugue o su familia no le permiten 
 11 Está enfermo/incapacitado 
 12 No está en edad de trabajar 
 
G MÓDULO ACTIVIDAD ECONÓMICA (PARA TODAS LAS PERSONAS) 
1 A que se dedica principalmente la empresa o negocio donde trabaja(ba)?  
2 En esta ocupación es (o era):  
 1 Empleado/obrero de gobierno/estado 
 2 Empleado/obrero privado 
 3 Empleado/obrero tercerizado 
 4 Jornalero o peón 
 5 Patrono 
 6 Cuenta propia 
 7 Trabajador del hogar no remunerado 
 8 Trabajador no remunerado en otro hogar 
 9 Empleado doméstico 
 10 Ayudante no remunerado de asalariado/jornalero 
3  Cuántos tiempo trabaja (o ha trabajado) como ….?  
 1 Número de años 
 2 Número de meses 
4 En cuál de los siguientes sitios o lugares trabaja(ba)?  
 1 Local de una empresa o del patrono 
 2 Una obra en construcción 
 3 Se desplaza 
 4 Al descubierto en la calle 
 5 Kiosco en la calle 
 6 Local propio o arrendado 
 7 Vivienda distinta a la suya 
 8 Su vivienda 
 9 Su finca o terreno 
 10 Finca o terreno ajeno 
5  El establecimiento o lugar donde trabaja lleva  
 1 Registros contables 
 2 No lleva registros 
 3 No sabe 
6 El establecimiento o lugar donde trabaja(ba) tiene RUC?  
 1 Si 
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 2 No 
 3 No sabe 
7 Cuántas personas trabajan(ban) usualmente en la empresa o negocio? 
 1 Menos de 10 
 2 Más de 10 y menos de 19 
 3 Más de 20 y menos de 49 
 4 Más de 50 y menos de 100 
 5 Más de 100 
8 Conoce cuántas de las personas que trabajan en su empresa son (eran): 
 1 Patronos  
 2 Trabajadores asalariados  
 3 Trabajadores por cuenta propia 
 4 Trabajadores familiares no remunerados  
9 Aproximadamente, sus ingresos laborales semanales alcanzan(ban)  
 1 Menos de $5 
 2 Más de $5 y menos de $15 
 3 Más de $15 y menos de $100 
 4 Más de $100 
 
H SEGURIDAD SOCIAL Y GARANTÍAS DE LEY (SOLO PARA PERSONAS QUE TRABAJAN 
ACTUALMENTE) 
1 El trabajo que tiene es  
 1 Con nombramiento 
 2 Con contrato permanente/indefinido/de planta 
 3 Con contrato temporal/ocasional o eventual 
 4 Por obra (a destajo) 
 5 Por horas 
 6 Por jornal 
2 Percibe usted AL MENOS  el salario básico unificado (ingreso mínimo de $318)? 
 1 Si 
 2 No 
3 Participa usted en el reparto de utilidades de la empresa? 
 1 Si 
 2 No 
4 Recibe por parte de su patrono o empleador 
 1 Alimentación 
 2 Vivienda 
 3 Transporte 
 4 Vacaciones 
 5 Ropa de trabajo 
 6 Seguro social 
 7 Seguro médico 
 8 Guardería 
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 9 Capacitación 
 10 13er. sueldo 
 11 14to. sueldo 
 12 Pago de horas extra y/o suplementarias 
5 En caso de ausencia de su trabajo por enfermedad, continúa percibiendo remuneración o 
recibiendo prestaciones del IESS? 
 1 Si 
 2 No 
6 En caso de incapacidad para trabajar por embarazo o parto, tiene usted licencia por ma-
ternidad? 
    1 Si 
 2 No 
 3 No aplica 
7 Tiene derecho a licencia por paternidad?  
 1 Si 
 2 No 
 3 No aplica 
8 En caso de despido intempestivo, recibiría usted indemnización? 
    1 Si 
    2 No 
 3 No sabe 
9 Está afiliado o cubierto por  
 1 IESS, seguro general 
 2 IESS, seguro voluntario 
  2.a. Si ha afiliado a su conyugue, marque (_) 
 3 Seguro campesino 
 4 Seguro del ISSFA o ISSPOL 
 5 Seguro de salud privado 
 6 Seguros municipales y de consejos provinciales 
 7 Seguro MSP 
 8 Ninguno 
 
I OCUPACIÓN SECUNDARIA (PARA QUIÉN INDICÓ TENER MÁS DE UN TRABAJO EN LA SECCIÓN 
E) 
1 A que se dedica principalmente la empresa o negocio donde trabaja(ba)?  
2 En relación a ocupación, qué labores realiza?  
3 En esta ocupación es (o era):  
 1 Empleado/obrero de gobierno/estado 
 2 Empleado/obrero privado 
 3 Empleado/obrero tercerizado 
 4 Jornalero o peón 
 5 Patrono 
 6 Cuenta propia 
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 7 Trabajador del hogar no remunerado 
 8 Trabajador no remunerado en otro hogar 
 9 Empleado doméstico 
 10 Ayudante no remunerado de asalariado/jornalero 
4  Cuántos tiempo trabaja (o ha trabajado) como ….?  
 1 Número de años 
 2 Número de meses 
5 En cuál de los siguientes sitios o lugares trabaja(ba)?  
 1 Local de una empresa o del patrono 
 2 Una obra en construcción 
 3 Se desplaza 
 4 Al descubierto en la calle 
 5 Kiosco en la calle 
 6 Local propio o arrendado 
 7 Vivienda distinta a la suya 
 8 Su vivienda 
 9 Su finca o terreno 
 10 Finca o terreno ajeno 
6  El establecimiento o lugar donde trabaja lleva 
 1 Registros contables 
 2 No lleva registros 
 3 No sabe 
7 El establecimiento o lugar donde trabaja(BA) tiene RUC 
 1 Si 
 2 No 
 3 No sabe 
8 Cuántas personas trabajan(ban) usualmente en la empresa o negocio 
 1 Menos de 10 
 2 Más de 10 y menos de 19 
 3 Más de 20 y menos de 49 
 4 Más de 50 y menos de 100 
 5 Más de 100 
9 Conoce cuántas de las personas que trabajan en su empresa son (eran): 
 1 Patronos 
 2 Trabajadores asalariados 
 3 Trabajadores por cuenta propia 
 4 Trabajadores familiares no remunerados 
10 Aproximadamente, sus ingresos laborales semanales alcanzan(ban)  
 1 Menos de $5 
 2 Más de $5 y menos de $15 
 3 Más de $15 y menos de $100 
 4 Más de $100 
11 El trabajo que tiene es  
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 1 Con nombramiento 
 2 Con contrato permanente/indefinido/de planta 
 3 Con contrato temporal/ocasional o eventual 
 4 Por obra (a destajo) 
 5 Por horas 
 6 Por jornal 
12 Percibe usted AL MENOS  el salario básico unificado (ingreso mínimo de $318)? 
 1 Si 
 2 No 
13 Participa usted en el reparto de utilidades de la empresa?  
 1 Si 
 2 No 
14 Recibe por parte de su patrono o empleador  
 1 Alimentación 
 2 Vivienda 
 3 Transporte 
 4 Vacaciones 
 5 Ropa de trabajo 
 6 Seguro social 
 7 Seguro médico 
 8 Guardería 
 9 Capacitación 
 10 13er. sueldo 
 11 14to. sueldo 
 12 Pago de horas extra y/o suplementarias 
15 En caso de ausencia de su trabajo por enfermedad, continúa percibiendo remuneración o 
recibiendo prestaciones del IESS? 
 1 Si 
 2 No 
16 En caso de incapacidad para trabajar por embarazo o parto, tiene usted licencia por ma-
ternidad? 
    1 Si 
 2 No 
 3 No aplica 
17 Tiene derecho a licencia por paternidad?  
 1 Si 
 2 No 
 3 No aplica 
18 En caso de despido intempestivo, recibiría usted indemnización? 
    1 Si 
    2 No 
 3 No sabe 
19 Está afiliado o cubierto por  
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 1 IESS, seguro general 
 2 IESS, seguro voluntario 
  2.a. 
 3 Seguro campesino 
 4 Seguro del ISSFA o ISSPOL 
 5 Seguro de salud privado 
 6 Seguros municipales y de consejos provinciales 
 7 Seguro MSP 
 8 Ninguno 
 
J SATISFACCIÓN LABORAL (PARA TODAS LAS PERSONAS QUE TRABAJEN ACTUALMENTE) 
1 Cómo se siente en su trabajo?  
 1 Contento 
 2 Poco contento 
 3 Descontento pero conforme 
 4 Totalmente descontento 
2 El motivo del descontento es…  
 1 Ingresos bajos 
 2 Por muchas horas de trabajo 
 3 Por horarios de trabajo inconvenientes 
 4 Por no tener estabilidad laboral 
 5 Por trabajar en un ambiente perjudicial 
 6 Por trabajar en la calle 
 7 Por trabajar con herramientas o maquinarias de alto riesgo 
 8 Por las tareas que realiza 
 9 Por las pocas posibilidades de progresar 
 10 Otras 
 
K PROTECCIÓN  SOCIAL 
1 En el último mes, recibió transferencias del BDH?  
 1 Si 
 2 No 
2 Desde hace cuánto tiempo percibe el BDH?  
 1 Número de años 
 2 Número de meses 
3 Quién recibe el BDH en su hogar?  
 1 Detalle 
 2 Relación/parentesco con el informante 
   
4 Quién administra el dinero de BDH?  
 1 Detalle 
 2 Relación/parentesco con el informante 
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5 El BDH sirve para cubrir gastos de... (priorizar)  
 1 Alimentación 
 2 Educación 
 3 Salud 
 4 Pagar deudas 
 5 Ahorro 
 6 Otros 
6 Conoce como funciona el BDH?  
 1 Si 
 2 No 
7 Alguien ha verificado su cumplimiento de las corresponsabilidades de BDH? 
 (Ej.: certificados salud/educación)   
 1 Si  
 2 No  
8 Cree usted que seguirá recibiendo BDH en el futuro?   
 1 Si  
 2 No  
 3 No sabe  
9 Cómo cambió su situación laboral desde que empezó a percibir el BDH?   
 1 Cambió de trabajo  
 2 Pudo trabajar menos horas  
 3 Tuvo que trabajar más horas  
 4 Perdió su trabajo  
 5 Renunció a su trabajo  
 6 No ha cambiado  
10 Cuál es (o era) la principal fuente de ingresos   
 a Antes del BDH  
  1 Trabajo 
  2 Transferencias del Estado 
  3 Pensiones/jubilación 
  4 Ayuda de familiares y/o ONG 
  5 Alquileres de tierras/departamentos 
 b Ahora (que recibe el BDH)  
  1 Trabajo 
  2 Transferencias del Estado 
  3 Pensiones/jubilación 
  4 Ayuda de familiares y/o ONG 
  5 Alquileres de tierras/departamentos 
L ACCESO A FINANCIAMIENTO: CRÉDITO DE DESARROLLO HUMANO 
1 Ha aplicado para el Crédito de Desarrollo Humano (CDH)?  
 1 Si 
 2 No 
2 Obtuvo el Crédito de Desarrollo Humano?  
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 1 Si 
 2 No 
3 Cuál fue el monto solicitado  
 $  
4 Necesitó complementar el crédito CDH con otros rubros, como:  
 1 Ahorros 
 2 Crédito institución privada 
 3 Crédito particulares (chulco) 
 4 No, fue suficiente 
5 Aplicó al CDH en su modalidad asociativa (Ej.: con su comunidad)?  
 1 Si 
 2 No 
6 En qué usa (o usó) principalmente el CDH?  
 1 Negocio 
 2 Pago de deudas 
 3 Alimentos 
 4 Estudios 
 5 Viajes 
 6 Electrodomésticos y muebles 
 7 Vehículos 
 8 Enfermedad 
 9 Compra, construcción o remodelación de vivienda/terreno 
 10 Otros 
7 Si usó el crédito para empezar un nuevo negocio, diría que el ingreso de su hogar a: 
 1 Mejorado 
 2 Da igual 
 3 Empeorado 
8 Cuál es la principal actividad a la que se dedica en su negocio?  
   
9 En su nuevo negocio, cuántas personas emplea:  
 1 Menos de 10 
 2 De 10 a 19 
 3 De 20 a 49 
 4 De 50 a 99 
 5 más de 100 
10 Cuántas de las personas que trabajan en su nueva empresa son:  
 1 Patronos 
 2 Trabajadores asalariados 
 3 Trabajadores por cuenta propia 
 4 Trabajadores familiares no remunerados 
 
  
300 A Matter Of Choice?   
 
Appendix 5 In-depth interviews: question guide 
 
[For working-age BDH recipients]  
What are the main problems that workers face when trying to find and/or secure a job? Have 
they changed over time? 
How has the labour market changed in recent years? How has [this change] affected you? 
Has BDH influenced the number and types of jobs available? How and why? 
Has BDH compensated for the lack of employment opportunities? If so, how? 
Do you think that the BDH programme will continue? Why and for how long? 
If the BDH programme would come to an end, how would this affect your household’s eco-
nomic situation? 
Would you prefer to be affiliated to social security (e.g. IESS) instead of receiving BDH trans-
fers? If so, why? 
Do you know your rights as employee (e.g. it is your employer’s obligation to contribute to 
IESS)? Who informed you? 
Do you know that you could contribute to the social security system on a voluntary basis (afil-
iación voluntaria)? Would you do it? Why?   
 
[For working-age CDH credit recipients]  
Why did you apply for a CDH credit?  
Do you think that CDH credit is a better option than monthly BDH transfers? If so, why? 
How has your economic situation changed after CDH credit? 
In your household, who decides on how to use the CDH loan?  
Did you use the CDH loan to start your own business? How is business going? 
Has the loan compensated for the lack of BDH monthly transfers? 
Has your business benefited your (and/or your household’s) employment situation? How? 
 
Note: Question guide drafted following FAO and UNICEF, as available at Oxford Policy 
Management (2012). 
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